Day of the Rangers: The Battle of Mogadishu 25 Years On

by Leigh Neville

  A Schweizer RG-8 spy aircraft was also overhead with its own FLIR and video equipment fitted. The Schweizer was a unique two-man design which would throttle back its engines once over a target location and glide almost soundlessly whilst recording and transmitting intelligence data from a suite of cameras. The RG-8 was likely flown by Air Branch of the CIA’s Special Activities Division. All of these surveillance aircraft were involved in establishing patterns of movement and looking for changes to that pattern that could indicate the presence of a high-value target like Aideed or one of his key lieutenants.

  One of the best leads developed in early September came from a CIA asset who managed to give Aideed’s daughter a cell phone which was immediately intercepted by the OMS. Through the intercepts, the CIA learned where Aideed had allegedly been staying the previous night and the Navy Reef Point was launched to track his vehicle convoy as he left the residence. Unfortunately he managed to escape detection in the teeming masses of downtown Mogadishu.

  There were valid concerns that Aideed might well have been receiving tip-offs about the Task Force’s intentions from at least one of their multinational partners in UNOSOM II. Early on in the deployment, questions were raised over Italian colonial links to the clans, including Aideed’s Habr Gidr. Certainly Italy had a lengthy history with Somalia. The country had been an Italian colony until early in World War II. After the war, the Italians became trustees for the country under the United Nations. Even after independence in 1960, the connections with Italy remained strong. Indeed Aideed himself had been educated in Rome and once served in the Italian-administered colonial police.

  Even the United Nations eventually became suspicious of Italian intentions. General Montgomery noted, “They [the Italians] felt they had a special relationship with the Somalis.” Historian Kenneth Allard makes mention of backroom deals between the Italians and Aideed: “the commander of the Italian contingent went so far as to open separate negotiations with the fugitive warlord Mohammed Aideed – apparently with the full approval of his home government.”34

  These suspicions of Italian complicity even led to embarrassment for Task Force Ranger. During a visit to the Italian contingent’s headquarters on September 14, the J-2 head, Colonel Dave McKnight, was informed by his escorting Ranger detachment that Aideed had just been seen leaving the very same Italian compound. This resulted in the launch of an assault force in a case of mistaken identity that will be examined later in this chapter.

  A Somali militia leader was quoted years later confirming the relationship between Aideed and the Italians, saying: “I’m not sure of any agreement as such but we were on friendly terms with the Italians. We understood that the Italians were not happy about the Americans operating so much force on us.”35

  Along with the constant struggle for intelligence and worries about Italian duplicity, the physical terrain of Mogadishu made upcoming operations difficult, particularly for ground forces. The city was criss-crossed by narrow alleys and dirt roads that had largely developed organically, catering to local needs, rather than by any conventional form of city planning. From the air, the city resembled a traditional grid pattern but once on the ground, that illusion quickly disappeared.

  Many of the roads, nearly all unpaved, were extensively pot-holed and covered in all manner of debris – perfect grounds for the laying of landmines such as the one that had killed the American Military Police patrol on August 10, leading to the deployment of Task Force Ranger. It also slowed traffic into choke points that could be easily ambushed. Once ambushed on the narrow streets, it would be difficult for any vehicles, let alone large military Humvees or trucks, to turn around or maneuver. Once a vehicle was immobilized, a convoy could easily be halted and forced to reverse out under fire. For aircraft, the situation was little better. Wires from illegal electricity connections hung above and across the roads making fast roping dangerous and limiting the availability of helicopter landing zones, particularly ones large enough to accommodate a Black Hawk.

  Buildings in Mogadishu were a mix of styles and heights but most were formed around a central courtyard and were typically a single to two stories in height. These were joined by rough thatch huts and aluminum shanties that had been constructed as shelter for the millions of internally displaced people who had flooded Mogadishu since the famine began. This confusion of structures made for ideal concealment: “they could fire through doors or windows even when closed and pop out into an alley or street to shoot rocket-propelled grenades, with little chance of being hit because of their short exposure time,” wrote Ranger Captain Lee Rysewyk.36

  Despite these difficulties, Task Force Ranger finally launched on its first mission on August 30. There had been numerous false starts: “Perhaps two or three times a day, the TF senior leadership would mull over some intelligence received about Aideed’s whereabouts. Each time, the TF would spin up, and sometimes launch, only to be called back and the mission scrubbed,” noted Kurt Smith. “Sometimes we would just turn one of these scrubbed missions into a signature flight since the whole task force was on the aircraft and kitted up anyway.”37

  In fact, Task Force Ranger “spun up” perhaps as many as 35 to 40 times prior to October 3, only to have the mission aborted, typically down to the poor quality of actionable intelligence. Garrison decided that they needed to start hitting targets in an effort to flush out Aideed. He also wanted to demonstrate that the SNA mortaring of the hangar would not go unpunished. Garrison would not be intimidated by the SNA. The militia had begun their regular mortar bombardments from the first night of Task Force Ranger’s arrival and, although largely inaccurate, it continued every night like clockwork.

  Their first operation targeted a building known as the Lig Ligato Compound, codenamed Objective Flute, located on a road called Via Lenin, just north of the K-4 Traffic Circle and near to the Parade Reviewing Stand, a regular venue for rallies held by Aideed and the SNA. According to the CIA’s assessment the location was a known “hang-out” for SNA leaders and the warlord had been seen frequenting it in the past. UNOSOM II provided additional late intelligence that a second adjacent building was also “Aideed associated” and a possible source of command and control for the nightly mortar attacks. This second location was added to the target set.

  As the official history explained: “that night [August 30] at 19:27, mortar rounds rocked the TF Ranger compound. The attack by Aideed’s followers lasted about 30 minutes, and a total of nine rounds landed at the airport, injuring four TF Ranger personnel. TF Ranger responded by launching an assault at 0309 on 30 August.”38 This first mission would be conducted purely by air with the 160th SOAR delivering and extracting the assault force upon completion of the operation.

  Objective Flute was deep within Habr Gidr-controlled territory. Task Force Ranger reconnaissance aircraft monitoring the target during the night reported that it appeared that there was significant activity inside and the buildings were illuminated in the early morning darkness as much of Mogadishu slept. Garrison was confident enough in the CIA targeting and what his own reconnaissance assets were seeing to launch a helicopter assault force at 03:09 that morning.

  Delta snipers shot out the security lights around the compound from their orbiting helicopters as the assaulters fast-roped to the ground. Moving swiftly, they gained entry into the buildings using breaching charges and shotguns. Nine inhabitants were detained and flexi-cuffed, blindfolded, and flown to a detention center before being released once their identities were confirmed. To the surprise of Task Force Ranger, the detainees were a mix of Westerners and local Somalis, all employed by the United Nations.

  The SOCOM history continued: “The assault force cleared the Lig Ligato house and an adjacent building, both of which were on the UNOSOM priority target list. This operation was conducted professionally and on short notice. The assault force detained nine people who turned out to be UN employees. They also took weapons, drugs, communications gear, and other items from the buildings. The UN employe
es were not supposed to be there.”39

  There were questions raised of racketeering, particularly after it emerged that the employees had been previously ordered from the site by UNOSOM. Later intelligence indicated that the second building was in fact owned by Osman Atto, a key associate of Aideed and number two in the SNA organization, but leased to the United Nations as additional office space during the day.

  This last point was missed by much of the following media frenzy. Headlines in the international press mocked the results of the operation: “Can Delta farce now get it right?” screamed one. Others spoke of a supposed “keystone cops” approach. Although the accusations of the press were at best uninformed, Dave McKnight at the Task Force Ranger J-2 Cell conceded, “we placed too much credence in (these sources) and failed to adequately confirm the target.”40 Kurt Smith remembered: “The next day, newspaper clippings posted at the JOC read ‘Delta Farce Strikes Again’ and similar headlines. It’s frustrating to read things like that, especially written by someone who clearly has no understanding of how difficult it is to do our job.”41

  Despite the “dry hole,” the operation itself had gone like clockwork. After the assaulters had completed their mission, 160th SOAR helicopters had landed in a nearby schoolyard and exfiltrated the operators and their detainees. There were some reports of light small-arms fire directed toward the helicopters as they had arrived, but this would not prove to be unusual in Mogadishu. As one Nightstalker pilot recalled to the author, “They shot at us every day!”

  Colonel Danny McKnight’s Rangers, idling nearby in the standby Ranger GRF should ground extraction be required, spotted what they thought, through night-vision devices, might be a gunman with an RPG on a nearby rooftop. The Rangers held their fire as they couldn’t positively identify their target as the rules of engagement stipulated and the figure was later identified as a CNN cameraman. The resultant footage of Delta fast roping into the target aired on the international networks the next day.

  Garrison immediately received pressure from the chain of command due to the press coverage of the raid. Lee Rysewyk wrote that they “now felt considerable restraint to go on [a] mission.”42 Furthermore there was now a “checklist of precursors” imposed by Hoar that would have to be followed before Task Force Ranger could launch. Garrison would now have to inform and clear targets through Montgomery, Hoar, and UNOSOM.

  Garrison explained the decision-making behind the Lig Ligato operation in later testimony to the House Select Committee hearing:

  I launched the first raid because the mortar attacks were the first time that the majority of our troops were ever in combat. I didn’t want them to develop a “bunker mentality” and I knew how important it was to get my guys up and operating.

  So I went to UNOSOM headquarters and said give me your number one target that Aideed had reportedly been at within the last 24 hours. It was the Lig Ligato house. We launched on that target. After the first raid, General Hoar gave me specific guidance that I had to have current, actionable intelligence, i.e. I had to know the guy was actually at the target – it had to be verified. That is why we spun-up more than 40 times but only conducted seven raids.43

  September 5 saw the CIA receive intelligence from one of their local assets that Aideed would be visiting his aunt’s home that night. The source even provided a drawing of the internals of the house itself and the CIA thought the tip was solid enough to launch. Garrison declined to launch, probably on the basis of the information coming from a single source, particularly in light of the criticism following the Lig Ligato operation. Garrison was likely referencing this mission when he later said: “One time, we had intelligence that Aideed went into a building and wasn’t seen coming out. We launched reconnaissance helos but there was nothing to see associated with Aideed, i.e. no extra guards. I was fairly confident he was there, but we did not launch because of our guidance.”44

  The next target would be the former Russian Embassy, otherwise known as the Military Compound, on the night of September 6. This target was again located north of the K-4 and near the Reviewing Stand. Delta inserted by a mix of MH-6s and Black Hawks whilst the Rangers fast-roped in to establish their blocking positions to isolate the objective from outside interference. Again this would be a helicopter-borne operation but with McKnight’s GRF standing by in the vicinity in case of difficulties. Smith remembered:

  One night we received intelligence that Aideed was attending a meeting at an old Russian compound in the city. We launched as usual and lined up on the compound. I sat on the front left side of our MH-6. Norm [Hooten] sat next to me on the rear seat. As we were on approach into the compound, I viewed through my NODs [night observation device] the AH-6s lift up high, level off, then turn down on their gunruns.45

  The AH-6s had seen militia in the immediate vicinity of the objective and had engaged them with their miniguns before the gunmen could harass the assault force. As the MH-6s landed, one of the operators spotted more gunmen and fired his SAW in their direction to warn them off. The assaulters breached and cleared a number of buildings and initially captured some 30 people, although there was no sign of Aideed. According to a number of sources, he had been present only a short time earlier. Tommy Faust mentioned: “We were off by one building and Aideed barely escaped. I do not know if [it] was caused by the source [a member of the CIA’s local surveillance teams] or our interpretation [of the source’s directions].”46

  The assaulters and their 17 eventual detainees, including two Tier 3 Habr Gidr leadership targets and a number of assault rifles and machine guns, were extracted by helicopter without incident. The Rangers in the GRF saw for the first time Somalis setting alight stacks of old automobile tires around the target location. It would also be the first mission on which the Rangers would receive direct enemy small-arms fire.

  The nine-Humvee GRF was engaged by AK47 and RPG fire as they waited for the assaulters to complete their part of the mission, inflicting minor wounds to two Rangers: Specialist Steve Anderson was hit in the leg by an RPG fragment and another, the turret gunner on McKnight’s own Humvee, Sergeant Mike Pringle, was struck in the helmet by an AK round. The Kevlar luckily stopped the bullet but part of it broke off and inflicted a nasty graze.

  The Ranger GRF returned fire against the militiamen that engaged them near the Reviewing Stand. Orbiting AH-6s were called in to provide close air support and a dismounted operation cleared out the gunmen. Paul Leonard remarked: “[After] the first two or three missions we did notice that they were getting quicker to responding to where we were going.”

  After the Somali combatants were suppressed, the Ranger GRF began to receive what could only have been friendly fire from one of the small US outstations known as Sword Base located to the northwest. Indeed, upon their return to the hangar at least one .50-caliber hole from a US heavy machine gun was discovered in the door of a Ranger Humvee. Luckily no one had been hit by the undisciplined fire.

  The next operation occurred on September 14 and again caused significant embarrassment to Garrison and Task Force Ranger. As mentioned earlier, relations with the Italian contingent had deteriorated amid growing suspicions that they were passing information to Aideed. Whilst visiting his opposite number in Italian intelligence at their compound, the Ranger security element for Colonel Dave McKnight, led by Staff Sergeant John Burns, spotted an individual whom they thought was Aideed. His behaviour, seemingly quickly spirited away upon the arrival of the Americans, only increased that belief.

  McKnight reported the sighting to the JOC and an OH-58D was launched to trail the suspect vehicle, a brown Land Rover. The helicopter’s camera apparently confirmed the Rangers’ sighting and the assault package was launched against the building where the Land Rover eventually stopped. Again the mission template was a helicopter insertion and extraction with the GRF convoy standing by. No enemy fire was received upon approach, particularly unusual for a daylight mission. The reason for this would soon become painfully clear.

  At
13:00 the assaulters stormed a building in northern Mogadishu and detained the suspect individual and 38 other Somalis. The individual wasn’t Aideed but General Ahmed Jilao, another former police chief from the Barre regime. The other detainees were members of the Abgaal Clan who were violently opposed to Aideed and were vocal supporters of UNOSOM. The location of the target should have indicated that it would have been an unlikely place for Aideed to hide out, deep in rival Abgaal territory in the north of the city far from the Habr Gidr enclaves to the south. Jilao and his clan members were soon released.

  Three days later, on September 17, Task Force Ranger conducted an operation to silence the warlord’s personal propaganda station, Radio Aideed. Although it normally only transmitted for three hours each evening, it had become a thorn in the side of UNOSOM and was added to the target list as an Aideed infrastructure target. The J-2 Cell had improvised a direction-finding kit to narrow down the exact location of the pirate radio station.

  Tommy Faust explained that his men rather ingeniously “wrapped WD-1 telephone wire around a broomstick as an antenna, attached it to a signal strength test receiver and put the assembly in a helicopter. The helicopter was cued by direction-finding assets into the general area and then used the fabricated antenna and receiver to find an aural null. This refined the location down to a building and what looked to be an antenna.”47

  Instead of helicopters, this time Task Force Ranger used the Ranger GRF to approach the target. Kurt Smith remarked:

  The convoy was a collection of turret and cargo Humvees. F-Team was on a turret Humvee, the last in the order of movement in and the first out. Since navigation was difficult throughout the city, the lead vehicle received help from a command and control aircraft hovering high above. The aircraft would designate the route with an IR [infrared] laser so that the lead vehicle would know where to make the appropriate turns. Upon arrival at the objective, the mission went similarly to the others thus far. The execution went well, but we didn’t find what we were looking for.48