Early Buddhist Meditation

by Keren Arbel

  According to this description upekkhā based on worldly life is upekkhā rooted in ignorance with regard to the nature of sensory experience. This description points out that this type of upekkhā does not go beyond (nātivattati) the objects of the senses; this is because one does not understand their disadvantage and unreliable nature. A person who lacks this wisdom is an ordinary person (puthujjanassa). This implies that upekkhā based on worldly life is not really the type of upekkhā that one aims at developing on the path to awakening (namely, upekkhā-sambojjhaṅga). I would suggest the preceding paragraph connotes the following: although one might think one is experiencing unfeigned equanimity, one’s mind is still entangled in the experience in some level. This is why one is bound to the laws of cause and effect: one’s mind is not free from subtle reactivity that creates imprints in the mind, imprints that will yield results (kamma). Thus, the obvious question is why this type of mental factor that is rooted in confusion (moha) and ignorance (avijjā) is called upekkhā at all, when upekkhā usually refers to a wholesome mental quality that arises from insight.

  There seems to be two possible explanations. The first is that the term ‘upekkhā based on worldly life’ actually refers to indifference masked as equanimity. It might be that since there is no term for indifference as such in the Nikāyas, the sutta describes this mental state as upekkhā rooted in ignorance. The preceding description implies that indifference can be identified mistakenly by an ordinary person as upekkhā. The second option, which I think is more likely, is that this type of mental state is a gross type of equanimity. That is to say, this type of equanimity manifests as non-reactivity on the surface of the mind, while subtle forms of reactivity operate in a deeper level.38 I suggest that this type of equanimity is still tainted by wrong perception of reality. In other words, on a subtle level, the mind still reacts according to underlying habitual patterns of aversion and desire and a distorted perception that considers phenomena to have some inherent existence.

  To put the matter a little differently, we can say that we all experience moments in which we are somewhat equanimous in the face of certain experiences, meaning we are not overwhelmed or completely captivated by the objects of the senses, be they pleasant or painful. However, if there is no penetrative insight into the unreliability of sense experience, if there is no real insight into the nature of phenomena and its selflessness, these moments are only superficially equanimous. This gross level of equanimity needs to be further deepened by the development of deep and penetrative wisdom. It cannot be considered perfect or complete (parisuddhi), since it does not originate from clear and transformative insight but only from partial and incomplete understanding. According to the earlier description, when this type of upekkhā arises, the mind still creates kammic results (vipāka). Thus, this upekkhā is associated with intention; moreover, even if the intention (cetanā) is wholesome and operates as an underlying tendency that is not completely conscious or obvious, it still creates impressions in the mind and sustains habitual patterns of desire and aversion that have the potential to cause dukkha.

  Having said that, we now have a better understanding of what it means that ‘upekkhā based on diversity and renunciation’ goes beyond the six sense objects.39

  I believe that the key to understanding this statement is the meaning of the verb ativattati in light of the preceding analysis. An ordinary person has not yet conquered the limits of ordinary attitudes towards sense experience; such a person continues to desire, reject and identify with seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and cognizing. By contrast, a person who attains this type of upekkhā has gone beyond ordinary limitations; that is, he or she experiences the sensory world without clinging or attaching to the flow of experience, without being ignorant as to their fleeting and empty nature and without identifying these experiences as ‘me’, ‘mine’ or ‘I’ (including to the quality of upekkhā itself). This upekkhā transcends the seductiveness of sense experiences by seeing them as they actually are.40 This seems to suggest that when this type of upekkhā is fully perfected in the attainment of the fourth jhāna, one does not re-create mental impressions, which means that one does not create kamma (while one is dwelling in the fourth jhāna).

  The last point I wish to mention is how upekkhā is described in the Dhātuvibaṅga Sutta. This discourse can assist in comprehending how upekkhā is purified (parisuddhi) and what this purification means. The Dhātuvibaṅga Sutta, albeit in a different formulation, describes the practice of observing phenomena as the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta does. It also (1) delineates the process of liberation by describing the insights that arise from such observation; (2) depicts the actual state of mind that originates from such a practice and consequent insights; (3) lays out the possibility of attaining liberation from such a state; and (4) portrays the nature of a liberated mind. I do not wish to enter into a deep analysis of this complex and interesting discourse, for my concern here is only the nature of jhānic upekkhā. To narrow the discussion, I would like to examine only what the Dhātuvibaṅga Sutta says about the purified (parisuddhi) upekkhā, which quite clearly evinces the nature of upekkhā of the fourth jhāna.

  According to the Dhātuvibaṅga Sutta, a purified upekkhā remains after one has progressively developed insight into the nature of phenomena, that is, after one has understood the impersonal and conditioned nature of experience. According to the sutta, the first step in the process of insight is ‘seeing as it is with proper wisdom’ (yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ) that each of the elements cannot be regarded as ‘me’, ‘mine’ or ‘myself’.41 This allows the mind to become dispassionate (cittaṃ virājeti) towards the elements, meaning towards the physical aspect of experience. When the mind is thus dispassionate, a purified and bright (parisuddhaṃ pariyodātaṃ) consciousness (viññāṇaṃ) is established.

  This purified consciousness has a particular function according to the Dhātuvibaṅga Sutta: it can cognize the ‘feeling tone’ of experience free from any type of clinging and identification since one has understood the conditioned nature of experience. In other words viññāṇa, in this context, designates the faculty of clear and purified discernment; it clearly refers to the ability to know the way feelings (vedanā) arise from contact between a sense door and a corresponding object. A purified consciousness is the faculty of discernment free from craving (taṇhā) and clinging (upādānā).42 In this context, a purified consciousness refers specifically to the faculty of knowing (pajānāti) the conditioned nature of every type of experience.43

  The sutta then explains that when this insight is gained, what remains is upekkhā that is ‘purified and bright, malleable, wieldy and radiant’.44 As already pointed out, it is safe to infer that this sutta refers to upekkhā of the fourth jhāna, which is also characterized as parisuddhi in the formulaic descriptions. This identification is further strengthened when we recognize that a similar depiction is made in various suttas in respect to the nature of mind as one finally attains the fourth jhāna.45 For our purpose what is interesting and illuminating is that this type of upekkhā is likened to refined gold that can be moulded into any kind of ornament. It can be directed wisely for the purpose of understanding the conditioned nature of very subtle states of mind (the arūpa samāpattis); that is, one does not confuse these exalted states of mind (if attained) with nibbāna. But more importantly, when upekkhā is thus purified,

  [O]ne does not form any condition or generate any volition tending towards being or non-being. Since he does not form any condition or generate any volition tending towards either being or non-being, he does not cling to anything in the world. When he does not cling, he is not agitated. When he is not agitated, he attains nibbāna.46

  The point is clear. A purified upekkhā – upekkhā of the fourth jhāna – is vital for the attainment of nibbāna. I would say that this type of upekkhā denotes a profoundly wise relation to experience, not tainted by any kind of wrong perception and mental reactivity rooted in cra
ving (taṇhā). This is not some superficial or momentary equanimity towards experience; rather, it is a profound and deep impartial attitude that is grounded in clear seeing of the conditioned and empty nature of every type of experience.

  What I am arguing is that attaining the fourth jhāna means that one has perfected this transformative quality (and hence, it can be recognized now as upekkhā-sambojjhaṅga). In other words, jhānic upekkhā is an essential quality for attaining nibbāna. Perfecting this quality seems to mean that one is in the best possible position for attaining liberation. When this quality is perfected, the mind does not cling to anything in the world; there is no tending towards being or non-being. It is the actualization of the middle way (a middle point between likes and dislikes, being and non-being). Thus , upekkhā (and sati) are characterized as purified or perfect (parisuddhi) because they are the actualization and embodiment of wisdom-awareness. This is why Sutta Nipāta 1107 declares that the attainment of pure upekkhā and sati (upekkhāsatisaṃsuddhaṃ) is the ‘breaking of ignorance’ (avijjāya pabhedanaṃ): it is a state of mind in which no reactivity rooted in nescience (avijjā), conscious and latent, is present. Therefore, it resembles and anticipates an awakened cognition. Dwelling in such a state, where sati and upekkhā are finally purified, stable and strong – that is, fulfilled as ‘awakening factors’ – might finally break ignorance completely.

  IV Sati

  With these reflections and suggestions in mind, let us now consider the second quality that is said to be perfected in the fourth jhāna, namely, sati. Sati is a central concept in Buddhist theory and practice. Therefore, much has already been written on it, regarding the variety of contexts it occurs in Buddhist texts (i.e., the suttas, the Abhidharma and later commentarial and exegetical literature), the various definitions it has received in these Buddhist literary genres and its application in meditative practice. This interest became even more widespread in the last decade when the practice of ‘mindfulness’ (sati) became common in contemporary psychology. Clearly, no attempt will be made here to survey and discuss the various uses and contexts of this concept in Buddhist textual traditions, nor would I offer a comprehensive review of sati in the Pāli Nikāyas. Various scholars have already offered extensive analyses of these occurrences;47 moreover, it is beyond the scope of this study. Here, I offer an interpretation of sati in one particular context – the fourth and final jhāna – based on definitions of sati offered by Bhikkhu Bodhi, Rupert Gethin and Anālayo. This interpretation, however, is by no means a definitive account of sati in all Buddhist texts and contexts. Yet, I will argue that this particular understanding of sati should be recognized as describing the nature of sati as a bojjhaṅga. The following interpretation is established on what has already been discussed in this study on the phenomenology of the jhānic process, the mental qualities it involves, the multidimensional nature of these mental qualities and their gradual development and maturation.

  The ongoing discussion and debate in modern scholarship as to the nature of sati in Buddhist theory of mind and the meditative procedure, produced different definitions of this term, some incongruous with others. Nevertheless, offering a satisfying description of the nature of sati in the (third) and fourth jhānas is less problematic than we would expect in light of this debate. This is because the fourth jhāna is the climax of specific mental cultivation. The fourth jhāna (as the previous ones) is a wholesome state, involving only specific mental and physical factors. That said, one must acknowledge that sati can be described slightly differently in other stages of the path and in different cognitive contexts. In other words, sati is a multidimensional and versatile concept in Buddhist theory of mental development (in the Nikāyas and in other Buddhist textual traditions). It can be cultivated in various levels and it can be associated with, or free from, certain mental factors. I would suggest that the reason sati incurred various descriptions and interpretations in Buddhist texts resulted from the following situation: the fact that sati can be cultivated in diverse ways48 and in various levels of stability, strength, steadiness, breadth and depth, and it can arise in conjunction with wholesome and unwholesome factors.49 That is, the description of sati seems to be dependent upon the technique one is utilizing for its development, the stage of the path a particular text is discussing, the level of stability sati has developed and its associated mental factors in a particular cognitive occurrence.

  Given that, it is interesting to ask: how does sati function when it arises in conjunction with unwholesome mental factors (e.g., the five nīvaraṇas)? How does it function when it arises in a completely wholesome stream of consciousness, associated with specific mental qualities such as upekkhā? How does it function when it arises in association with ethically indeterminate factors such as vitakka and vicāra (in a wholesome and unwholesome stream of consciousness)? And lastly, what happens to the function of sati when these mental capacities (i.e., vitakka and vicāra) fade away? Before offering a definition of the nature of sati, as what I will call a ‘jhāna -awakening factor’, and before discussing its mode of function in the fourth jhāna, a few general words on sati are in order.

  In the Buddhist context, sati was translated in various ways such as ‘memory’, ‘remembrance’, ‘recollection’, ‘mindfulness’, ‘bare attention’, ‘presence’ or ‘present awareness’. Sati is the Pāli term for the Sanskrit word smṛti, which originates from the root smṛ. This root involves two basic notions: ‘to remember’ and ‘to have in mind’. In Indian culture the term smṛti has a specific use: it refers to a class of historical narratives such as the epics, the myths, traditional law, public and domestic rituals and grammar.50 In other words, texts not ‘revealed’ (śruti) by the sages (ṛṣi) but ‘remembered’ and kept in mind. Dreyfus has pointed out that ‘within the Buddhist context, this word has usually a related but more restrained meaning and refers to the quality of mind when it is recollecting or keeping in mind an object’.51

  The relation between sati and the process of memory has prompted various suggestions;52 however, I believe that Bodhi was correct in observing that although the meaning of sati as ‘memory’ is preserved in the Buddha’s discourses in certain contexts, ‘we should not give this excessive importance’.53 He further argued that

  [T]o designate the practice that became the main pillar of his meditative system, he chose the word sati. But here sati no longer means memory. Rather, the Buddha assigned the word a new meaning consonant with his own system of psychology and meditation. Thus it would be a fundamental mistake to insist on reading the old meaning of memory into the new context.54

  It is plausible that the Buddha used the term sati specifically because the term smṛti was associated with the idea that everything that is not the Veda cannot be a source of real knowledge.55 That is, his choice of using the term sati, which is a key term in his theory and practice of meditation, might have been his way of separating himself completely from Vedic ideas while granting sati a central role in the way of gaining immediate knowledge of the nature of phenomena.

  In his book on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, Anālayo makes this observation about the connotation of sati as memory in the Nikāyas:

  [S]ati is not really defined as memory, but as that which facilitates and enables memory. What this definition of sati points to is that, if sati is present, memory will be able to function well.56

  If sati no longer has the simple meaning of memory or remembrance, what is it exactly? First, we should bear in mind that the Pāli Nikāyas do not offer a comprehensive definition for the term sati. As previously noted, in certain places, it is defined as that which facilitates basic mental activities as remembering;57 as such, it is connected to the practice of recollection (anussati).58 Other descriptions of sati describe it as that which guards the mind against unwholesome states.59 The latter definition is important since sati is a necessary component of Buddhist meditation practice; it supports the contemplative process of recognizing what is wholesome (kusala) and w
hat is unwholesome (akusala) and underpins the abandonment of the latter. As pointed out by Bodhi, in this process of discrimination, sati works in unison with right view and right effort.60 This evaluative quality of sati in the Buddhist meditative practice is sometimes pretermitted by contemporary vipassanā teachers who defined it solely as ‘bare attention’, accentuating the pre-conceptual element of Buddhist meditation, while identifying sati with a brief moment of pre-conceptual attention (an issue I will address later).61 The last recurrent context in which sati is a prominent factor is, of course, the (third) and fourth jhānas, where it is characterized as purified or fulfilled (parisuddhi).

  It is obvious from looking at these various contexts that they reflect different cognitive events and different levels of mental development. What makes this situation even more complicated is the fact that we cannot find a clear and precise description of sati in any of these contexts. Despite this, we can construe its function and nature from looking at the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. As Gethin has pointed out, it seems the Nikāyas prefer to describe sati by the actual practice of satipaṭṭhāna, which is seen as the method by which sati is established.62 This sutta (together with the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta) became in modern times the main sutta for the practice of meditation, viewed as the discourse that lays out the practice of mindfulness (or in its traditional appellation: vipassanā-bhāvanā).63 It is interesting, however, that although the name of the sutta contains the word sati, the sutta itself does not use this term very frequently.

  The actual practice in this sutta is usually designated by the verb anupassati (‘to observe’) and not as ‘mindfulness or insight practice’ (e.g., vipassanā-bhāvanā), which is a modern usage. In other words, the practice in this sutta is not formulated by the instruction to ‘be mindful’ of body, feelings, states of mind and mental phenomena (the four satipaṭṭhānas); rather, it is by the instructions to observe (anupassati) and know (pajānati) these various phenomena factorized in these teachings into four categories of experience. The four satipaṭṭhānas are a process of setting up sati through direct and specific observation of the phenomenal field. This type of observation (guided by various techniques) is the means by which the practitioner develops sati (and ways of looking that free the mind from clinging). It seems plausible to suggest, then, that sati, in its refined and fulfilled mode, must contain an element of insight infused within it from the simple fact that it is developed and established by a specific type of observation or a way of looking: observation that allows one to see (anupassati) and know (pajānati) the true nature of the phenomenal field. We can therefore conclude that the act of observing (anupassanā) is the practice while sati is the quality developed (in various levels of stability, strength, breadth, depth and continuity) as a result of such observation. Gethin has put it quite clearly when he states that