Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  Western, which is to say American, deterrent theory is simplicity itself: Mutual Assured Destruction. In plain language, it’s a mutual suicide pact: if I use n-weapons against you, you die, but as you do, you push your own N-button, and I die too. So, since both of us knows that we’re going to die if one starts an N-war, both are deterred from ever doing the deed. There is a word for this construct, called Mutual Assured Destruction. The acronym of which is MAD – typical American dark humor at work here. The theory is insane. Or if you are inclined to reference American pop-culture, Looney Tunes. This short explanation lays out the logic of MAD if we stop thinking rationally and assume there is logic in MAD.

  To go into the contorted, pathological logic of MAD requires signing yourself into the mental hospital for deep discussions with insane people. You require a pill that suppresses your logical thinking to make this work. Why would you bother doing this when you already know everyone at the discussion, including temporarily you, is a Loony Tuner? What possible benefit is there? None and I will not waste readers’ time by going into that discussion. I will point out that the policy originator (as opposed to the academic originator) of MAD was the super-rational US Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. His argument was: we both have enough N-weapons for MAD, why waste resources by building more? In my opinion, McNamara was entirely and honestly invested in the concept. But if we look at what the US did as opposed to what it said (declaratory policy), it becomes near impossible to believe that the US believed it. My suspicion – which requires a year and another book to prove – is that the US used MAD as a bluff to stop the Soviets from adding more N-weapons, but US doctrine remained what it was from 1948 onward, the acquisition of a capability to fight nuclear war and win, at any point on the N-use spectrum, from a single warhead to expending every last one if necessary. This is a small simplification, because US N-warfighting doctrine required the ability for first, second, third, or if needed, more strikes. At all times a reserve pool of warheads was to be maintained.

  If you are interested, trace the development of US N-weapons and types from 1948 onward to see a pattern supporting the warfighting thesis. Take for example, the neutron bomb for Europe in the 1980s. This was an attempt to make N-weapons useable. The problem with the usual N-weapons is the enormous collateral damage they cause, despite the continual US effort for great precision, allowing the use of ever smaller warheads. Neutron bombs (a) cause no property damage and (b) the radiation is very short-lived. Naturally Soviet and Euro-left propaganda seized on the effective theme of “Ooooh, the capitalist bomb, it destroys people but not property.” The neutron bomb was not saving US property; it was to save European civilian lives and devastation of their property. Which includes not just their homes, but hospitals, fire stations, schools, bridges, factories and so on, so that the survivors could survive after the war. In other words, in the event of a Soviet conventional offensive through Germany, it was not necessary to destroy the Germans to save Germany. As it turned out, the West European liberals were deeply opposed to the neutron bomb deployment, and public opinion nullified the US plans to gain a warfighting advantage. It is truly bizarre that US academicians want India to declare its nuclear doctrine for “stability”, when their own country’s declared doctrine was a sham.

  15.2 A brief note on making threat analyses

  Considering that Mr. K. Subramanyam was my mentor, we talked rarely. Meetings went like this: “For your next project I want you to think about XYZ”. Since I always knew what he meant, there was no need for further elaboration; moreover, as a true scholar himself, he let me write as I thought best. Once in a long while I would pass his door to find it open, and a visitor or two and IDSA fellows sitting around his desk. Then I would go in. I do not recall ever knocking on his door of my own violation. He worked ferociously hard, had an institute to run, and other tasks too, so disturbing him was not an option. The first aphorism I recall him pronouncing was “Judge capabilities, not intentions”. Intentions can change without warning, capabilities take years to change. In this analysis, I have consciously followed these words when analyzing the threat posed by China and Pakistan. Many readers may consider my interpretations of the Chinese threat to be extreme. Nonetheless, it makes little military sense to presume that once China has acquired capabilities that it won’t use them against India if it needs to.

  This process is quite different from worst-case analysis, and this diversion is an explanation to show how. Many believe the US was responsible for the Cold War. The US was not. That was the Soviets’ doing. The US offered unilateral nuclear disarmament; it had already, by 1948 withdrawn its ground forces from Europe except for two constabulary divisions to police the American zone in West Germany. The US had worked sincerely and stolidly to cooperate with the Soviets and to understand their concerns. Indeed, if you have the time to read about Yalta, you will learn Roosevelt and the Americans trusted the Soviets significantly more than they trusted Great Britain. The trouble started when the Soviets began overthrowing the newly liberated democratic governments in Eastern Europe and replacing them with communist totalitarian ones. That the Soviets needed a security buffer is something the US understood. Had Stalin agreed on a neutral buffer, the US would have had no problem. But Stalin embarked on his own imperialism. Moreover, the West starting with Britain went to war with Hitler over his occupation of Poland. How could they now accept Stalin’s occupation?

  That said, the US is likely responsible for the insane nuclear-arms race. My belief is because of their limited resources, the Soviets would have focused on building a minimum deterrent but for the US. Proving this would require another book but look at it this way. The Soviet economy was destroyed, it had lost perhaps 10-15% of its population killed and others incapacitated, as a totalitarian state it required huge resources to hold down its Union and newly acquired colonies. Simultaneously, the Soviets had to spend ever ruble possible on reconstruction. There was no rational reason for them to get into a nuclear atms race when a minimum deterrent was adequate. During the 1960 presidential campaign, a major John F. Kennedy plank was the missile gap between the US and Soviet Union. In response, McNamara oversaw a nuclear arms buildup that peaked at 1054 ICBMs, 656 Polaris submarine-based missile, and 600 B-52s. Incidentally, the (in)famous General Curtis LeMay (depending on your view, wanted “at least” 2400, and the head of US Strategic Air Command wanted 10,000! And the military chiefs got upset when McNamara put a limit of 1000 Minutemen (and 54 Titan II). Unless you lived in those times, it is near impossible to understand how someone could make a rational case for 10,000 missiles. Compare this with the actual number of Soviet ICBMs. End-1960 they had exactly two missiles at a test-launch facility. The US had 18 Atlas ICBMs and 48 Polaris missiles; perhaps 1500 B-47E medium bombers including many -47B converted to E standard, capable of reaching the USSR from several NATO airbases in Europe; and perhaps 80 B-52 heavies. Here is a pertinent statement illustrating the difference between assessing worst case intentions and worst-case capabilities.

  “The intelligence community projected how many missiles the Soviets could deploy in the future, not how many they would be likely to deploy. This number was only an estimate, less certain than the number planned for U.S. forces over the same time frame. Moreover, the projection for Soviet forces represented a worst-case estimate.”

  The interesting aspect of this is that McNamara by early 1961 conceded there was no missile gap and still proceeded to make a giant buildup that the Soviets never came close to equaling. There could be many reasons for this. (a) Having trumped up a missile gap that likely was a tipping factor in a very close presidential vote in the Democrats’ favor, perhaps McNamara did not want to call attention to his party’s propaganda; (b) McNamara and company decided to create a warfighting capability; (c) bureaucratic momentum; (d) pressure from the military-industrial complex, which departing President Eisenhower declared was the biggest threat to American democracy. By the way, the reason Kennedy refused to authorize a b
igger buildup, and not coincidentally to centralize launch authority solely in his hands is that he did not want the US to be so strong that deterrence would become ineffective, and a group of generals acting without presidential authority to launch an annihilating first strike on the Soviets. As an opponent of MAD, I find the control issue acceptable, but not the upsetting of deterrence vis MAD.

  It is acceptable to say, “China now has the capability to put 30 divisions against India because we can see the divisions; we see the enormous and continued infrastructure building allowing the deployment and maintenance of those divisions; and we see from Chinese behavior that it wants to be global King of the Hill, replacing the US”. It is not acceptable to say “China, now with its $13-trillion GDP can easily raise and deploy 100 divisions and 3,000 combat aircraft against India”, because there is no evidence it has embarked on a gigantic ground/air expansion or that it needs to. Because however, it could we have to monitor China closely, and take countermeasures against its existing capability. To an extent, we have, by openly allying with the US. This leaves me most unhappy because, as I’ve said, US military power in relation to China is decreasing, the US has become fat and lazy about staying on course to remain Number 1, and worse, the US is not a reliable ally. Remember the aphorism: “We have no permanent allies, we have no permanent enemies, we only have permanent interests.” This is attributed to 3rd Viscount Palmerston, who served Queen Victoria as foreign secretary and twice as prime minister. This can be seen most clearly in the aftermath of World War II: the west’s ally Stalin became its dire enemy; its enemies Japan and Germany which the US was ready to fight to the death had they not surrendered, became next to Great Britain, the closest allies the US has had 1950-present. In World War I, Japan was a British ally, in the next act, it was enemy. Italy was France’s ally in World War, as part of the Triple Entente, it was an enemy in 1939-43, became an ally in 1944 during the war, and has stayed that way. Not to mention Britain and France, who fought each other whenever possible for almost 8 centuries after the Norman invasion up to Waterloo in 1815, and then became close allies in the 20th Century with the rise of Germany.

  Has India ever overestimated an adversary threat? Yes. Between 1954 and about 1968, India consistently overestimated Pakistan because they had the Patton tank the Sabre fighter. Our Hunter was superior to the Sabre. As for the Patton. Sime had fire control computers, but our Centurion had a much superior range. And as for the Starfighter which we so feared, the US delivered 14 and refused a promised second squadron so as not to upset India. That we had only 200 Centurions to Pakistan’s 600 Pattons can hardly be blamed on Pakistan, the numerical disparity arose because of our negligence – primarily that of GOI, not the military. Then in the early 1980s, India became completely unhinged because the US sold 40 F-16s to Pakistan, too few to make a real difference. The US needed Pakistan in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, for every quid, there must be a pro. Did we ever thank the US for embargoing 71 F-16s that Pakistan paid for and were delivered only 20-years later? Of course not. Because we are morally right and Pakistan morally wrong, it’s okay for us to buy 250 MiG-21s and complain for decades about the US stabbing us in the back. When we had 126 Rafale on order, and Pakistan bought 18 F-16 C/D with an option for 8 more, we went totally bananas. This is quite ugly of us and shows how little confidence we have in ourselves. Just once, before I go all four paws up, I would like to hear India say: we are ten times more economically powerful than Pakistan; Pakistan is an independent nation free to do what it wants, if it is buying XYZ, we are confident we can deal with ourselves, and good luck to them. Instead, all we do is whine, moan, and complain. Then we get upset at being equated with Pakistan. When we ourselves act as if Pakistan is so super-powerful that 8 F-16s is going to mean our defeat, can we, in all honesty, believe that other countries will not treat us as badly as we treat ourselves?

  A second time we overestimated is twofold. In 1961, the Army figured six more divisions were needed for an adequate defense against China. As shown by retrospect, that estimate was correct. Panicked as we were, the Army bid for 12 divisions and got 11. Moreover, we figured our adding 11 divisions would lead Pakistan to raise more divisions, so we had best provide for four divisions. When this was explained to me by Mr. K. Subramanyam, I was momentarily awestruck: the notion of India planning ahead was so alien as to reduce one to silence. Now, in the event, Pakistan lacked the resources to react; it went into 1965 with just seven proper divisions: 1st Armored, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14 (East Pakistan), and 15. Its new 11th Division was raised by raiding 8th Division for brigades, and its 6th Armored Division was nothing more that its 100th Independent Armored Brigade, admittedly a large brigade. So, did we take advantage of our now considerably superiority in divisions and use the excuse Pakistan gave us by attacking Kashmir to finish that unfinished business? Obviously not. By September 11 we were begging the US to tell Pakistan to ceasefire. The reason the war continued another 12 days was that Ayub was refusing aa ceasefire. When China was in the throes of its Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, did we take the advantage and recover Eastern Ladakh? Obviously not. The extra divisions we raised were used effectively once: in the Eastern campaign of 1971. So, that campaign won, we began a buildup in the west to take care of Kashmir, but instead of following through, the minute our troops entered Dhaka, we surrendered in the west by declaring a unilateral ceasefire under pressure from Moscow and Washington. Perhaps we should take up needlepoint and knitting. We could gaze at our navels, though honestly, I cannot understand why we should meditate on the lint in our navels on a 24/7/365 basis, taking February 29th off to clip our toenails. Nonetheless, these activities are far more meaningful than worrying about Indian national security.

  15.3 India’s doctrine of No Doctrine

  Weapons are something the US does better than anyone else. In the 1960s, the US began developing guided bombs, eliminating much of the need for tactical nuclear weapons in land and surface sea weapons. Nuclear weapons develop very high overpressures, so accuracy is relatively unimportant. Please bear with me now while we run through a few elementary calculations. This is a very crude calculation.

  (i) Overpressures generated by a nuclear weapon dissipate rapidly in the ratio 1/Radius3. The same is true of conventional weapons. The calculations are done in terms of TNT for both types, and therefore a comparison can be made.

  (ii) A 10-KT weapon generates a 10-psi overpressure out to 500-meters, and a conventional 1000-lb bomb does the same out to 33-meters. At 10-12 psi, most structures are destroyed.

  (iii) Take a 10-meter accuracy for a 1000-lb guided bomb or cruise missiles against a point target, and you don’t need an N-bomb. Should the target have more points, simply drop more bombs. A B-2 bomber, for example, can drop 20 x 2000-lb bombs on twenty separate targets. We’re getting close to the effects of a 100-KT nuclear weapon here.

  (iv) If more destructive power is required, a B-2 can deliver 2 x 14-ton bombs. These bombs can penetrate 66-meters of 5,000-psi concrete. In most cases, an N-bomb is not needed. The US is developing penetrators with the same yield but 1/3rd the weight. Depending on the form factor, a B-2 could carry six. And it is possible to send two of these bombs one after another, to get – in theory – penetration of 126-meters of concrete. A 100-KT surface burst explosion will make a 33-meter crater, and a 1-MT will make a 90-meter deep crater. A nuclear penetrator will, of course, amplify the effect yield, but hopefully, the point is made: why to use nuclear with all the complications when conventional can do the job. One Russian “continuity of government” facility, incidentally, is supposed to be under 333-meters of granite.