The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion

by James Price Dillard

  Climax Versus Anticlimax

  In a climax structure, the most important arguments of a persuasive message are presented at the end of the message; while in an anticlimax structure, the most important arguments are presented first. Regarding overall persuasive effectiveness, there seems to be little difference between the two structures (Gilkinson, Paulson, & Sikkink, 1954; Gulley & Berlo, 1956; Sikkink, 1956; Sponberg, 1946). Available studies on climax versus anticlimax structure seem to be dated; and no systematic review is available. The lack of interest in this topic has probably been due to a lack of significant differences; and the lack of systematic review is probably due to a small number of studies. Available studies also tend to be in a public speaking setting, rather than in mediated persuasion. O’Keefe (2002) observed that it might be more advantageous to present a message in an anticlimax structure when time is limited and the message will likely be interrupted or stopped, for example, appellate oral arguments in U.S. courts or (televised) debate between political candidates. Such benefits, however, might be nonexistent in mediated persuasive messages, especially when the message is presented in a modality with high level of referability (i.e., the receiver is able to play back or read the message multiple times if they want to).

  Conclusion Explicitness

  Conclusion explicitness, however, has received substantially more attention in the literature, with two meta-analytic studies on the topic (Cruz, 1998; O’Keefe, 1997). Conceptually, researchers have disagreed over which conclusion, explicit or implicit, is more effective in terms of persuasion. Three explanations have been proposed to argue that messages with implicit conclusions should be more persuasive than those with explicit conclusions. First, Hovland and Mandell (1952) argued that messages are more persuasive when the conclusion is omitted and receivers are able to draw their own conclusions. The second explanation is rooted in the theory of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and suggests that messages with explicit conclusions show clear intention to persuade and may be perceived as more threatening to an individual’s freedom. Hence, messages with explicit conclusions are more likely to activate psychological reactance, which reduces their persuasive impact. The third explanation suggests that explicit conclusions in persuasive messages reduce source credibility because an explicit message source may appear to have a vested interest in persuading the audience, and is therefore perceived as less trustworthy. On the other hand, an implicit message source may appear to be less biased and more objective, and therefore perceived as more trustworthy.

  However, others disagree regarding the impact of conclusion explicitness on source credibility; and consequently disagree about the persuasiveness of implicit conclusion messages. Results from two meta-analyses showed that in fact the opposite was true. O’Keefe (1997) found that messages with explicit conclusions were more persuasive than those with implicit conclusions (r = .12, k = 14, N = 2,649), as did Cruz (1998; r = .05, k = 7, N = 1,675). It should be noted that there were eight studies included in O’Keefe that were not in Cruz, while Cruz had one study that was not included in O’Keefe. One explanation for the relative effectiveness of messages with explicit conclusions is related to source credibility, essentially reversing the argument made in favor of implicit conclusions. Hovland and Mandell (1952) argued that an explicit conclusion would increase source credibility because the source of an implicit message may be seen as having something to conceal; while the source of an explicit message may be seen as frank and forthright.

  Potential Moderators

  Researchers also have proposed conditions when messages with explicit conclusions would be more persuasive. First, when receivers are unable (due to lack of intelligence or prior knowledge) to comprehend an implicit conclusion, according to McGuire’s (1968, 1989) information processing model, they will not be persuaded. In other words, ability could be a moderator of the relative effectiveness of explicit versus implicit messages. Less intelligent receivers require an explicit conclusion for understanding (to be persuaded), whereas more intelligent receivers can comprehend implicit conclusions. Another potential moderator is involvement (Kardes, 1988; Sawyer & Howard, 1991; Tubbs, 1968). These scholars argue that individuals with high levels of involvement tend to reach the correct conclusions spontaneously after hearing an implicit message, and more frequently so than would individuals with low levels of involvement. Such self-generated conclusions then lead to more persuasion. The third potential moderator is the recipient’s pre-existing/initial position (Fine, 1957; Weiss & Steenbock, 1965). Weiss and Steenbock argued that individuals would resist a persuasive message with an explicit conclusion, but accept an implicit message, if the message advocacy is inconsistent with their pre-existing position. On the other hand, when the conclusion is consistent with the recipients’ pre-existing position, individuals would be more receptive to explicit messages.

  O’Keefe (1997) tested two potential moderators: intelligence and initial position. Neither was found to be significant. Cruz (1998) attempted to assess the role of all three potential moderators, but also lacked significant results. He found source credibility does not moderate the association between conclusion type and persuasion; nor does it mediate the relationship between conclusion drawing and persuasion. Initial position was not found to be a significant moderator either, and there were too few studies that looked at the potential role of involvement to draw any conclusions. In the same article, Cruz also reported an empirical study he conducted to test these three moderators. The results were consistent with both his and O’Keefe’s meta-analyses: Involvement was not a significant moderator and conclusion drawing was not associated with source credibility. However, Cruz did find the impact of conclusion drawing on persuasion was mediated by comprehension and perceived position of the source.

  Message Style

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  Persuasive messages can vary in the ways information is presented linguistically (McQuarrie & Mick, 1999), although the information might be the same or equivalent. Some examples of message styles include: the use of hyperbole (Colston & Keller, 1998) and visual hyperbole (Callister & Stern, 2007), coherence markers (Kamalski, Lentz, Sanders, & Zwaan, 2008), phonetic symbolism (Lowrey & Shrum, 2007; Yorkston & Menon, 2004), powerful versus powerless language (Lakoff, 1975; O’Barr, 1982), metaphor (Sopory & Dillard, 2002), and message framing (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006). The research reviewed in this chapter focuses on the effects of such stylistic features that are intrinsic to the messages, rather than the corresponding psychological responses (O’Keefe, 2003; Tao & Bucy, 2007) that might mediate such effects. The persuasive impacts of three message style features are examined: powerful versus powerless language, metaphor, and message framing. A brief overview of recent work on coherence markers in text-based persuasion is also included.

  Powerful Versus Powerless Language

  Based on Lakoff’s (1975) model of women’s language, O’Barr (1982) and associates started investigating the effects of powerful and powerless language. Powerless language is characterized with frequent use of specific linguistic features that indicate lower social power/status of the speaker such as hedges, hesitation forms, polite forms, and questioning intonations. Language that does not demonstrate frequent use of such features is considered powerful language. The majority of the research on powerful versus powerless language focuses on applied contexts, such as the courtroom, although the messages are not necessarily delivered as speeches (e.g., Areni & Sparks, 2005; Hosman & Siltanen, 2006). Source credibility is oftentimes an outcome variable of interest in addition to attitude change.

  To date, there has been one meta-analytic study on the impact of powerful/powerless language on source credibility and persuasion (Burrell & Koper, 1998). Burrell and Koper found that powerful language is significantly more persuasive than powerless language (r = .23, k = 5, N = 413. In addition, powerful language also enhances source credibility (r = .21, k = 14, N = 1,299). The effect sizes appeared to be homogenous in both cases, bu
t the obvious limitation is that there were a small number of studies reviewed.

  Additional evidence comes from more recent studies that replicated and extended the results from the Burrell and Koper (1998) meta-analysis. The impact of powerful language on source credibility was replicated by Hosman and Siltanen (2006), and Areni and Sparks (2005) replicated the impact of powerful language on persuasion. In addition, Areni and Sparks (2005) found evidence that when presented in video format, powerful/powerless language functions as a peripheral cue: Powerful language led to more positive source-related thoughts than powerless language. On the other hand, when presented in print format, powerless linguistic features (i.e., hedges, hesitation forms, polite forms, and questioning intonations) might direct the receivers’ attention toward the message source and results in more source-related cognitive response (but of negative valence). The (relative) ineffectiveness of powerless language may be attributed to the negative perception of the source and the resulting biasing influence.

  Metaphor

  As a figure of speech, metaphor is traditionally defined as a comparison between two (dissimilar) objects (e.g., “A is B.”), such that the comparison results in aspects that normally apply to one object would be transferred to the other (Sopory & Dillard, 2002). The object whose meaning is transferred (B in this particular example) is called the base, and the object that receives the meaning that it is otherwise not associated with (A in this example) is the target. Sopory and Dillard argued that, despite being distinctive linguistic devices, simile, analogy, and personification can be treated as equivalent to metaphor when it comes to persuasive effects because they all involve transferring a certain meaning from the base to the target.

  Scholars believe that metaphor has a powerful impact on persuasion and can structure, transform, and create knowledge; evoke emotions; and change attitudes (Aristotle, 1952; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; MacCormac, 1985). Six different explanations have been provided for the persuasive impact of metaphor. The first explanation, pleasure or relief, is rooted in the assumption that metaphors are semantic anomalies, and the impact of a metaphor comes from how it is comprehended. Both pleasure and relief approaches argue that the perception that there is an “error” in the metaphorical message leads to negative tension, although the reasoning of these approaches is slightly different. The pleasure approach suggests that resolving the true meaning for the metaphor and finding the novel similarities between the base and the target is a pleasurable experience. On the other hand, the relief approach posits that comprehending the metaphor dissipates the negative tension, thus experiencing relief. Pleasure and relief are both rewarding and reinforce the metaphorical meaning, which results in the persuasive impact.

  The second explanation lies in source credibility. This explanation argues that communicators who use metaphors are perceived to be more credible than ones who do not. Aristotle (1952) argued that the use of metaphor is a sign of genius. Bowers and Osborn (1966) suggested that by using metaphor, the communicator points out previously unknown similarities between the target and the base, which is a source of interest and pleasure to the receiver; hence, source credibility is enhanced.

  The third explanation assumes that any persuasive message is going to encounter considerable resistance in the form of counter-arguments. This view argues that the comprehension of a metaphor requires a great deal of cognitive capacity, thus fewer cognitive resources are available for counter-arguments. Persuasion is then increased by reducing counter-arguments.

  The fourth explanation, resource matching, also concerns cognitive capacity in message processing. Similar to the reduced counter-arguments explanation, this view proposes that comprehending a metaphor requires cognitive elaboration, hence higher demand for cognitive capacity. In addition, this explanation acknowledges that there is limited cognitive capacity. When there is a match between the resources required to comprehend the metaphor and the resources available, maximum elaboration is possible and persuasion is enhanced. On the other hand, when there is too little or too much cognitive resource (i.e., a mismatch), persuasion is inhibited. When resources are insufficient, the metaphor is not comprehended; hence, less persuasion. When resources are too abundant, there will either be more counter-arguments or more irrelevant thoughts that dilute the persuasive impact of the metaphor.

  The fifth explanation, stimulated elaboration, is attributed to two theories. The structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Whaley & Wagner, 2000) proposes that understanding metaphors stimulates cognitive elaboration by focusing on a similar relational structure between the target and the base, rather than simple inferences. The increased semantic connections then produce greater message elaboration. The salience-imbalance theory (Ortony, 1979) proposes that the common features of the target and base are assembled into the ground when a metaphor is comprehended. The evaluation associated with these common features is also part of the ground. In other words, both the ground-relevant attributes and their associated evaluations are integrated in the message elaboration. Therefore, more valenced thoughts would be generated, which leads to more persuasion. With different assumptions and rationale, both theories argue that metaphors facilitate persuasion by enhancing the number of favorable cognitive responses to the persuasive message.

  The sixth explanation, superior organization, is also based on the structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983, 1989). This view proposes that a metaphor helps to structure and organize the arguments in a persuasive message (see Mio, 1996). When a metaphor activates a great number of semantic associations, the arguments are connected more coherently. In addition, a metaphor also increases the salience of these arguments. Better coherence and salience facilitates the comprehension of the arguments, leading to more persuasion (McGuire, 1985).

  The meta-analysis by Sopory and Dillard (2002) assessed the overall persuasive effectiveness of metaphor and tested some of the explanations. They found that compared to literal messages, metaphor is significantly more persuasive (r = .07, k = 38, N = 3,945). The data did not allow for a test of the pleasure or relief explanation since no mediating variable was measured; and the same was more or less true for the resource matching explanation. The advantage of novel metaphors (r = .12) over old metaphors (r = .01) implies that source credibility could be an explanation; however, there was no significant effect of metaphor on perceived competence or character aspects of source credibility. The use of metaphor did enhance the perceived dynamism of the source (r = .06), meaning that it is less likely that source credibility could have explained the effect of metaphor on persuasion, as the theoretical explanation lies in the aspects of competence and character in source credibility. There was also no evidence for the reduced counter-argument or the stimulated elaboration explanation. One potential reason, however, could be due to the small number of studies that looked at message elaboration (i.e., number of thoughts of agreements and/or disagreements).

  One explanation, the superior organization explanation, did receive consistent support. The results from the meta-analysis showed that: (1) Persuasive messages are more persuasive with a single metaphor (r = .31) than with more than one metaphor (r = .11); (2) metaphors are also most persuasive when non-extended (r = .42) than extended (r = .18); and (3) metaphors are more persuasive when placed in the introduction position of a message (r = .25) than when introduced later in the message (r = −.05; Sopory & Dillard, 2002). Combined, these results show that superior organization seems to be the best explanation for the persuasive impact of metaphors.

  Message Framing

  Another stylistic feature that has received substantial attention in the literature is message framing. Message framing refers to the persuasive strategy either to highlight benefits and rewards from compliance with the message advocacy (i.e., the gain frame), or to emphasize the costs and punishments associated with noncompliance (i.e., the loss frame). There are several explanations for the relative effectiveness of gain versus loss frame.

  One explanation in
favor of the loss frame is based on the premise that the loss frame leads to higher levels of message elaboration, hence better persuasion. The most frequently mentioned perspective in support of this claim is the negativity bias, which proposes that individuals assign greater weight to negatively valenced information than positively valenced information, even when they are equivalent in intensity (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The second explanation is rooted in the elaboration likelihood model (ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This explanation considers the inherent valence associated with the two frames as peripheral cues (e.g., Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Rothman, Salovey, Antone, Keough, & Martin, 1993), which affect subsequent message processing. This logic suggests that the loss frame would be processed more carefully because it is more attention grabbing and/or it is more likely to violate individuals’ expectancies. The third explanation lies in the fear appeal literature. Conceptually and operationally, the loss frame and the threat-to-health component of a fear appeal message share certain common characteristics (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2008). Other research shows that fear can increase message processing (e.g., Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; Hale, Lemieux, & Mongeau, 1995; Slater, Karan, Rouner, & Walters, 2002). Lazarus’s (1991) cognitive-motivational-relational theory also suggests that the function of fear is to protect the individual from risks. Thus, fear motivates individuals to seek and process information that offers protection from and/or reduction of risks involved in the message (Das et al., 2003; Nabi, 2003).

  There are also a few explanations in favor of the gain frame. The first explanation lies in affect and persuasion. There has been evidence that the gain frame leads to stronger positive affect and the loss frame stronger negative affect (e.g., Millar & Millar, 2000; Schneider et al., 2001; Shen & Dillard, 2007). In turn, this positive affect might facilitate persuasion (Hullett, 2005). The second explanation involves psychological reactance (Reinhart, Marshall, Feeley, & Tutzauer, 2007). The loss frame might be perceived as more threatening to an individual’s freedom for two reasons: (1) by depicting negative consequences, the language used in the loss frame might be perceived as more intense; and (2) due to the fact that the loss frame arouses stronger negative emotions, it tends to be perceived as more manipulative (e.g., Witte, 1994). Therefore, the loss frame tends to arouse stronger psychological reactance, which potentially makes the gain frame more persuasive.