A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  Ottoman Artillery at Derna. Taken by Georges Remond, this photograph shows what appear to be mountain artillery in the Ottoman camp. Both the Italian and Ottoman armies were equipped with Krupp 75mm 1904 mountain guns, but it seems possible that these are captured weapons.

  If the fighting around Derna was centred around possession of the Wadi, and hence control of the water supply, the terrain around Benghazi was rather less difficult, at least in terms of defence, with a fairly flat plain between the coast and the hills. Although frequent small-scale skirmishes occurred, there was no real attempt at an attack for weeks after the Italian occupation of the town, giving the occupiers time to construct strong earthworks and blockhouses. The Benghazi defences were sophisticated, and a ten-kilometre ‘Decauville Railway’ was constructed to provide communication between the various parts. An artificial airstrip was also built as, due to the soft nature of the ground around the chosen area of construction near the Wells of Sabri, it was necessary to lay down a wooden platform some 100 x 12 metres for the machines to take-off and land.

  As at Tripoli City, the artillery had been reinforced with a number of heavy, 152 mm, guns by the middle of November. Provided that the Italians did not venture outside these defences then they were safe even though the Ottoman forces, estimated to number around 15,000, constantly attacked them, or pretended to. Following the movement of Ottoman officers into the vilayet the forces around Benghazi were under the command of Aziz Ali Bey El-Masri, an officer of Egyptian descent, of whom more later. According to the Italians, the tactics he often employed revolved around simulated nocturnal attacks, with the object of the exercise being twofold; the defenders would be unnerved and they would waste a great deal of ammunition in repelling these ‘attacks.’ Whether the first object was attained is difficult to judge, but the second was certainly achieved as these excursions usually resulted in a huge artillery barrage, from both land-based and, often, naval artillery. Tittoni describes such an action in what he calls a ‘general attack upon the city:’

  This action involved only the artillery, as the Arab-Turks advanced cautiously and kept a great distance from the lines. The other arms, ready and on the watch, consequently participated neither in the action nor in the defense of the trenches nor in the counter-attacks.

  The artillery opened up an efficacious and continuous fire at 3800 to 4000 metres […] using 29 pieces, each one firing on an average of 39 shots.

  There were no appreciable losses; and when it is taken into consideration that the firing kept up all day, the expenditure of that amount of ammunition was justified. The batteries gave proof of their perfect fire-discipline, excellent technical and professional preparation, efficacy, and coordination of action.46

  In November reconnaissance revealed that substantial elements of the Ottoman force were located to the north-east of Benghazi, principally at the oases of al Kuwayfiya (el-Coefia, al-Kwaifiya, Koefia, el Coef) and Sidi Khalifa (Sidi Chalifa, Sidi Califa); some 10 and 15 kilometres away respectively. Because these oases were close to the sea they were well within range of naval gunfire, therefore any advance on them would be well supported and thus less hazardous than an inland manoeuvre that went beyond the range of the warships. Accordingly, on 28 November Major General Raynaldo de’Amico led his 3rd Brigade, supported from offshore by the armoured cruiser San Marco and the destroyer Agordat, on a march along the coast towards the two oases.47 The brigade reached both objectives but came into conflict with a large Ottoman force. As usual, accounts of the fighting and its outcome differ greatly according to the proclivities of the author. Tittoni, quoting from the reports of the Italian General Staff, puts it thus: ‘[…] our troops, after ably overcoming the difficulty of the terrain, and giving proof of their vigor and ardor, surprised and dispersed a large force of Bedouins, who left on the field 21 dead […]. McClure, who admits he was not a witness of any of the events which took place in Cyrenaica, reported, from Italian sources, ‘a sharp but indecisive action’ whilst most non-Italian accounts describe a defeat, with twenty-two killed and fifty wounded, followed by retreat to Benghazi.

  Minor combats of this nature, with no larger purpose other than to consolidate gains already made, were much in evidence at Tobruk, the third Cyrenaican port in Italian hands. Indeed the only notable feature of the conflict there, other than perhaps the airborne wounding of Carlo Montu, was the presence on the Ottoman side of Mustafa Kemal, who went on to become the Ottoman Empire’s greatest general and Atatürk (Father of the Turks), the founder of modern Turkey. Kemal had left Istanbul on 15 October and arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, on 29 October (the dates vary dependant on source).48 Travelling as either a journalist named Sherif (Serif) Bey, or a carpet salesman, or conceivably a mixture of the two, he was taken ill and delayed in the city. He eventually reached Benghazi on 8 December and was sent on to Tobruk, where the main Ottoman camp was situated at el-Mdàuar (Ras Mdauar, Mdawar) some 20 kilometres to the south.

  The commander there was Edhem Pasa, who had requested the services of Kemal and quickly oversaw his promotion to the rank of major. Kemal, according to one of his biographers, stressed discipline and order to the men under his command, and divided them into small units.49 As soon as he arrived he personally reconnoitred the Italian positions and recommended a small-scale attack. This, his first engagement with the enemy, took place outside Tobruk on 22 December, and was deemed a victory.50 It was though, as elsewhere, impossible to do more than attempt to hold the Italians within their defences. As Tittoni related it: ‘the adversary was growing in numbers, and made a great many attacks against our works and skirmished with our troops on reconnaissance, but all the engagements were limited in importance.’51 On 30 December Kemal was reassigned to Ayn al-Mansur (Ain Mansur), where he was to command the forces before Derna and Tobruk while Enver commanded the whole Cyrenaican theatre from the same place. He was to write to a friend about how he had ‘crossed the Mediterranean Sea’ and ‘covered distant deserts to confront an enemy based on his Fleet, and how the Ottoman-led forces had ‘managed to keep the enemy at bay at certain points on the coast.’52 If his later account to his biographer, Hikmet Bayur, is to be believed, he realized from the start that doing anything more than containing the Italians in their enclaves ‘was hopeless.’ He had to stay and make the effort however in order ‘to keep my material and moral position in the army and amongst the officers who were my contemporaries.’53 It is often said that Kemal and Enver did not get on and this is borne out by the former’s 1926 reminiscence:

  ‘How his (Enver’s) designs were to be carried out was for him a matter of detail. He was generally ignorant in military matters, as he had not progressed step by step from the command of a battalion to that of a regiment, and so on.’54

  At Al Khums in Tripolitania it became evident by the end of December 1911 that an advance, albeit one tactical in nature, was necessary. The port and town, complete with its 18-metre lighthouse, was surrounded on its landward side by an oasis, whilst some 6 kilometres to the east were the ancient ruins of Leptis Magna (Neapolis, Lebda). However the feature of most importance in the military context was Ra’s al Marqab (al-Markib, Markib, Colline del Mercheb, Mergheb), a steep-sided hill some 213 metres high and about 6 kilometres to the south-west. Dominating the town as it did, this was the key strategic feature of the landscape. Elements of the 8th Bersaglieri that had landed on 21 October under Colonel Giovanni Maggiotto to occupy Al Khums had penetrated as far as the hill, but without support could not take and hold it. Upon the withdrawal of the Bersaglieri, Ottoman forces had swiftly occupied the position, which was topped with a structure dating from antiquity, probably a blockhouse, that was then adapted for modern military purposes.55 According to Irace, this had ‘always been a well-known refuge of brigands, who, ensconced amongst the ruins of an old Roman castle, defied from this mountain eyrie the Turkish authority.’56

  The modern adaptation might have been of only minor import had it not eventually included the emplacing of t
wo artillery pieces; probably the Krupp 87 mm 1897 model though they might have been the more potent 75 mm 1906 model captured from the Italians. The usual inconclusive skirmishes and minor actions had taken place around the periphery of the defences ever since the occupiers had taken possession of Al Khums, and following the sending of large-scale reinforcements there were about 5,000 troops in the garrison under Major-General Ezio Reisoli. This garrison was apparently surprised when early in the New Year the Ottoman guns began a sporadic bombardment, firing several shells a day into Al Khums. This was little more than a nuisance, and was countered by the emplacing of a counter battery of 149 mm howitzers near the lighthouse that silenced the Ottoman guns on 12 January. It became clear to Reisoli though that to make the occupation secure Ra’s al Marqab would have to be taken and held. As well as mounting the two guns, it provided a secure base from which to mount harassing attacks.

  Assaulting the position would be no easy task however, as the Ottomans had entrenched themselves around the prominence and were present in significant numbers. In order to weaken the defenders Reisoli devised and implemented a cunning and audacious plan. On 26 February 1912 two Italian vessels, a warship and a passenger steamer, appeared off the coast at Zliten (Sliten), some 40 kilometres east of Al Khums. Activity aboard these vessels indicated to those watching from shore that a landing was imminent. Accordingly, substantial reinforcements were hurried from the Ra’s al Marqab area to oppose the manoeuvre. It was however merely an Italian ruse, and during the early morning of 27 February almost the entire garrison of Al Khums left the defences and, divided into three columns, made towards the mountain in the pre-dawn darkness.

  The centre column was composed of a battalion from the 89th Infantry Regiment, a battalion of Alpini, and a company of engineers, with a mountain battery in support. This was the assault column, tasked with making a frontal attack on Ra’s al Marqab in an attempt to take it by storm. The left and right columns, composed of battalions from the 8th Bersaglieri and two infantry battalions drawn from the 6th and 37th Regiments respectively, together with supporting elements, had the task of protecting the flanks and rear of the assaulting troops from any enemy interference. At daylight the artillery at Al Khums began a heavy bombardment of the Ottoman position and the troops of the centre column attacked the mountain. It was, according to reports issued from Rome the following day, ‘an all day battle’ but the Italians prevailed and by the evening of 27 February they held the summit of Ra’s al Marqab. Reisoli, through a combination of guile and daring, had won an important, if relatively minor, victory at the cost of 26 dead and 130 wounded; the Italian occupation of Al Khums was made secure.

  Italian innovation was not restricted to tactical matters however. Mention has already been made of the collecting of motor wagons at the market at Tripoli City, and the use of lorries to carry and distribute supplies, and later infantry, became widespread. It had not at first been thought that such vehicles would prove useful due to the lack of proper roads in the theatre. A trial of two light FIAT lorries fitted with twin pneumatic tyres on the rear wheels was undertaken. Despite much of the terrain over which they operated consisting of rough, loose sand and gravel-type material strewn with rocks, interspersed with dunes that they could not negotiate, they quickly established their superiority over animal transport. Thirty more of the same type were then despatched followed by larger consignments. Sources differ as regards to numbers, but around 300 light ‘auto-trucks’ were sent to the theatre with around half being deployed in and around Tripoli City – heavier vehicles were excluded because they used solid rubber tyres, which would have been of no use given the ground.

  The idea of using self-propelled vehicles in warfare was not novel and had been long encouraged by proponents of the devices. Indeed between the years 1873-1883 the Italian Army had conducted extensive experiments in using traction engines, or road locomotives (locomotive stradali) as they were termed, to haul artillery, but had concluded that they were too unwieldy and not reliable enough at that time.57 This was undoubtedly correct, but late nineteenth century technological evolution by no means discarded steam power. The Horseless Age, the first US automotive magazine, had carried an article in 1897 entitled ‘Motor Vehicles in Warfare’ which had identified deficiencies in internal combustion engine powered vehicles, and therefore argued that the future of such vehicles lay in steam power:

  […] since the petroleum motors at present are not satisfactory above ten horse power […] a motor vehicle for military service must be a carefully designed steam traction engine, planned to haul artillery and supply trains anywhere where horses can go; the questions of speed and personal comfort, so important in pleasure vehicles, need hardly be considered […] and it is not at all unlikely that motors in warfare may soon enter the field service as extensively as they have already entered other departments.58

  They were indeed used in small number during the Second Boer War when the British despatched 24 of them to South Africa in 1899 followed by six armoured versions; the latter being equipped with four armoured trailers apiece.59 Used to tow heavy guns and their impedimenta the British named them ‘steam sappers,’ but the Italian experience was replicated according to Major General Sir John Headlam of the Royal Artillery who served with them. He concluded that they were ‘too cumbersome for general use on ordinary roads, and quite unsuited for taking guns into action.’60

  Technological advances though led to much improved internal combustion engines, and by 1911 the objections to utilising vehicles powered by them had been largely overcome. Italy thus scored another military first by making large-scale use of motorised lorries to transport supplies. According to Renato Tittoni:

  This new method of transportation resulted in the rapid clearing of the wharves and transmitting the stores to the troops, transporting construction materials, removal of camp equipage, and carrying ammunition and rations to the firing-line. We therefore had ample proof from this complex work – the long daily trips made over desert and variable ground – that inspired complete faith in this mode of transportation to follow the troops, under any circumstances and for long distances, with great saving of time and fatigue, besides the ordinary services required by the presence of many troops on a warlike mission.61

  A Fabbrica Automobili Isotta Fraschini armour-plated car. By 1911 technological advances in internal combustion engines had led to their widespread adoption in vehicles. The Italian Army scored a military first by making large-scale use of motorised lorries to transport supplies, though the convoys thus formed of these thin-skinned vehicles were of necessity slow moving and thus somewhat vulnerable to small arms fire. In order to offer some protection, and to be able to retaliate against attack, armoured versions were constructed armed with machine guns. The first of these, designed by Giustino Cattaneo of the Milanese company Isotta Fraschini, was ready for deployment by the end of 1911. It was of an advanced design armed with two 6.5 mm Vickers-Maxim machine guns, one in a turret mounting that could swivel and one rear-firing. Plated with 4 mm steel for crew protection, the vehicle weighed some 3 tonnes and was fitted with steel extension rims for the wheels to prevent it sinking into the ground. It was a success, and several more of similar designs were ordered from various manufacturers. Though the concept was not entirely new, these were the first armoured fighting vehicles ever to be deployed in a combat situation. (Author’s Collection).

  The convoys thus formed of these thin-skinned vehicles were of necessity slow moving and thus somewhat vulnerable to small arms fire. In a similar manner to their steam-powered ancestors, and in order to offer some protection and to be able to retaliate against attack, armoured versions equipped with machine guns were developed. Again this was not a totally new idea, and armoured cars powered by internal combustion engines had been both mooted and built previously; Austria-Hungary and France had constructed working, albeit experimental, models in 1900-6.62

  Working quickly, and probably sensing a commercial opportunity, the M
ilanese company Fabbrica Automobili Isotta Fraschini had a model designed by its engineer Giustino Cattaneo ready for use by the end of 1911. It was of an advanced design armed with two 6.5mm Vickers-Maxim machine guns, one in a turret mounting that could swivel and one rear firing. Plated with 4mm steel for crew protection the vehicle weighed some 3 tonnes and was fitted with steel extension rims for the wheels to prevent it sinking into the ground. It can safely be concluded that the concept was considered successful, inasmuch as several more of similar design were ordered from various manufacturers.

  The mobility conferred by the use of vehicular transport was first put to use in a military operation during another advance towards Zanzur (Janzur) that took place on 8 June 1912. This was undertaken by the heavily reinforced 1st Division comprising 13,494 infantry including troops from Eritrea (ascari), 8 squadrons of cavalry, 12 machine guns, and 50 artillery pieces now under the command of conteVittorio Camerana, which departed from the Italian lines near Gargaresh at 03:30 hours with its two core Brigades each in column.63 These two columns advanced in echelon, with Giardina’s 2nd Brigade (the 6th and 40th Regiments and two batteries of mountain artillery) on the right nearest the sea being slightly ahead of the 1st Brigade (the 82nd and 84th Regiments, with three batteries of field artillery) under Rainaldi.

  Accompanying the advance were 54 motor lorries divided into four transport columns, the whole of this mechanical transport being under the command of Captain Corazzi. One of these columns, consisting of ten vehicles, formed an ambulance train under the command of a surgeon, whilst the other three (under the command of Lieutenants Milani, Bosio and Marocco) carried engineering equipment such as barbed wire, sand bags, and shovels together with a large quantity of dynamite. The ambulance column followed directly behind the advancing troops whilst the engineering supplies waited until called upon.