Plato

by Roy Jackson

Love and friendship

  In the previous four chapters we have concentrated primarily on the philosophy presented in Plato’s dialogue Republic. Deservedly so, for it is a great work, but it must not be forgotten that Plato wrote many other dialogues that elaborate on important and interesting topics that are as relevant to us today as they were to the people of Athens. One such important issue that no doubt affects us all, and always will do, is love and friendship, and so this will be examined in this and the next chapter. Having said that, sexual relationships in Athenian society had a uniqueness that the modern reader may find curious and complex.

  Pederasty

  Plato, alongside many other Ancient Greek writers, including Herodotus and Xenophon, liked to explore the issue of same-sex love, especially the prevalent practice of pederasty; that is, the erotic relationship between an adult man and an adolescent boy. The importance of this for Ancient Greece is indicated by the use of words used in the previous sentence that have Greek origins: ‘pederasty’ and ‘erotic’. ‘Pederasty’ derives from the Greek paiderastia, meaning ‘love of boys’, and is a compound of pais (‘child’ or ‘boy’) and erastes (‘lover’). The boy – considered such until able to grow a beard – is the eromenos (the ‘beloved’) of the relationship and, therefore, the passive and subordinate recipient of the dominant erastes.

  Now, the word ‘paedophile’ also comes from the Greek, as you can probably now recognize, but its modern concept needs to be separated from the Ancient Athenian practice which, in terms of the law of the state, recognized mutual consent between the partners (keeping in mind we are only talking about the free Greek citizens here, not slaves).

  In establishing the pederastic relationship, there was no such thing as a ‘legal age’ as such, although the boys were usually between the ages of 15 to 17, and, in fact, the adult could be as young as 20, and so it might well be the case that there was not such a huge age difference between lover and loved, while it was nonetheless considered important that one is older than the other, or at least this was considered the ideal model for this kind of relationship.

  As was so often the case for the Ancient Greeks, they would look to the gods for guidance as to how to live their lives, and what was regarded as perhaps the best model of pederasty was that between the god Zeus and the mortal Ganymede. Zeus was so taken by Ganymede, who was considered the most beautiful of mortals, that he made his eromenos immortal. In this relationship there is certainly a considerable age difference, given Zeus’ immortality and the fact that he is regarded as the father of gods and men. Another ideal relationship because of the age difference can be found in Plato’s work Symposium (see Chapter 9). The symposium in this case was hosted by the handsome young poet Agathon, who was eromenos for Pausanias. The difference in age was about ten years, starting when Agathon was 18. Neither married or had children and it seems that their relationship lasted longer than the usual, perhaps lifelong. Symposium also makes reference to another pederastic relationship that was considered less than ideal, that between the Greek heroes Achilles and Patroclus. This is a more contentious relationship because they were of a similar age, so that it is difficult to determine who was the erastes and who the eromenos.

  ‘Aeschylus talks nonsense when he says that Achilles was Patroclus’ lover: he was more beautiful than Patroclus (indeed, he was the most beautiful of all the heroes), and was still beardless, as well as much younger than Patroclus, as Homer tells us.’

  Plato, Symposium, 180a

  The Myth of Ganymede

  In Greek mythology, Ganymede is born in the city-state of Troy, the son of the ruler of this state, Tros (from where the name ‘Troy’ derives) and his wife Callirrhoe, who was the daughter of the river-god Scamander. One story (there are a number of versions) tells us that Ganymede was tending his sheep – despite such noble parentage – when Zeus, in the guise of an eagle, abducted the young boy and took him to Mount Olympus. According to the tale told by Homer in Iliad, Ganymede’s father was compensated for his loss by the gift of fine horses, but the tale is indicative of the importance of pederasty by the fact that Ganymede’s father was consoled that his son was so honoured to be loved by the greatest god of them all, although Socrates, in Symposium, argues that Zeus loved Ganymede non-sexually; for his mind rather than his body. Zeus gave Ganymede eternal youth and he held the official and honoured office of cupbearer to the gods. Ganymede’s beauty proved a big hit among the gods, with the exception of the jealous Hera, Zeus’ wife.

  The Latin form of the name Ganymede is Catamitus, and this is from where we get the English word ‘catamite’, which in modern usage refers to a boy who is the passive (that is, receiving) partner in anal intercourse with another male. Images of Ganymede, especially on vases, understandably portray him as young and athletic. A popular portrayal in painting is of his abduction by the eagle, with a variety of interesting viewpoints presented. For example, Rembrandt’s (1606–69) rather strange painting Rape of Ganymede (1635) shows the boy as a crying, cherubic baby clearly distressed and wetting himself as he is carried off.

  Sexual relationships in Athenian society were a complex matter, with the practice of pederasty seen as an important educative process, with the erastes acting as mentor for the eromenos, and which required the approval of the father of the boy who would appoint one of his slaves, called a pedagogue (the Greek paidagogeo, or ‘to lead the boy’), to ensure the subject of the lover is not taken advantage of and that the intricate etiquette is followed.

  Pederasty

  Pederasty is not exclusive to Ancient Greece, but has in fact existed among many cultures in various forms. Perhaps not surprisingly in Ancient Rome, due to the influence of Greek culture, but it has also existed in the Middle East, China, Japan, North and South America, and Europe. Some have argued that a form of pederasty existed in English public schools until late into the 20th century.

  Lysis

  It is within this helpful context that the reader can understand one of Plato’s earlier dialogues – Lysis. In any quiz that asks someone with some familiarity with Plato to list his works, it’s quite likely this one will not be on the list, as it perhaps does not present the reader with the finest of examples of Socratic dialogue, of elenchus, in comparison to, say, Republic or Euthyphro, and it presents something of a confusing argument at times. Nonetheless, in terms of the topic of love and friendship, and the deeper philosophical issue of how we define ourselves in relation to others, this short work presents us with some thought-provoking ideas and is worth some perseverance. Remember it is a very early work by Plato, so far as we can determine, and it had even been suggested that it was written while Socrates was still alive.

  The dialogue begins with Socrates, who was on one of his walks having just come from a gymnasium (which in Ancient Greece was not just for physical exercise but for the intellect too, as well as often places of religious observance) just outside Athens called the Academy (which was later to become Plato’s Academy) and was heading to another gymnasium to the north-east of Athens called the Lyceum (which was to become the home of Aristotle’s famous school – the Lyceum). Socrates is met on the way by some young men, two of whom – Hippothales and Ctesippus – invite Socrates to come with them to a palaestra (a wrestling-school). Having been told that an old and respected friend of Socrates will be there, he agrees to go with them, provided they answer two questions: First, what are they expecting of him? Second, who will be the most beautiful boy there? Ctesippus ignores his first question and answers the second by stating that it is a matter of opinion; when Socrates asks Hippothales he can tell immediately from the latter’s blushes that he is in love with someone. It is Ctesippus, who then tells Socrates that Hippothales is in love with a young man by the name of Lysis.

  At this point Socrates is determined to find out what love is, although this dialogue differs to some extent in that Socrates seems less concerned with the usual method of considering an ‘ideal’ (such as love, goodness, beauty, etc.) and s
eeks a definition for it via his interlocutors and, instead, is less ‘philosophical’ in Socrates’ greater, almost banal, concern with how a person can win one’s beloved and, even more specifically, how Hippothales can win the love of Lysis. Such a conversation as this would not seem out of place in any general conversation in a bar or dinner party throughout the ages.

  Socrates is, at first, critical of Hippothales because he likes to bore his friends by composing poems that praise his beloved. Socrates is critical because he makes the psychological observation that these poems have not really been composed to praise Lysis at all, but is motivated by Hippothales’ need to praise himself. If Hippothales succeeds in acquiring the love of Lysis, then it is Hippothales who achieves praise for winning such a great prize (although this also runs the risk of looking the fool if he fails). In addition, Socrates states that Hippothales is making it even harder to capture his love by singing his praises, as it only gives Lysis a much higher opinion of himself.

  Having told Hippothales how not to woo the boy, Socrates then sets out to show how it should be done. Interestingly, Socrates is not in this case claiming his usual ignorance in such things, but is instead putting himself forward as an old hand in matters of the heart. Once inside the palaestra, Socrates engages in a more rigorous elenchus with Lysis himself, although the latter’s responses are short and acquiescent, and he seems more amused by Socrates than particularly intimidated. During this dialogue, Hippothales listens in, but remains hidden, and this allows Socrates to fulfil his role of educating both Hippothales in how he should woo Lysis, and also in teaching Lysis the importance of being the eromenos to an older man.

  While Lysis has friends of roughly his own age, friendship (philia) is not the same as sexual love (eros). For example, a close friend of Lysis is Menexenus, and Socrates also converses with him with the intention of determining what the differences are between love and friendship, although the reader of this dialogue may find such semantics rather confusing and, indeed, sophistic in nature. Take, as an example, this quote:

  ‘Is that thing for the sake of which the friend is friend to the friend a friend, or is it neither a friend nor an enemy?’

  ‘I’m not quite with you there,’ he [Menexenus] said.

  ‘That’s not surprising,’ I [Socrates] said.

  Plato, Lysis, 218d

  No wonder Menexenus is confused! This is not helped by the problem of translating a word such as ‘friend’; not just in terms of its literal translation, but also within the context of Ancient Greek society. As Robin Waterfield notes in his translation of Republic, for example:

  ‘Whereas nowadays we think of friends primarily as those we like or feel affection for, the less sentimental Greeks thought of them as those who do you good. Friendship involved ties of loyalty as much as those of warmth.’

  Plato, Republic, p.382

  The Socratic elenchus with Lysis and Menexenus goes something like this:

  • i) Lovers may not also be friends

  Socrates sets out to show that a relationship that involves friendship, such as that between Lysis and Menexenus, is not the same thing as a loving relationship for in the latter someone could love someone but not be loved in return and, indeed, may even be hated by the person who loves them.

  • ii) Likeness as a condition of friendship

  If lovers are not necessarily friends then, Socrates wants to know, who are friends? As Socrates often does, he appeals to the poets and to the earlier philosophers for guidance: for example, the poet Homer who said that ‘God always brings like with like’ (Homer, Odyssey XVIII, 218) and the philosopher Democritus who, when talking of his atoms, explains their attraction as like with like (see Chapter 11). So, then, is friendship a matter of like loves like? Is likeness a condition of friendship? Now, here Socrates says this cannot be applied in all cases, for what of bad people? Consider this quote from Republic:

  ‘Now do something else for me, and answer me this: do you think a city or an army, or pirates, or thieves, or any other group that jointly undertakes some enterprise in injustice, would be able to achieve anything if they treated one another unjustly?’

  Plato, Republic, 351c

  What Socrates is asking Thrasymachus here is relevant to Socrates’ belief that the bad cannot be friends with other bad people for, being bad, they will inevitably do their ‘friends’ an injustice which, of course, means they are not friends at all. If only good people can do good to other people, then only good people can be friends and so, it seems, the good are friends!

  However, Socrates is not at all happy with this definition of friendship either. Keep in mind the Waterfield quote above; the importance of friendship as a form of utility, of being of service to others. Socrates is being very strict in his understanding of like being friends with like in that this alikeness is identical. But if someone is identical to me then that person has nothing to offer me, nothing that I cannot do for myself. This logic will certainly seem misconstrued by the modern reader, for Socrates seems blind to the possibility that two people can be alike in some ways, not all, and, therefore, can be of use to one another and form a friendship because of this.

  A relationship can be built because I may be deficient in one thing, for example, I’m poor at maths, but my friend can help me with that. Likewise, my friend may be awful at cooking, whereas I can rustle up a fine casserole; he or she does not have to be alike in every respect in order to be useful to me, and vice versa (given Socrates equates friendship with mutual utility).

  • iii) Dissimilarity as a condition of friendship

  Instead of this, however, Socrates then suggests that friendship must therefore be based on dissimilarity. The greatest friendship is of opposites! But Socrates is also quick to dismiss this possibility because surely the good man is not the friend of the bad and so we are left with ‘neither like is friend to like nor opposite to opposite’ (216b).

  • iv) The good is the friend of the neutral

  If we follow the logic of the above, we are left with only one option. Let’s just go through these again:

  • The good cannot be the friend of either the good nor the bad

  • The bad cannot be the friend of anyone

  • Like cannot be friend with like

  • Therefore, the good is the friend of the neutral (i.e. what is neither good nor bad).

  The conclusion above is based on Socrates’ view that there are three categories of things: good things, bad things and things that are neither good nor bad. If this is the case then it follows deductively that the only conclusion that can be reached is that the good can only be friends with this final category, as the other two have already been ruled out. The example Socrates gives, and keeping in mind the importance of friendship as ‘utility’, is one he is very fond of using in his dialogues; the doctor and medicine. In this case, here are the three categories of things:

  The good thing = medicine

  The bad thing = disease

  The neutral thing = the human body

  The human body (the neutral thing), in this case, is only ‘friends’ with medicine (the good thing) when it is diseased (the bad thing). Now, remember Socrates has already said that bad things cannot be friends with anything, so how can he now say that the bad thing (the disease) is friends with a good thing (the medicine)?

  Socrates presents a rather convoluted, but poetic, argument here that involves Menexenus’ hair dye! Socrates asks Menexenus to imagine that his hair is dyed white and asks him if it really is white or only seems to be white. Menexenus answers, obviously, with the latter, but then Socrates says that when Menexenus is an old man his hair will actually be white: that is, it will permanently become what is temporarily present within it (‘whiteness’). By analogy, a body which is diseased is only seemingly possessing ‘bad’, but it is not a permanent state. Hence, the body is still ‘neutral’ to all intents and purposes. Hence, Socrates exclaims:

  ‘So now, Lysis and Menexenus,’ I said, ‘we�
�ve done it! We’ve discovered what a friend is and what it is not. We say that in the soul, in the body and anywhere else, it is what is neither bad nor good that is the friend of the good because of the presence of the bad.’ The two of them agreed wholeheartedly, admitting it was so.

  Plato, Lysis, 218c

  Frustratingly, but also very typical of Socrates, this is not to be his final word on the matter and he is not himself satisfied with this definition of friendship. The reason for this is a common one with the arguments that Socrates presents in so many of his dialogues, and it is the use of analogy, for analogy as arguments are only as good as the analogy is, and Socrates himself feels that the doctor–medicine example is not really that good an analogy with that of true friendship. This is because the analogy requires moving from a particular example (medicine) to something much more universal in nature (friendship) and, as a consequence, something gets left out. Socrates’ main concern here is that medicine is desired by the body for the sake of something else – health – but surely, he argues, true friendship with another is not for the sake of something else (that is, it’s contingent) but is rather self-contained, otherwise it is not genuine friendship but a means to an end.

  While this does concern Socrates, it is not entirely clear – at one level anyway – why this should be such a worry, given the understanding of friendship as in some way ‘useful’, which does imply a means-end relationship. However, this comes back to the Socratic concerns with ‘universals’; Friendship with a capital ‘F’, like Good, Beauty, etc. Socrates is also concerned that friendship is, if only ‘temporarily’, reliant on the presence of evil (as in ‘diseased body’ analogy): can I not form a friendship with someone with the presence of evil? And doesn’t ‘evil’ in some way taint true friendship which seems to imply a goodness and a purity?