Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018
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54th Armored Brigade (High Plateau Cavalry) (Lhasa City, Duilongdeqing County), Unit-77625; an Artillery Regiment; a mechanized infantry First Battalion; mechanized infantry 2nd Battalion; a mechanized infantry 3rd battalion; Tank Battalion; Chemical Warfare Battalion.
Border Defense Regiment of the Military Sub-District under Tibet Military District (also the Independent Battalion：
Luoza County 5th Independent Battalion (Shannan City, Luoza County): China-Bhutan Border.
3rd Border Defense Regiment (Shigatse City, Tingri County) Unit-77639: China-India and China Nepal Border.
5th Border Defense Regiment (Shigatse City, Saga County) Unit 77646：China -Nepal Border.
6th Border Defense Regiment (Shigatse City, Yadong County) Unit-77649：China-India and China Bhutan Border. (Nathula outpost is the 1st outpost of South West, Zhangniangshe Outpost of the 6th Border Defense Regiment is the Yunzhong outpost).
Gyantse 1st Independent Battalion (Shigatse City, Gyantse County) Unit -77655：China-India and China-Bhutan Border.
Gangba 2nd Independent Battalion (Shigatse City, Gangba County) Unit-77656：China-India Border. (Chaguola Outpost is the High Plateau Red Border Defense Troops).
4th Border Defense Regiment (Chayu, Linzhi), Unit-77643：China-India Border.
Medog County 3rd Independent Battalion (Beibeng village, Linzhi City, Medog County);
Medog Garrison, Mofan Battalion，Unit-77659：China-India Border;
Milin 4th Independent Battalion (Nanyi Township, Linzhi City, Milin County): China-India Border.
6th Border Defense Regiment (Shigatse City, Yadong County) Unit-7764：China-India and China-Bhutan Border. (Nathula outpost is the 1st outpost of South West, Zhangniangshe Outpost of the 6th
It may be noted that Prasun Sengupta gives a different border orbat: 9,10, 11, and 12 Border Defense Regiments, in the Military Sub-Districts of Shannan, Shigatse, and Nyingchi. [232] Using this as a template, it is possible that four regiments face Northeast India, one faces Nepal, and one is in the Middle Sector, also called the Central Sector, of Uttarkhand and Himachal. Ladakh falls under the Xinjiang region, and to the best of my knowledge has two regiments. Prasun also notes there are two underground storage bases for P-20 surface-to-surface missiles, 200-kg warhead and 70-270 km range, (Haft-9 in Pakistan) targeted at Ladakh and Uttarkhand.
Note: Readers are pressed to appreciate that these are approximations, but reasonable ones. For India, reliance is placed on the official unpublished 1962 history; for China on China’s history of the war, which understates forces by omitting formations not directly engaged in the fighting plus information given by the CIA to India. See Tibet political map below.[233]
Now it is the other way around: India has 13 divisions plus at least 10 brigades in the north, or the equivalent of 16 divisions, versus China’s 4 regular and one reservist brigade. We also have perhaps 100 border defense battalions from the ITBP and Assam Rifles. The Army’s other strengths are that is composed entirely of long-service professionals and a burning desire to avenge the ignominious 1962 defeat. Like China, India has a high percentage of obsolescent equipment, but it is kept in good order. Due to the usual attitude of ‘tomorrow let’s worry about tomorrow’, our logistics capacity is a fraction of China’s, but India makes up for it by forward stocking. There is a real concern about ammunition war stocks. In many critical categories, instead of the required 45-days, it is a few days. [234] Though the Government of India has very recently permitted theatre commanders to make up shortfalls on their own authority instead of going through the immensely complicated and snail’s pace MOD bureaucracy, it is difficult to take this seriously. Tens of billions of dollars are needed to bring stocks to 21-days, forget 45-days. For example, in 2011 Israeli 125mm APDS tank gun ammunition, adjusted a very modest 15% for inflation, will cost about $3350 today.[235] A modest 300 rounds per tank requires an outlay of $4-billion in just this one category. Moreover, 125mm ammunition is specific to Soviet/Russian tanks and made in a few countries including Russia, Israel, and perhaps Ukraine. India has a license; there were acute quality control problems that led to imports which continue today. On one 2012 emergency order the Russians, acting from “friendship,” marked up the price “only” 3-4 times.[236] India-produced rounds were supposed to go into production in 2015, about fifteen years behind schedule because too high a percentage was being rejected for inferior quality. Equipment war reserves have been run down first to raise the Army’s specialized counter-insurgency force and then for the four new mountain divisions and one corps HQ. Separately, too many helicopters are obsolete. Air defense cover for the troops is inferior to China’s. Major steps have been taken to improve army communications networks and interoperability, yet much remains to be done. Lateral mobility in the Northeast remains poor.
For an overview of India’s ammunition woes, see the article by Arun Kumar.[237]
Back to the Pakistan front, of course, India has many extra brigades. For example, its XII Desert Corps nominally has two divisions, but with additional and independent brigades, it is equal to three divisions. The problem is that on its side of the border, Pakistan too has three divisions plus many extra brigades. In North Ladakh, where India has one division, and Pakistan has none, the latter has two divisions worth of infantry in several independent brigades. China used to deploy several independent regiments when it reinforced Tibet, as in 1986-87, in addition to divisions. Currently, we cannot say if this will continue after China completes its reorganization, but China is keeping several reserve brigades that can be sent to quiet sectors, for internal security, and for protecting the line of communications.
India, and Pakistan to a lesser extent, has a habit of ad hoc withdrawal of brigades from divisions to reinforce the perceived threat axis. In 1965, for example, the critical XI Corps offensive against Lahore was weakened when India withdrew three of nine brigades committed to the attack. In 1971, such withdrawals weakened the planned offensive on both sides of the Chenab River that was to draw Pakistan’s northern strike reserve away from the Shakergarh sector and permit the success of India’s major western front offensive. The loss of two brigades from 14th Infantry Division eliminated any chance of India’s 1st Armored Division launching a successful offensive south of Suliemanke. In Operation Parakram 2001-02, India committed five divisions to reinforce sectors where ground might be lost (4, 6, 20, 23, 57 Divisions). With so great an increment unavailable, offensives against Pakistan became difficult. There are other reasons why the offensive did not materialize.
India’s strategic posture is built on the fallacy that it can mount offensives without giving up terrain elsewhere and that zero divisions in Army HQ reserve is a viable way of fighting a war. Moreover, this does not consider other contingencies such as (a) a joint China-Pakistan attack against Ladakh (b) a Chinese strike through Nepal, or the Siliguri Corridor via Bhutan, or Myanmar. As of now, China is unlikely to force a passage through another country. Consider this, however. India’s northeast defenses depend on sending two divisions to Bhutan to prevent outflanking operations by the Chinese. Beijing could legitimately declare Bhutan a belligerent. India does not have enough troops in reserve to meet such contingencies.
India-Pakistan
India
Pakistan
J & K
7 (28, 19; 25, 10, 39; 26, 29)
5 (12, 23, 19; 8, 15)
Plains
8 (9, 15, 7; 16, 18, 24; 11, 12)
8 (10, 11; 14, 26, 35; 16, 18, 25)
Plains strike corps
9 (1, 14, 22; 31, 4, 36; 33, 23, 54)
4 (1, 40; 6, 17)
GHQ Reserves
5 (7, 9; 33, 41; 37)
24 (+14 China front = 38)
22
The Pakistan list needs explanations. Technically, the Army has 22 divisions: 2 armored, 2 mechanized, 5 with an integral armored brigade and thus equivalent to India’s RAPIDs, i.e., and 13 infantry. The ground situation, however, tells a different story.
Pakistan’s deployments in North Kashmir equal a reinforced division. Its 12th Division is the equivalent of two. XXX and IV Corps each have “corps reserves” which consist of three armored/mechanized brigades each that will, one day, be put under division HQs. That is another two divisions. Now, of course, India has many extra brigades with several divisions. But so does Pakistan, aside from the independent brigades listed. That evens out.
A truer picture of Pakistan’s strength would look like this: (the +1 means ‘equivalent of 1 division)
India
Pakistan
North Kashmir
1
0 + 1 ¼
West Kashmir
5+2 (XV, XVI)
4 + 1 (X)
Sialkot sector
2+1 (IX)
2 + 2 (XXX)
Lahore sector
3 + 1 (XI)
2 + 1 (IV)
Multan sector
3 (X)
3 + 1 (XXXI)
Sindh sector
2 + 1 (XII)
3 + 1 (V)
Plains strike reserve
9 (I, II, XXI)
4 (I, II)
Kashmir/Desert strike reserve
-
4 (XI, XII)
Western Theatre reserves
-
1
28
29
Other Pakistan Divisions
3
Air Defense (administrative, not tactical HQ)
4
Air Defense (administrative, not tactical HQ)
5
Airborne, SSG battalions (can function as tactical HQ)
21
Strategic Forces
22
Strategic Forces
34
Special Security Division for protection of CEPC [a]
45
Engineers
[a] There is confusion here because some believe the SSD protects the strategic force. But as an article[238] makes clear, the SSD which consists if of 17,000 troops (9 infantry battalions and 6 Frontier Corps wings) is dedicated to the CPEC. Several other sources support the article.
Previously we could use mountain divisions from the north to make up deficiencies in the west, but in a 2-front war, each front needs to be self-sufficient. (a) India normally needs an additional division at Srinagar to boost internal security. (b) Another division is needed in the Jammu-Pathankot corridor because Pakistan now has the equivalent of four plus its I Strike Corps is assigned to the area. (c) In Sindh, Pakistan has four divisions and will bring in XII Corps to reinforce, plus Chinese marine brigades will reinforce the Sindh; we have three and need one more. (d) Last, we absolutely must have at least one division in reserve. Please appreciate the lay down here is just one of many possibilities, for the sake of discussion.
In the past, India managed to keep things in its favor by sending China-front divisions to reinforce. During Operation Parakram 2001-2002, for example, three China-front divisions (6, 27, and 57) were sent to Kashmir and the Western front. 4th Division was detached from a strike corps for further reinforcement of the Pathankot-Jammu corridor. 54th Division, nominally part of XXI Strike Corps, was also pulled, to reinforce Punjab. In 1971, 6th and 9th Divisions were shifting to the west to continue the war. In 1965, once it became clear that China would not intervene, 23rd Division shifted from the east to I Corps then stalled in the Sialkot salient, but the ceasefire was called before it entered action.
In the event of the next war, there is no chance that Pakistan and China will not work together, for reasons to be explained later. There will be no opportunity to use China-front divisions in the west.
We have not taken Bangladesh into account. Bangladesh is a friend. Why then has it raised/raising three corps HQ and 10 divisions, versus our zero division in Eastern Command reserve for the plains? We’ll discuss this later.
Summary
China talks a good game about the Revolution in Military Affairs. In its next war, however, China will find the practical is not as easy as the theoritical. It is very proud if its cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. In war, when the US hits them with conventional EMP weapons, they will be looking ay a lot of fried junk.[239] Of course there are countermeasures. But the US developed these weapons 30-years ago and is likely able to negate countermeasures. Because India is not as invested in these areas, it has a degree of insulation from loss of effectiveness. China has no modern experience in mountain warfare. Conversely, its logistics capability in Tibet has improved by orders of magnitude compared to 1962 or even 1986-7. Which is as well, because the days when a PLA division needed 50-tons/day in combat are long gone.
10. Navies
10.1 China
10.2 Pakistan Navy
10.3 Indian Navy
10.1 Chinese Navy
Fleet Structure
China does not have as advanced a military capability as it makes out. The army and air force are still saddled with huge amounts of obsolete equipment. Not because China cannot afford to modernize, but because defense in general and especially the army is given low priority. The navy is favored: it has modern warships and is rapidly expanding. The US Navy totals 3.5-million [240] tons; the Russians are closing in on 1-million, China is 1.2-million, and in 2016 alone added 150,000-tons. Tonnage is obviously only one metric of a navy’s size, but it is a good corrective to measurement by numbers of ships. Vinayak Bhat[241] notes that Chinese warship yards take no days off, and work three 8-hour shifts every 24-hours and that modular construction is used. In December 2016, just one of China’s four main warship yards had sixteen ships under construction. In the 1990s, the Chinese Navy got just three destroyers. In 2016, one yard alone had seven destroyers under simultaneous construction.
Chinese fleet 2000 and 2017[242]
Type
2000
2017
Aircraft carriers
0
1
Ballistic missile subs SSBN
1
5
Attack submarines SSN
4
5
Attack submarines SS
60
54
Destroyers DDG
20
31
Frigates FFG
40
52
Corvettes
0
23
Missile-armed coastal patrol
50
88
LST/LPD
50
32
225
291
Omitting corvettes and missile boats, both of which are used for coastal defense, the total is 175 versus 171. Number-wise, the Chinese Navy has not expanded in seventeen years. So, what is the fuss? Simply that the 2000 navy was 75% junk; the 2017 navy is 75% modern. The ships are not just much larger, they are quite sophisticated for a middle-ranking power.
First unit, approx.
Newest units, approx
Type 52 destroyer
1996 = 4,400 tons
2017 = 7,500-tons
Type 55 destroyer
2018 = 13,000-tons
Type 053H2G frigate
1991 = 2,400-tons
Type 54A frigate
2017 = 4,000-tons
SSBN 098 Tang (4 Gen) 1 + 2 u/c
2022? = ~15,000-tons, 24 tubes
SSBN Jin (4 + possibly 8 more by 2020)
2015 = 11,000-ton
SSBN 092 Xia 1st SSBN, only 1 unit
1988 = 8,000-tons
SSN 091 (already retiring)
1974-1991 = 5,500-tons
2021? SSN 095 = 8000-tons
SSN 095 3rd generation Sui class
2017 = 8000-tons
SS Yuan
15 + 5 building + 20 planned 3,600-tons, AIP
SS Romeo (replaced by Yuan)
= 1750-tons
Consider this. In the summer of 2017, the Chinese Navy got its first overseas base, in Djibouti, staged its first naval exercise in the Mediterranean,[243]
and the first in the Baltic.[244] A squadron of two surface combatants and a replenishment ship and often a submarine is a continuous presence in the Arabian Sea on account of the international anti-piracy campaign since 2008, and exercises off Australia and in the Sea of Okhotsk are routine. The navy attends exercises in Hawaii in RIMPAC. Also in 2017, a five-ship squadron visited the North Pacific just off the Aleutians, which are in America’s backyard.
The Chinese Navy has port rights at Gwadar, Pakistan, where it will help Pakistan with a naval security squadron of 4-6 patrol craft for local security.[245] A Pakistan Navy official has said Chinese ships would be based at the base. Though the Djibouti base’s contingent is not yet fully deployed, it already includes a mechanized infantry company, presumably from the Marine Corps, and has already stated readiness exercises. There is speculation it will host up to 10,00 troops, in which case it must be expanded.[246] In 2017 the Chinese participated for the fifth biannual multinational exercise at Karachi.[247] Ahead of the annual Malabar joint exercise, the Indian Navy identified ten Chinese navy ships over a 2-month period, including an AGI sent specifically to watch the exercise, a destroyer, a submarine tender indicating the presence of at least one submarine, hydrographic vessels, and logistic support vessels.[248] The Chinese majority control of the Port of Hambantota, Sri Lanka has already been discussed, now the Chinese will take majority control of a port in Burma.[249]