The SAGE Handbook of Persuasion

by James Price Dillard

  Cognitive appraisal theories are frameworks for understanding discrete emotions. There are several such theories, but they all agree that emotions arise from a particular form of cognition known as appraisals (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). At the broadest level, appraisals are judgments of the extent to which relevant aspects of the environment are configured so as to promote or inhibit an individual’s goals, where goals range in abstraction from survival to arriving at work on time. When the person-environment relationship is seen as relevant and goal congruent, positive emotions follow. Conversely, perceptions of relevance and goal incongruence yield negative emotions. But, there is a host of other appraisals too that, in combination, create unique constellations of appraisals that define different emotions. For instance, joy/happiness derives from the belief that (1) some event has transpired that is (2) compatible with a previously existing goal (e.g., Roseman, 2001). Guilt is the product of knowledge that one has failed to meet some personally relevant standard for behavior. Other possible appraisals might be expressed as the answers to questions such as: How certain is the event (e.g., past vs. future)? What is the cause (e.g., self vs. other)? Can I control it (e.g., high vs. low)? Was it fair/legitimate (e.g., high vs. low)? Emotion theorists disagree about how the content and number of appraisals that are required for a theory of emotion. However, they agree on the larger point that each of the emotions results from an exclusive pattern of antecedent judgments.

  Emotions themselves can be thought of as distinctive, patterned responses that are observable in six domains.

  One of them is subjective experience. Fear feels different from anger, which feels different from elation.

  Emotions are also represented in the physiological domain, which includes changes in: blood flow to different areas of the body, blood pressure, heart rate, nervous system activation, and muscle tension.

  Neurological activity in distinct brain regions is associated with different emotions (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002).

  Emotions correspond with alterations in expression. The most obvious of these alterations are facial expressions, but other aspects of behavior, such as gait and body lean, are expressive as well. This point underscores an often unappreciated feature of emotion: They are not merely internal phenomena. Rather, emotional states produce behaviors that are seen and interpreted by others.

  Emotions bring about changes in cognition. Fear, for example, narrows the perceptual field and focuses attention on the threatening stimulus. Happiness enables associations across conceptual categories.

  Emotions prompt change in the realm of motivation. Although all emotions energize behavioral tendency in terms of approach or avoidance (except, perhaps, contentment), the motivations associated with particular emotions are best conceptualized at a more specific level. Disgust causes people to recoil, hope prompts engagement, and team pride encourages embrace. In other words, each emotion is functionally different and behaviorally specific form of approach or avoidance.

  One important question that has been raised about appraisal models is the order in which the cognitive judgments occur. Lazarus (1991) draws a line between two groups of judgments: Primary appraisals—relevance and goal congruity—have to do with the nature and significance of the event. Secondary appraisals, which include notions of accountability and coping potential, have more to do with defining the options for behavioral response. Another writer, Scherer (1984), suggests that appraisals are sequenced such that they move from rudimentary evaluations, such as novelty and the intrinsic pleasantness of the event, through more cognitively complex judgments, including cause, power, and legitimacy. His multistep model does not require that every appraisal take place. Steps can be skipped. But, the overall process is thought to occur in a strict order. Whether one supposes two-steps or several in the appraisal process, the assumption that appraisals are ordered implies questions concerning the speed at which the process unfolds.

  An answer can be had by turning attention to the function of emotions. From an evolutionary perspective, emotions are decision-making programs that accept input in terms of appraisal information, then output directions for behavior. They are designed, evolutionarily speaking, to provide adaptive solutions to problems that occurred with regularity in the physical and social environment that produced homo sapiens (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). A key part of the argument here is that those problems were recurrent. Though they might take many different forms, threats to individuals’ well-being occurred with reliable frequency. And, obstacles to goal achievement presented themselves on a regular basis. Due to the persistence of these problems, humans developed emotions as a standardized means for recognizing and addressing them. One of the primary advantages of emotions over cognition is their speed. Relatively speaking, emotions are very fast. This can be a distinct benefit when circumstances require an immediate response. It may prove disadvantageous when an immediate impulse calls for behavior in one direction, but a more considered examination of the situation suggests the reverse. Because persuasive messages so often prompt several emotional and cognitive responses, studying persuasive effects requires that researchers recognize and test for multiple, possibly conflicting, reactions to messages.

  Understanding Persuasion and Emotion

  * * *

  An Appraisal Model of Persuasion

  As previously described, the focus of appraisal theories is the link between a specific type of cognition (i.e., appraisals) and a particular type of affective response (i.e., emotions). The theoretical machinery designed to explain that linkage is now well-developed and widely accepted. But, theories of appraisal are not theories of persuasion. To render them applicable to the issues that are the focus of this volume, persuasion researchers have attempted to extend the framework at both ends of the appraisal-emotion sequence (see Figure 10.1). For example, messages may be viewed as representations of past, current, or future environments such that they instigate appraisals. Indeed, manipulations of message content to achieve variations in valence and probability of an outcome are remarkably similar to appraisals of goal congruence and relevance (i.e., Lazarus’s primary appraisals). However, where appraisal research emphasizes the overall content of the circumstances, persuasion inquiry has recognized the importance of noncontent features such as style and structure (e.g., Shen & Bigsby, this volume). The model in Figure 10.1. also extends the appraisal process by considering standard persuasion outcomes—beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behavior—as potential consequences of emotion (see chapter 4 in this volume for a discussion of the relationships among various persuasion outcomes). These additions have allowed researchers to pose theoretically engaging questions such as: What message features provoke emotional response? How exactly do emotions influence persuasion? The next two sections examine those questions in more detail.

  Figure 10.1 An Appraisal Model of Persuasion

  That May Evoke Emotions

  Content

  As Shen and Bigsby (chapter 2 of this volume) note, content can be thought of as the topic of a message, the theme of an appeal, or, in some cases, the story that is being told. Appraisal theory is especially useful for identifying message content that might arouse emotion. Table 10.1. presents a summary of appraisals and their corresponding emotions at two levels of abstraction. Molar appraisals are global summaries of the cognitions that precede emotion. They are often helpful shorthand, but only insofar as they are used with awareness that they summarize a more precise and complex set of judgments. The column labeled molecular illustrates this point by offering a more detailed description of their underlying components. Both are useful for understanding the antecedents of emotional arousal and, hence, for message design. However, there are at least two respects in which Table 10.1. is limited.

  For one, controversy regarding what should be counted as an emotion and what should not is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Even so, probably there is agreement that the table is missing some elements that might be impor
tant to the study of persuasion and affect. For example, a more exhaustive account would include the self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, pride, and embarrassment. Because these feelings may figure prominently in consequential contexts such as democratic action (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) and the radicalization of terrorists (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), they warrant the attention of persuasion researchers. Another set of missing entries in Table 10.1. is those emotions that are not experienced, but only anticipated. Lindsey, Yun, and Hill (2007) offer a case in point when they demonstrate that anticipated guilt may provide the motivation for helping unknown others (see also Wang, 2011). Thus, Table 10.1. is intended as an illustration, one that is helpful primarily for its heuristic value.

  Table 10.1 Emotions and Their Cognitive Antecedents

  Source: Adapted from “The persuasive influence of emotion in cancer prevention and detection messages,” by J. P. Dillard and R. Nabi, 2006, Journal of Communication, 56, p. 123-139. Copyright 2006 by Wiley. Adapted with permission.

  The distance between events and appraisals also merits mention. Whereas it is tempting to assume that audience members generally grasp the intended meaning of messages, such a presumption can be wildly off the mark. One classic example can be seen in the literature on fear appeals, which for many years simply assumed that message content that was considered scary by the message designer would be fear-inducing in the message recipient. When attention was given to the gap between message content and emotional response, it became clear that threat appeals, rather than fear appeals, would be a more appropriate title for that research literature because that terminology avoids conflating message features with their expected effects (see chapter 12 in this volume). As appraisal theory makes plain, any given message may evoke distinct emotional effects in different recipients. The presentation of specific message content does not guarantee evocation of particular emotions.

  Style

  Whereas message content refers to what the message is about, style is how that content is expressed. Classically, this has meant a focus on language. The advent of mediated messages, however, has broadened the meaning of style to include ideas such as editing, point of view, and pacing.

  With regard to language, one of the most prolific areas of inquiry has been that of framing. This is the idea that stylistic variations shape understanding by selecting, then making salient, certain aspects of a perceived reality to the exclusion of other elements (Entman, 1993). The concept is broad enough that it now refers to several distinct lines of research. One of these draws primarily from the tradition of journalism and mass communication. To wit, news coverage is thematically framed when it emphasizes context broadly by presenting evidence that is collective, abstract, and general. Episodically framed news stories focus on concrete events and specific cases (note the parallels here with research on narrative; see chapter 13 in this volume).

  Although most existing research on news framing hews to a cognitive perspective, more recent work highlights emotional reactions. For instance, Aarøe’s (2011) analysis of news coverage of a controversial Danish law revealed that episodic framing produced stronger expressions of compassion, pity, anger, and disgust (relative to thematic framing). The same pattern, for the same emotions, has been reported for persuasive messages that make an explicit case against mandatory minimum sentencing (Gross, 2008). Major’s (2011) data show heightened anger and diminished happiness for thematically framed messages about lung cancer and obesity. More complex findings appear in Gross and D’Ambrosio (2004), who describe framing effects on responses to the 1992 Los Angeles riots that are contingent on person factors such as political orientation (liberal vs. conservative). After reading a message that emphasized individual responsibility, conservatives experienced more anger than liberals. The reverse pattern held the two groups consumed a message that highlighted the situational causes of the riots. These statistical interactions underscore the appraisal theory notion that emotional responses are the result of the interplay between stimulus and person. Hence, while message features may produce main effects, theory and research indicate that it would be ill-advised to expect simplicity as a regular occurrence.

  The term framing has also been used to distinguish messages that contrast the potential for favorable outcomes with those that highlight undesirable consequences. More specifically, gain-framed messages emphasize the benefits of compliance with the advocacy, which may include avoiding harm. Appeals that are loss-framed highlight the unattractive consequences of failure to comply or the potential loss of attaining wanted outcomes. Although the genesis of this distinction lies in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, its’ application to persuasion is appreciably different from their work on decision-making (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006).

  Only a few studies have investigated the ability of gain- and loss-framed appeals to evoke affect. Millar and Millar (2000) report that gain frames produced more favorable reactions than did loss frames. However, their bipolar measure of affect rendered it impossible to tease out the effects of frame on emotions of positive and negative feelings independent of one another. Similarly, Schneider et al. (2001) assessed only negative affects, fear and anxiety, which precluded the possibility of testing for an effect of gain-framing on positive emotions. Studies that utilized a discrete emotions approach present a clearer picture. Shen and Dillard (2007) describe positive effects of gain (vs. loss) framing on happiness and negative effects on disgust, anger, fear, and sadness. Cho and Boster (2008) found functionally identical results for the same set of emotions. At first blush, this overall pattern of results might appear to be most parsimoniously interpreted by the valence-only model of affect. However, to do so would be to overlook important variation with the categories of positive and negative, as well as the unique effects of discrete emotions on persuasion.

  Accompaniments

  All persuasive messages contain or imply content. Even seemingly vacuous advertisements that present no more than a brand name on a blank page are understood to be promoting a particular product or service. There are other message features, such as imagery, that may accompany message content even though they do not stand on their own. The choice of the term accompaniments is not intended to imply triviality. In fact, it may be that they are capable of powerful effects on the elicitation of emotion. Nonetheless, they are mainly used to support or amplify the verbal portions of messages.

  Probably the most extensive theoretical analysis of imagery is offered by Zillmann’s (1999) exemplification theory, which posits that individuals form and maintain beliefs about phenomena based on samplings of direct or indirect experience. Exemplars are defined as informational units that are representative of some phenomena. For instance, a news story about a particular smoker may exemplify the category of persons who smoke. A series of studies demonstrates that the addition of a picture to a news story is sufficient to elevate perceptions of risk of melanoma, farm failure, roller coasters, and tick-borne diseases (the findings are summarized in Zillmann, 2006). Although many persuasive efforts target outcomes other than beliefs about risk, Zillmann’s data imply the potential for a broader array of effects, including emotional arousal. Indeed, Banerjee, Greene, and Yanovitzky’s (2011) research shows a dosage effect of images on surprise such that before-and-after images of cocaine users provoked more surprise as a function of the number of images.

  There are features of accompaniments that may themselves be considered stylistic. For example, the size of an image may influence emotional arousal. Research using clips of people engaged in potentially arousing activities, such as piloting a fighter plane and driving in the Indianapolis 500, reported that viewers were more excited and perceived more danger when watching the clips on larger versus small screens (Lombard, Reich, Grabe, Bracken, & Ditton, 2000).

  Research Designs and the Elicitation of Affect

  Generally speaking, there are two kinds of research paradigms used to study persuasion and affect. In the first, messages are desi
gned with the intention of provoking particular emotions. For example, fear/threat appeals may contain content that describes the likelihood and severity of some hazard if the message recipient fails to comply with the advocacy. Research designs that vary message features for the purpose of eliciting emotion may be referred to as message-induced affect approaches. These designs and their corresponding theory focus on pathos as a rhetorical proof or, equivalently, the study of emotional appeals.

  Of course, even very brief messages vary on a multitude of dimensions including content, structure, pacing, language, imagery, and so on. Such complexity greatly complicates the problem of causal inference. Which message features are responsible for evoking the intended emotions? And, when other feelings are created, which message features brought them about? Some traction on the inference problem can be gained by including multiple messages of any given sort in the research. If they comprise a representative set, one should expect some consistency of effects across the set for the message feature under study. To the extent that the other message features are really unimportant, they should show little or no consistency of effect.

  A different research paradigm separates the message from the affect induction altogether (e.g., Anghelcev & Sar, 2011). One common instantiation of this approach is the Life Event Inventory Task (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), an experimental procedure in which participants are asked to recall and write briefly about a past event that caused them to experience a particular emotion. Subsequently, participants are presented with a persuasive message. The phrase message-irrelevant affect has been used to describe these research designs in order to emphasize that the induced emotions have no logical connection to the message. Indeed, one key feature of many investigations is an effort to obfuscate in the minds of the participants any perceived linkage between the affect induction and the persuasive message. This is usually achieved by informing participants that they are taking part in two unrelated studies, one that deals with emotional memories and one that focuses on something else, such as message evaluation.