Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  The relevant question is: how many first-class fighters can the Chinese deploy against India? It is not as simple as saying that Tibet/Xinjiang have – say – eight bases within range of India, so assume 400 aircraft. First, all bases in Tibet are primarily civil, and some are dual-use, like Lhasa-Gonggar, Nagri, and Nayangtri. The last, by the way, stops flights by 1400, it cannot even support civil operations after that, let alone military ones. Next, it is no longer possible to park combat aircraft in the open. In this age of cluster-bombs and long-range missiles, the aircraft must be accommodated in hardened shelters, and there must be parking aprons and taxiways. The former do not exist as yet. As for the latter, only a few of the eight major bases have them. The days are gone when you could put a bunch of fighters on a grass airstrip and be in business. Most Tibet airfields lack even paved runways. As China heads towards a first-class air status, it will run into the problem that put together, almost one supporting aircraft is required for one combat aircraft. That includes tankers, AWACS, transport aircraft, reconnaissance, search and rescue and so on. Except for Lhasa-Gonggar and Nyangtri, there is no room for these additional aircraft. Let’s not forget air defense units, ECM, weather, and liaison aircraft, too. Then there’s the resupply problem.

  My estimate is that if China tackles these issues on top-priority, by end-2020 they could have the facilities for four air brigades, 200 combat aircraft, in place. Except China is showing no signs of any rush in this direction. Please read the IAF COS comment in 2017.[285]

  Runway (m)

  2018 estimated fighters

  Shiqanhe

  4500

  8

  Lhasa-Gonggar

  4000 & 3600

  16

  Nyangtri

  4000?

  8? (to be stationed)

  Pangta

  Hoping

  Shigatze

  5000 & 3000

  16

  Quando Bamda

  5500

  8

  Until the 2017 Doklum crisis, China kept a handful of fighters at Lhasa-Gonggar and rotated in others for training. In 2017-2018 moved to permanently station fighters as well as helicopters, UAVs, at least 2 AEW, and SAM squadrons at the above four airbases. Shigatse has a new runaway for the air force, and Lhasa has added a second runway parallel to the existing one. Underground bunkers have been built to shelter ammunition stores, as also presumably POL and perhaps even aircraft. This is a big increase in capability. Quando Bamda (Chamdo) is 600-km from the Indian border, and while air refueling is available, my suspicion is that the airbase is for air defense. It is reasonable to assume by 2020 China will have an offensive capability since they have begun expansion of Tibet bases to accommodate military aircraft.

  11.2 Pakistan Air Force

  Squadron

  Aircraft

  Comment

  1

  K-8P

  Training

  2

  JF-17 Block II

  3rd squadron, 2016, maritime strike

  3

  Saab 2000 Erieye

  AEW&C (6 by 2018)

  4

  Shaanxi ZDK-03

  AWACS x 4

  5

  F-16C/D Block 50/52+

  An additional 18 were stalled by inability to arrange financing from the US

  6

  C-130

  7

  Mirage IIIEA/DP ROSE I, Mirage EL

  8

  Mirage 5VPA2/3

  9

  F-16A/B Block 15 and 15 MLU

  10

  Il-78 Midas

  11

  F-16A/B Block 15 and 15 MLU

  12

  Airbus A310, Phenom 100, Gulf Stream IV

  14

  JF-17 Thunder

  4th squadron 2017

  15

  Mirage IIIRP/EP, Mirage VPA,VDA, DR

  16

  JF-17 Thunder

  2nd squadron, 2011

  17

  F-7PG

  18

  F-7P OCU

  19

  F-16A/B Block 15 ADF OCU

  20

  F-7P/PG OCU

  21

  C-130/Saab 2000

  22

  Mirage IIIDF, IIIDA, EL, DL OCU

  Lead In Fighter Training

  23

  F-7PG

  24

  Falcon DA-20

  Electronic warfare

  25

  Mirage 5VEFROSE II, IIIDP

  26

  JF-17

  1st squadron 2011

  27

  Mirage III ROSE 1

  28

  JF-17

  5th squadron 2018 at Quetta

  The raising of No. 28 Squadron poses a question: why a new squadron instead of reequipping one of the nine squadrons flying obsolete F-7s and Mirage 3/5s? I suggested to Angad Singh, an expert on the Indian and Pakistan air forces, that perhaps the alleged two squadrons of J-10 on order were arriving this year. At least one is supposed to be a gift. Angad demurred.

  In addition, there is the Combat Commander’s School. It appears to have 4 squadrons, one each on F-7, Mirage 3/5, JF-17, and F-16s. It used to have two squadrons of 12 each. Possibly some squadrons now have less than 12 aircraft.[286]

  In addition, there 8 Search and Rescue Squadrons, Nos. 81-88, which are more akin to flights. They are equipped with Alouette IIIs and some Mi-171s. No. 88 Squadron was re-equipped with 2 x AW-139s in early 2018, and the PAF has shown interest in more of these Italian helicopters.

  Pakistan F-16 Block 15s were upgraded 2010-14 in Turkey.[287]This included structure work to ensure 8000-hour life, AN/APG-68(v9) radar, a new cockpit, the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), a new electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures system. Now a 2016 order plans a further upgrade to provide night vision. There is another contract which may be to provide all F-16s with night attack capability.

  Seven of the nineteen fighter squadrons have obsolete equipment. But unlike India, Pakistan has been working diligently to upgrade. Primarily Pakistan is to get another 150 JF-17s in Block II and III and rumored to have signed for two squadrons of J31s, the Chinese twin-engined stealth fighter. Apparently, a deal for two squadrons of J10s, called FC20 in it export version, was torpedoed by India. The plane uses a Russian engine, and India told Russia if it permitted the deal to go through India would retaliate on Russian arms purchases. But this was not the end of the deal, because the aircraft is now flying with the Chinese W10 engine, 27,000-lbst+, and one source says deliveries will start next year. The J10B is said to be the equivalent of an F-16 Block 60.[288] The Chinese have been using the Russian RD-93 for the J31, which first flew in 2012, but are improving the WS13 used on the JF17, expected combined maximum thrust without further improvements underway will be 38,000-lbs. With the improvements, the WS13E may give combined 42,000-lb. This should take care of re-equipment.

  A word of caution. If there are three wrong reports for every correct one regarding Pakistan’s army purchases, the ratio is even higher for the Pakistan Air Force. Until someone sees a J31 in PAF colors in Pakistan, there’s no certainty about this. Before the Internet, information travelled slowly but with greater accuracy. In the Internet age, anyone is free to read an article saying, for example, J31 has been signed for, post it for one thousand people to see, who post it for a million people to see and so on. The media picks up these stories, and the rumor circle starts all over again: “I read in media XYZ that a J31 deal has been definitely signed”, and so it continues.

  Now days the Internet is even saying Pakistan is looking to buy the F-35. The Pakistanis, because they have only one-fifth the defense budgetary resources that India has – that too by spending twice as much as a percentage of GDP as India – must exercise extreme caution in their purchases. So maybe the PAF is looking at the F-35, but likely it is window shopping. Even with the J31, there are only two prototypes flying, and unless China subsidizes the purchase, it would be uncharacteristic of Pakistan
to rush in before they are satisfied to the last rivet.

  With that in mind, by end-2016 Pakistan had produced 70 J17 Block I and 33 Block II. Pakistan can produce 25 aircraft a year, but typically turns out 20, or one squadron, annually, with about half the components made in China. In 2017 the 2-seater combat capable version, JF17B, began deliveries. It appears 29 Block II remain to be delivered before the start of Block III in 2019. Aside from 6-12 aircraft for the CCS, Pakistan has 10 in a developmental unit.

  A speculative PAF orbat 2025

  F-16

  5 squadrons

  Assume 1 squadron new from the US or upgraded 2nd hand

  JF17

  10 squadrons

  Assume delivery of 1 squadron/year

  J10

  3 squadrons

  Assume delivery of 8 aircraft/year

  CCS

  1 squadron

  Combat Commander School

  § The Process of making intelligence estimates. I have my own process and explaining it is difficult because I’ve never systematically analyzed it, let alone put it down in words. First, a story. In November 1971 I assessed there would be no war with Pakistan because its tremendous military disadvantage made an attack a losing proposition. Well, there was war. My error? Being fully indoctrinated by Indian propaganda that we never started a war, I assumed for war Pakistan would have to attack. Knowing its situation hopeless, Pakistan would not attack. But see, India started that war on the night of November 21/22, 1971. I never would have believed we would attack first. I had few contacts then. Nonetheless, I never forgave myself because you cannot give excuses for these things.

  In my mind, there are two types of estimates: immediate and longer term. Immediate is you’re making an estimate for what happens the next day or next few days. You process all the available information and make an estimate. If at any point during the current day contradictory or new information comes in, you must be prepared to modify or even abandon your construct. Immediately. People go wrong because they stick to assumptions and ignore non-conforming data. So, it's 2003 and you’re reading Turkey is not letting the US 4th Infantry (Mechanized) Division unload, you already know two things: there’s going to be offensive thrust from the north, possibly through Mosul, and something has gone seriously wrong with the plan. Is there another formation in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia that vould serve as a replacement? No, because there’s just a handful of divisions and they’ve all been identified in Kuwait. You may not know what has gone wrong, but you stick a red flag well north of Baghdad, reading “Trouble.” In fact, the lack of a thrust through Turkey meant that Saddam’s loyal die-hards had the opportunity to withdraw north to the Sunni triangle Tikrit before the Americans got there to start the insurrection. Now, we don’t know if 4th Division had coming speeding down the road Mosul-Baghdad that there would have been no insurrection. Nonetheless, what did happen, aside from Turkey promoting itself to anti-American status and refusing to grant passage for a war cleared by the UN, is that Turkey proved it was no ally and should have been punished immediately, is that the lack of 3-4 US brigades in the north from the start let the insurgents have a free run. The division was quickly unloaded in Kuwait and, based at Tikrit, took charge of all of Iraq north of Baghdad. Even before the war, it was obvious to the US military that insufficient troops had been provided and that the Pentagon was engaged in magical thinking. You send more troops that you need to meet unforeseen contingencies. As it was, a special forces/paratroop/Marine task force of about 6,000 was to infiltrate the north from Turkey; it had to be rerouted through Jordan, and secure what it could until 4th Division arrived. Personally, I hate instant analyses because I write for the public and the public does not understand live situations change every hour.

  The PAF 2025 estimate is an example of longer-term prediction, based on every little detail I can get. In 2018 no genius is required to tell that the JF17 will be the backbone of the PAF. That PAF will continue trying to get 2nd hand F-16s and rebuild them may not be so obvious on the surface. Indians have convinced themselves it is near obsolete when it has at least 30-years more of front-line service. The media may not tell you that it is a first-class aircraft and is valued by the PAF above all others. If a report comes in that PAF wants Rafale or Eurofighter, those familiar with Pakistan’s financials will disregard the reports. There is no set-up to sustain Rafale/Typhoon, where JF17 is in Pakistan/China co-production, and Turkey can help with F-16 modernization. If a report comes in that Pakistan wants the Chinese heavy stealth J20, you should disregard it because it is far from cheap; likely it is more expensive than the US F-35. We know from Prasun Sen Gupta that the PAF/Army is replacing its radars with Chinese, so if of a sudden a report arrives Pakistan wants a western radar, you should be skeptical. Money is short. China appears ready to give long-term credits for weapons, but the Army also needs modernization and more armor. So, the analyst must be aware that deciding to buy, say, 1000 Chinese T-96s to get rid of the lower end MBTs means the PAF has to sacrifice something of importance to it.

  The question India needs to ask itself: Pakistan by end 2018 six JF17 squadrons (Including the Combat Commander’s School squadrom). Doubtless, our Tejas is more sophisticated. But where is it? The IAF’s No. 45 Squadron became operational with two Tejas in July 2016; presumably, it will be fully stood up by 2018. The naval version failed its weight limits and was rejected. There is constant talk of 120+ more Tejas; it is unclear this will happen given that the IAF now wants best-in-the-world fighters. The point made by Dave Majumdar[289] is straightforward. Tejas has been in development since 1985, and we do not have one ready squadron. JF17 began around 1995, first flight 2003, in service 2007. There is no point in making excuses. That may provide rhetorical comfort, but it does not change the real-world situation one iota. Already dissatisfied with the Tejas I, India plans Tejas II with the US F411 engine, which requires redesign. Allegedly, Tejas II will fly in 2025. The plan is to have 324, sufficient for 15 squadrons. If/when that happens, it will go a long way of rebuilding IAF squadron strength.

  Why has Pakistan succeeded with its JF17 while we continue to fail with our Tejas? Because Pakistan’s limited resources force it to be practical. Does Pakistan think that the JF17 is the best thing since sliced bread? Not one bit. If it had the choice, it would have focused on the F-16 and be placing orders for the Block 70 version. But neither does it have the money, nor does the US intend to give aid. Rather the US does everything to hinder additional deliveries, first because of Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests,[290] and now due to its anger over Pakistan’s two-faced role in the Global War On Terror. After delivery of 18 F-16C/D to Pakistan after clearing the embargoed aircraft, delivery of 8 more at the cost of $700-million has fallen through because the US withdrew financing, and now Pakistan is looking to buy 16 Jordanian Block 30s. So far the US has not raised objections, but it may when Pakistan requests items for modernization. The Jordan option follows an earlier purchase of 13 Jordan Block 15s, which were modernized.[291] There is concern about replacing the first F-16 batch of which perhaps 25 remain: these aircraft are 33-years old. The F-16 airframe, however, has turned out to have a much longer life, so with modernization Pakistan may be able to make do with the Block 15 MLU until 2045 or so, probably with one more rebuild. This shows that Pakistan is willing to make compromises. It cannot be imagined that India would buy rebuilt Mirage 2000s to get rid of, say, 60-80 MiG-21s. India wants new, or nothing. So far nothing is the result.

  We should not underestimate the Pakistan Air Force because of its small size. Currently in terms of combat squadrons it is 2/3rds the IAF’s size, the highest ratio it has ever seen. In 1965 it was 1:3, in 1971 possibly close to 1:5, and 1:14 in terms of modern aircraft, with 1 F-104 squadron to our 8 MiG-21 and 6 Su-7. Two reasons why the smaller size is still a problem for India. First, remember this analysis is about a 2-front scenario. Second, the PAF is configured primarily to protect its own airspace and requires fewer aircraft. A long-standing discussion
is on what help Pakistan can expect from its Muslim allies. PAF pilots fly extensively with Gulf air forces, but today transfer or loan of any US aircraft can be ruled out. In 1971, since Messers Nixon and Kissinger were running their own policy independent of US Congressional approval, Jordan sent F-104s, Indonesia sent MiG-19s, and five F-5s came either from Libya or Iran. This was nominal help considering the huge disparity in forces. Theoretically, there is no bar to send French Rafales and Mirage 2000s from the Mideast, but unless they come with logistic support, they will not be of much help. This support will be largely render by European contractors, and governments may well bar their citizens from transferring to the war zone. Ordnance and spares are a different matter, but much too complex to deal with in a short analysis. All this is, however, irrelevant. If Pakistan needs air reinforcements, they will come in the form of Chinese Air Force units.