A Box of Sand

by Charles Stephenson

  With the occupation of the islands in the Southern Sporades and Millo’s ‘reconnaissance’ the limits of Italian navalism, and its ability to influence the outcome of the conflict with the Ottoman Empire, had been reached. There were to be no further notable actions, other than the occasional exchange of fire with Ottoman coastal defences, in the eastern Mediterranean or Aegean, but in the main theatre of the war the navy continued to assist in the occupation of key points. Perhaps chief amongst these was the operation to take Misrata (Misratah, Misurata), probably the most important commercial centre in the Tripoli vilayet after Tripoli City. It was a substantial town with a population estimated at about 10,000, surrounded by a large oasis with a population calculated to be some 35,000 strong.

  The amphibious operation once again involved a feint by vessels of the Training Division. On the evening of 15 June and the next morning a demonstration was made at Zliten, about 60 kilometres west of Misrata by three auxiliary cruisers, the Duca di Genova, Citta di Messina and Citta di Siracusa, accompanied by three transports. The real landing however took place on the morning of 16 June at Qasr Ahmed (Bu-Sceifa, Misurata Marina), some 12 kilometres to the east of the target, under cover of the guns of the major units of Borea Ricci’s command. The military force, aboard nine transports, was made up of a composite division under Major-General Count Vittorio Camerana drawn from formations stationed in Italy, Tripoli, Derna and Benghazi. Three regiments of infantry formed the core of his command, the 35th, 50th, and 63rd, together with the Mondovi and Verona battalions of Alpini, a battalion of the 40th Infantry, a company of the 5th Eritrean, a squadron of Lucca cavalry, and artillery and engineer support. The whole force totalled about 10,000 men, and in command of the second of the two mixed brigades (II Brigata Mista) was Major-General Gustavo Fara, the hero of the actions at el-Hani on 23 October and Bir Tobras on 20 December.

  The landing was accomplished without major incident, and by the evening of 16 June a secure bridgehead had been established ashore. Easily repulsed piecemeal attacks were made on the defensive perimeter during 17 June, but Camerana had decided on remaining on the defensive for the moment and so he made no attempt to exploit the lodgement. Indeed, the next week was spent by the Italians in consolidating their position on what was a barren stretch of coast, and building up supplies there for use as a base of operations. The cavalry squadron was used for reconnaissance towards the target and surrounding areas, and reported that there was no sign of the enemy in any force. This changed on 23 June when signs of Ottoman activity in the oasis of Misrata were detected and a concerted attack by a force reckoned to have been 5,000 strong was repulsed on 2 July.

  At 04:00 hours on 9 July Camerana moved over to the offensive, advancing on Misrata in three columns supported by the Training Division steaming slowly offshore. The right and centre columns advanced directly towards the town whilst that on the left, commanded by Fara, swept around it to the south with his flank protected by the cavalry. According to official Italian reports, the column closest to the coast encountered stiff resistance from the start from enemy troops entrenched on the eastern edge of the Oasis of Misrata. The centre and left-hand columns bypassed much of this resistance, though the centre column also encountered enemy forces entrenched at the village of Az Zarrug on the eastern outskirts of the town, and Misrata itself was entered and taken by 18:00 hours that evening. It took until 20 July for the oasis to be completely cleared of enemy combatants, but the final Italian casualty list, 9 killed and 121 wounded (including 4 ascari) since landing, again suggests that the fighting had not been particularly hard. The figures for Ottoman casualties are impossible to compute, the Italians as always estimated several hundred, but a strong force remained congregated at the village of Al Ghiran (Gherem) southwest of Misrata. This village was attacked by Fara on 20 July and, relatively speaking, he suffered heavy casualties with 19 killed and 87 wounded and was almost overwhelmed; a manifestation of his supposed ‘inclination to rashness’ perhaps.

  In any event, with the capture of Misrata the sole port on the entire coastline of the vilayet not in Italian hands was Zuwarah. The landing at El Faru and subsequent capture of Abu Kammash on 10 April had served notice that the usefulness of this coastal village as a node in the contraband route was threatened, but it had not completely negated it as there was an alternative, parallel, route some 15 kilometres inland. Ottoman forces still retained control of the village of Bi’r Sidi Sa’id (Sidi Said), situated some two kilometres along the coast from the base of the El Faru peninsula. Retention of this position gave the holders a flanking position in respect of any move on Riqdalin (Regdalin) which sat astride the inland road.

  Accordingly, on 26 June 1912 Garioni had moved in two columns on Bi’r Sidi Sa’id from Abu Kammash and the peninsula and, after three days fighting, had taken possession. The next step was the taking of Zuwarah itself, and this was accomplished on 4 August via a two-pronged assault utilising control of the sea. Escorted by the battleships of the Training Division, together with two destroyers and six torpedo-boats, a brigade strength force, 5,000 men in 6 battalions with 2 artillery batteries, under Major-General Giulio Cesare Tassoni was conveyed in seven transports and landed at a small bay some 3.5 kilometres to the east of Zuwarah. Once ashore this force began to advance on the town hoping to time its arrival to coincide with an advance from the west by a brigade under Major-General Lequio. This force had set out during the night, but despite having to traverse rough terrain, covered the 18 kilometres in good time and arrived outside Zuwarah before Tassoni’s command at about 09:00 hours. Here they halted until 13:00 hours when Tassoni arrived, and the two brigades then entered the oasis and town; both were deserted.

  The last significant port in the vilayet, albeit a very small and poor one, available to the Ottoman forces had fallen into Italian hands, cutting off any kind of meaningful marine trade. The road to the south was not to remain open much longer either; on 15 August Garioni directed both brigades southwards and they occupied and fortified high ground around Riqdalin. From here the road could be interdicted and so the trade had to be moved to the southern route where the Italians could not venture.

  The amphibious warfare practised by Italy was sophisticated, and the various feints and ruses employed to ensure that the landing forces met with no opposition were an essential part of it. Perhaps the landing at Rhodes was the most prominent of these, achieved as it was with minimal cost. That operation, together with the occupation of the other islands, represented, according to General Ameglio, ‘the first major and successful combined operation between the army and the navy.’33 One may quibble at that statement, inasmuch as other landings such as the Benghazi operation of 21 October under Ameglio were similar, but he did identify a major point; that of the necessity of cooperation. This had the potential to be problematical, and historical examples abound of inter-service rivalry, but Italy seems to have had little trouble in 1911-12.

  The other main problem was of course tactical. The only way of getting men from transport ships to the landing beach was by putting them in small boats, usually ships’ boats but almost anything that would float could be pressed into service. Before the First World War no army or navy possessed any specialised equipment to facilitate landing operations, the first such being the British ‘Beetle.’ These were armoured and each could carry about four hundred men; ‘They have a long gangway which lets down in front to enable troops to jump ashore across deep water, the gangway acting like a drawbridge.’34

  The most hazardous parts of the operation from the point of view of the attackers was when they were still in the boats and completely powerless, or, having successfully made the journey from the ships, just after landing when they are weak and exposed. If Ottoman forces were present at or near the landing site in any significant number, then they would wreak havoc on the unprotected troops, and although the guns of the warships could lend support they were of little utility against nearly invisible defenders stationed in sand dunes and
the like.

  Unless they had the element of surprise, Italian amphibious operations were then hazardous and likely to fail. As the famous military theorist and historian, Basil Liddell Hart, was to put it in 1939 when considering the forthcoming war with Germany: ‘A landing on a foreign coast in face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.’35 The need for surprise is an enduring principle; the modern doctrine of the US Marine Corps, whose knowledge and abilities in the matter are unrivalled, emphasises this element.36

  Mostly then, through cooperation between their army and navy, combined with good intelligence and thus their use of surprise, or ‘landing where the enemy wasn’t’ as it might be termed, the Italians were successful in most of their amphibious enterprises and scored some notable achievements. However, as has been noted, the Italians never admitted to suffering any setbacks and consequently their records show no indication of overt failure. In the amphibious context it is probably the case that two operations had to be aborted because of the presence of defenders, though because of the way the Italians conducted their operations casualties were slight. Italian practice devolved around landing parties of marines or sailors to reconnoitre and, if there were no resistance, secure the beach. These were then followed by the main body of the landing force. If resistance was met, then the initial landing parties would withdraw. This is what happened at Zuwarah on 16 December 1911, though the Italians blamed poor weather. Another hazard revolved around disinformation. This is what seems to have occurred on 1 June 1912 when landing parties were lured ashore under a false pretext, at least according to Enver Pasa. His diary entry for that day is as follows:

  It was reported that the Italians had landed at Susa. That would be an excellent opportunity for us. They will run up against insurmountable difficulties in the terrain and fierce resistance from the Bedouin.37

  Susah (Susa) is located some 70 kilometres to the west of Derna, on the Cyrenaican coast and was described in 1854 by ‘Mediterranean Smyth’ as ‘a mere boat cove, though once the port of the potent city of Cyrene.’38 A slightly fuller account of the event was given by Enver in his entry for the following day:

  The landing of the Italians at Susa went as I had hoped. A native of Derna that served the Italians as a spy, was put ashore in order to ask the Bedouin around to a meeting with the Italians, where they would be persuaded by words and deeds of Italian generosity. The local Bedouin chief sent the spy back with a message agreeing to meet. Some Italians then left the ships and came to the beach in boats. After they had landed they were immediately put under a heavy fire and flew headlong back into their boats. In response to this friendly reception, the warship fired on the coast for the rest of the day.39

  Nevertheless, the majority of Italian amphibious operations were successful, and the experienced gained made the Italian armed forces skilled in this form of warfare. Indeed, until the British and French operations at Gallipoli in 1915 were undertaken, amongst the European nations it was Italy that possessed the most knowledgeable and experienced forces in the technique. Skills in the military and naval spheres could not though resolve the conflict with the Ottoman Empire in Italy’s favour, and so it remained to be seen whether Italian politicians and diplomats could succeed where force had failed.

  CHAPTER THIRTEEN

  The Iron Dice Roll

  ‘In Europe, the opinion is widespread that the Italians found it impossible to penetrate into the interior, due to the resistance, of the Turks and Arabs that opposed them. That is completely erroneous. The Italians have not penetrated into the interior, because they have not had the courage to act.’

  From an article in Rome’s La Tribuna, 19121

  IF Italian strategy vis-à-vis war with the Ottoman Empire was paralysed, then the Ottoman strategy of waiting in the hope of gaining Great Power support in order to force Italy to an acceptable compromise had also failed. Ottoman approaches to various of the Great Powers had been rebuffed, and the focus of attention had begun to shift from the North African vilayet to trouble in areas far closer to home. Chief amongst these was the Albanian issue. The Ottoman vilayets of Janina, Kosovo and Iskodra had a majority population that considered themselves Albanian, and a large proportion of the vilayet of Monastir was likewise. Albanian nationalists, though not necessarily hostile to Ottoman rule as such, desired the amalgamation of the four vilayets into an autonomous homeland.

  The advent of the CUP-supported regime following the revolution and counterrevolution of 1908 led the nationalists to hope that their aim of autonomy within the empire would be realised. As stated, they were not anti-Ottoman inasmuch as they shared the Islamic faith and culture, but the ramshackle nature of the empire, and its various ad hoc expedients over time, had allowed the Albanian people certain privileges. The arrangements by which they were governed were shambolic. Sir John Hobhouse accompanied Lord Byron on a tour through the area in the early years of the nineteenth century and put it thus:

  Specimens of almost every sort of government are to be found in Albania. Some districts and towns are commanded by one man […]; others obey their elders; others are under no subjection, but each man governs his own family. The power in some places is in abeyance, and although there is no apparent anarchy, there are no rulers.2

  Things had not altered much a century later, but the CUP aimed to change all this by imposing centralised government with equal citizenship rights for all. Such policies discountenanced the notion of autonomous ‘national’ homelands and, accordingly, discontent manifested itself in armed revolts in many areas where Albanians resided. The Sultan himself visited Albanian areas in 1911 but to little effect, and the continuing and growing discontent not only consumed more and more Ottoman military resources, but fed political tensions in the whole Balkan region. A large-scale uprising occurred in May 1912 and was more successful than many previous efforts inasmuch as the city of Skopje, now in the modern Republic of Macedonia but at the time the administrative centre of Ottoman rule in the vilayet of Kosovo, fell to the insurgents.

  By the summer of 1912 Ottoman control of the whole Balkan region had begun to deteriorate badly and the government in Istanbul seemed impotent. The situation was exploited by groupings other than Albanian nationalists with agendas of their own, and several of these most definitely did want to throw off Ottoman rule. Further, concessions made to Albanian nationalism in respect of Kosovo, were highly provocative to Serbian nationalists. They regarded the vilayet as unredeemed Serbian territory, the acquisition of which was pivotal in their struggle for national reunification and the reconstitution of ‘Old Serbia.’3 The question of unredeemed territory currently under Ottoman control was also central to the ambitions of Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, and in 1912 these independent states had begun to form themselves into an alliance or coalition in order to pursue their shared interests. A ‘Treaty of Coalition’ was signed between Serbia and Bulgaria on 29 February 1912, followed by a ‘Military Convention’ on 12 June. Likewise Greece and Bulgaria came to an agreement, signing a ‘Treaty of Coalition’ on 16 May, which was followed by a ‘Military Convention’ on 22 September.4 These bilateral arrangements included an informal agreement between Montenegro and Bulgaria, which was concluded in April, but no formal treaty was signed.

  Attempts were made to keep the formulation and existence of these treaties and agreements secret. However the inevitable rumours did the diplomatic rounds particularly as Russia – the Protector of the Slavs – was perceived, correctly, to be complicit in the creation of a bloc to counterbalance the expansive moves of Austria-Hungary.5 Rumours of impending conflict were also fuelled by military purchases; both the Ottoman and Serbian governments began making large-scale purchases of horses in Austria-Hungary and Russia during the month of May. The following month the Serb Parliament voted a special credit of twenty million francs for war purposes. Whether or not they knew of the alliances in detail, the Ottoman government was certainly aware of increased instability; ‘chaos w
as increasing in the Balkans day by day’ following the agreements. ‘After the formation of the Serbian-Bulgarian alliance, demonstrations against the Ottoman state had begun in Bulgaria. Through the provocations of Serbia and Bulgaria, militia activities in Macedonia suddenly increased, and anarchy broke out.’6

  Balkan unrest, or at least unrest that led to Austro-Hungarian or Russian advantage, was very much against Italian interests. This was particularly so in respect of the area that encompassed the Albanian vilayets, which Italian politicians and businessmen had viewed through imperialist eyes for some time. Italian economic penetration in the area, including the presence of banks and railway construction, might be said to have been greater than it had managed in Tripoli. The ties went even deeper than that though; Italy also had a substantial population of Italo-Albanians (Schipetaro, Arbëreshë) living mainly in the south and it was from this community that Francesco Crispi had hailed. Indeed none other than San Giuliano, before he became foreign minister, had published a book advocating Italian expansion in the area.7 There were also dynastic ties in that the King of Montenegro, Nikola (Nicholas) I, was the father-in-law of Vittorio Emmanuel III of Italy.

  Whether Italy’s war with the Ottoman Empire was a contributory factor in bringing about the Balkan turmoil, and if so to what extent, has long been debated. According to the British Ambassador to Rome in 1912, Sir James Rennell Rodd, it was ‘generally accepted’ at the time that it was a direct cause. This is perhaps overstating the case. For example, Sir George Young, writing in 1915, argued that the Italo-Ottoman war ‘brought no material contribution to the conjunction of political forces that was to cause the war of the Balkan Coalition.’ He did though go on to contend that:

  [I]n the moral sphere of international relations, it was of great effect. It radically changed the moral situation in Eastern Europe by breaking the ice for the plunge into war, on the brink of which the Balkan Governments were shivering.8