A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  […] we see him circling in great sweeping rings over a special point, like a hawk which has sighted its prey below. Five minutes more and we mark in the far distance, rising from the ground one after the other, in a straight line right ahead of us, eight towering black columns of smoke, like gigantic solitary trees sprung up by magic on the horizon. The master of the sky has sighted the enemy’s trenches and bombarded them, vanishing shortly afterwards towards Ain-Zara.22

  Whether Moizo, and his fellow pilots, were responsible for the ‘towering black columns of smoke’ is debatable. Because they had very small charges and tended to bury themselves in the sand before exploding, the grenades utilised were largely ineffective unless they dropped amongst a group of people. As the Ottoman forces had learned to scatter upon the approach of an aircraft, the pilots concentrated on what they could see and, according to some sources, Fenduk Sharki, being large and therefore obvious was a favourite target.23 The soft sand also mitigated the effects of the heavy artillery shells; these sometimes penetrated to the depth of a metre or more before exploding.24

  Though the fire of the heavy and naval artillery would have been the most damaging had it been able to hit its target accurately, this was rendered problematical because it could only fire indirectly. As an aid to spotting, a captive observation balloon (drachen-ballon) was sent up from one of the ships to a height of some 1300 metres. From this lofty position the observers were able, to some extent, to correct the fire of the big guns. What would have made a real difference were using aircraft for this service. However, whilst they were eminently suited for the task, they lacked any means of real time communication, or near so, between the aviators and the gunners. Thus observers in aircraft could only communicate by landing to deliver a report, or dropping weighted notes in small metal containers, either of which meant flying away from whatever was being observed. Guglielmo Marconi himself was to argue that whilst the aeroplane had ‘demonstrated in Tripoli its usefulness for scouting purposes in wartime’ this usefulness would ‘be greatly multiplied if the aeroplanes could carry wireless telegraph instruments and operators so that information gathered on scouting trips could be instantly communicated to the operating forces.’25

  To counter the Italian advance Nesat ordered the troops stationed to the west of Ain Zara to advance and cover the left flank of the trenches in front of Bulemiana. He also ordered the guns near Ain Zara to advance and support the defenders facing Sidi Messri, but great difficulty was encountered in moving them across the desert and each needed ten pairs of horses to drag it through the sand. It took three hours to get three of the guns forwards and these, together with about fifty regulars, were positioned slightly to the west of the extant battery.

  ‘The New Arm’s Fearful Strength: Death from the Air’: this drawing appeared in The Illustrated London News on 13 January 1912 and was derived from a sketch made by Henry Seppings Wright. Despite the effects depicted, he was to write that ‘bombs from the aeroplanes were small; quite sufficient to create a scare, but not so deadly and destructive [as those launched from dirigibles]. Also the great elevation at which they flew presented the camp as a very small target.’ The first ever delivery of ordnance from an aeroplane occurred on 5 November 1911. (Author’s Collection).

  With these reinforcements the Ottoman front was about 5 kilometres wide and manned by approximately 500 regulars and 1,000 irregulars. The Italian infantry advanced slowly and carefully under the cover of the overwhelming artillery superiority that the pitifully few Ottoman guns could do little to counter. Ordinarily Ain Zara would have been about two hours march from Tripoli, but it was some four hours later that the position on the right of the Ottoman line, its commanding officer having been killed, began to give way and the troops to retire leaving their dead and carrying their wounded. With the left retiring, the centre of the line had also to give way and begin to fall back slowly.

  The Ottoman infantry, though forced from its first line of trenches, did not quit the field but rather fired at the Italian infantry from whatever cover could be found. However, as Irace put it, ‘They cannot long resist the fire of our artillery and the menace of the enveloping movement.’26 The enveloping movement by the 2nd Brigade had indeed forced the Ottoman left to give ground, whilst the reinforcements sent by Nesat had become entangled with the Italian cavalry and were also forced to retreat. In withdrawing the Ottomans were required to abandon their artillery through an inability to tow the guns away. One observer reckoned that it took no fewer than 19 horses to drag a gun through the desert sand. This problem also affected the Italians, though they had a way around the worst of it in the shape of mountain artillery.

  Attached to the army in Tripoli were three groups (gruppi), each of three batteries, of mountain artillery. The 2nd (Mondovì) and 3rd (Torino-Susa) groups were part of the 1st Mountain Artillery Regiment (1° Reggimento Artiglieria da Montagna), whilst the 2° Reggimento Artiglieria da Montagna had provided its 3rd (Vicenza) group. These artillery regiments formed the organic artillery component of the Alpini, the army’s mountain warfare force. Incongruous though it might appear, the Alpini had extensive experience of operating in North Africa. The 1st African Alpine Battalion (1° Battaglione Alpini d’Africa) had been formed in 1887 and campaigned in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The mountain artillery were equipped with the 70 mm Cannone da 70/15, which weighed nearly 400 kg when assembled, but could be broken down into four loads for transporting by mule.27 The ammunition was also loaded onto mules. The mobility conferred allowed the 2nd Brigade to emplace mountain guns under Colonel Besozzi on a large dune to the southwest of Bulemiana and, from roughly 14:00 hrs, direct enfilade fire onto the enemy positions to their east. Under fire from two directions, the Ottoman forces facing the left of the Italian advance were obliged to retire southwards.

  The Italian infantry moved forward as the Ottomans began to retreat, though they did not press hard. By this time the 2nd Brigade and the cavalry were advancing to the west of the wadi Mejneen and Nesat at Ain Zara perceived that his forces were in danger of being encircled, and ordered a general retirement to the south west in the direction of Kasr Azizia some 40 kilometres away. As he later explained to Abbott:

  There was nothing else to do. When I saw the enemy coming on - regiment after regiment -my only thought was to save my men. I feared the Italians might take it into their head to send a regiment round our left, and take us all prisoners!28

  Attached to the army in Tripoli were three groups (gruppi), each of three batteries, of mountain artillery, which ordinarily formed the organic artillery component of the Alpini, the army’s mountain warfare force. The possession of such weaponry - guns that could be broken down and transported on the backs of mules or camels – proved invaluable due to the desert terrain. Field artillery was extremely difficult to move with up to 19 horses required to drag a single piece through the sand. (George Grantham Bain Collection/Library of Congress)

  At about 15:00 hrs the majority of the Ottoman forces had conducted a fighting withdrawal towards Ain Zara. However, a previously unengaged contingent that had been stationed some 6.5 kilometres to the west of Tripoli, near Gargaresh, and had been summoned by Nesat, appeared near the wadi to the west of the oasis. Seemingly oblivious to the presence of the 2nd Brigade, or that his command was in its path, the commanding officer led his men towards the wadi until he was intercepted by a messenger who warned him of the situation. This information must have caused the officer to panic, as instead of taking up a position whereby he could impede the advancing Italian brigade, if only for a time, he instead led his command in a dash southwards. According to Abbott ‘he was the only Turk who on that day failed to do his duty, and he was subsequently cashiered for his incompetence.’29 Not that it would have made any difference, for there was no, or very little, fighting between the infantry of the two sides. Whenever the Italians encountered resistance, and the Ottoman forces sniped at them incessantly, rather than engage in infantry attacks they made the defenders retre
at by bombarding their position.

  The vast majority of the Ottoman forces being irregular, they had their families and other non-combatants camped around Ain Zara. The order to retreat obviously applied to them too, but as Ostler discovered they seemed reluctant to up sticks:

  Beyond the ridge that shelters the greatest of the many scattered villages of tents, I came to the straggling encampment of the Arab women, children, and camp-followers. Here were the markets that supplied the army with fodder, meat and flour, and milk and eggs. Already the market was afoot, and the thoughtless Arabs chattered and haggled and brawled, heedless as ever of the rumbling guns; though here and there upon the crests of the rolling dunes sat groups of men intently watching clouds and rings of smoke far to the north. At little distances, too, upon the ridges, sentinels in Turkish uniform kept watch upon the fight, but in the hollows noisy Arab commerce ruled the day.30

  It was one of the local leaders, Suleiman el Barouni, who with his colleague Farhat al-Zawi had been a deputy in the Ottoman Parliament, that roused them: ‘The Italians have come against our left in thousands; but on the right we still hold them back. I go to Suk el Juma.’ One of the reasons el Barouni went to the HQ of Fethi Bey was to order or help organise the Ottoman retreat from the Oasis of Tripoli, where the retreat order also applied. With Ain Zara in Italian hands Ottoman communications with their forces in the oasis would be effectively severed. The 1st Brigade had not made much headway in penetrating the Ottoman-held part of the oasis due to the difficulty of the terrain. Italian artillery preponderance was of much less utility when they were fighting in what was, effectively if not actually, a built up area with its ‘maze of deep, tortuous lanes, winding among gardens and groves, the trees and enclosures of which afforded ample cover to the defenders.’31 Elements of the brigade, supported by marines – ‘men in white’ landing from warships32 – had managed to get forward along the coast, avoiding the worst of the ‘maze,’ nearly as far as the Ottoman HQ at Suk el Juma, a distance of 5 kilometres or so. But being unsupported on their right flank through the inability of the rest of the brigade to advance, they could not consolidate, and were forced back to their original position.

  Nor had the two battalions of the 52nd Regiment under Colonel Amari had an easy time of it. They had advanced from Fort Sidi Messri to interdict the Suk el Juma-Ain Zara road as per plan, but had come under fire from their own artillery. They took some casualties and their advance was halted whilst a messenger was sent back to the fort. When they resumed their advance they were opposed. Abbott got the tale from ‘Ismail Effendi, a middle-aged Lieutenant of infantry – the Turkish officer in command at that point:’

  I was stationed in the Fenduk Jemel, opposite Fort Sidi Misri, on the Ain Zara road, with fourteen Turks and two hundred Arabs. An Italian regiment attacked us furiously, shouting ‘Hurrah! Hurrah!’ and drove us out of the fenduk. Then my Arabs made a counter-attack, yelling ‘Allah! Allah!’ and forced the Italians to fall about one hundred and fifty metres back. These attacks and counter-attacks went on till evening, and at sunset the enemy withdrew into their trenches. About an hour and a half later we made an offensive reconnaissance to see if there were any Italians in front of us or not. We found the field deserted and covered with knapsacks, water-flasks, caps, shovels, rifles, and cartridges. We picked up as much of the loot as we could, and returned to the fenduk, where we rested and slept till midnight. About an hour after midnight two horsemen came to tell us that the headquarters had moved from Ain Zara to Ben Gashir, where we were ordered to follow at once. We could not make out why.33

  Nesat’s order to withdraw was also greeted with something approaching incredulity at Suk el Juma. Like Ismail Effendi’s command, they were unaware of the precise nature of the events to their south and had similarly more than held their own against the Italian attacks. Accordingly, those Arab irregulars who were so minded refused to obey and remained in the oasis. The others moved along the Ain Zara road, which of course remained open, and joined the exodus, first to Ben Gashir, around 28 kilometres south of Ain Zara, and then a further 31 kilometres to the south west to El Azizia (Kasr Azizia, Al’Aziziyah). The forces at Ain Zara had begun to retreat at about 16:00 hrs and, rather remarkably, this manoeuvre was carried out in a leisurely manner, at least by the regulars. Abbott likened their attitude to that of:

  […] an East End mob going home after a day on Hampstead Heath. There was no hurry […] The soldiers just strolled away, passed Ain Zara, and got to the headquarters. The first to arrive there were the artillerymen with some of their horses, but without any artillery. The infantry followed. Then came the Staff officers.34

  This would have been leaving it too late had not the 2nd Brigade swung eastwards towards Ain Zara at about 15:30 hrs, more or less at the same time as the Mixed Brigade was approaching the oasis from the north-west. From the peak of some of the higher ridges around the place they were able to see the last of the fighters and the camp followers evacuating the place in a disorderly mass. Ostler, who was with them, described the sight thus:

  The retreating columns marched across sands now glowing rosy in the sunset [sunset was a little after 18:00 hrs]. Belated Arabs straggled beside the ranks of marching Turks. Arab women, carrying huge loads, staggered wearily through the loose sand, but would not bate a whit of their burdens. One passed me bearing on her head a shallow wooden dish of mighty size, inverted, hat-wise. There were tiny children, hardly old enough to walk. I saw a pair of new-born calves, yoked together at the neck. Frail as they were they must bear some household burden; and even sheep and goats had packs and nets of fruit on their backs. A fainting rabble followed in the army’s wake, and the desert way for close on twenty miles was strewn with discarded horse-gear, cooking pots, a chair or two, and miscellaneous litter from the Arab tents.35

  It seems probable that the 2nd Brigade had mismanaged its swing to the east, and so rather than cutting off Ain Zara it merely approached it from that direction. This left the south uncovered and allowed the former occupants to escape. This was not unobserved as has already been noted, and why the Italians, and particularly their cavalry, made no attempt to intercept this mass is a mystery. Little resistance would have been encountered, since to cover the retreat, or at least to give warning of Italian intentions, only a small detachment of cavalry under Captain Ismail Hakki had been deployed. They were not called upon to do any fighting, but according to Abbott, who got the story from him later, Hakki observed the Italians from the top of a high dune. From a distance of some 150 metres he had a good view of at least the vans of both brigades in the moonlight, and he saw them deploy outposts whilst the battalions behind them remained massed. There was much shooting by the sentries at shadows and bushes swayed by the breeze, but his conclusion was that the Italians had settled down for the night. Once he had established that there was no danger of any further activity from the Italians, Hakki returned to Ain Zara at around 21:00 hrs and calmly dined. The Italian decision allowed several parties of Ottoman combatants from north of Ain Zara to pass through it during the night without hindrance, and the last contingent from the oasis left at 04:30 on the morning of 5 December with a small caravan of camels. The oasis was occupied by the Italian forces at daybreak without fighting and work on constructing entrenchments immediately began.

  The capture of Ain Zara was undoubtedly a useful victory, though not perhaps of quite the stature that the Italian army made of it. Reports based on a communiqué issued from Tripoli on 6 December told their version of the battle:

  The fighting lasted from daylight to dusk. When darkness began to fall, 8,000 Turks and Arabs disappeared rapidly to the south-east. A long line of camels was with them, bearing their wounded. The Turks lost several hundred killed, while the Italian casualties are estimated at 100. The headquarters staff of the Italian Army asserts that the battle was a decisive one for the possession of the country, as it has almost entirely cleared the oasis around the town of Tripoli and forced the Turks from the coas
t and away from their bases of supplies.36

  This pronouncement, as with all similar types issued during the conflict, must be treated with some scepticism. Though there are no accurate reports of, and no way of calculating accurately, the number of those who evacuated Ain Zara, it seems highly unlikely that they numbered anything like 8,000. The best estimates, made from the observations of the various foreigners, mainly correspondents, who retreated with the Ottomans reckon the numbers to have been less than 4,000, including non-combatants. Neither did the capture force the enemy ‘away from their bases of supplies’; these, such as they were, were not on the coast, which was already dominated by Italian naval supremacy. The claim about the battle clearing the enemy from the Oasis of Tripoli was however accurate, or mainly so. Although a number of irregulars had declined to obey Nesat’s order to evacuate, they were few, and when the eight battalions of Rainaldi’s strengthened 1st Brigade resumed the offensive they made swift headway. Tagiura was occupied on 13 December without serious opposition.

  Frugoni had then, by the use of a military force ill-equipped and poorly trained to deal with the terrain, manoeuvred his enemy out of their position at Ain Zara without serious fighting; the total Italian casualties are reckoned to have been 17 killed and 94 wounded. This can be viewed as tactically skilful, however at the operational level the battle was a failure inasmuch as it did little to diminish the Ottomans capacity to resist. The main factor in this was that, by accident or design (and probably the former), the 2nd Brigade and the cavalry had turned too soon to cut off the enemy and prevent their retreat. Had Ain Zara been encircled from the south then it is at least possible that a large number of Ottoman regular troops might have been captured, which would have severely weakened the ability to resist Italian occupation. Pursuit of the retreating enemy was also rendered difficult, if not impossible, because the traditional main arm of pursuit, the cavalry, were weak (two squadrons at 142 men per squadron).37 Also, and like the infantry and artillery, they were unable to operate properly in such difficult terrain. Indeed, the fact that such a small force of cavalry was attached to the right wing of the brigade suggests that using them in pursuit was not envisaged, and that their task was confined to screening the flank of the advance.