Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  Okay, that was 1971. Now it is 2018, 47-years later. The Indian Army now focuses on the offensive. Indeed, Cold Start requires we initiate an all-out offensive in the plains before Pakistan even mobilizes. No more defensive-offensive, no more handing the initiative to the adversary, no sitting around waiting for him to show his hand with his strike force before we show ours. Thanks to rigorous exercises, our strike corps commanders now handle their formation confidently for multi-day, continuous advances (I, II, XXI). Further, even our regular corps (IX, XI, X, XII) are to go on the offensive from the start of war. To remind, the strike corps each have an armored, RAPID, and plain vanilla infantry division; our ordinary corps are infantry; in two cases (X, XII) they have a RAPID (X has two); and in two cases (XI, XII) also have a mechanized brigade. The theory is nice, but what about the reality? Tuthfully, I cannot say. In battle, sometimes troops perform unimaginably brave feats, and sometimes they funk out. Some commanders are all dash and push, other are tremulous. Sometimes the civil leadership orders an offensive (East Pakistan 1971, Punjab, 1965), sometimes it chickens out (Haji Pir Pass 1965, Western front 1971, Kargil 1999). The minute your tanks and IFVs start getting whacked, plans fail. IFV/APC crews bail, and it doesn’t matter if the tanks go charging along, they must match pace with the now dismounted infantry. Maybe a tank regiment OC speeds up his advance when encountering serious opposition, maybe his squadrons go to ground. In short, you cannot tell in advance what will happen.

  So how did they manage advances back in the day? Simple. Wars were long. Inept soldiers got killed off in their first 20-days, inept commanders were replaced. When the advance resumed, it was now composed of battle conditioned experienced men and officers, who generally realized that the only safety lay in speed, and that stopping severely reduced your life expectancy. The Russians had a great system. They had so many divisions that they attacked on multiple axes over a wide front, operating in waves – for example, three armored divisions following one behind the other – and always had massive reserves. The reserves were committed to the axes that penetrated the most, not – as in our case – sent to reinforce the formations that had failed. It didn’t end there. If your army was failing but your adjacent army was succeeding, the front commander took away your army reserves, followed by your division reserves, artillery, and engineers, and throw them into the axis that was succeeding, leaving your army naked on the battlefield. But wasn’t this dangerous? What if the enemy counterattacked? The point was that the enemy, overwhelmed by the formations that were succeeding, and the non-stop offensives that gave him no time to reorganized, was in no position to counterattack. The enemy was busy pulling back to his next defensive line. Of course, the Soviets had other clever refinements like shooting retreating soldiers and executing generals who fell back, creating a situation where you either came back on your shield, or surrendered to the enemy. Even this last didn’t help: when POWs were returned, the Soviets shot them too. Parenthetically, this is one reason I have never been impressed by the very heavy Soviet losses when they talk of their World War II sacrifice. To begin with, in dire situations they would sweep up peasants, give them two weeks training, and send them off to the front. There was minimal medical care, and sparse rations. Large numbers died because of the lack ofvbasic skills. Then the system of don’t bother coming back unless you succeed also must have contributed to the unimaginable losses. If you’re going to treat your men worse than cattle, don’t boast of your fantastic losses.

  In India’s case, on the current count, 29 armored and mechanized brigades cover a front Jammu-Kutch, ~1200-km straight line, or one brigade per 40-km. This will leave big gaps in the front because formations will be bunched up. Akhnur-Pathankot, for example, will have six tank brigades in 120-km if an armored division is sent to reinforce IX Corps. And it must be because Pakistan opposes with nine. X Corps backed by I Corps will have 8 armored brigades for ~200-km. Etc. I’ve already shown that Pakistan can meet Cold Start without committing its two strike corps, so what happens if it attacks through gaps. Is GOI going to say “steady as she goes, maintain your course” to the strike force formations or will it start screaming “not one meter of ground shall be conceded”? Several times in this analysis I’ve said we must have reserves and we must have mass. We have neither. How all this plays out cannot be predicted.

  Poonch 1971

  Now let’s shift to Poonch, Pakistan’s offensive on December 3-7. On the face of it, Pakistan did everything right; yet it failed. Why? Because of the India-Pakistan habit of attacking without a second and a third wave. The first wave is our best and only effort. That makes impossible the exploitation of initial gains.

  Pakistan used its 2nd Azad Kashmir Brigade and 26th Infantry Brigade from its 12th Division against India’s Poonch defense, which was manned by our 93rd Brigade of 25th Division. Looking at the situation from Pakistan’s side, it was attacking from the southern side of the Poonch-Uri bulge, and aiming to reach the Poonch River and handing India a major defeat by taking the town. India had 1/ 4 GR, 6 Sikh, and 11 J&K defending the border, and 3 J&K in depth behind 11 J&K. Later, 13 Mahar from 33rd Brigade (ex 14th Division) was sent. Pakistan had 7, 9, 26, and 28 Azad Kashmir Regiment; and 7 FF, and 51 Punjab. This last was the division reserve. It is no use trying to assign battalions to Pakistani brigades because on both sides battalions had been picked up from other brigades and thrown together. In Pakistan’s case it was because though 12th Division had eight brigades (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 AK Brigades, 26 Brigade) – an absurd span of control - before 23rd Division was activated in July 1971 (4 and 7AK, 20, 66 (ex-17 Div), and 111 Independent Brigade), Pakistan thinned out 12th Division sectors to assemble the six battalions for the Poonch sector. In peacetime, only 26th Brigade was at Kahuta. History books from Pakistan are impossible to get on line as booksellers refuse to ship overseas even when offered extra money to cover the expenses. Dr. Hamid Hussain kindly lent six books, Babur Mahmood sent some orbats he complied, but otherwise, I have been unable to compile a complete battalion orbat of forces in West Pakistan.

  With six battalions against India’s three, Pakistan followed the rule about concentrating superiority of force. Moreover, on the axis of maximum effort, it put three battalions (5FF, 7 AK, 51 Punjab) against 6 Sikh which held the center, 28 AK against 1 /4 GR on India’s left, and 9 and 26 AK against India’s 11 J&K Rifles on the right. The division commander had studied and practiced Chinese infiltration tactics. As a result, both 11 J&K and 3 J&K were successfully bypassed despite putting up a fight, and Pakistan reached near the Poonch River, threatening to capture the bridge which was the only link with the rest of 25th Division. Yet within 48-hours, GOC Pakistan 12th Division realized he had lost the battle and ordered his troops to withdraw. So, what went wrong?

  (a) 6 Sikh anticipated Pakistan’s move because the latter spent perhaps six weeks building a road between Kahuta and the Indian outposts. The Sikhs built fortified back-up positions behind their main positions. And India also built a road to 6 Sikhs position, to bring up supplies and evacuate casualties. (b) The official map omits 8 Jat, which was backing up the Sikhs, 13 Mahar (from 33rd Brigade), and another battalion or two that moved along the Surankote-Poonch road to stop any further advance toward the Poonch River bridge. This meant 7 or 8 battalions against Pakistan’s six. (c) When the three Pakistan battalions infiltrated through 6 Sikh’s position, it first put up a staunch fight, then withdrew to its second-line, from where it refused to budge. Pakistan quickly ran out of ammunition and had no good arrangement to keep supplies moving to the advancing columns. Conversely, well-placed Indian artillery cost the attackers many men. 7 AK lost 174 killed, 5 FF lost 74, and 51 Punjab lost 61. To this 309, add the likely 600 wounded, and it possible the three battalions lost 50% of their fighting strength within 72-hours. Mountain defenses are very difficult to overrun at the best of times. To the south of Indian 93rd Brigade, 14 Grenadiers was tasked to overrun a 2-platoon Pakistan strong-point that dominated several other aro
und, with five companies, at Daruchhian. The Grenadiers attacked from three directions but failed. In such situations, a second and a third wave must immediately follow. India, however, lacked follow on troops, just as Pakistan did at Punch.

  As a lesson for India, let us step back and look at Pakistan’s over all position in March 1971, before the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan. India had 25 divisions, of which eleven were against China and 14 against Pakistan. Pakistan had only 11 divisions, one in the East and the rest against India. Pakistan’s problem was that India could move several mountain divisions against Pakistan, as the Chinese infrastructure for reinforcing Tibet was minimal, and move them back in 6-8 weeks in case China attacked. In that time India could cause considerable damage to Pakistan. In May 1971, Pakistan sent two of its reserve divisions, 9th, and 16th, to East Pakistan, and replaced them with the new 17th and 33rd Divisions. Because it had many extra brigades, for better command and control it also raised 18th Division for the desert and 23rd for the Jammu sector, shortening 12th Division’s absurd span of control which extended to perhaps 8 brigades. For the December war, India left five divisions on the northern border against China. It had eight against East Pakistan, and 12 against Pakistan. Of Pakistan new total of 15 divisions, three were in the East, and 12 against India. We’ll ignore details such as Pakistan’s Kashmir division was double-strength, and India had an ad hoc division in the south Punjab/north Rajasthan.

  Right from the start, the Pakistani position in the East was hopeless. Indeed, its plan from 1947 itself was that if India attacked the East, Pakistan would retaliate in the West. Could Pakistan have defended the East? Yes, with a two-division reserve, all five divisions having a full artillery and armor component. 9th and 16th Divisions left their artillery behind, and there was little armor. Given India’s air supremacy, it can be argued India would have defeated even five divisions. This is debatable; in any case, Pakistan could have held on for another 4-6 weeks. Given that from the start the UN was against India, and India was extremely sensitive to world opinion, it is likely India would have terminated operations.

  In the West, while Pakistan had sufficient force to protect itself, there was no question of launching a successful attack against India to offset the latter’s offensive in the East.For that it required at least two more divisions. Indeed, Pakistan put 35th and 37th Divisions under raising in November 1971, but it was too late. I won’t go into the details of how Pakistan could have raised four divisions in 1971, besides HQ 18th and 23rd Divisions, as this would take us too far astray, but it could have done so with Chinese help, which in any case was received for the six new divisions raised in 1971-72.

  The point is that restricting yourself to an absolute minimum number of divisions, as India has done against Pakistan to this day (except for the post-1962 buildup), means reducing your options to the point all are bad. Using superior skill to offset inferior numbers, as the Germans did with the Soviets, cannot work with armies like India and Pakistan, who are roughly equal in operational skill. Given that chance, luck, unforeseen circumstances play a major role in war, extra divisions are needed, and India can quite easily afford them. I have calculated 54 divisions and not 38 are required at this time. India, however, has another big problem: the lack of self-confidence against an increasingly powerful China. For that, as mentioned, we need 72 divisions in 24 corps, divided equally between Pakistan and China fronts. Militarily it is overkill. Psychologically it is necessary to fight an offensive war. Instead of 54, let alone 72 divisions, the GOI has reduced defense spending to 1.56% of GDP in 2018-2019, down from the already highly dangerous 1.65% of 2017-2018, preceded by the continuous fall since 1989 from 3.5%. The current fiscal year's allocation suffices only for 18 divisions, 18 fighter squadrons, and perhaps 36 blue-water ships/submarines.

  Can the GOI really be that stupid as to run down defense to well below danger point? This is a great mystery. This is the fourth budget the current government has presented. It has already started making excuses for sorting the military in its fifth budget. At some point, continuing reductions become less and less likely to be dismissed as anomalies, and increasingly likely to be a deliberate policy. This was the case for 15 of Nehru’s seventeen years of rule. Then we had 36 years of minimally acceptable budgets. Starting 2000, we have had right-wing governments sworn to strong defense for eight years and left-leaning government not entirely convinced of the need for strong defense, at a time China, has steadily risen to become the second leading power in the world. I am starting to think that GOI, regardless of which party is ruling, is so intimidated by China that we have decided we cannot compete with it. Our strategy can be besat described as “Lie back and thin of England in winter.” Since 1000 AD, historically, we have been most excellent at doing this. If considered in this framework, the 40 years, roughly 1960-2000, are an aberration and we have simply reverted to type.

  A summary of sector balances

  The word “sector” is loosely used in India to mean different things. The technical definition of a sector is an administrative HQ that has a flexible number of units assigned. For example, 36 Sector in Himachal Pradesh has been around since before the 1962 War. Its existence began with armed police, then an infantry battalion from a plains division was assigned on a contingency basis. The post 1962 buildup saw the rebuilt 4th Division, now converted to mountain configuration, one brigade on the China border, one in immediate reserve, one in deep reserve. In 1970, the division was withdrawn and moved to Allahabad because of the diminution of the assessed threat. 51st Parachute Brigade arrived to take over but was withdrawn to Foxtrot (Fazilka) Sector as part of an ad hoc division in preparation for the 1971 War. [The other units in Foxtrot Sector were 163rd Infantry Brigade, the Leh-based reserve for 3rd Infantry Division that protected Eastern Ladakh, three engineer regiments, and an ad armored brigade named Mike Force, which later formalized as 6th Independent Armored Brigade after the war.] For about 40-years, until perhaps 2015, 36 Sector consisted of one regular infantry battalion, one Scouts battalion, and a heavy mortar battery of 12 x 120mm tubes. At some point, the battery was renamed “regiment” with no increase in tubes. It was only in 2008, when a new buildup against China began, that division was nominally authorized, and a strong independent brigade raised which I am not at liberty to discuss. It does, however, have an offensive role as opposed to the defensive role of past units/formations. With the GOI having gone wobbly on new raisings for the China front, there is no telling when the division will form. I have a request. Please understand that I am not Mandeep Singh Bajwa. He seems to know when every single Indian Army brigade was raised and where it is. So, if it turns out that 51st Parachute Brigade was sent to 36 Sector before 1970, kindly confine yourself to a polite note. I can tell you from memory where every single US divisionwas in 1960, 1970, 1980 and so on. I came to India only in 1970.

  Meanwhile, the word “sector” can also refer casually to a front covering a state. So someone will say “Rajasthan sector”; others will refer to “Barmer sector” or “Jaisalmer sector”, both of which have army divisions and are in Rajasthan state. In this part of the analysis, “sector” normally means a corps front.

  The dangerous part of the situation is that India has not a single division in general reserve. If you put XXI or XVII Corps into reserve, you are reducing the number of formations allocated to a theatre. Incidentally, while there is no precise definition of “theatre” equating it would a Command is acceptable. Thus, for example, Northern, Western, Southwestern, Southern, Central, and Eastern Commands. Of these, Eastern is by far the biggest, with 11 assigned divisions. It is folly of the highest order to fight a major war without substantial reserves. But the Indians are famous for their one-short-of-a-six-pack way of thinking, which sometimes get so absurd that we become seven-short-of-six-pack. These days we are in this second type of phase, which means we are not making any sense at all.