Kuala Lumpur at War 1939-1945

by Andrew Barber

  The Royal Selangor Golf Club was turned over to vegetables and the open ground near Pudu Prison was cultivated by prisoners, whose regular rations were barely above starvation levels. One contemporary witness later noted that towards the end of the Japanese occupation ‘it was not uncommon to see cows with a crude bandage over their shortened tails which had been cut off by thieves for meat’. He also noted that ‘our chickens were guarded more and more and they were moved from the edge of the garden to nearer the house… My parents now lived on mainly tapioca and sweet potato and kept what little rice was available for their children’.

  At Tanjong Karang near Kuala Selangor the Japanese set aside 1,200 acres of land, which had previously been part of a sugar factory, as a ‘pioneer farm’. This followed similar projects in Johor and in Province Wellesley. It was originally intended that one thousand settlers, ‘Indians and Selangor Chinese’ would till this land and produce vegetables and staples for the markets of Kuala Lumpur. The project was underway when the British returned, and facing similar food shortages, they were keen that the settlement should continue, but the ‘pioneers’ quickly abandoned the project and it made little appreciable contribution to the food supply. There was a similar scheme at Sungei Labu, near Sepang to the south of Kuala Lumpur, where 5,000 acres of land had been set aside for a ‘food growing settlement’. By August 1944, two thousand acres of light jungle had been cleared and ‘bunds were under construction’. The settlement was divided into eight lots, ‘two of which were to be given to the Chinese’ and it was planned that 3,000 families and 20,000 people would move there. But thereafter, little more was heard of this ‘settlement’ suggesting the scheme ran out of steam.

  The Federated Malay States Railway

  Kuala Lumpur was the headquarters of the Federated Malay States Railway (FMSR) and the centre of Malaya’s rail network. It had large engineering workshops and marshalling yards at Sentul and the main station was a magnificent Indo-Moorish extravagance near Brickfields. On their departure, the British sought to destroy much of the heavy equipment. Despite these efforts, the Japanese were able to rehabilitate the rail network in quick order. By the time the British returned in August 1945, however, the railway system was in a sorry state. The absence of proper servicing and the non availability of spare parts contributed but so too did Allied bombing raids of early 1945. Following these, in order to avoid further bomb damage, about half of the mechanical equipment from the Central Workshops was dispersed for safety to sidings on a rubber estate alongside the Port Swettenham branch line. But the biggest problems stemmed from an incredible dispersal of equipment due to Japanese wartime needs. FMSR locomotives and rolling-stock steadily leached northwards as they connected with the Thai, Burmese and Indo-China railway systems. In 1946, the Railway Department noted that ‘60 locomotives; 20 carriages; 3,300 wagons; rails 25,000 tons, bridges – considerable quantities’ had been sent to Thailand while 25 FMS locomotives were eventually located in Burma. As if this was not enough, when the final accounting took place track, rolling stock and locomotives had also been removed to French Indo-China, where 82 FMSR wagons were identified plying the Phnom Penh – Saigon route. Not surprisingly, after the war the job of restoring the rail system and its rolling-stock proved a long, hard haul.

  The Black Market

  Shortages, inflation and rationing inevitably led to a thriving black market. There was also a widespread lack of confidence in the Japanese ‘banana notes’ leading to an increase in barter trade. One contemporary witness noted that by the time of the Japanese surrender inflation was so high that $1000 in ‘banana notes’ would not buy a coffee. He also recalled seeing in August 1945 a box of new $1000 notes breaking open in Bukit Bintang and the notes lying strewn and unwanted in the street. They were valueless and did not even have serial numbers. This chronic inflation and the collapse in faith in money led to rapid changes in economic fortunes. With salaries eroded by price rises, the old professional and salaried classes suffered. While money became less valuable, disposable goods of all sorts became the new currency. Traders and businessmen, adept at playing the new system, found themselves able to acquire quick wealth and possessions. It was an ‘upside downside’ world, and many who had previously found themselves amongst the social elite were now reduced to penury, while illiterate but street-wise opportunists were able to benefit from the new realities and possibilities. A classified advert dated June 1942 in the Malay Mail requesting ‘New golf balls. Any Make. Cash paid. No questions asked’ was indicative of the new world of skulduggery.

  Chapter Sixteen

  Shifting Tide of War

  In terms of its military significance, the Japanese viewed Kuala Lumpur in a similar way as the pre-war British. It housed a garrison, headquarters staff, a number of military hospitals, a base for stores and was an important communication hub. But beyond that, it had little strategic or military importance. By the time of the Japanese surrender there were about 4,000 Japanese troops in and around Kuala Lumpur, out of a total 45,000 based in Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur airfield held a few trainers and transport aircraft but little more as, by this stage of the war, Malaya was largely denuded of front-line fighters. But it was the capital city of Malaya and had the Japanese been forced to defend it against an invasion force there is little doubt that they would have fought tenaciously and bravely to retain it. Luckily for the city and its people, the shifting course of the war meant this did not materialise.

  Allied Bombing Raids

  From late 1944 from bases in India the Allies began to launch bombing raids into Malaya. The primary targets were the ports of Penang and Singapore, as well as nearby sea lanes, which were heavily mined. In early 1945, however, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme-Commander of Allied Forces South Asia, decided that he wanted to preserve these port facilities to support an allied return, so the focus shifted. Kuala Lumpur, with its extensive railway engineering sheds and marshalling yards, was next on the planner’s targeting list and responsibility was handed to the United States Army Air Force’s (USAAF) XX Bomber Command’s 45th Bombardment Group flying B29 long-range Superfortress bombers out of Karagapur, close to Calcutta in West Bengal.

  The first air raid was on 19 February 1945 when 49 (out of 50, one had to turn back) aircraft attacked the railway facilities at Sentul and the Batu Arang coal mine. On arrival at Kuala Lumpur, the resistance was light, bombing conditions were good, and the raid - from photo reconnaissance evidence - was judged a success. One eyewitness noted that the US bombers ‘shot down a few Japanese Zero fighters who were out gunned. I recall hearing the distinctive cannon fire from the planes and seeing the Japanese Zeros plummeting down with smoke trailing’. Despite clear evidence of a one-sided duel, the pro-Japanese Tamil language newspaper, Tamil Nesan, reported damage to workers’ housing and a store during bombing raids though it claimed, a little implausibly, that the main facility was little damaged and thanks to air raid shelters the loss of life was low. This daytime raid stretched the B29s to the limit, and involved twenty hours or more of flying, with a number limping back with empty fuel tanks. But they all did return, and this encouraged the USAAF to revisit Kuala Lumpur.

  Some six weeks later the USAAF decided to hit the same target, the ‘Railroad marshalling Yard, Kuala Lumpur’. It was deemed that a successful raid would ‘destroy substantial quantities of military supplies and commercial goods and will for a time impede movements along the railroad’. On 10 March 1945, under Colonel J.V. Edmundson, thirty B29 Superfortresses of XX Bomber Command set off deep into the night, heading east across the Bay of Bengal. Each was carrying fifteen 500lb ‘GB bombs’, essentially large high-explosive bombs designed to destroy and wreck buildings, heavy equipment and rolling stock. One plane was carrying radar-tracking intercept equipment, designed to test the Japanese electronic defences. In the event that an attack on Kuala Lumpur had to be aborted, for weather or other reasons, the fall-back target was the airfield at Alor Star, and the ‘last resort opportunity
target’ was a Japanese base in Thailand.

  Map of B29 Bombing Missions

  The aircraft flew in three flights of ten, and almost immediately in the dark skies over the Bay of Bengal one plane lost its companions, though it continued on with its mission and eventually made a solo attack on the marshalling yards. Over the Bay of Bengal, two B29s had technical difficulties and turned back. Later in the journey another B29 lost its way and ended up attacking the ‘last resort’ target in Thailand. That left twenty-six aircraft to line up over northern Sumatra and then Penang before making their final approach from the west to Kuala Lumpur. Given the experience of February’s raid, when resistance had been light, it was decided once again to bomb at a low altitude of 10,000 feet. Over Penang and Sumatra, the radar-tracking equipment picked up signs of Japanese monitoring, so it was no surprise that when the bombers arrived over Kuala Lumpur they were intercepted by fifteen Japanese ‘Vals’. But the Japanese counter-attack was weak, the fighters were outmoded and did not press their attacks, and the bombers were not seriously troubled as they began their final run on the target. It had initially been decided that all three flights should zero in on the marshalling yard’s round-house, but it was later determined that each flight, which attacked separately and in phases, would have its own target, so the engineering works and the supply depot buildings were added as target markers.

  The attack took place between 7.30 and 9.00am on a clear morning, with generally good visibility. One B29 found his bomb run obscured by cloud, and so turned and dropped his load on the back-up target of Alor Star airfield, leaving twenty-five aircraft to drop their high explosives on Kuala Lumpur’s marshalling yard. Post-raid photographic record judged the raid a success. Fifty per cent of the round-house, ninety per cent of the engineering shed and ninety per cent of the supply depot were adjudged to have been destroyed, along with six locomotives and 83 wagons, while 30 nearby residences (mostly the Indian workers of the FMS Railway) were destroyed. The raiders then made the long journey back across the Bay of Bengal without loss in what, for the USAAF, had been a highly successful raid.

  After the raid the pro-Japanese Tamil Nesan newspaper claimed that four of the bombers had been ‘destroyed’ and a further five ‘captured’ – though quite how a bomber could be captured was not explained. After the war, one official report questioned the extent of damage to the railway sheds and the accuracy of the bombing, noting instead that some wayward bombs had blown up the nearby museum; luckily, being a Saturday, it was shut and no one was killed. The report also noted that earlier, much of the rolling stock had been removed to sidings outside Kuala Lumpur. Nevertheless, photographs taken by the returning British of the engineering works and central train shed at Sentul show a mass of twisted metal and destroyed locomotives and wagons. A post-war British assessment stated that there was ’60 per cent destruction at loco house and total destruction of about 80 carriages which are a mass of twisted wreckage.’

  Collectively the attacks were a military success and gave a further knock to Malaya’s faltering railway system. They also offered a huge propaganda fillip to the resistance, which could now demonstrate in the most tangible terms that the war really was going against the Japanese and that powerful external forces were beginning to line up and focus their energy and attention on Malaya. One such pamphlet, The Voice of Malaya, which was printed in ‘upper Pahang’, noted in April 1945 ‘On 19 February more than 50 B29 Super Flying Fortresses devastated a factory of the FMS Railways at the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur. On 12 March, 60 Flying Fortresses raided Kuala Lumpur for the second time. In central Burma, the allies are now converting a base near Mandalay into a general air base for launching extensive air raids against Malaya.’

  In April 1945, the British launched Operation Livery around Phuket, designed to clear the shipping lanes of mines, and followed this with Operation Sunfish, which was the intensive aerial photography of possible landing beaches in Selangor and Negri Sembilan. These were recognised by the Japanese for what they were – the initial preparations for Operation Zipper, the planned reoccupation of Malaya. In response to the increased threat of invasion, in early August intelligence gained from intercepted Japanese signals noted plans to buttress defences in Penang and along the beaches and mud flats around Morib (which was, indeed, the planned landing site). British estimates at the time put the Japanese army in Malaya at around 54-58,000 and the total military deployment to around 81-85,000. Tellingly for the British, they only identified three to seven fighter aircraft and between eight to sixteen reconnaissance planes in the whole of Malaya. Against this force the British were assembling in Ceylon a small armada from which to launch their assault, including a number of aircraft carriers. Initially, the invasion had been scheduled for November 1945, but in July the Chiefs of Staff decreed that the invasion should be brought forward to late August; an ambitious time-frame made all the more difficult by the huge distances involved.

  Chapter Seventeen

  Communists and Colonialists – MPAJA and Force 136

  Following the British defeat of 1942, the MCP, through its military arm the MPAJA, formed the main resistance to the Japanese. During the fighting in January and February 1942 it had gained some limited experience of irregular warfare training with Spencer Chapman’s No1 STS, but mostly the communist guerrillas headed for the security of the jungle where they established bases and cached stores and weaponry. Alongside their fighters - who were initially very few in number - the MCP had an important covert civilian support movement called the Min Yuen which provided spies and logistic and financial support; the MCP literally had supporters and agents in every Chinese community. The official history of the British Force 136, which was the name given to the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in South East Asia, noted that ‘the Communists in Malaya were by far the most fertile ground on which to plant the seeds of subversive activity and resistance in general; this had been made abundantly clear by their conduct in the closing stages of the Malaya campaign’.

  In Selangor, the military wing of the MCP was the MPAJA 1st Regiment. While the military commander was responsible for operational activity, in the early years of the war the political commissar was, in theory, the more powerful figure. Initially this led to a lack of coordination between political and military wings and perforce over time the military units had become increasingly autonomous. The main focus of MPAJA activity was the assassination of collaborators and the development of covert operational networks and capabilities. The MPAJA developed four to five-man ‘killing squads’ that carried out public, brazen killings. These sent the clear message that the MCP was the prime source of resistance to the Japanese but by focusing on local targets also indicated the extent to which the conflict was as much an ‘internal’ struggle for hearts-and-minds within the Chinese community as a battle against the Japanese. In Kuala Lumpur, the communists made the lives of Japanese collaborators highly dangerous but they were not a potent insurgency movement and posed little direct threat to the Japanese military. They needed equipment, training, money and guidance to bring raise their performance and ambitions.

  From mid-1944, once the British had begun to role back the Japanese in Burma, they set their sights on the armed re-occupation of Malaya. Critical to their plans was the development of an insurgency force to cause mayhem and confusion behind the Japanese lines. The plan was that British would arm and train communist guerrillas who would emerge from their jungle lairs to coincide with the British invasion. It was a marriage of convenience, and the objective of these strange bedfellows was to defeat a mutual enemy whatever inherent contradictions there might be in their respective political outlooks and ambitions.

  Strange bedfellows

  The Secretary-General of the MCP, Lai Teck was, as already noted, a pre-war agent of the British who had then offered his services to the Japanese. Lai Teck was canny enough to recognise that the war had begun to go against the Japanese and in October 1944, at an MCP meeting at Serendah, he announc
ed that he had decided to work with the British to help bring about the defeat of the Japanese. True to his devious nature, however, he told his senior commanders that the MPAJA would also form a ‘clandestine’ army (Mi Mi Tui) which would operate independently and undeclared to the British – thereby maintaining the MCP’s independent operational capability. In April 1945, in a jungle hideaway in Perak, Lai Teck (using the alias Chang Hong) and Chin Peng, signed a formal agreement with Captains Davis, Broome and Chapman of Force 136. It was agreed that the MPAJA would work under South East Asia Command (SEAC) and in return would be given supplies, money, training and operational support.

  As a result of this agreement, and with increasing strength, Force 136 clandestinely infiltrated into Malaya liaison teams to work alongside the MPAJA. With the decision to bring forward the planned armed invasion of Malaya (Operation Zipper) from an initial target date of November 1945 to late August, the whole scheme took on increased urgency. The British agreed to provide individual MPAJA regiments with equipment, money and liaison teams comprising British officers, radio communicators and interpreters. From a starting point of a handful of operatives scattered across Malaya at the beginning of the year, by mid-July 1945 ‘111 bodies were successfully dropped into Malaya’.