A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  The origins of it appear to have been when news was conveyed to Ain Zara on 18 December to the effect that a body of Arabs, some 2-300 strong, had occupied a small oasis called Bir Tobras, about 15 kilometres to the south. This information was supposedly brought by five Arabs, who claimed that the usual inhabitants of the oasis were being mistreated by the occupiers and were appealing for protection from the Italians. When this news was conveyed to Conte Pecori-Giraldi he determined to send a column to force the occupiers to disperse and to rescue the inhabitants. The core of this force was to consist of two battalions of the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment reinforced with a battalion of Grenadiers. In support was a machine gun section of two guns, a squadron of light cavalry, and two mountain guns. The whole amounted to 1,500 men and it was put under the command of the ‘ambitious’ Colonel Gustavo Fara, hero of the defence at al-Hani on 23 October.19

  Fara set out at 02:00 hours on the morning of 19 December with the object of arriving at Bir Tobras at 06:00 hours in order to attack at dawn. To guide him through the unfamiliar terrain, and in the dark, Fara took three of the five Arabs who had reported the enemy at Bir Tobras whilst the other two were kept at Ain Zara. Four hours would, under ideal circumstances, have been plenty of time to cover the required distance. The circumstances were very far from ideal however, and the column was distant from its objective at 06:00 hours, having become, perhaps predictably, disoriented in the difficult topography. With daylight the Arab guides were able to establish their position and successfully guided the force towards its objective. The delay occasioned meant that it was though another four hours before the Italians sighted the oasis and elements of the enemy contingent. These small groups were immediately brought under fire and they retreated towards Bir Tobras, followed by the column which was now itself under harassing fire from the flanks. The more they pressed forward however the more resistance they came up against and Fara realised that the enemy were in greater strength than had been calculated. Nevertheless he was confident that his command could still deal with them, though he took the precaution of sending a report of his progress and situation back to Ain Zara.

  Mountain Artillery at Bir Tobras with, inset, Colonel Gustavo Fara. Bir Tobras is a small oasis about 15 kilometres to the south of Ain Zara. On 19 December 1911 two battalions of the 11th Bersaglieri reinforced with a battalion of Grenadiers plus a machine gun section of two guns, a squadron of light cavalry, and two mountain guns amounting to some 1,500 men under the command of Colonel Gustavo Fara, set out to disperse an Ottoman detachment reported to be there. Upon engaging the enemy, however, it soon became apparent to Fara that they were far too strong and he sought to disengage. This proved impossible when the enemy pressed forward, flanking the Italian force on both sides so that it was in danger of being completely cut off. The retreat was in danger of turning into a rout as Fara attempted to manoeuvre his force through the dunes, with incipient panic becoming evident amongst the troops. Only by exercising decisive leadership did Fara rescue his command though they were forced to abandon much of their equipment. Fara was feted for his courage and coolness under fire and promoted to Major-General, but it was claimed that an ‘inclination to rashness’ and a ‘failure to see difficulties’ made him somewhat suspect. Any further such ventures were thereafter banned. (Author’s Collection).

  By 12:00 hours, and still moving forward, Fara came to realise that his previous impression had been in error and that he was in fact up against a force that was far too large to engage with, and contained numbers of regular troops. Accordingly he ordered disengagement and withdrawal. The enemy though refused to allow him to disengage and pressed forward in turn, flanking the Italian force on both sides so that it was in danger of being completely cut off. The retreat was in danger of turning into a rout as Fara attempted to manoeuvre his force through the dunes, with incipient panic becoming evident amongst the troops.

  Realising this, and with commendable coolness, he ordered the column to halt and entrench whilst he despatched further messengers back to Ain Zara for reinforcements. These were urgently required; his men were running short of ammunition and water and sand ingress had rendered his machine guns inoperable. Once the ammunition was gone then the column was finished. At least three concerted attacks were made by the enemy at 17:00, 20:00 and 23:00 hours, but while each was repulsed it was at the cost of depleting the ammunition. Indeed, it was fortunate in the extreme for the Italians that the enemy did not press home their attacks with more vigour, or move to completely surround their force. Given that his messengers had got through at all, which was by no means certain, Fara calculated that reinforcements should have arrived at midnight or so. However, with no sign, or even news, of them whatsoever he determined that he would have to evacuate his position before dawn on 20 December. If not he would then face certain destruction as the Ottomans were certain to renew their offensive, probably in greater strength, and his force would quickly run out of ammunition.

  This withdrawal began at 03:00 hours and succeeded in moving silently through the dunes in a northward direction. They were completely unmolested and at about 07:00 hours they came across a camp containing a brigade strength contingent under Major-General Clemente Lequio that had entrenched for the night. This combined force then returned to Ain Zara, meeting on the way virtually the entire strength of the rest of the 1st Division under the personal command of Conte Pecori-Giraldi. The divisional commander was in search of his two subordinates and was undoubtedly mightily relieved to find them, and their forces, both largely intact; Fara’s casualties, announced at the time as six killed and 78 wounded, amounted to eleven dead and 91 wounded.20 The corresponding enemy casualties were according to Bennett, eleven killed and 40 wounded.21

  There is no question that the Italians had been both foolhardy and extremely lucky. The sole creditable facet of the entire affair was the behaviour of Colonel Fara, who displayed a superlative presence of mind and quality of leadership without which the column would have been destroyed. Indeed, the decision to send the column seems of itself somewhat curious. The word of the five Arabs seems to have been taken at face value, at least by Pecori-Giraldi. That it was not a trap seems self-evident in retrospect inasmuch as the column escaped, whereas if the Ottomans had been waiting for it then they would have pre-deployed a much larger force and surrounded it properly. The bodies of the three who acted as guides were subsequently found riddled with bullets, and it seems practically certain that Fara, convinced of their treachery, had seen that they were shot. The two who remained at Ain Zara are believed to have been hanged.

  According to Abbott, who was with the Ottoman forces and witnessed much of the fighting at Bir Tobras, the five Arabs were actually genuine. They were acting on behalf of a sheikh called Mukhtar, ‘a rich man who owned […] a large estate, consisting of a dozen palm-groves, with many mud dwellings and wells […]’ in the vicinity of Bir Tobras. At first he supported resistance to the Italian occupation, but suspected that the advance to Ain Zara presaged further movement:

  When that came to pass, his property, owing to its position, would be the first to be seized, ravaged, and confiscated. He saw in fancy his noble palm-trees cut down, his mud dwellings demolished, his wives and his children, if not slain, driven to starvation and mendacity. He determined to avert this fate from himself, while there was yet time, by entering into secret negotiations with the enemy, and offering not only his submission, but also his assistance.22

  Bennett, who was also there, admitted he did not know whether or not ‘these Arabs were mere Decoys’ or ‘were actually seeking the protection of the invaders.’23 He went on to make the point that ‘If the arrival of the five Arabs at Ain Zara was part of a carefully planned ruse, one can only say that no military trap ever caught a more gullible enemy.’24 On the other hand, and Pecori-Giraldi was to argue this when his decision to despatch the force came under criticism, the column was a powerful unit that was well able to take care of itself under foreseeable circumstance
s. It was not expected to operate at any great distance from its base and neither the troops nor their commander were inexperienced. The 11th Bersaglieri in particular had extensive recent experience of fighting the Saraceni, and they were supported by artillery and machine guns, albeit the latter were difficult to keep working in the sandy conditions. Against this the Ottomans were able to bring together a force, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, that was probably not greatly superior in numbers. The Italians estimated them as being 3,000 strong, whilst the Ottoman side reckoned there were only about five or six hundred. Undoubtedly both were inaccurate, but no reliable figure can be arrived at. The peril that the column found itself in was not then caused by weakness as such, but rather to the extreme difficulties of moving across the terrain combined with the lack of a reliable system of communications, and thus the ability to summon support. That it was not expected to have to do any serious fighting is evidenced by the limited supplies of ammunition, food, and water, it carried.

  Despite its outcome, the Bir Tobras affair was condemned by the Italian high command in Tripoli, and Frugoni in particular. Indeed there was no aspect of the operation that Frugoni did not find fault with. He complained that he had not been consulted by his divisional commander and knew nothing of the despatch of Fara’s column, and he censured Pecori-Giraldi for initiating an operation, particularly as it escalated to embrace the entire 1st Division, without his knowledge and consent. Frugoni was also censorious of the tactics employed, especially with regard to night marches across the desert. The divisional commander was reminded that Frugoni had forbidden such manoeuvres during the advance on Ain Zara some two weeks previously, and that Pecori-Giraldi should therefore have known of, and respected, this decision. Damning criticism was directed at the planning and support of the operation, inasmuch as no provision had been made for keeping in communication with Fara’s column, and that no preparations had been made to have a reserve force ready to move in case of an emergency. Therefore when news reached Ain Zara at about 15:00 hours on 19 December, to the effect that the enemy were in greater strength than had been calculated, the divisional commander was unable to immediately initiate steps to get in touch with Fara. Astonishingly, neither did he bring his command to a state of readiness for going to his relief. The composition and strength of the column was also found wanting. Frugoni considered it too weak for independent operations and stated that it should have had at least a whole battery (six guns) of mountain artillery in support instead of just two guns.

  Pecori-Giraldi defended himself against the majority of the charges, though he did acknowledge that the despatch of the column on the say-so of the five Arabs demonstrated a lack of prudence. He did, however, argue that the operation differed only slightly from the reconnaissance missions that had been carried out from Ain Zara on an almost daily basis since its capture. He also, as already explained, disputed Frugoni’s points about the strength of the unit, and claimed that if the enemy’s strength was greatly in excess of what he expected then the failure lay with army intelligence, upon whose information he had to rely, rather than him. The failure to maintain adequate communication he blamed on Fara, who, he claimed, had been assigned cavalry for just such a purpose. He also held Fara responsible for failing to make a surprise attack at dawn on the oasis, and held that he should have abandoned the attack after arriving at the oasis so late in the day. Carrying on with it was a major departure from the expected mission, and he should have sent word back to Ain Zara immediately he began the attack, instead of waiting two hours until he discovered the opposition was stronger than at first thought. Fara’s message to this effect, despatched at noon, did not arrive until after 15:00 hours, by which time, Pecori-Giraldi claimed, any relieving force would have to travel in the dark and would likely get lost in the desert. Further, he stated, Fara had informed him in the message that the column could take care of itself. When some hours later he was informed that the column was in trouble and had been forced to entrench, the two hour delay in sending Lequio and his brigade was explained by the need to try and prepare such a manoeuvre in the darkness. That General Lequio did get lost has already been noted, and because he could hear no firing from the south towards which to march he, perhaps wisely, decided to encamp and wait for daylight.25

  There can be little doubt that Pecori-Giraldi’s arguments were as weak as his performance; nor can there be an excuse for his failure to at least ensure that reinforcements were on standby. This is particularly the case following the arrival of Fara’s morning message at around 15:00 hours stating that the enemy were in greater strength than anticipated. The outcome of this lack of preparation meant that when the message requesting urgent relief was received this had to be organised from scratch. As McClure was to state it: ‘General Pecori seems to have launched Fara’s column into the desert, and then ceased to have troubled himself about it any further.’26

  The Bir Tobras affair was, of itself, of minor importance. One of the immediate outcomes was that the Ottomans claimed a victory and salvaged a great deal of booty from the battlefield. The most important of this was the two hundred rifles or so recovered. Abbott’s account offers an explanation for the large number of these:

  […] there were scores and scores of them, and as I could not believe that every rifle represented a dead enemy, I was obliged to accept the explanation which everybody gave - namely, that the Italians, knowing the Arabs’ unquenchable thirst for plunder, throw their rifles and cartridges away as they flee, so that they may escape while their pursuers waste time in picking them up.27

  Gustavo Fara was feted for his courage and coolness under fire and promoted to Major-General, but it was claimed that an ‘inclination to rashness’ and a ‘failure to see difficulties’ made him somewhat suspect. If Fara came out of the affair with credit, the same cannot be said of Pecori-Giraldi. His position became untenable and early in January the inevitable ‘General Peccori-Giraldi has returned to Italy owing to ill health’ notice appeared. His replacement was the former commander of the 13th Division at Ancona, Count Vittorio Camerana. None of this was particularly significant in the grand scheme of things, but what was of great importance was the effect the whole business seems to have had on the minds of Caneva and Frugoni.

  The plan for a powerful advance to the south in divisional strength, still very much in play in December, was quietly shelved. On 4 January 1912 the politicians and staff in Rome were told that any such offensive would be too costly and hazardous and would in any case be unlikely to bring about a decisive battle. Operational strategy defaulted to consolidation of territory already occupied, localised and small scale military operations, and to ‘ally ourselves with time.’28 The relationship between the Bir Tobras affair and the abandonment of what might be termed a forward strategy is impossible to determine with any certainty; it cannot be claimed that it was indisputably one of cause and effect. Nevertheless observers noted that progress on the railway to Ain Zara was not pursued with any great urgency. The specialised material and labour for the construction did not arrive at Tripoli until the middle of January 1912, suggesting that an advance early in 1912 was not a high priority. At some 14 kilometres in total length the line was of single track, with double track at six locations to provide passing places, and laid directly onto an excavated sand base with iron sleepers. The first train steamed into Ain Zara on 17 March 1912.

  It was of course not perceived immediately that the lack of advance movement was a matter of policy rather than a matter imposed by military difficulties or ‘that tendency to wait upon events which must be held to have marked the Italian conduct of hostilities.’29 Repington noted towards the end of December that ‘the failure to turn the enemy out of Bir Tobras is one of the various symptoms that little progress is being made.’30 Retrospectively, McClure adjudged that ‘the most interesting points’ revealed by the events at Bir Tobras were ‘the obvious determination of the supreme command to avoid all the ordinary risks of war and, with that end in view, its
conception of the proportionate military strength requisite for given operations.’ He perceived that this heralded the first indication of a policy that proscribed any action ‘involving the minimum of risk or more than the minimum of loss.’ The corollary of this required that ‘no operation should be undertaken without the assurance of a strong numerical superiority over the forces of the enemy.’ Despite being avowedly pro-Italian in outlook he was critical, arguing that: ‘The adoption of such principles of action gives ground for surprise; the enunciation of the second certainly seems to call for criticism.’31

  This hesitant and risk-free philosophy was demonstrated in the Battle of Gargaresch, which took place on 18 January 1912. The decision to finally take the village seems to have been a reaction to the Ottoman forces operating openly in the area and, according to Italian sources, terrorizing the ‘loyal’ inhabitants. In any event on the morning of 18 January a powerful force was despatched westward from Tripoli consisting of the entire 57th Regiment of Infantry, reinforced with a battalion of Grenadiers and supported by a battery of mountain artillery, a half-battery of field artillery, a force of engineers, and the 2nd and 4th squadrons of the 19th Cavalry (Guide) Regiment (Cavalleggeri Guide 19°) – about 3000 men in total under the regimental commander, Colonel Giuseppe Amari. This force, arrayed in column, reached the oasis surrounding Gargaresch at about 09:00 hours and encountered an enemy force estimated to be about 100 strong lurking amongst the foliage.

  Being greatly outnumbered and under threat of being outflanked to the south, the defenders soon abandoned their positions and retreated to the west, allowing the column to occupy the village and its oasis. The construction of a series of strong entrenchments was immediately begun. By late morning the defenders to the south were deployed in deep trenches at a distance of around two kilometres from the outskirts of the oasis whilst the Grenadiers were similarly placed to the west. According to some sources there were three lines of trenches, but all accounts agree that there were two at least.