Early Buddhist Meditation
Page 18
From the first passage, it is quite clear that the four jhānas are one of the factors of the Eightfold Path, and therefore an essential component of the Buddhist path to liberation. The second passage indicates that the four jhānas can only be attained by the development of the other seven path-factors. The later statement is further strengthened by the Micchatta Sutta from the AN, which points out that the ten qualities of the Tenfold Path are gradually developed from one another. Each quality gives rise (pahoti) to the next quality33
From right view, right intention originates; from right intention, right speech originates; from right speech, right action originates; from right action, right livelihood originates; from right livelihood, right effort originates; from right effort, right mindfulness originates; from right mindfulness, right samādhi originates; from right samādhi, right knowledge originates; from right knowledge, right release originates.34
Even if we are cautious in taking this statement at face value, that is, as describing a strict causal relationship between the qualities, it does point at the importance of developing certain qualities first as a foundation and condition for other qualities (as with the ‘bojjhaṅga process formula’). It is also significant that both the Mahācattārīsaka Sutta and the Micchatta Sutta (and other suttas as well),35 clearly state that sammā-samādhi can be achieved only by the previous development of the other seven path-factors, which then serve as its support, requisite and foundation. In our context, what is of importance is that sammā-sati is one of the qualities that supports samādhi, and not vice versa. This is further supported by the Cūḷavedalla Sutta of the MN, which states that the ‘signs’ (nimitta) of samādhi are the four satipaṭṭhānas, 36 not the kaṣinas or the brahma-vihāras, for example. This was also pointed out by Vetter, who argued that sammā-sati is perfected just before one enters into the jhānas. 37 In light of this, it can be inferred that only when the practitioner develops the four satipaṭṭhānas, that is, observes experience and its characteristics and establishes right sati to a certain degree, sammā-samādhi can be fulfilled and perfected.38
From this, it is hard to understand how the idea that the four jhānas can be bypassed on the path to liberation was conceived by the Theravāda tradition. It seems to me that the commentarial distinction between ‘ordinary’ jhāna and lokuttara-jjhāna was created for dealing exactly with this problem: how to reconcile their view that one can achieve liberation without the jhānas with the explicit description in the Nikāyas that sammā-samādhi is another name for the attainment of the four jhānas. However, as I have shown in the Introduction, this distinction cannot be found anywhere in the Nikāyas. The only type of jhānas the Nikāyas (and the Āgamas) record are the four gradual attainments that should be attained on the path to liberation. There are no references to the Abhidhammic idea that the jhānas are also a label for the moment one attains one of the four stages of awakening, in which a particular set of jhāna factors corresponds to each of the four stages of awakening.39
As to how the Pāli Nikāyas understand the liberative value of samādhi specifically, SN IV.144 has an interesting perspective. This sutta explains that the attainment of samādhi (and while we can assume that the sutta refers here to sammā-samādhi, it also may refer to samādhi of the second jhāna as a factor of awakening) leads to seeing experience manifest: ‘Monks, develop samādhi. When a monk has samādhi, [things] appear as they are.”40
The Samādhibhāvanā Sutta further explains that the quality of samādhi allows the practitioner to understand things as they are, and more specifically, it allows one to understand the origination and cessation of the five aggregates. The point is to understand the nature of self:
Monks, develop samādhi. A bhikkhu who has samādhi understand things as they really are. And what does he understand as it really is? The origin and the passing away of form… feeling… perception… volitional formations… and consciousness.41
Both suttas expound that one who has samādhi can understand the dependent and transitory nature of experience.42 The striking point for our purpose is that the development of samādhi enables one to see the dynamics of experience. These suttas do not portray the quality of samādhi as an absorption disengaged from experience or as a state of mind which narrows the field of awareness. On the contrary, samādhi is depicted as a broad field of awareness, knowing but non-discursive.
However, even if samādhi refers to a mind focused a small range of related objects, I will argue, that contrary to the traditional view that characterizes the quality of samādhi in the jhānas as states of absorption – absorption that does not allow for insight to arise – the Nikāyas consider the quality of samādhi in the jhānas as what allows the meditator to see the dynamics of experience, even if this dynamic is ‘on a small sample of “reality”’.43 In other words, sammā-samādhi (i.e., the four jhānas) are not states of one-pointed absorption; rather, they states of a stable, discerning and focused mind, either on a broad phenomenal field or on a sample of it.44
That said, how can the qualities of samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ be understood as the actualization of insight as I have already suggested? How do the seemingly disparate qualities such as samādhi, ekodibhāvaṃ, sati and paññā actually interrelate?
The term samādhi is a complex concept in Indian contemplative traditions. It has various descriptions and characteristics depending on which text one studies. In Buddhist (and Hindu) texts, the term samādhi refers to a spectrum of higher or altered states of consciousness. It is also associated in later Buddhist texts and in non-Buddhist meditative traditions with the development of special powers,45 the possibility of being reborn in higher cosmological realms46 and even with liberation itself.47 In the Buddhist context, it is usually translated as ‘concentration’ and interpreted, together with terms such as ekodibhāvaṃ and ekaggata, as signifying ‘one-pointed concentration’ of mind. More specifically, this means a one-pointed absorption into a certain object of meditation, probably the sensation of the breath or one of the kaṣinas. In the Nikāyas, the term samādhi is used in reference to both states of consciousness that are desirable, such as the samādhi bojjhaṅga, animitta samādhi, suññata samādhi and appaṇihita samādhi, 48 and to attainments that are not specifically conducive to liberation, such as the ‘one-sided samādhi’ (ekaṃsabhāvito samādhi)49 and the ‘two-sided samādhi (ubhayaṃsabhāvito samādhi).50 However, since the focus of this study is the nature of the jhāna attainments, I shall confine my analysis of samādhi to its appearance in connection with the second jhāna and to its related terms ekodibhāvaṃ and ekaggata/ekaggacittā.
Let us first begin with discussing the correlation of samādhi, ekodibhāvaṃ and ekaggacittā to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhāna. The Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta has an interesting and illuminating account that sheds light on the significance of these qualities for observing and understanding experience:
Come friends, dwell observing the body as body, ardently, fully aware with unified and clear mind, calm and with oneness of mind, in order to know the body as it really is. Dwell observing feeling as feeling… dwell observing mind as mind… dwell observing phenomena as phenomena ardently, fully aware with unified and clear mind, calm and with oneness of mind, in order to know phenomena as it really is.51
This passage points at an interesting perspective: to really know experience, full awareness (sampajānā) and effort (ātāpino) are not enough. For understanding the nature of phenomena, the mind has to be unified (ekaggacittā) and clear. It has to be ‘one-natured’ (ekodibhūtā). This statement conflicts with the view that ‘oneness of mind’ (ekaggacittā/ekodibhāvaṃ) actually characterizes a type of mystical experience that has nothing to do with knowing and understanding experience in the Buddhist sense.52 This is because it refers to a state of mind that is disconnected from sense experience. For example, in his article ‘Mysticism and Meditation’, Gimello has suggested that ‘oneness’ is a characteristic of all mystical experiences. He
claims that it would be fruitless to distinguish between varieties of ‘oneness’, due to the fact that these differences seem to be the outcome of doctrinal interpretation. His argument is that ‘there must be some common factor in all of these experiences’.53 Gimello provides this analysis – of a shared characteristic of mystical experience – in order to demonstrate that Buddhist meditation is not ‘a form of mysticism or a means by which to attain mystical experience’54 (i.e., the experience of oneness/the jhānas). Thus, he divides the Buddhist meditative path into samatha55 and vipassanā; having done so, he contends that only vipassanā meditation is genuinely Buddhist. He further argues that vipassanā meditation has nothing to do with ‘mystical experience’56 or with the quality of ‘oneness’ (contrary to samatha meditation). That is, Gimello argues that discernment or vipassanā meditation does not lead to the ‘feeling of oneness’, since it is a different category of religious experience.57
His argument cannot be substantiated when we consider what has been established thus far. The Nikāyas clearly correlate the practice of ‘vipassanā’ (as the observation of the four satipaṭṭhānas) with the attainment of the jhānas and hence with developing samādhi58 and ekodibhāvaṃ. We should also bear in mind that the Buddha used known terms and concepts while changing their meaning to suit his own understanding. Therefore, his use of samādhi, ekaggata and ekodibhāvaṃ might very well have a distinct meaning in the Nikāyas; this use is not necessarily the same as their use in other Śramaṇic traditions, nor can we assume that it is similar to the way they were used in later texts or in other contemplative traditions. I would suggest that in the Nikāyas, the term samādhi together with ekodibhāvaṃ imply an intimate relationship and closeness with experience. It is ‘being-at-one-with’ that which one is experiencing. This is implied in the earlier description from the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta: for knowing phenomena as it really is, we need to be ‘one with’ it. However, we should bear in mind that in this context, being-atone-with experience does not mean absorption, but close contact with what presents itself to awareness devoid of discursive interpretation and mental reactions
Contrary to Gimello’s argument that genuine Buddhist meditation does not lead to the ‘quality of oneness’. SN V. 144 (as SN V.150 and MN III.136) makes the opposite claim by connecting the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas with the presence of the qualities of samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ. Even though the description from SN V. 144 does not identify this attainment as the second jhāna, we are justified in assuming that it does portray the attainment of the second jhāna with a different emphasis in mind. In other words, it is likely that this passage describes the second jhāna in a slightly different way than the formulaic description. If we accept this premise, it means that when one attains the second jhāna, a different type of knowing occurs: knowing that is associated with samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ.
To sum up, SN V.144 points out clearly that having such qualities of mind means that one is in a better position to observe and know experience.59 It also indicates that this knowing of phenomena occurs despite the fact that discursive thinking is absent – even better, one knows clearly the nature of phenomena because of it. SN V.144 also integrates qualities such as samāhita, ekaggacittā and ekodibhāvaṃ with the practice of satipaṭṭhāna. I would also emphasize that from the preceding discussion, samādhi cannot be viewed as a quality that ‘immunizes’ the meditator against disturbances or functions merely as an extraordinary ‘data’ for the meditator to scrutinize, as Gimello has put it.60 On the contrary, samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ are the actualization of insight – of knowing experience clearly. Here we see how mindfulness, insight and samādhi are interrelated and complementary in the Nikāyas’ conception of the nature of the meditative practice.
At this point, based on the preceding analysis, I would like to offer a more precise definition of samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ in the context of the jhānas. How are we to understand the quality of mind they actually describe? What will be a meaningful and precise translation of these two significant terms?
Samādhi literally means ‘together’ or ‘joining’. It can also mean ‘being-atone-with’, especially when it is combined with terms such as ekodibhāvaṃ. As I have already pointed out, in the Theravāda Buddhist tradition, the idea of ‘oneness’ (ekodibhāvaṃ and samādhi) was usually understood to denote one-pointed concentration that has nothing to do with insight. However, as I have just shown, being-at-one-with is exactly that which allows the mind to know the nature of phenomena. That is, the quality of ‘oneness’ and ‘being one with’ one experiences does not refer to mental absorption;61 it does not mean that when ‘oneness of mind’ is experienced in the second jhāna the practitioner abides in a state of mind in which the senses are withdrawn. It also does not refer to ‘feeling’ in the ordinary sense of the word. The feeling (vedanā) one experiences in the second jhāna is spiritual pleasure (nirāmisa sukha) – the same type of feeling one has experienced in the previous jhāna. In other words, samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ do not refer to the ‘feeling tone’ (vedanā) of the experience; rather, they refer to a different mode of being with experience.
I would suggest that samādhi and ekodibhāvaṃ signify a close and intimate contact with experience. This kind of contact occurs when mental interpretation and the fluctuation of ordinary cognition have ceased. We can say that when thinking, interpretation and intention are still present in the mind, one cannot be with experience fully and intimately. This is because every moment of ordinary sense experience is tinged by conditioned habits of commenting on and interpreting experience based on previous memories. I might even suggest that the type of knowing that occurs in the second, third and fourth jhānas is empty of the notion of subject and object. When thoughts subside, the mind does not tell a story about the experience and does not re-create the sense of ‘I-ness’. Experience is known just as it is: impermanent (aniccā) and not-self (anattā).
Samādhi also seems to denote an undisturbed and unshakable state of mind (samāhita); that is, a stable and unshakable awareness of phenomena. Given the preceding, it seems that the common interpretation of samādhi as ‘concentration’ or as ‘one-pointed concentration’ is not only narrow but also misleading. However, I also think that it will be impossible to find an appropriate translation of samādhi without losing its multi-layered meaning. Therefore, I suggest leaving it un-translated, just as we do with other complicated terms such as jhāna and nibbāna.
V Ekodi, ekagatta and samādahāti
I would like to conclude our discussion on the second jhāna by considering three occurrences in which ekodi, ekagatta and the verb samādahāti are associated, quite oddly I think, with the first jhāna. If these records are authentic or correct, the suggestions I have already made might be weakened. This is because I have associated these qualities with the cessation of discursive thinking and intention; such cessation occurs only in the transition into the second jhāna. However, it still needs to be noted that there are only three suttas in the four primary Nikāyas that connect the terms ekodi, ekagatta and samādahāti with the first jhāna. Furthermore, both Martin Stuart-Fox and Govid Chandra Pande have already pointed out the anomalies of these three records.62
In one of these records, from the Savitakka Sutta, ekodi and samādahāti are related to the attainment of the first jhāna. Two things should be pointed out here: the first is that this record is not attributed to the Buddha himself, and the second is that the description is logically problematic.63 In this sutta, Moggallāna describes how the Buddha came to him by means of spiritual power and said,
Moggallāna, Moggallāna… steady your mind in the first jhāna, unify your mind in the first jhāna, stable your mind in the first jhāna.64
Here we have a peculiar reference to cittaṃ ekodi karohi and samādhahāti with reference to the first jhāna. This contrasts how these are referred to in numerous other suttas; in other suttas, the qualities of oneness and samādhi are said to arise only wh
en one enters the second jhāna. It is also interesting that this passage records an instruction ‘to make the mind one’ (cittaṃ ekodi karohi) and does not describe the mind as already having the quality of oneness or samādhi. In this passage, the Buddha supposedly instructs Moggallāna to develop these qualities while he is in the first jhāna as an antidote to Moggallāna’s dilemma, expressed in his statement, that while he was abiding in the first jhāna he was assailed by perception and attention accompanied by sense desire.65 Logically, this statement is inconsistent: how can Moggallāna state that he is detached from kāma and other unwholesome states66 and, at the same time, declare that he is beset by the same hindrances he just abandoned? In view of this inconsistency, it might be reasonable to suggest that this record is corrupted. It should also be noted that the instruction to unify the mind (cittaṃ ekodiṃ karohi) is repeated without distinction for each jhāna in this sutta. Martin Stuart-Fox has suggested that this repeated sentence is the consequence of a faulty memorization; he further postulates that the reference to Moggallāna seems to indicate the lateness of this sutta.67
I tend to accept Martin Stuart-Fox’s conclusion. However, if we do not accept the argument that this sutta was corrupted due to faulty memorization or any other reason, it might be that the Buddha’s instructions imply that one should make an effort to unify the mind while abiding in the first jhāna. Put differently, this sutta points out that the mind is not unified in the first jhāna. Therefore, one has to make an effort to develop these qualities in order to progress to the second jhāna. I would suggest that this is another way to instruct the practitioner to observe the four satipaṭṭhānas without thinking thoughts connected with body, feeling, mind and dhammas. It might be a different formulation of the instructions given in the Dantabhūmi Sutta.68