The Connected Discourses of the Buddha
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348 I read saññamasambhūtāni, as in Se and Ee, as against Be sāmaññasambhūtāni. Spk merely glosses with sesası̄laṃ.
349 I read nihitaṃ vā nādhigacchati, again with Se and Ee, as against Be nihitaṃ vā ṭhānā vigacchati.
350 The rule is Nissaggiya-pācittiya No. 18; see Vin III 236–39 and Vin I 245,2–7. The sutta is cited at Vin II 296–97 as testimony for the prohibition against the acceptance of gold and silver by bhikkhus. At Vin III 238, “silver” is more broadly defined as including coins made of silver, copper, wood, or lac, or whatever serves as a medium of exchange. Its commentary (Sp III 690) extends this to include bone, hide, fruit, seeds, etc., whether imprinted with a figure or not. Thus in effect the expression “gold and silver” signifies money. On samaṇa sakyaputtiya, see II, n. 376.
351 Be omits the second question, apparently by editorial oversight, as it is in Se and Ee.
352 Cp. 12:33 (II 58,3–5). Spk’s treatment of the line here indicates that it takes akālikena pattena as a single expression, with akālikena functioning as an adverbial instrumental in apposition to pattena: Akālikena pattenā ti na kālantarena pattena; k̄lạ anatikkamitvā va pattenā ti attho; “Immediately attained: not attained after an interval of time; the meaning is that it is attained even without any time having elapsed.” For more on akālikena, see I, n. 33, II, n. 103. The opening of this paragraph in Ee seems garbled.
353 Note that the headman here ascribes to the Buddha, as a direct quotation, a general statement of the causal tie between desire and suffering (yaṃ kiñci dukkhaṃ uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati ...). As this statement is not found in the Buddha’s words above but is clearly needed as the referent of “this principle” (imin̄ dhammena), it seems likely that the statement had been in the original text but at some point had been elided. Just below the Buddha does make the generalization himself.
354 These are the words with which the Buddha opened his first sermon; see 56:11. Spk: The pursuit of sensual happiness is mentioned to show the types who enjoy sensual pleasure (II–III); the pursuit of self-mortification to show the ascetics (IV–V); the middle way to show the three types of wearing away (VI). What is the purpose in showing all this? The Tathāgata, who attained perfect enlightenment by abandoning the two extremes and by following the middle way, does not criticize or praise all enjoyers of sensual pleasures or all ascetics. He criticizes those who deserve criticism and praises those who deserve praise.
355 The three coordinates of the pattern to be expanded upon are: (i) how wealth is acquired, whether unlawfully, lawfully, or both; (ii) whether or not it is used for one’s own benefit; and (iii) whether or not it is used to benefit others. Those who rank positive on all three counts will be further divided into those who remain attached to their wealth and those who are unattached to it. This same tenfold analysis of the kāmabhogı̄ is at AN V 177–82.
356 See n. 325. Here a wholesome state (kusala dhamma) must rank lower than a “superhuman distinction,” since the attainment of the former does not necessarily entail the latter. The former can include simple moral conduct and ordinary wholesome states of mind, while the latter includes only the jhānas, formless attainments, direct knowledges, and supramundane paths and fruits.
357 Tisso sandiṭṭhikā nijjarā. Nijjarā, “wearing away,” was a Jain term adopted by the Buddha. The Jains held that ascetic practice was the means to “wear away” all suffering (sabbạ dukkhaṃ nijjiṇṇaṃ bhavissati); see their position at MN I 93,2–11 and II 214,7–13, and the Buddha’s alternative approach to “wearing away” at MN II 223–25. Three other kinds of sandiṭṭhikā nijjarā are described at AN I 221,5–30 (i.e., virtue, the jhānas, the destruction of the taints) and a twentyfold nijjarā is at MN III 76,12–77,23. Spk says that one path is described as three kinds of wearing away because of the wearing away of the three defilements.
358 Samaṇo Gotamo māyaṃ jānāti. At MN I 375,12–14 the Jains proclaim, “The ascetic Gotama is a magician (m̄ȳvı); he knows a converting magic (̄vạ̣anị māyaṃ jānāti) by which he converts the disciples of other teachers.” The same charge comes up for discussion at AN II 190–94.
359 Samaṇo khalu bho Gotamo māyāvı̄.
360 Lambacūḷakā bhaṭā. Spk gives no help, but Rhys Davids interprets the passage thus in his Buddhist India (p. 21): “The Koliyan central authorities were served by a special body of peons, or police, distinguished, as by a kind of uniform, from which they took their name, by a special head-dress. These particular men had a bad reputation for extortion and violence.”
361 See 24:5, III, n. 254.
362 See 24:6, III, n. 255.
363 Spk proposes alternative interpretations of dhammasamādhi and cittasamādhi: (i) dhammasamādhi is the dhamma of the ten wholesome courses of action, cittasamādhi the four paths along with insight; (ii) the five dhammā (mentioned below)—namely, gladness, rapture, tranquillity, happiness, and concentration—are called dhammasamādhi, while cittasamādhi is again the four paths along with insight; (iii) the ten wholesome courses of action and the four divine abodes are dhammasamādhi, the one-pointedness of mind arisen for one who fulfils this dhammasamādhi is cittasamādhi .
364 Apaṇṇakatāya mayhaṃ. Spk: “This practice leads to what is incontrovertible for me, to absence of wrongness (anaparādhakatāya ).” At Ps III 116,21 apaṇṇaka is glossed aviruddho advejjhagāmı̄ ekaṃsagāhiko; “uncontradicted, unambiguous, definitive.”
365 Kaṭaggaha. The allusion is to the lucky throw at dice, glossed jayaggaha, “the victorious throw.” The opposite is kaliggaha, the dark throw or losing throw. The style of reasoning here is reminiscent of that used at MN I 402–11 (which also includes the metaphor of dice) and at AN I 192–93.43. Asaṅkhatasaṃyutta
366 Kāyagatā sati. In sutta usage this includes all the practices comprised under “contemplation of the body” (kāyānupassanā ) in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (DN No. 22, MN No. 10). They are treated separately under this heading in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta (MN No. 119). The commentaries generally confine the term to the meditation on the thirty-two aspects of the body, as at Vism 240 (Ppn 8:44).
367 This triad of concentrations occurs elsewhere in the Nikāyas, e.g., at DN III 219,19–20, MN III 162,14–15, and AN IV 300,28–301,1. A concentration without thought but with examination (avitakka vicāramatta samādhi) does not fit into the familiar sequence of the four jhānas, in which the first jhāna includes both thought and examination and the second excludes both. To reconcile the two schemes, the Abhidhamma supplements the fourfold sequence of jhānas with a fivefold sequence in which the second jhāna is the avitakka vicāramatta samādhi. The second jhāna of the tetrad then becomes the third jhāna of the pentad. See As 179–80, which explains the reasons for the two sets.
368 Suññata samādhi, animitta samādhi, appaṇihita samādhi. Spk gives no explanation of these terms. The three are mentioned as a set at DN III 219,21–22, again without explanation, but Sv III 1003–4 comments on them thus: One who, at the stage of advanced insight, contemplates things as nonself, acquires the emptiness concentration on arriving at the path and fruit (because he has seen things as empty of self); one who contemplates things as impermanent acquires the signless concentration (because he has seen through the “sign of permanence”); one who contemplates things as suffering acquires the undirected concentration (because he has no leaning to things seen as painful). See too the discussion of the “triple gateway to liberation” at Vism 657–59 (Ppn 21:66–73). On animitta cetosamādhi, see n. 280 above.
369 This sutta and the next six cover the “thirty-seven aids to enlightenment,” elaborated at 43:12 (ix–xlv). More detailed explanations are given in the Introduction to Part V and in the notes to SN 45–51.
370 I follow the numbering in Ee. Though Woodward says “the sections are wrongly numbered in the text” (KS 4:261, n. 1), in fact it is the text that is correct and Wo
odward’s numbering that is off. For this sutta I prefer the Be reading anataṃ and the gloss in Spk (Be): taṇhānatiyā abhāvena anataṃ; “uninclined due to the absence of inclination through craving.” This seems more original than the Se and Ee reading antaṃ, “the end,” with Spk (Se) explaining: taṇhāratiyā abhāvena antaṃ; “the end due to the absence of delight through craving.”
371 Under each of the epithets for Nibbāna, Ee has “I–XLV” as if the elaboration is to be developed only as in §12. In the last sutta, however, “the path leading to the destination” begins with “mindfulness directed to the body,” which means that each elaboration is to be developed in full as in §§1–12. This means that each epithet should be conjoined with fifty-six versions of the path.
372 Nippapañcaṃ. Spk: Through the absence of proliferation by craving, conceit, and views. 44. Abyākatasaṃyutta
373 At AN I 25,19 she is declared the foremost bhikkhunı̄ among those with great wisdom (etadaggaṃ mahāpaññānaṃ ), and at 17:24 she is extolled as a model for the other bhikkhunı̄s. For a biographical sketch, see Hecker, “Great Woman Disciples of the Buddha,” in Nyanaponika and Hecker, Great Disciples of the Buddha, pp. 263–66, and Pruitt, Commentary on the Verses of the Therı̄s, pp. 164–74.
374 As at 16:12, 24:15–18, 33:1–55.
375 The reply here is identical with the Buddha’s famous reply to Vacchagotta at MN I 487–88. Though worded in terms of the Tathāgata, the questions refer to any arahant misconceived as a “being” or a self.
376 Spk: “The form by which one might describe the Tathāgata” considered as a being (sattasaṅkhātaṃ tathāgataṃ)—as tall or short, dark or light, etc.—has been abandoned by the omniscient Tathāgata through the abandoning of its origin. He is “liberated from reckoning in terms of form” (rūpasaṅkhāya vimutto), that is, because there will be no arising of form in the future for him, even the statement, “He will be such and such” through his physical form and mental qualities, loses its validity; thus he is liberated even from description by way of form. He is deep (gambhı̄ra) through the depth of his inclination (ajjhāsayagambhı̄ratā) and through the depth of his qualities (guṇagambhı̄ratā). As to the description that might be used in relation to the omniscient Tathāgata with such deep qualities, considering him as a being, when one sees the nonexistence (invalidity) of this description [Spk-pṭ: “a being”] owing to the nonexistence [Spk-pṭ: of the five aggregates], then the statement “The Tathāgata—considered as a being—exists after death” does not apply, i.e., it is not valid.
377 Be and Ee read the last verb as virodhayissati, Se vihāyissati. Spk glosses na viruddhaṃ padaṃ (Se: viruddhasaddaṃ) bhavissati; “there will be no contradictory term.” Spk glosses aggapadasmiṃ simply as “in the teaching” (desanāya). Aggapadasmiṃ occurs also at AN V 320,32, glossed by Mp with nibbāne.
378 Rūpagatam etaṃ. Spk: This is mere form. He shows: “No other being is found here apart from form, but when there is form there is merely this name.” Spk-pṭ: What is being rejected here? The self posited by the outside thinkers, spoken of here as “Tathāgata.”
379 See III, n. 83.
380 Spk explains kutūhalasālā (lit. “commotion hall”) as a place where ascetics and brahmins of other sects engage in various discussions. It is so named because commotion arises as they say, “What does this one say? What does that one say?”The teachers mentioned are the famous “six heretics,” the rivals of Gotama (see I, n. 200). It is strange that predictions about rebirth are ascribed to Ajita, since elsewhere he is reported to have taught materialism and to have denied an afterlife. Even Sañjaya is reported to have been a sceptic about such issues.
381 Sa-upādānassa khvāhaṃ Vaccha upapattiṃ paññāpemi no anupādānassa. There is a double meaning here, with upādāna meaning both “fuel” and subjective “clinging,” but I have translated the sentence in consonance with the following simile. It was also in a discourse to Vacchagotta that the Buddha used his famous simile of the fire that goes out from lack of fuel to illustrate the status of one who has attained Nibbāna; see MN I 487,11–30.
382 Tam ahaṃ taṇhūpādānaṃ vadāmi. The Buddha’s statement seems to imply that a temporal gap can intervene between the death moment and reconception. Since this contradicts Theravāda orthodoxy, Spk contends that at the death moment itself the being is said to be “not yet reborn” because the rebirth-consciousness has not yet arisen.
383 Here and below I read saddhiṃ, with Be and Ee, as against laddhi in Se. Spk glosses: tesaṃ laddhiyā saddhiṃ etaṃ abhavissa. To my knowledge laddhi, in the sense of belief, is a term of later usage, and it may have been incorporated into Se via a misunderstanding of the commentary.
384 I read ñāṇassa uppādāya, with Be and Se, as against ñāṇassa upādāya in Ee. Spk: “As to the insight knowledge that arises thus, ‘All phenomena are nonself,’ would I have been consistent with that?”
385 Probably this means that Vacchagotta would have interpreted the Buddha’s denial as a rejection of his empirical personality, which (on account of his inclination towards views of self) he would have been identifying as a self. We should carefully heed the two reasons the Buddha does not declare, “There is no self”: not because he recognizes a transcendent self of some kind (as some interpreters allege), or because he is concerned only with delineating “a strategy of perception” devoid of ontological implications (as others hold), but (i) because such a mode of expression was used by the annihilationists, and the Buddha wanted to avoid aligning his teaching with theirs; and (ii) because he wished to avoid causing confusion in those already attached to the idea of self. The Buddha declares that “all phenomena are nonself” (sabbe dhammā anattā), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since “all phenomena” includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self.
386 Yassa p’ assa āvuso etam ettakena ettakam eva, tam p’ assa bahuṃ. I translate this obscure exclamation with the aid of Spk.
Part V
The Great Book
(Mah̄vagga)
Introduction
The fifth and final part of the Saṃyutta Nikāya is the Mahāvagga, The Great Book. There are at least three explanations that might be given for this title. First, it is the largest division of SN, and could become exponentially larger if the abbreviated repetition series, at the end of many chapters, were to be expanded in full. Second, we find here, not one giant saṃyutta towering over a retinue of lesser peaks, but a veritable Himalayan range of saṃyuttas, with at least eight major chapters among a total of twelve. And third, almost all the saṃyuttas in this book deal with different formulations of the Buddha’s path to liberation, the most precious part of his legacy to the world.
A glance at the contents of the Mahāvagga shows that its first seven chapters are devoted to seven sets of training factors which occur elsewhere in the Pāli Canon, though in a different sequence. In the standard sequence these are:the four establishments of mindfulness (catt̄ro satipaṭṭhānā)
the four right strivings (catt̄ro sammappadhānā)
the four bases for spiritual power (catt̄ro iddhipādā)
the five spiritual faculties (pañc’ indriyāni)
the five powers (pañca balāni)
the seven factors of enlightenment (satta bojjhaṅgā)
the Noble Eightfold Path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga).
In SN we have already met these sets several times: at 22:81, when the Buddha explains how the Dhamma has been taught discriminately; at 22:101, as the things to be developed for the mind to be liberated from the taints; at 43:12, as different aspects of the path leading to the unconditioned. In the Buddhist exegetical tradition, beginning very soon after the age of the canon, these seven sets are known as the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (sattatịsa bodhipakkhiyā dhamm̄). Although this term is not
used in the Nikāyas themselves as a collective appellation for the seven sets, the sets themselves frequently appear in the Nikāyas as a compendium of the practice leading to enlightenment. On several occasions the Buddha himself underlined their critical importance, referring to them, in his talks to the bhikkhus, as “the things I have taught you through direct knowledge” (ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desit̄). In the prelude to his parinibbāna he urged the bhikkhus to learn, pursue, develop, and cultivate them so that the holy life would endure long in the world, out of compassion for the world, for the good, welfare, and happiness of devas and humans (DN II 119–20). He requested the bhikkhus to meet often and recite the seven sets “meaning for meaning, phrase for phrase,” without disputes, again so that the holy life would endure long (DN III 127–28). He made unity in the Sangha contingent upon concord regarding the seven sets (MN II 245) and urged the disciples to train in them “united, in concord, not disputing” (MN II 238). It is because he teaches these seven sets that his disciples venerate him, and by developing them many of these disciples have attained consummation and perfection in direct knowledge (MN II 11–12).