Early Buddhist Meditation
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39 MN III.219.
40 MN III.219: evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato upapajjati upekkhā yā evarūpā upekkhā dhammaṃ sā ativattati.
41 MN III.240–2.
42 MN III.242–3.
43 Note that this is similar to the Mahāvedala Sutta: vijānāti vijānātīti kho āvuso, tasmā viññāṇanti vuccati. Kiñca vijānāti: sukhantipi vijānāti, dukkhantipi vijānāti, adukkhamasukhantipi vijānāti. Vijānāti vijānātīti kho āvuso, tasmā viññāṇanti vuccatīti (MN I.292).
44 MN III. 243: athāparaṃ upekkhāyeva avasissati parisuddhā pariyodātā mudu ca kammaññā ca pabhassarā ca.
45 E.g., MN I.182: so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti. See also MN II.38, II.226, III.136; DN I.76.
46 MN III.244: so neva taṃ abhisaṅkharoti, nābhisañcetayati bhavāya vā vibhavāya vā. So anabhisaṅkharonto anabhisañcetayanto bhavāya vā vibhavāya vā na kiñci loke upādiyati. Anupādiyaṃ na paritassati, aparitassaṃ paccattaṃyeva parinibbāyati.
47 The concept of sati is discussed at length in the last issue of Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011) and especially by Bodhi 2011, 12–39; see also Anālayo 2003, 46–66; Gethin 2001, 36–44; Bhikkhu Sujato 2005, 111–23; Shulman 2010, 393–420; Olendzki 2011, 61, 64–70; Kuan 2005.
48 According to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, one can cultivate sati in different ways, for example, by observing the breath, repulsiveness of the body, by contemplating death or by knowing states of mind (citta) as states of mind.
49 It should be noted that in the Abhidhamma, sati is a ‘wholesome universal’, meaning it is only present in a wholesome state of mind. However, in the Abhidharmakośa, sati is considered among the universal mental factors, and it arises in an unwholesome stream of consciousness. See Olendzki 2011, 67.
50 Larson 1993, 374.
51 Dreyfus 2011, 45.
52 For example, Shulman suggests an interesting relation between sati and memory in the practice of Buddhist meditation (Shulman 2010, 408).
53 Bodhi 2011, 22. Gethin has also observed that ‘it is clear from the notion of satipaṭṭhāna that what the Nikāyas mean by “remembering” is rather more than simply the ability to recall information from the distant past’ (Gethin 2001, 36).
54 Bodhi 2011, 22; Dreyfus 2011, 47. Anālayo suggests something different. He argues that ‘sati is not really defined as memory, but as that which facilitates and enables memory’(Anālayo 2003, 47).
55 In the Hindu traditions, the concept of smṛti as ‘memory’ was not considered as a means or a source of knowledge by most Indian philosophical schools, although it was viewed as an important dimension of cognition. The Mīmāṃsakas also contended that smṛti does not give any new information, and hence, is not a valid source of knowledge (Larson 1993, 37–56). Later Buddhist thought followed this line of reasoning and did not consider smṛti as a pramāṇa since it involves thoughts and construction (vikalpa).
56 Anālayo 2003, 47. He also argues that, in the context of satipaṭṭhāna, sati ‘is not concerned with recalling past events, but functions as awareness of the present moment’.
57 E.g., MN I.356.
58 E.g., AN III.284.
59 E.g., MN III.136and SN IV.194.
60 See Bodhi 2011, 26.
61 For a fuller discussion on this issue, see Bhikkhu Bodhi 2011, 27–32.
62 Gethin 2001, 36.
63 It should be noted, however, that the Satipaṭṭhāna and Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Suttas were probably important throughout the history of the Theravāda tradition and not only in modern times. It is not clear how these discourses were used exactly, but it seems likely that they were significant. This historical observation is founded on the fact that the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta has many palm leaf copies in the ‘Guardian of the Flame Collection’, a collection containing five hundred manuscripts from Sri Lanka. This collection is the largest known collection of Sri Lankan manuscripts. According to Berkwitz, ‘the multiple manuscripts of these titles (in which the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta is one) speaks of their importance in Sri Lankan monastic culture’ (Berkwitz 2009, 42).
64 Gethin 2001, 32. Bhikkhu Bodhi explains that ‘upaṭṭhāna means, firstly, “setting up, establishing”, which is what one does with mindfulness’. Already in the Nikāyas the word is closely connected with sati. The compound satipaṭṭhāna is itself composed of sati and upaṭṭhāna. The four satipaṭṭhānas are the four establishments of mindfulness, a process of setting up mindfulness (Bhikkhu Bodhi 2011, 25).
65 See also SN V.151–2. All this has been pointed out by Gethin, who has concluded that the establishing of mindfulness is seen as presupposing a certain degree of concentration (samādhi), but this concentration itself is the outcome of the preparatory practice of the establishing of mindfulness. He has pointed out that ‘in opposing the four satipaṭṭhānas to the five n īvaraṇas, it once more associates the practice of the satipaṭṭhānas with the practice of the jhānas’ (Gethin 2001, 58).
66 E.g., MN I.181. See also SN V.143, where the Buddha declares that, based upon sīla, one should develop the four satipaṭṭhānas. By this development, one should expect only growth in wholesome states, not decline. These wholesome states seem to be the four jhānas, as the foundation on which nibbāna might be realized. See the discussion on this path structure in the chapter on the first jhāna.
67 MN III.136ff.
68 Here I mean that ‘one is not with or without sati’ in the context of practice, as there are for sure instances where one does not have sati at all. After all, sati is a cultivated factor, not necessarily present in all moments of consciousness.
69 I have showed in my analysis of the ‘bojjhaṅga process formula’ that sati (just as the other factors of awakening) is fulfilled in a gradual manner: it is first established (upaṭṭhitā), then aroused (āraddha) and then fully fulfilled (pāripūri). I have argued that sati is technically present in the first and second jhānas (and to some degree even before), fully obvious in the third jhāna but perfected and fulfilled only in the attainment of the fourth and final jhāna.
70 Anālayo 2003, 267.
71 Bodhi 2011, 25. Gethin has concluded that sati watches over the mind, it is a form of presence of mind (Gethin 2001, 32).
72 Bodhi 2011, 25–6.
73 For Bodhi, this aspect of sati provides the connection between its two primary canonical meanings: as memory and as lucid awareness of present happenings. Bodhi 2011, 25.
74 Bodhi 2011, 31.
75 Bodhi 2011, 27.
76 Bodhi 2011, 30.
77 Bodhi 2011, 28.
78 Bodhi 2011, 30. See Olendzki, who observed that sati, according to the Pāli Abhidhamma, ‘is a mental state that arises over and above basic levels of attention’ (Olendzki 2011, 61).
79 Note that according to the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta perception (saññā) functions in the jhānas. However, it is not ordinary but ‘true’ (sacca) and ‘subtle’ (sukhuma). DN I.182–3.
80 Bodhi 2011, 32.
81 Bodhi 2011, 31.
82 E.g., the practice of visualizing the decaying process of a corpse (MN I.58).
83 Bodhi 2011, 28.
84 Bodhi 2011, 30.
85 I have already suggested that the jhānas are not momentary attainments. This is clear by the way these experiences are described: the practitioner enters and abides (viharati) in these attainments for a period of time. I have argued that this is one of their liberative strengths and benefits.
86 Bodhi 2011, 32.
87 Bodhi 2011, 32.
88 I would further suggest that the fulfilment of sati in the fourth jhāna means that the quality of sampajāna (which is present in the third jhāna but not mentioned in the fourth jhāna) is now intrinsic to sati as the aspect of knowing experience as it is. That is, the fulfilment of sati as a factor of awakening in the fourt
h jhāna might mean that sati does not refer only to the quality of presence of mind but also has a wisdom aspect in it: knowing the nature of each phenomenon.
89 E.g., SN IV.214–5. Note that some feelings (vedanā) originate from kamma but some feelings originate from different physical disorders, from change of climate, from careless behaviour and by assault. SN IV.230–1.
90 SN IV.204ff.
91 SN IV.208–9 and IV. 231.
92 E.g., SN IV.205, 208 and 209; MN I.303.
93 E.g., SN IV. 205 and 209
94 MN I.303–4. The Pahāna Sutta further states that the underlying tendency to ignorance should be abandoned in regard to neither painful nor pleasant feeling together with the underlying tendencies to lust and aversion. The reason given for this is that this is how a practitioner is called: ‘one who sees rightly. He has cut off craving, severed the fetters, and by completely breaking through conceit, he has made an end to suffering.’ SN IV.205: acchecchi taṇhaṃ, vāvattayī. Saññojanaṃ sammāmānābhisamayā antamakāsi dukkhassāti.
95 According to the instruction given in the Salla Sutta, a noble disciple feels painful feelings as like a dart but since he does not harbours aversion towards it: ‘he feels (only) one feeling-a bodily one, not a mental one’ (SN IV.209: so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati kāyikaṃ, na cetasikaṃ and SN IV.206–7). Since he knows an escape other than sensual pleasures, a noble person does not harbour aversion towards painful feelings. I would suggest this means that one knows jhānic pleasure, which is not connected to sense pleasures; therefore the underlying tendency to desire does not underlie that.
96 SN IV.208: so tāsaṃ vedanānaṃ samudayañca atthagamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti. Tassa tāsaṃ vedanānaṃ samudayañca atthagamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṃ appajānato yo adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo so anuseti. This is also stated in MN I.303, MN III.286 and SN IV.205.
97 The Daṭṭhabba Sutta instructs that one should see the painful ones as like a dart, the pleasant ones as painful and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling as impermanent (SN IV.207).
98 SN IV.205.
99 MN I.303.
100 See, for example, SN IV.214–5.
101 E.g., MN III.286–7.
102 E.g., Sn 14 and 369; MN I.47; MN I.109–110.
103 MN I.303–4.
104 See SN IV.232, where domanassa is classified as an indriya under the category of vedanā.
105 MN I.304.
106 This is clearly stated in MN I.303, and I would argue that this is implied in SN IV.208–9.
107 SN IV.209.
108 It should be clear that I am not suggesting that the latent tendencies are rooted completely in the jhānas but that during the experience of the jhānas, these latent tendencies do not underly these particulat moments of experience.
109 We should bear in mind that paññā is also a conditioned and impermanent dhamma.
110 SN IV.207: adukkhamasukhā vedanā aniccato diṭṭhā hoti.
7
Morality (sīla), Wisdom (paññā) and the Attainment of the Jhānas
In this way Ānanda, it may be understood how this is a designation for this Noble Eightfold Path: ‘the divine vehicle’…:
Its qualities of trust and wisdom
are always yoked evenly together.
Conscience is its pole, mind its yoke-tie,
Mindfulness the watchful charioteer.
The chariot’s ornament is virtue,
Its axle is jhāna, energy its wheels;
Equanimity keeps the burden balanced,
Desirelessnsess serves as upholstery.1
In the course of this study I made the point that, if one reads the Nikāyas closely, some key terms such as jhāna, ekodibhāvaṃ, viveka and samādhi might have different meanings than the way they are conceptualized traditionally. We have seen evidence for this in each chapter and in reference to other terms as well. This observation has led me not only to rethink the interrelation between these qualities (and the whole jhānic process) and other key terms (and mental processes) in the Nikāyas’ path-model, such as satipaṭṭhāna, vipassanā and paññā, but also to offer a new perspective on their nature and mutual dependency.
I have already discussed the reciprocity and essential connection between the attainment of the jhānas and the development of the seven factors of awakening, and the clear correlation between the jhānas and the gradual maturity of the practice of satipaṭṭhāna in the Nikāyas’ teaching of meditation. In this chapter I wish to further emphasize the interrelation between the attainment of the jhānas and the development of sīla; I also wish to offer some reflections on the nature of ‘wisdom’ (paññā) in the Nikāyas’ vision of spiritual liberation and its dependency on the attainment of the fourth jhāna. This will be anchored in the discussion on the problematic identification of paññā – as liberating insight – with the understanding of the Four Noble Truths.
In his conclusion to his monumental work The Buddhist Path to Awakening, Rupert Gethin points out that a path to awakening is a process of change and development. He observes that this process of transformation involves coming to know the relationship between unawakened mind and the awakened mind. This process postulates that some kinds of ordinary mind actively perpetuate the defilements; at the same time, it postulates that other kinds of ordinary mind ‘actually approximate rather closely to the waking mind itself’.2 Following that, Gethin postulates that the task of the Buddhist spiritual path is to maximize these kusala or ‘skilful’ tendencies. He further observes that the Buddhist solution for maximizing these skilful tendencies is to practice calm (samatha) and concentration (samādhi). Stilling the mind, Gethin explains, allows the natural skilful tendencies to grow and strengthen; at the same time, the mind becomes clearer. In other words, Gethin concludes, one must cultivate the jhānas; it is in these states that the skilful tendencies – the bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā – are fully activated.3
Gethin’s conclusion has echoes in my analysis of the jhānas and in my suggestions regarding their transformative power. But there are differences. Gethin and other interpreters of the Nikāyas emphasize the calming and one-pointed concentration aspects of the jhānas and samādhi and argue as to what degree of concentration one needs for practicing vipassanā for the attainment of liberation.4 In contrast, I have offered a different perspective on the jhānas, their phenomenology and their relation to the practice of satipaṭṭhāna. I have argued that the common interpretation of the jhānas as one-pointed absorption, a narrow field of awareness, absorbed in a single object of meditation (possibly a synthetic one) seems to be misleading and even erroneous. I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters that the various descriptions of the jhānas and the combination of jhānic factors in each jhāna -state imply that jhānic mind is a broad field of awareness, observant of the changing phenomenal field. This observation was further established when we saw that the Nikāyas clearly correlate the gradual maturity of the practice of satipaṭṭhāna with the attainment of the jhānas and the establishment of samādhi.5
The premise that the jhānas can be practiced and attained separately from the development of sīla and the practice of satipaṭṭhāna has led to conclusions about the jhānas. Based on this premise, the jhānas are viewed as unnecessary for the attainment of liberation, as they have no real liberative value; as such, one can develop insight and attain nibbāna on the basis of lower levels of concentration (i.e., ‘access concentration’). However, unlike the view that the Nikāyas present two distinct and even contradictory meditative procedures (i.e., samatha meditation and vipassanā meditation), I have attempted to demonstrate in the course of this study that the four jhānas should not be conceived as meditative techniques at all. They are not concentration exercises that one can choose to practice as a basis for insight meditation (and only if one wishes or is able to); rather, the four jhānas are the actualization and embodiment of insight
practice.6 In other words, the jhānas are not separated and distinguished from the practice of satipaṭṭhāna; they are the fruit of this type of bhāvanā, which includes not only calming the mind but also insight into the nature of experience. I have argued that the fourfold jhāna model exemplifies a gradual development of an awakened awareness of reality, showing how the jhānic process designates a gradual spiritual ascent in which each jhāna signifies a more clarified perception of experience. What I wish to argue further here is that the jhānas – particularly the fourth and final jhāna – exemplify the ideal mind, in the Nikāyas’ theory of spiritual development. It expresses, I believe, what I will call ‘wisdom-awareness’.7
I Sīla and the attainment of the jhānas
Before moving on to offer some reflections on the nature of wisdom (paññā) in the Nikāyas’ vision of spiritual liberation and its relation to the attainment of the fourth jhāna, let me first discuss the interrelation between sīla and the attainment of the jhānas. The Nikāyas’ theory of mental development associates the attainment of the jhānas not only with the practice of satipaṭṭhāna and the deepening of insight (vipassanā) but also with the cultivation and embodiment of sīla. That is, the jhānas in the Nikāyas’ path theory are not some meditative states that can be attained independently from other path-factors. More importantly, the jhānas have an important and imperative liberative role in the path itself: by progressing through the jhānas, one gradually de-conditions the unwholesome tendencies, purifies the mind from unethical demeanour and fulfils those qualities that can awaken the mind. In other words, the jhānas actualize the aim of Buddhist practice, which includes both the development of morality and insight.