Early Buddhist Meditation

by Keren Arbel

  [T]he transports of samatha, dhyāna, and samādhi serve primarily the purposes of immunizing the meditator against such disturbance (i.e. agitation from within and distraction from without) and of honing his faculties of attention… It is especially to be emphasized that samādhi and its associated experiences are not themselves revelatory of the truth of things, nor are they sufficient unto liberation from suffering.52

  Another theory was presented by Schmithausen who has argued that there are two traditions in the Pāli Nikāyas: one which he calls the ‘negative intellectualist’53 and one which he describes as the ‘positive mystical’54 tradition. Schmithausen has separated the path into two ‘currents’ of liberation,55 which correspond to La Vallée Poussin’s division into the ‘rationalist’ conception of liberation and the ‘mystic’ one.56 Tilmann Vetter has concluded that although the path to liberation in the Buddha’s teaching was considered manifold, not all paths are from the same time or were preached by the Buddha. He has argued that the path of the four jhānas and the path of discriminating insight (without the attainment of the jhānas) both contain elements belonging to an early period,57 while the path in which one progresses through the four jhānas, the four arūpa samāpattis and finally achieves the state of saññāvedayitanirodha was not taught by the Buddha, at least not in the early phase of his teaching career. He suggested that the jhāna path was probably too difficult for the Buddha’s disciples, and hence afterwards, the Buddha introduced a simpler method, ‘judging the constituents of the person as non-self’.58 Stuart Sarbacker, in a more recent book, has suggested that although the two different types of meditation (i.e., samatha and vipassanā) are important and complementary, samatha is characterized by the development of what he calls ‘numinous’, while vipassanā is characterized by liberating drive.59

  This debate is not confined to the academic study of Buddhist meditation. We have seen in the introduction that the Theravāda tradition has also tried to settle this dilemma by integrating the jhānas and the practice of insight into one process:60 a gradual path of meditative practice, the aim of which is nibbāna. Yet, given that the jhānas were perceived as states of absorptions, which can be attained independently of the development of wisdom (paññā), the practice of samatha was regarded as optional and only preliminary to the practice of vipassanā. We have seen that according to Buddhaghosa some practitioners develop deep states of concentration, such as the jhānas and the arūpa samāpattis, and then embark into insight practice, while others develop only ‘access concentration’ (a level of concentration before the attainment of the first jhāna) which Buddhaghosa considered as sufficient for the practice of vipassanā and the attainment of nibbāna.61

  For most contemporary Theravāda thinkers and meditation teachers (which mainly base their teaching on Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga),62 the attainment of the various jhānic states (and for most Buddhist teachers, the arūpa samāpattis are a kind of jhāna)63 are not necessary for liberation; they can be used as a basis for insight practice, but only if one wishes or is able to.64 A clear statement that reflects the notion that the jhānas are preliminary to the practice of vipassanā was made by Pa-Auk Sayadaw one of the leading jhāna masters in present day Theravāda, in his book Knowing and Seeing:

  When a yogi has reached the fourth jhāna using ānāpāna-sati, and has developed the five masteries, the light of concentration is bright, brilliant and radiant, and he can, if he wishes, moves on to develop Vipassanā meditation. The yogi can, on the other hand, continue to develop Samatha meditation.65

  Pa-Auk Sayadaw’s explanation reflects the idea that the attainment of the four jhānas is separate from the development of insight (although the object of meditation might be the same) and preliminary to the practice of vipassanā. It illustrates the common hierarchal model of the path in which the jhānas can be attained separately from the practice of satipaṭṭhānas and prior to the establishing of wisdom.66 Furthermore, Pa-Auk Sayadaw uses ānāpāna-sati in the practice of the jhānas, not for developing insight, but rather for developing concentration and absorption. That is, ānāpāna-sati can be used, as in Pa-Auk Sayadaw’s system, as a basis for samatha meditation. In this regard it is interesting to bring Erik Braun’s statement, in connection to Ledi Sayadaw’s presentation of meditation (which is relevant to understanding Pa-Auk Sayadaw’s system as well), that ‘it is noteworthy that mindfulness, contrary to presentations by many later meditation teachers, is not a quality emphasized as more properly in the domain of insight practice. In fact, it also lays the basis for calming meditation.’67

  As for Mahāsi Sayadaw, one of the most influential meditation teachers in the twentieth century, he has advocated that one does not need to attain the jhānas or ‘access concentration’ for attaining nibbāna, since ‘momentary concentration’ (khaṇika-samādhi) is sufficient.68 This latter view was also presented by Buddhadāsa who stated that ‘deep concentration (and he clearly refers here to the jhānas) is a major obstacle to insight practice. To practice introspection one must first return to the shallower level of concentration’69 (i.e., momentary or access concentration). Ven. Sri Ñāṇārāma Matara, a respected meditation teacher from Sri Lanka, has also explained that momentary concentration has the same strength as access concentration and is enough for insight practice and for the attainment of Arahantship.70

  All the different theories about the relationship between the practice of samatha and the practice of vipassanā assume the phenomenological sameness of the jhānas and the arūpa samāpattis. What is more significant is that the preceding views are all based on the assumption that, in the Pāli Nikāyas, the Buddha actually taught two distinct meditative procedures, namely, samatha-bhāvanā and vipassanā-bhāvanā. However, it should be clearly pointed out that the commonly used idioms samatha-bhāvanā and vipassanā-bhāvanā (which express this idea) cannot be found in the Nikāyas. Moreover, there is no clear correlation in the Nikāyas, to the best of my knowledge, between the term samatha and the attainment of the jhānas (or to the expression sammā-samādhi); at the same time, the term vipassanā is never defined as the practice of satipaṭṭhāna or associated with the term sammā-sati.71 The word vipassanā does not even occur in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta or the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, the foundational texts for the ‘practice of insight’. What we do find in the Nikāyas is the terms samatha and vipassanā but without the adjunct bhāvanā. Interestingly, the term vipassanā, which became synonymous in contemporary Theravāda with ‘Buddhist practice’, occurs in the Nikāyas less than the term samatha; moreover, when it does occur in the suttas, in most cases, it is part of the pair samatha-vipassanā and has no apparent spiritual or meditative precedence72 over samatha.73

  In light of all this, I wish to suggest that the meditation model that distinguishes between samatha-bhāvanā and vipassanā-bhāvanā has its roots in the Theravāda commentarial tradition, the Aṭṭhakathā, and not in the Nikāyas.74 I would further propound, following Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that the terms samatha and vipassanā do not designate specific practices in the Nikāyas; rather, these are viewed as qualities of mind75 fulfilled through the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the various path-factors, including sammā-sati and sammā-samādhi. In other words, the terms samatha and vipassanā should not be identified with sammā-samādhi and sammā-sati, respectively, but should be seen as terms designating a mind that fulfilled the whole Eightfold Path. Consequently, and following the analysis of the jhānas offered in this study, we might construe the attainment of the fourth jhāna, the apex of a gradual development of an awakened awareness of phenomena, as constituting the fulfilment of both samatha and vipassanā. These two qualities can be associated with the attainment of the fourth jhāna; this is because attaining this state means that one’s mind is free from what obstructs clear seeing (vipassanā) and is completely peaceful and un-agitated (samatha) due to the absence of mental reactivity and any unwholesome mental states.

  III Paññā-vimutti

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p; I have already mentioned the traditional Theravāda idea that one can ‘bypass’ the attainment of the jhānas on the path to liberation.76 In the Pāli commentaries, those who attain Arahantship without attaining the jhānas are called ‘dry insight’ arahants (sukkha-vipassaka). This type of arahant is classified under the category of ‘liberated by wisdom’ (paññā-vimutti).77 The commentaries explain that paññā-vimutti arahants includes ‘those who attain Arahantship either as a dry insight meditator or after emerging from one or another of the four jhānas’.78

  It is obvious that the idea of dry insight arahants reflects the traditional conjecture that the jhānas can be attained without the practice of satipaṭṭhāna and the development of paññā; in contrast, paññā, a specific liberating knowledge, can be developed without the attainment of the jhānas. However, we have seen in the course of this study that this conjecture is problematic in light of a close analysis of the Nikāyas. Moreover, as we shall see, while the Nikāyas clearly present the option that one can be liberated without attaining the arūpa samāpattis (and the attainment of cessation), there is no support for the idea that some paññā-vimutti arahants attain nibbāna without entering and abiding in the four jhānas. Even the term sukkha-vipassaka, which describes this idea, cannot be found in the suttas; rather, it seems to emerge for the first time in the early Pāli commentaries.

  Before discussing particular suttas that served as a foundation for the idea of sukha-vipassaka -arahants, a few words on the classification of liberated (vimutti) persons in the Nikāyas are in order. This is a complex issue. The term vimutti, which means ‘liberation’ or ‘freedom’, appears in different contexts and apparently signifies different spiritual achievements; some of these are temporary (sāmāyikaṃ), while others are permanent (akuppā).79 This is also seen in the Nikāyas’ system of categorization of spiritual achievements in which the term vimutti refers to those who are fully liberated as well as to persons who have ‘still work to do’.80 The Kīṭāgiri Sutta enumerates seven types of people in relation to spiritual progress: ‘one liberated in both ways’ (ubhatobhāgavimutto),81 ‘one liberated by wisdom’ (paññāvimutto),82 a ‘body witness’ (kāyasakkhī), ‘one attained to view’ (diṭṭhappatto), ‘one liberated by faith’ (saddhāvimutto), a Dhamma follower (dhammānusārī) and a ‘faith follower’ (saddhānusārī).83 These definitions introduce important technical terminology84 that should be subject to a deeper investigation elsewhere.85 For our present inquiry, suffice it to say that kāyasakkhi diṭṭhappatta and saddhāvimutti may comprise the Noble Persons belonging to sotāpatti, sakadāgāmin and anāgāmin; in contrast, saddhānusārī (and according to De Silva also dhammānusārī) have not made any special spiritual progress.86

  Furthermore, it is obvious that the last five types of persons are not fully liberated and, therefore, still have work to do to attain complete liberation; in contrast, the first two types, the ubhatobhāgavimutti arahants and the paññā-vimutti arahants, are fully liberated, since their ‘taints are completely destroyed by seeing with wisdom’.87 For this study, only paññā-vimutti arahants are of interest; this is because the Theravāda tradition considers ubhatobhāgavimutti arahants as having attained the four jhānas, the arūpa samāpattis and the attainment of cessation.88

  The origin of the idea that some paññā-vimutti arahants attain Arahantship as ‘dry insight meditators’ (sukkha-vipassaka), namely, without entering and abiding in the four jhānas is interesting; this is because there is no evidence for this in the Nikāya’s delineation of paññā-vimutti arahants. The Kīṭāgiri Sutta explicates:

  What kind of person is a paññā-vimutti? Here, some person does not contact with the body and abide in those liberations that are peaceful and formless, transcending forms, but his taints are utterly destroyed by his seeing with wisdom.89

  It is clear from this description that a paññā-vimutti arahant does not attain ‘those liberations (vimokkhā) that are peaceful (santā) and formless (āruppā), transcending forms (atikkamma rūpe)’ (i.e., the arūpa samāpattis and presumably the attainment of cessation),90 yet there is no indication that this type of arahants does not attain the four jhānas. Similarly, this possibility does not appear in any way in the Susīma Sutta, 91 which is also considered as presenting the idea that one can become an arahant without the attainments of the four jhānas.

  The Susīma Sutta tells us the story of Susīma. Susīma is a wanderer who joined the Buddhist order after realizing that wanderers from other sects did not enjoy the honour and support the laity gave to followers of the Buddha. After ordination into the Buddha’s saṅgha, he enquires about the spiritual attainments reached by a group of bhikkhus who have declared Arahantship. He asks them if they achieved five special powers (traditionally called ‘higher knowledges’ [abhiññā]): (1) the iddhis (iddhi-vidha), spiritual powers such as to walk through wall and so on; (2) the divine ear (dibba-sota); (3) the power to know other beings states of mind (ceto-pariya-ñāṇa); (4) the ability to recollect past lives (pubbe-nivāsānussati); and (5) the divine eye (dibba-cakkhu). The bhikkhus all reply that they do not possess any of the five abhiññā. Then Susīma inquires further:

  ‘[D]o you venerable ones abide in those liberation that are peaceful and formless, transcending forms, having touched them with the body?’

  ‘No Friend.’

  ‘Here now, venerable ones: this answer and the non-attainment of those states, how could this be, friend?’

  ‘We are liberated by wisdom (paññāvimuttā), friend Susīma.’ 92

  From the bhikkhus’ answers, we learn that since they do not possess the five spiritual powers, or the ‘formless (āruppā) liberations’, they identify themselves as ‘liberated by wisdom’ (paññāvimuttā). In other words, they are arahants but not ubhatobhāgavimutti arahants. Interestingly, nothing is said about their attainment (or non-attainment) of the four jhānas. From this exchange, we can further learn that for Susīma, someone who was liberated must have obtained two apparently connected abilities: (1) various spiritual powers and (2) proficiency in attaining the ‘formless liberations’. Since we know Susīma just joined the Buddhist saṅgha after being a wanderer for some time, his questions also suggest that these spiritual accomplishments were known to wanderers outside the Buddha’s order. This seems to indicate that these attainments were acknowledged in the wanderer’s milieu as an indication of complete freedom. What is surprising, however, is that Susīma does not ask the bhikkhus about their attainment of the four jhānas. Was it obvious to Susīma that the bhikkhus had attained these states, and therefore, he did not even think to ask them about them? I might hypothesize differently. I would suggest that something to do with Susīma’s biography is the reason why he did not ask the bhikkhus about the jhānas – or, in other words, why the suttas do not mention such a question. As a newcomer to the Buddhist path, it is plausible to assume that he did not know the jhānas, which were the unique discovery of the Buddha,93 just as Nigaṇṭha Nātaputa was astonished to hear from Citta the householder that there is a samādhi without thought and reflection (atthi avitakko avicāro samādhi) –94 a characteristic of the second, third and fourth jhānas.

  Although the Susīma Sutta says nothing about the attainment or non-attainment of the four jhānas, the Pāli commentaries interpreted the bhikkhus’ answer to imply that one can become an arahant as a dry insight meditator; that is, without the jhānas (nijjhānakā).95 This interpretation implies that the commentators identified the attainment of the five abhiññās with both the attainment of the jhānas and the formless liberations. This assumption is also seen in Nathan Katz’s statement that ‘we use the term ubhatobhāgavimutti to indicate the path that includes the useful but not essential practice of the jhānas, along with their resultant abhiññā’.96 However, as Bhikkhu Bodhi has correctly observed in his notes to the Susīma Sutta,

  [W]hile Spk seems to be saying that those bhikkhus did not have any jhāna, the sutta itself establishes only that they lacke
d the abhiññās and the āruppas; nothing is said about whether or not they had achieved the four jhānas.97

  Gombrich has also discussed this sutta in his book How Buddhism Began. He has argued that this sutta is an example of a redaction in the Pāli texts for depicting a positive picture of the monks who claimed to be liberated without any meditative accomplishments and the abhiññā.98 Gombrich suggests that some suttas such as the Susīma Sutta should be seen as products of historical change in the perception of awakening.99 By comparing the Chinese version of the Susīma Sutta with the Pāli version, Gombrich argues that the bhikkhus in the Pāli version are lying about their attainment of Arahantship.100 According to Gombrich, the Chinese version describes the outcome of Susīma’s cross examination as an exposure: the monk who claims that all of them are liberated is ‘shown up: they cannot even claim that they are free of greed and hatred’.101 According to Gombrich, the redactor of the Pāli texts wanted to change the uncomplimentary image of these monks, perhaps because the notion of sukha-vipassaka arahants became predominant in the Theravāda tradition. The redacted version therefore substituted what the monks had not achieved in the Chinese version with something less basic as the elimination of greed and hatred, something such as the five abhiññā that were regarded as unnecessary for the attainment of liberation. Gombrich posits that the lack of these powers might allow the assumption that the monks achieved liberation without having meditated.102 He then argues that the ‘redefinition of paññā-vimutti to exclude meditation has arisen not as the result of debate but rather as a kind of narrative accident due to saṅgha apologetics’.103