Garibaldi

by Lucy Riall

  Although there are many artistic continuities between classicism and romanticism,31 it is also important to stress the break and conflict between the two traditions. This means that there are strong distinctions as well as continuities between the neo-classical and the romantic hero. The romantic hero was a rebel like Byron; he could also be melancholic, transgressive and even criminal.32 The bandit was an especially common, and not necessarily negative, hero-figure in many romantic dramas and novels, from Schiller's The Robbers (1791) to the novels of Walter Scott, and beyond. The bandit – hero is often a good man pushed outside the law, who scorns rational civilisation for the passions and energy of nature. Rob Roy MacGregor, the eponymous hero of one of Scott's most popular stories, has an appearance which is ‘wild, irregular, and … unearthly’; he is described as an ‘outlawed robber’ and a ‘celebrated freebooter’, a ‘kind and gentle’ man and loving husband but with ‘ideas of morality’ which ‘were those of an Arab chief’.33 His ‘commanding’ wife, the cruel ‘virago’ Helen, fights with him, and teaches his young sons to do the same. Moreover, Rob Roy rejects the offer to be reconciled with the law because he cannot leave his native land: ‘the heather that I have trod upon when living, must bloom ower me when I am dead – my heart would sink, and my arm would shrink and wither like fern in the frost, were I to lose sight of my native hills; nor has the world a scene that would console me for the loss of the rocks and cairns’. Nor can he leave his wife, he adds: she will never leave the Highlands and he cannot bear the ‘heartbreak’ of being separated from her.34

  Adrian Lyttelton argues that romantic critics of the classical tradition in Italy proposed ‘the dethronement of the hero or central figure’ and his replacement by secondary figures who would emphasise the popular and collective dimension of historical events.35 And while the hero had eventually to be retained ‘for full dramatic impact’ in romantic narratives, his character and resonance changed. The Italian romantic hero personified an idealised Italian past; he was firmly based in a national time and space, and his function was to be part of, and to inspire, the collectivity. Instead of being ‘an exemplar of timeless virtue and dignity’ who suppressed all domestic and affective ties for the public good, the Italian romantic hero's qualities were, like those of Rob Roy MacGregor, ‘grounded in feeling’. In line with popular taste, he was driven by passion and enthusiasm; he was adored by, and adoring of, women, and his love for his family was the basis for the love for his country. He had always a private, family reason for action as well as a patriotic one.36 When it came, the clash between family and ‘fatherland’ was no longer resolved decisively in favour of the latter, but was instead shown as an agonising and poignant choice with uncertain outcome.37 All this served to define the appeal of the romantic hero as a specifically ‘Italian’ figure, a hero who was democratic and of, or with, the people, and who was more passionate, sensitive and sexual – indeed, more feminine – than his neoclassical counterpart.

  This is not to suggest that there was no trace of the neo-classical hero in Garibaldi or that the tendency towards authoritarianism identified by Mosse is entirely mistaken. Rather, it is to argue against the idea of a straightforward or uncontested political and cultural continuum between the symbols of the French Revolution and Napoleon and the totalitarian cults of the twentiethcentury dictators. Like political concepts, the meaning of symbols can alter while their outward (linguistic or visual) structure remains the same.38 Heroes too have their history, and what they signified changed and was subject to challenge. In the course of the nineteenth century, Napoleon himself went from ‘saviour’ to ‘black legend’ (and back again) and from dictator to a liberal and to a romantic hero.39 At the same time, as Lyttelton shows, which symbols and narratives were chosen to construct the nation had a real political signficance. They could be ‘the terrain of a vigorous contest’ between political rivals, their meanings could be challenged and could alter over time, and control over their interpretation was essential for ‘conveying the desired national message’. And it mattered who or what ‘was cast as the protagonist of the story’, and at what time.40

  The promotion of Garibaldi as a national hero during the 1840s should be seen as part of a political struggle to personify and popularise a specific vision of national community. This vision was tied not so much to an authoritarian and exclusive form of mass politics as to an inclusive, democratic ideal of liberty and fraternity. To support this vision, Italian democrats not only had to identify themselves with romanticism, they also had to appropriate the revolutionary symbolism of the Jacobins, and to challenge and subvert the conservative legacy of Napoleon. How these struggles related to Garibaldi, and how the cult of Garibaldi was fashioned and elaborated during the moments of democratic initiative and political power during the 1848–9 revolutions, is the subject of the rest of this chapter.

  The return of the hero

  The January revolution in Palermo, which Garibaldi might have heard about as he left Montevideo, was the start of an extraordinary spring. The revolutions which followed were the result of a deep and prolonged economic crisis, which had begun in 1845 with the failure of the potato crop in much of Europe. With the bad grain harvest in 1846, Europe's rural population faced near or real famine conditions, which in turn caused rising prices and food shortages in the towns and cities and produced a downturn in the business cycle, together with a crisis in the banking sector. In part, the symptom of larger structural changes in European society, such as industrialisation, the commercialisation of agriculture and the expansion of cities, the general economic depression, placed the social, financial and political structures of Europe under an intolerable strain. Open criticism by a disaffected middle class and the growth of opposition movements across Europe (the banquet campaign against Louis-Philippe in France; radical and constitutional agitation in the German states; the explosion of public opinion in Italy) challenged and undermined the legitimacy of most European states. Popular riots and demonstrations in early 1848 then delivered them an evidently devastating coup de grâce.

  Starting with the revolt in Palermo, governments crumbled and rulers succumbed to revolution across Europe. The Sicilian revolt spread to the mainland and a constitution was proclaimed in Naples. In February, both the king of Piedmont and the Grand Duke of Tuscany were forced to grant constitutions and, in March, there were successful popular revolts against Austrian rule in the cities of Milan and Venice, while in Rome the Pope granted a constitution for the Papal States. Nationalism appeared in the ascendant when the king of Piedmont, Carlo Alberto, declared war on Austria and crossed the frontier into Lombardy on 23 March, supported by a seemingly united coalition of the Pope, Leopold II of Tuscany and Ferdinando II of Naples. Between March and July 1848, around 300 volunteer corps were organised all over Italy to help in the fight against Austria; this was a striking indication of patriotic feeling and engagement among young men, albeit largely from the urban and educated classes.41

  These events in Italy encouraged, and were encouraged by, revolts in France, Germany and the Habsburg Empire, and were paralleled in Chartist agitation in Britain and, the following year, a Young Irelander uprising in Ireland. In February 1848, a republic was proclaimed in Paris; this was followed by street fighting in Berlin and Vienna, and nationalist demonstrations in Zagreb, Prague, Cracow and Budapest. Rulers – including Louis-Philippe in France and the Austrian chancellor Prince Metternich – fled their capitals; the king of Prussia promised a constitution; and liberal governments were formed in the south German states. Discussions began in Frankfurt for the formation of a popularly elected German national assembly. By the time Garibaldi set out for Italy in April, the revolution had already taken a more radical turn, with a republican uprising in Baden, riots in Paris and moves toward separatist rule in Sicily and in the Habsburg Empire.42

  So it seemed that Garibaldi's arrival in Italy could hardly have been better timed. It had been predicted and heralded well in advance by the Turin paper
La Concordia, which was owned by the moderate radical Lorenzo Valerio and was already supportive of Garibaldi. On 6 March the paper had announced the arrival of his family in Nice and indicated that ‘the intrepid warrior’ himself was soon to arrive in Rome. On 10 March Garibaldi was said to have left Montevideo; on 27 March a position was said to have been offered him in the Piedmontese army; and on 13 April he was apparently at sea with twenty-five men and making for Civitavecchia, a port to the north of Rome.43 Although none of this, other than the arrival of his family in Nice, was true, it helped to sustain an air of excitement about the ‘valiant’ hero's imminent arrival.

  Garibaldi finally arrived in Italy on 21 June, landing at his birthplace, Nice (until 1860 part of Piedmontese territory), having learnt at Alicante the news of revolution. The welcome was so enthusiastic that all the passengers on board his ship, La Speranza, were able to ignore the two-week quarantine regulations and come ashore at once. ‘Since he is a native of this city’, the governor-general of Nice reported to the capital, Turin, ‘and his arrival had been eagerly awaited for over a month, a quantity of people gathered at the port to see him’ and to welcome him back to the ‘fatherland’. A Milan paper, Il 22 Marzo, noted their arrival by describing for its readers the appearance of Garibaldi and his men: ‘their uniform is rather beautiful (red blouse with green patterns; white trousers); they are armed and parade with great skill; they are chosen men who can serve as a nucleus to form an excellent regiment’.44 Mazzini's new daily newspaper, L'Italia del Popolo of Milan, greeted Garibaldi with the words: ‘another brave man has joined the brave men who are defending the fatherland’; he had come, the paper told its readers, for:

  the final duel between the House of Austria and of Italy; between civilisation and barbarism, between liberty and tyranny … thus, Garibaldi is among us; with him is his companion Anzani; and he is followed by a hundred courageous and expert fighting men … We therefore salute with brotherly love the brave, the long-awaited Garibaldi, and we wish him new glory, for his glory is our glory, and is Italian glory.45

  All Italian nationalists, it seemed, expected great things of Garibaldi.

  From Nice, Garibaldi raised around a hundred extra volunteers and after a week he moved on to Genoa, where his arrival was again the occasion for nationalist demonstrations and he again recruited more men. Both his speech from the York hotel to the inhabitants of Nice and his speech at the National Club in Milan were reported and republished by La Concordia on 23 June, 29 June, 1 July and 6 July; the democratic paper Il Pensiero Italiano of Genova and the moderate La Patria of Florence also published his Milan speech on 4 July and 7 July, respectively. In these speeches, Garibaldi endorsed the war of Carlo Alberto, the Piedmontese king, and declared himself ready to renounce his republicanism in favour of uniting all their forces: ‘[t]he great, the only question at this moment is the expulsion of the foreigner, and the war of independence’.46 After Genoa, Garibaldi went to the Piedmontese army's front line just outside Mantua, determined to meet with the king and offer him his services and those of his men. His movements from there to the War Office in Turin, and then back to Milan in mid-July, were again reported and celebrated by La Concordia, which drew attention to his popularity and to his ‘sweetly austere and martial appearance’; the paper also expressed a hope that Garibaldi would be ‘quickly, and without bureaucratic cares and delays’ given a mission which was ‘worthy of him’.47

  In fact, Garibaldi had got himself into trouble almost immediately. The republican groups who had led the famous Cinque Giornate (five-day uprising) in Milan against the Austrians were far from convinced by Carlo Alberto's decision to enter their war, ostensibly on their side. Even Mazzini himself, who had arrived in Italy on 7 April to a ‘triumphal progress’ from the frontier to Milan, had fallen foul of the republican leaders Ferrari and Cattaneo when he had attempted to mediate between them and the Piedmontese monarchists for the sake of Italian unity.48 Cattaneo and Ferrari were in favour of a federal Italy, and told Mazzini that they feared Piedmontese ambitions in Lombardy more than Austrian rule; when Mazzini called them ‘municipalists’, Cattaneo accused him of ‘selling out’.49 By May, however, Mazzini had been outmanoeuvred by the Piedmontese king and his ministers, and so was infuriated by Garibaldi's speeches and actions in their favour. ‘Garibaldi is another disappointment’, he told his mother; his decision to join forces with the regular army meant ‘he will no longer be the Garib[aldi] that Italy loved and admired’.50 But Garibaldi was soon to be disappointed too. He was obstructed in his efforts at every turn by Carlo Alberto's generals, and, although he was eventually appointed a general by the Milan administration, he was confined to an office organising the call-up of volunteers. He then caught malaria, and was forced to stay in bed for several days.51

  The difficulties which Garibaldi encountered upon returning to Italy reflected serious problems with the revolution itself, and specifically with the military campaign in northern Italy. Apart from anti-Austrian feeling, there was little common ground and even less love lost between moderate liberals and republicans in Milan, and thus between those who sought an alliance (or union) with monarchical Piedmont and those who refused to consider the possibility. The republicans were of course sharply divided between unitarians (like Mazzini) and federalists (like Cattaneo and Ferrari). In reality, neither side had the support of the countryside, and both were more or less dependent on the military power of Piedmont. Yet King Carlo Alberto's ambitions in Lombardy were dynastic more than nationalist, and his Italian coalition soon fell apart when the Pope pulled out at the end of April, refusing to countenance war against Austria, another Catholic state. Moreover, Piedmont was no match for Austria. As David Laven has remarked, the initial defeat of the Habsburg army in Lombardy and Venetia was ‘illusory’; it masked the strength of Austria's strategic position within the famous Quadrilateral fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona and Legnano, the resilience of the conservative coalition behind Austria, and the weakness and divisions within the Italian camp.52 All of this was amply demonstrated in the crushing defeat suffered by the Piedmontese army at Custoza on 24 July. Carlo Alberto initially fell back on Milan. But when the news arrived in the city of the Salasco armistice, in which he had agreed to abandon Lombardy and Venetia to the Austrians, the king's headquarters were besieged by indignant crowds and he was forced to flee to Turin, amid accusations of cowardice and general public derision.53

  It was of course entirely characteristic that both Mazzini and the other republicans – including Garibaldi – saw this disaster as an opportunity. No sooner had the news arrived of the defeat at Custoza than the republicans in Milan settled their differences and formed a committee of public safety to defend the city. Mazzini issued a call ‘to young men’ to volunteer to defend the revolution, and it was published in a special supplement to his newspaper, L'Italia del Popolo, at the end of July.54 Garibaldi too launched an appeal to youth to fight for Italy (‘[r]ush forward: gather round me: Italy needs ten, twenty thousand volunteers … We will show Italy, Europe, that we want victory and we will have it’).55 He established a new volunteer battalion, the Italian Battalion of Death, with the slogan ‘COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH’.56 At the end of July, he marched to Bergamo with around 1,500 men to help in the defence of Brescia, ‘acclaimed’, according to L'Italia del Popolo, ‘by the joyful cries of all Milan’.

  Today the Italian man rises as one; strengthened by danger itself, he will rebaptise himself in battle; who wants to win, will win … The serene fearlessness of their leader [Garibaldi], whose name is so dear to all of Italy because it represents Italian honour across the ocean, will inspire faith in victory; obeying his military prowess we will have victory … Follow him with confidence, oh Lombards; gather round him in every place, blessing and expanding the holy legion of Garibaldi.57

  From Bergamo, where he was joined by around another 1,500 men and by his comrade from South America, Giacomo Medici, and Mazzini himself, Garibaldi headed for Como.
Mazzini had decided to join the fighting as an ordinary soldier, but he was unable to stand the physical pace and soon left for Lugano. Garibaldi and a (dwindling) band of men spent the next three weeks moving between Varese and the area around Lake Maggiore, acting as guerrilla fighters and attempting to disrupt the Austrian advance as much as possible. Early on, Garibaldi seized two boats in Arona, which allowed him and his men to move easily around the lake and avoid capture. They also came out on top in their first encounter with the enemy (a Croat unit) at Luino on 15 August, and succeeded in occupying Varese for two days, but they were subsequently caught at the small town of Morazzone, and forced to disperse and retreat across the border into Switzerland. And although Garibaldi was keen to organise new guerrilla incursions into Italy, he was dissuaded from doing so by Medici, who was planning a larger (but eventually abortive) campaign against the Austrian forces with Mazzini.58