Early Buddhist Meditation
Page 12
the brahmin Pokkharasāti is enslaved by these five cords of sensual pleasures, having desire for them, being infatuated with them, and being utterly committed to them, since he enjoys them without seeing the danger in them or understanding the escape from them.101
The problem, according to the Buddha, is ignorance regarding the dangers of desiring sense pleasures. Since an ignorant person does not understand the true nature of sensual pleasures, he or she superimposes qualities onto these experiences that are not true; thus, the happiness that arises in dependence on these experiences is not ‘noble’ or conducive to liberation. According to Buddhist theory, it creates more desire and perpetuates delusion. However, jhānic pīti (and sukha) are independent of the five cords of sensual pleasures (but not cut off from sense experience) since they arise due to clear seeing of the danger of sense gratification. When one sees the danger and true nature of sense pleasures, one can enjoy experience without any unwholesome mental states such as clinging, aversion and so forth.102
This line of reasoning is strengthened by what we discussed previously concerning kāma, viveka and the process of entering into the first jhāna. By developing insight into the nature of phenomena, one is separated from the desire for sense gratification (kāma). One understands that true and abiding pleasure and happiness do not depend on the arising of gratifying sense experiences or the passing away of unpleasant and painful experiences. This insight inclines the mind to renunciation (nekkhamma), which is a mental standpoint in which infatuation with sense pleasures is absent:
Bhikkhus, desire and lust for the eye is a corruption of the mind. Desire and lust for the ear… for the nose… for the tongue… for the body… for the mind is a corruption of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the corruptions of mind in these six cases, his mind inclines to renunciation. A mind fortified by renunciation becomes wieldy in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.103
It may be deduced that sense contact can occur without desire, lust, and aversion, even before the attainment of awakening, and for prolonged period of time (that is, not a momentary experience). I would contend that this occurs during the experience of the jhāna- states. Experiencing phenomena without these corruptions of mind allows the mind to find delight, not in sense pleasures, but from seeing the true nature of phenomena.104
Leading on from this, the next question is whether jhānic pīti and sukha have a certain purpose in the path to liberation, or whether they are, in a manner of speaking, only the fruit of clear seeing. In our attempt to understand the jhānas as a vital and necessary path-factor,105 the next section will explore this question and offer a hypothesis regarding the transformative and liberative value of jhānic pīti and sukha.
VII The first jhāna as a middle path
In the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta of the MN, the lay disciple Mahānāma asks the Buddha why – even though he understood the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One that greed, hatred and delusion are imperfections that defile the mind – at times these unwholesome states still invade his mind and remain. Mahānāma further wonders what (mental) state (dhamma) is still un-abandoned by him internally (ajjhattaṃ), owing to which these defilements still invade his mind.106 The Buddha explains that since he had not abandoned one thing internally, he still enjoys the home life and the gratification born from sensual experiences. He explains that
[E]ven though a noble disciple has clearly seen, as it is, with proper wisdom, how sensual pleasures provide little gratification, much suffering and much despair, and how great is the danger in them, he is (still) not un-enticed by sensual pleasure. As long as he does not attain [mental] joy and [bodily] pleasure other than sensual pleasures, other than unwholesome states, or to something more peaceful than that,107 he may still be enticed by sensual pleasures.108
This explanation is interesting and its implication important. First, it is clear from this answer that the internal mental state Mahānāma did not abandon is kāma. In other words, the Buddha points out that the source for Mahānāma’s moments of greed, hatred and delusion is attraction, aversion and confusion regarding sense pleasures. This is not surprising. Desire arises due to sense gratification while aversion arises due to its passing away or absence.109 A second important point is that the Buddha’s answer refers specifically to an advanced disciple (ariyasāvakassa). We can assume quite confidently from this sutta that Mahānama was not a beginner in the spiritual path (although a lay person), but an advanced disciple, possibly even a ‘once-returner’ (sakadāgāmi). Otherwise the Buddha would not have opened his answer to Mahānama with the designation ariyasāvaka. 110 This seems a reasonable assumption since Mahānama indicates that greed, hatred and delusion invade his mind and remain only ‘at times’ (ekadā). The use of the adverb ekadā in this context shows the rarity of which these unwholesome states take hold of his mind. That is to say, they have limited power. Thus this sutta gives us an interesting account of a question posed by an advanced disciple to the Buddha, and explicates the process of how desire and involvement with sense pleasures (i.e., kāma) – a basic tendency of the human mind – can be uprooted completely.111
Mahānāma’s question, together with the Buddha’s answer, is significant because it touches upon the relationship between insight and liberation: between the ability to ‘see clearly as it is with proper wisdom’ (yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya sudiṭṭhaṃ hoti) and the purification of mind from the defilements. Though he is an advanced practitioner who understood that greed, hatred and delusion are imperfections of the mind (and if we assume that he is a ‘once-returner,’ it means that he had some kind of direct insight about it), Mahānāma wonders why this insight into the Dhamma did not eradicate these defilements? This time, the Buddha’s answer is surprising: even though a noble disciple has insight into the true nature of sensual pleasures, this insight is not enough for the mind to become disillusioned and disenchanted with sense gratification (and abandon aversion to their passing away or absence). This is a surprising statement. A common perception of Buddhist theory of liberation is that knowing how things really are is enough for attaining liberation.112 However, it seems that even though the cause for our attachments is partly cognitive and associated with our distorted perception, according to this sutta (and other suttas that will be discussed later), this cognitive capacity is not enough for uprooting the tendencies of desire (or for attaining complete liberation). That is, ‘wisdom’ (paññā) and ‘clear seeing’ (sudiṭṭhaṃ) of ‘things as they are’ (yathābhūtaṃ)113 cannot transform the mind completely. Something else is required for abandoning the attraction and desire for sense pleasures.
A similar point of view is presented in SN II.117–118 regarding the attainment of nibbāna. In this sutta, the venerable Saviṭṭha asks the venerable Nārada if ‘other than faith, other than personal preference, other than oral tradition, other than reasoned reflection, other than acceptance of view after pondering it, does the venerable Nārada have personal knowledge’114 of the twelve links of dependent origination in their arising and cessation modes. Nārada answers that apart from all of those things, he knows and sees (ahametaṃ jānāmi ahametaṃ passāmi) the twelve links of dependent origination in their arising and cessation modes. Note that Nārada not only accepts a view after hearing or reflecting upon it; he also declares that he knows and sees this reality directly. After Saviṭṭha’s investigation regarding the twelve links of dependent origination, he also asks Nārada if he has personal knowledge (paccattameva ñāṇaṃ) that ‘nibbāna is the cessation of existence’ (bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ). Nārada answers that he does know and see nibbāna as the cessation of existence. At this point of the investigation, Saviṭṭha concludes that Nārada must be ‘an arahant whose taints are destroyed’ (nārado arahaṃ khīṇāsavo). However, Nārada’s response is quite unexpected. He says that even though he has clearly seen (sudiṭṭhaṃ) as it is (yathābhūtaṃ) with correct wisdom (sammppaññāya) (similar phrasing to the Cū
ḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta) that nibbāna is the cessation of existence, he is not an arahant whose taints are destroyed (na camhi khīṇāsavo). He explains his statement in terms of a simile about a thirsty traveller. This thirsty person can see water in a well, but because no rope or a bucket is available, he is unable to quench his thirst; that is, he ‘was not able to dwell having touched [the water] with the body’ (na ca kāyena phusitvā vihareyya). Nārada continues by saying,
So too, friend, though I have clearly seen as it is with correct wisdom: ‘nibbāna is the cessation of existence’, I am not an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.115
The Sekha Sutta of the SN is another sutta that presents this notion. It explains the difference between a sekha (‘a trainee’) – one of the first three noble persons – and an asekha (‘one who is beyond training’, an arahant). The Buddha explains that a sekha knows the Four Noble Truths and the five spiritual faculties (trust, effort, mindfulness, samādhi and wisdom) but:
He does not yet dwell having touched with the body, their destination, their culmination, their fruit, and their final goal; but having pierced it through with wisdom, he sees. This too is a method by means of which a bhikkhu who is a trainee, standing on the plane of a trainee, knows: ‘I am a trainee.’116
That is, a ‘stream-enterer’, a ‘once-returner’ and a ‘non-returner’ have seen the nature of experience as it is and have penetrated with wisdom (paññā) the Four Noble Truths. However, since they did not yet ‘dwell having touched with the body’ in the final goal (kāyena phusitvā viharati), they are not fully liberated; thus, they are still trainees.
These two suttas from the Saṃyutta Nikāya elucidate the difference between ‘seeing clearly with proper wisdom’, that is, the cognitive insight that arises through seeing things as they are (which a sekha has achieved), and the actual experience of full freedom (which only arahants attain). According to SN II.118, seeing clearly that nibbāna is the cessation of existence does not make a person liberated. Similarly, according to SN V.229–30, understanding the Four Noble Truths is not enough for becoming an arahant; nevertheless, it is the turning point where one becomes a sekha. Although the Saṃyutta Nikāya suttas discuss the nature of nibbāna while the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta discusses the eradication of kāma, the principle is the same: cognitive understanding cannot transform the mind completely, although it is an important step in the transformation.117
Here we find the notion that while paññā, as a specific cognitive understanding, is an initial and important quality in the process of awakening, it is not enough for liberating the mind. To quench a thirst, just as to become an arahant, one needs more than seeing the way out clearly; one has to experience this quenching reality directly. These two suttas describe this direct experience as ‘touching with the body’. In the very same way, only by experiencing a different type of bodily and mental pleasure can one actually let go of the rooted desire for sensual pleasures. The cognitive understanding that these pleasures are impermanent can be the impetus for the spiritual path, but cannot transform rooted tendencies. For a deeper change – for the transformation of ordinary, recurrent patterns – a different embodied reality must be experienced.118
The Māgandiya Sutta of the MN presents a similar view to that of the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta and elucidates further the liberative role of jhānic pīti and sukha. The Māgandiya Sutta describes a conversation between the Buddha and the wanderer Māgandiya about the dangers of the desire for sensual pleasures and the way to abandon this desire. The Buddha explains to Māgandiya how one can become free from the desire and lust for sense pleasures. The Buddha describes a twofold process: first, one develops insight into the true nature of sense experience (the cognitive wisdom aspect) and then one ‘abides without thirst with a mind inwardly at peace.’119 The latter statement makes more sense when the Buddha explains this process by describing his own experience:
On a later occasion, having understood as they actually are, the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger and the escape in the case of sensual pleasures, I abandoned craving for sensual pleasures… I see other beings who are not free from lust for sensual pleasures, being devoured by craving for sensual pleasures, burning with fever for sensual pleasures, indulging in sensual pleasures, and I do not envy them, nor do I delight in that. Why is that? Because there is, Māgandiya, a delight other than sensual pleasures and unwholesome states, which surpasses divine pleasure. Since I take delight in that, I do not desire what is inferior, nor do I indulge [myself] therein.120
It is justified to assume that in this context the term rati (‘delight’) can be read as synonymous to jhānic sukha and pīti. Perhaps the term rati was more familiar to the Buddha’s interlocutor, who was not a disciple of the Buddha. Thus, this passage points at several important issues. Above all, the Buddha states that pleasure, other than sensual and divine pleasures (dibbaṃ sukhaṃ), is pleasure that allows the mind to let go of coarser pleasures, such as the desire for sensual and divine pleasures. The Buddha clearly states that he was able to abandon desire for sensual and divine pleasures (the pleasure attained in the heavenly worlds, either by meditation or by being reborn there),121 and remove burning for these pleasures, by abiding in that delight which is apart from sensual pleasures and unwholesome states. Such a state is achieved presumably by abiding in the first two jhānas. 122
This statement is similar to the one made in the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta. The Buddha clarifies his statement about the importance of jhānic pīti and sukha by giving a simile. He describes a householder who is reborn in a heavenly world, enjoying ‘divine sensual pleasures’ (dibbehi pañcahi kāmaguṇehi). Since he experiences this type of divine pleasure, he could no longer envy a householder who experiences only ‘ordinary human sensual pleasure’ (kāma). The principle is that through the direct and intimate experience of a loftier pleasure, one can let go of attachment to pleasures which were perceived as desirable and attractive before.123
This account also points at the important distinction between ‘divine pleasure’ (dibbaṃ sukhaṃ) – the pleasure attained in heavenly worlds of the kāma-dhātu, the rūpa-dhātu and the arūpa-dhātu –124 and the pleasure of the jhānas. This is significant, since it can be argued that the Buddha surpassed only ‘divine sensual pleasures’ (dibba-pañca-kāmaguna) when he attained the first jhāna. This argument is based on a problematic identification of jhānic pleasure with the pleasures of the rūpa realms. I will discuss this issue later on, but here I would just like to point out that the Buddha clearly states that he was able to abandon kāma, because he experienced pleasure which ‘surpasses divine pleasure’, and not only ‘divine sensual pleasures’ (dibba-pañca-kāmaguna). We can take this to mean that the pleasure of the first jhāna surpasses all types of divine pleasures, including those experienced in the kāma, rūpa and arūpa realms.125
At this point, I would like to make a few observations concerning the Chinese version of the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta. The earlier account from the Cūḷadukkhakkhandha Sutta, in which the Buddha states that the experience of jhānic pīti and sukha allows the mind to abandon kāma [MN I.91–2], has no parallel in the Chinese version.126 At first glance, it seems as though the Chinese version is quite similar to the Pāli one, apart from the aforementioned missing part; this parallel might be an argument against the authenticity of the passage. However, in a closer look, the two versions have a different ‘flavour’. I would suggest that the Chinese version primarily deals with the external state of the spiritual seeker, while the Pāli version is more concerned with the internal mental state, that is, with elucidating the mental process of purification and liberation.
Both versions open with Mahānama’s question about greed, hate and delusion. In the Chinese version, Mahānama asks the Buddha why these three things do not cease in him permanently, even though he is mindful. In this version, the Buddha states, quite differently than in the Pāli version, that Mahānama still lives with
his wife and children, which shows that he has lust (lobha/raga), and this lust causes him to remain a householder. The Buddha adds that a bhadra [賢] (a practitioner who is advanced beyond the level of a worldling 凡夫)127 knows that although separation from family life is difficult, the happiness (sukha) from renouncing lay life is greater; this is because happiness from being a householder is impermanent. Here it is quite clear that the external choice of Mahānama to stay a householder, rather than becoming a monk, is the main issue. That is, renunciation in the Chinese version refers quite explicitly to the external renunciation of family life. After this statement, the Buddha continues to describe the lower happiness of the five strands of sensual pleasures connected to the householder life (these are also described in the Pāli version). The end of this version is also different from the Pāli one. The Chinese version ends with a remark to the monks about the importance of giving back to parents; this is something that is absent from the Pāli and seems to be more Chinese in nature. It also points to social and external conditions of the monks’ choice and their behaviour and relationship with their families. As I have noted, it seems that the Chinese version was mainly directed to monks (even though the main character is a lay person), and its concern was to reinforce the choice of becoming a monastic. In other words, this version was more concerned with the external condition that might sustain greed, hatred and delusion; according to this version, these three poisons belong to the life of a householder. At the same time, this version advocates for the choice of becoming a monastic as the external condition most conducive to eradicating the three poisons. In the Pāli version, however, Mahānama asks the Buddha specifically what state (dhammo) is still un-abandoned by him internally (ajjhattaṃ), by which these unwholesome states still invade his mind.128 Neither Mahānama nor the Buddha is discussing his situation as a householder. Thus, the Pāli version is concerned explicitly with the internal state that impedes the mind from being free, and with the internal mental process of abandoning kāma. The Buddha points out clearly that Mahānama’s situation as a householder has no significant bearing on his spiritual progress; rather, the problem is internal mental attachment and not his life as a lay person. As previously pointed out, although this internal state (dhammo ajjhattaṃ) is not specified, it is quite clear that the Buddha refers to the desire for sensual pleasures (kāma) – desire that arises in both lay persons and monastics.