The Connected Discourses of the Buddha

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

  192 He refers to them as Gotamas because they were members of the Gotama clan, to which he himself belonged.

  193 Spk: During his six years of ascetic practice the Blessed One had experienced great bodily pain. Therefore, in his old age, he suffered from back winds (pị̣hiv̄ta, rheumatism?). Or else he lay down because he wanted to use the council hall in all four postures, having already used it by way of walking, standing, and sitting.

  194 Avassutapariyāya, anavassutapariȳya. Avassuta means literally “flown into,” or leaky, implying a mind permeated by defilements. The substantives avassuta and āsava, and the verbs anvāssavati and anu(s)savati, are all based on the same root su, “to flow.” Waldschmidt has published a Skt version of Moggallāna’s discourse (see Bibliography).

  195 As at 35:132 (IV 119,27–120,11).

  196 This sentence, as inordinately complex in the Pāli as in my translation, introduces three themes that will be taken up for detailed explanation just below. The syntax seems to be irregular, since the initial relative yato is not completed by its corresponding demonstrative tato. I read the last word with Se and Ee as nānu(s)savanti, as against Be nānusenti.

  197 Spk explains dukkhadhammā as dukkhasambhavadhammā, “states from which suffering originates”; “for when the five aggregates exist, suffering of various kinds, such as being wounded, slain, and imprisoned, originates.”

  198 The simile is at 12:63 (II 99,27–100,4), but here the phrasing is a little different.

  199 Wherever Ee has yato ca, I read with Be and Se sato va.

  200 I follow Se here: … ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa vinaye kaṇṭako. Taṃ kaṇṭako ti iti viditvā saṃvaro ca asaṃvaro ca veditabbo. 35:247 (IV 198,11–12) supports this reading; see n. 219 below.

  201 The simile is also at MN I 453,26–29 and MN III 300,19–23. Spk: Just the arising of mindfulness is slow, but as soon as it has arisen the defilements are suppressed and cannot persist. For when lust, etc., have arisen in the eye door, with the second javana process one knows that the defilements have arisen and the third javana process occurs with restraint. It is not surprising that an insight meditator can suppress defilements by the third javana process; for when a desirable object comes into range and a defiled javana process is about to occur, an insight meditator can stop it and arouse a wholesome javana process. This is the advantage for insight meditators of being well established in meditation and reflection.

  202 The purification of vision (dassana) usually means the attainment of stream-entry, the gaining of “the vision of the Dhamma” (dhammacakkhu). Here, however, the qualification “well purified” (suvisuddhạ) seems to imply that the question concerns the path to arahantship. It is so taken by Spk.

  203 Spk says that all the bhikkhus who replied were arahants; they answered in accordance with their own method of practice. The inquirer was dissatisfied with the reply of the first because it mentioned the formations only partly (padesasaṅkhāresu ̣hatv̄); he was dissatisfied with the other replies because they seemed to contradict one another.

  204 Kiṃsuka means literally “what’s it?” The name may have originated from an ancient Indian folk riddle. Kiṃśuka is also known in Skt literature (see MW, s.v. kị). Both PED and MW identify it as the tree Butea frondosa. Liyanaratne lists two kinds of kiṃsuka (“South Asian flora as reflected in the Abhidhanappadı̄pikā,” §§43–44.). One, also called the pāḷibadda, is identified as Erythrina variegata; the English equivalent is the coral tree (elsewhere used to render the pāricchattaka tree—see 48:68). The other, also called the palāsa, is identified as Butea monosperma; its English name is the Bengal kino tree or the dhak tree. Woodward translates it as “Judas tree,” but this is unlikely as the Judas tree is of the genus Sercis.The Kiṃsukopama Jātaka (No. 248; Ja II 265–66) begins with an incident similar to the one with which the present sutta starts, but employs a somewhat different story about the kiṃsuka to make the same point. In the Jātaka version the kiṃsuka appears like a charred stump at the time the buds are sprouting; like a banyan tree, when the leaves turn green; like a piece of meat, at the time of blossoming; like an acacia, when bearing fruit. According to Spk, the kiṃsuka is like a charred stump when the leaves have been shed; like a piece of meat, when blossoming; with strips of bark hanging down and burst pods, when bearing fruit; and giving abundant shade, when covered with leaves. The similarity of its flowers to meat is the theme of a humorous poem at Vism 196,5–15 (Ppn 6:91–92), about a jackal who chanced upon a kiṃsuka and rejoiced at finding “a meat-bearing tree.”

  205 Sirı̄sa. This was the Bodhi Tree of the Buddha Kakusandha (see DN II 4,12).

  206 Spk: Just as the four men who described the kiṃsuka described it just as they had seen it, so these four bhikkhus, having attained arahantship by purifying their vision, described Nibbāna, the purifier of vision, in accordance with the path by which they themselves had attained it. Spk draws parallels between the four modes of appearance of the tree and the four different approaches to meditation by which the monks attained arahantship.

  207 Spk: Why is this introduced? If that bhikkhu understood (the meaning being conveyed by the kiṃsuka simile), then it is introduced to teach him the Dhamma. If he did not understand, this simile of the city is introduced to explain and clarify the meaning.Again, Spk gives a much more elaborate version of the simile and its application. In brief: The lord of the city is a prince, son of a virtuous world monarch, who had been appointed by his father to administer one of the outlying provinces. Under the influence of bad friends the prince had become dissolute and passed his time drinking liquor and enjoying music and dance. The king sent the two messengers to admonish the prince to abandon his heedless ways and resume his duties. One messenger is a brave warrior (representing the samatha meditation subject), the other a wise minister (representing the vipassanā meditation subject). The brave warrior grabs hold of the wayward prince by the head and threatens to decapitate him if he doesn’t change his ways: this is like the time the mind has been grabbed and made motionless by the concentration arisen through the first jhāna. The fleeing of the prince’s dissolute friends is like the disappearance of the five hindrances when the first jhāna has arisen. When the prince agrees to follow the king’s command, this is like the time the meditator has emerged from jhāna. When the minister delivers the king’s command, this is like the time when the meditator, with his mind made pliable through concentration, develops insight meditation. When the two messengers raise up the white canopy over the prince after he has been coronated, this is like the time the white canopy of liberation is raised over the meditator after he has attained arahantship by means of serenity and insight.

  208 Also at 35:103; see above n. 87.

  209 Spk identifies this as the insight-mind (vipassan̄citta), which is the prince to be coronated with the coronation of arahantship by the two messengers, serenity and insight. This interpretation strikes me as too narrow. I see the point to be simply that consciousness is the functional centre of personal experience.

  210 Spk: Nibbāna is called the “message of reality” (yath̄bh̄tạ vacanaṃ) because in its real nature it is unshakable and immutable (yathābhūtasabhāvaṃ akuppaṃ avikā̄ri).

  211 Apart from SN 5, references to bhikkhunı̄s are rare in SN, but see 35:231 above. The five defilements are also at MN III 294–95. Spk: Desire (chanda) is freshly arisen weak craving (tạh̄), lust (r̄ga) is repeatedly arisen strong craving. Similarly, hatred (dosa) is freshly arisen weak anger (kodha), aversion (pạigha) is repeatedly arisen strong anger. The five terms incorporate the three unwholesome roots, and when these are included, all the subsidiary defilements are included. The five terms also imply the twelve unwholesome cittas (of the Abhidhamma—see CMA 1:4–7).

  212 Duhitika. Spk analyses this word as du-ihiti-ka, ihiti being synonymous with iriyanā, “moving, faring”: Ettha ihitı̄ ti iriyanā; dukkhā ihiti etthā ti duhitiko (verbal analysis). Along whatever path the
re is no food or refreshments such as roots and fruits, the faring there is difficult; one cannot fare on it to reach one’s destination. Similarly, one cannot reach success by faring along the path of defilements, thus the path of defilements is duhitika.The correct derivation of duhitika, apparently lost by the time of the commentators, is from du-hita. See the discussion below at n. 347, and see too MW, s.v. dur-hita, and its antonym, su-hita.

  213 I follow Se and Ee, which do not include pamādaṃ āpajjeyya /āpajjati, found in Be. Spk: Just as the owner of the crops fails to gain the fruits of the harvest when, due to the watchman’s negligence, the bull eats the barley, so when the mind is separated from the mindfulness that guards the six sense doors, it enjoys the five cords of sensual pleasure; then, because his wholesome qualities are destroyed, the bhikkhu fails to attain the fruits of asceticism.

  214 Be: udujitaṃ hoti sudujitaṃ; Se: udujjitaṃ hoti sudujjitaṃ; Ee: ujujātaṃ hoti saṃmujujātaṃ. Spk glosses with tajjitaṃ, sutajjitaṃ , and says the meaning is sujitaṃ, “well conquered,” udu and sudu being mere indeclinables (nip̄tamatta). Possibly all texts are corrupted here. Spk says that at this point the Buddha has discussed the guarding of serenity and the virtue of restraint of the sense faculties (samathānurakkhaṇa-indriyasṃvarası̄la ).

  215 The Pāli terms for the parts of the lute (vı̣̄̄) are: camma, doṇi, daṇḍa, upavı̄ṇā, tanti, koṇa. The simile occurs at Mil 53, inclusive of the list of terms (preceded by patta, sling). In translating the names of the parts I follow Horner, at Milinda’s Questions, 1:74, who bases her renderings on A.K. Coomaraswamy, “The Parts of a Vı̣̄̄” (Journal of the American Oriental Society, 50:3).

  216 I read with Be: Asatı̄ kir’ āạ bho vı̄ṇā nāma, yath’ evaṃ yaṃ kiñci vı̄ṇā nāma, ettha ca pan’ āyaṃ jano ativelaṃ pamatto palaḷito. Se differs only in the v.l. palāḷito, but Ee differs more widely. The exact meaning is obscure. Spk glosses asatı̄ with lāmikā and paraphrases: “It is not only the lute that is a poor thing, but like this so-called lute, whatever else is bound with strings—all that is just a poor thing.”

  217 Spk: The five aggregates are like the lute, the meditator is like the king. As the king did not find any sound in the lute even after splitting it up and searching, and therefore lost interest in the lute, so the meditator, exploring the five aggregates, does not see any graspable “I” or “mine” and therefore loses interest in the aggregates. By the terms “I” or “mine” or “I am” in regard to form, etc., the three “grips” of views, craving, and conceit are respectively described. These do not exist in the arahant.There is an important difference between the king and the meditator, not conveyed either by sutta or commentary: In the parable the king, looking for the sound of the lute by taking the instrument apart, seems foolish, while the meditator, dissecting the aggregates to dispel the delusion of a self, becomes wise.

  Spk ends its commentary on the sutta with a quotation from the Great Commentary (Mahā-atṭ̣hakathā, no longer extant):“In the beginning virtue is discussed,

  In the middle, development of concentration,

  And at the end, Nibbāna:

  The Simile of the Lute is thus composed.”

  218 Saravanaṃ. Spk (Se) glosses with kaṇṭakavanaṃ. Sara, according to PED, is the reed Saccharum sara, used to make arrows.

  219 Here Be and Se both read: … asucigāmakaṇṭako ti. Taṃ kaṇṭako ti iti viditvā saṃvaro ca asaṃvaro ca veditabbo. Ee is the same except for the omission of iti. See n. 200. Spk: He is a foul village thorn: “foul” in the sense of impure, a “village thorn” in the sense of wounding the villagers [Spk-pṭ: that is, oppressing them by accepting their services while being unworthy of them].

  220 Byābhaṅgihatthā. Spk glosses kājahatthā, Spk-pṭ daṇḍahatthā.

  221 Āyatiṃ punabbhavāya ceteti. Spk: Thus beings, thoroughly struck by the defilements (rooted in) the longing for existence, experience the suffering rooted in existence (bhavam̄lakạ dukkhạ).

  222 On the enmity between the devas and the asuras, see 11:1–6. The following is parallel to 11:4 (I 221,3–17).

  223 As at 22:64 (III 75,3–4). Spk says: “In conceiving the aggregates by way of craving, conceit, and views.”

  224 Maññita. Spk: “I am” (asmi) is a conceiving through craving; “I am this” (ayam aham asmi), a conceiving through views; “I shall be,” a conceiving through the eternalist view; “I shall not be,” a conceiving through the annihilationist view. The rest are specific types of eternalism.The connection Spk makes between “I am” and craving is unusual, as the notion “I am” (asmi) is typically ascribed to conceit; however, 22:89 (III 130,31) has asmı̄ ti chando, and possibly the commentator had this in mind. “I am this” is the seminal type of identity view, whereby a person establishes a personal identity by identifying one or another of the five aggregates as a self. The ninefold conceiving is mentioned at 22:47; see too MN III 246,11–17.

  225 The key terms of the next three paragraphs are iñjita, phandita , and papañcita. Spk: “This is to show that on account of these defilements (craving, etc.), beings are perturbed, vacillate, and procrastinate.” Papañca is often explained in the commentaries as pamādakarā dhammā, the factors responsible for heedlessness or procrastination.

  226 Mānagata. Spk: Conceit itself is an involvement with conceit. In this passage, “I am” is stated by way of the conceit associated with craving; “I am this,” by way of view. Although conceit does not arise in immediate conjunction with views (according to the Abhidhamma analysis of mind-moments, they are mutually exclusive), views occur because conceit has not been abandoned. So this is said with reference to views rooted in conceit.36. Vedanāsaṃyutta

  227 Since these verses (and those in the suttas to follow) are not expressly ascribed to the Buddha, I do not enclose them in quotation marks. Though several have parallels in other texts, where they are ascribed to the Buddha, here they seem to have been added by the redactors, perhaps quoting from these other sources.The verse alludes to the Four Noble Truths, with feeling in the place of suffering (on the ground that “whatever is felt is included in suffering” and because feeling is one of the five aggregates mentioned in the formula for the first truth). Spk points out that two terms respectively signify serenity and insight (Spk-pṭ: samāhito and sampaj̄no); the rest, the Four Noble Truths. “Hungerless” (nicch̄to) means without craving, and “fully quenched” (parinibbuto) implies the full quenching of defilements (kilesaparinibbāna ). Thus the verses are all-inclusive, comprising all states of the four planes (see n. 6).

  228 I render mosadhammaṃ in pāda c in accordance with the gloss of Spk, nassanadhammaṃ, “subject to destruction,” on which Spk-pṭ remarks: “There is nothing to be seen after its dissolution owing to its momentariness.” The word may also be related to musā, from the same verbal root but with the acquired meaning “false.” Thus mosadhamma could have been rendered “of false nature” or “deceitful.” This meaning seems to be conveyed at MN III 245,16–18, and perhaps at Sn 757d, though it is also possible both nuances are intended in every case. Spk glosses phussa phussa vayaṃ passaṃ with ñāṇena phusitvā phusitvā vayaṃ passanto, “seeing its fall, having repeatedly contacted it (touched it) with knowledge.” Spk-pṭ takes virajjati to be an allusion to the path (maggavir̄gena virajjati).

  229 In Pāli the three underlying tendencies are rāgānusaya, paṭighānusaya, avijjānusaya. Among the seven anusaya (see 45:175), these three are specially correlated with feelings; see too MN I 303,6–11.

  230 I read niranusayo with Be, as against pahı̄narāgānusayo in Se and Ee.

  231 Mānābhisamayā. Spk: Breaking through conceit by seeing it (dassanābhisamayā ) and by abandoning it (pahānābhisamayā). See II, n. 13.

  232 Pātālo. Also at I, v. 147d, v. 517b, v. 759c. Here Spk derives the word from pātassa alaṃ pariyatto, “enough, a sufficiency of falling,” and says
the word denotes a place without bottom (natthi ettha patị̣hā). “Painful bodily feeling” here renders sārı̄rikā dukkhā vedanā.

  233 Spk: Because it undergoes change.

  234 I prefer the reading in Se: tam enaṃ dutiyena sallena anuvedhaṃ vijjheyyuṃ. Be differs only in having a singular verb. Spk: The second wound (anugatavedhạ) would be only one or two inches away from the opening of the first. For one wounded thus, the subsequent feeling would be worse than the first.

  235 Spk: The escape is concentration, path, and fruit. This he does not know; the only escape of which he knows is sensual pleasure.

  236 Spk says that among the noble disciples, here the stress is on the arahant, though the nonreturner would also be appropriate. According to the commentarial system, both have abandoned paṭigha or dosa and thus are no longer subject to displeasure (domanassa), painful mental feeling. Everyone with a body, including the Buddhas, is subject to bodily painful feeling (here, kāyikā dukkhā vedan̄).

  237 Spk: He went so that the bhikkhus, seeing the Tathāgata, the foremost person in the world, attending on the sick, would think, “We too should attend on the sick.” He also went to explain a meditation subject to those who needed one.