Pseudopandemic

by Iain Davis

  [24] - https://archive.is/rwjiD

  [25] - https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brettonwoodsagreement.asp

  [26] - https://archive.is/etWx8

  [27] - https://archive.is/sk5lx

  [28] - https://archive.ph/E7WFj

  [29] - https://web.archive.org/web/20210607172234/https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/25/feds-daly-says-the-economy-is-strong-but-its-way-too-early-to-tighten-policy.html

  [30] - https://web.archive.org/web/20210608021752/https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/07/deutsche-bank-warns-of-global-time-bomb-coming-due-to-rising-inflation.html

  Chapter 27 - Pseudopandemic Trigger Event

  It seems the majority have been convinced by the pseudopandemic. They believe that a low mortality respiratory virus presents a threat on such a scale that they are willing to allow their respective GPPP State franchises unprecedented control of their lives. They are prepared to abandon all the freedoms they imagined their democratic societies were based upon in exchange for safety.

  Yet, for a large minority, the pseudopandemic was an obvious scam. Those who listened to scientific and medical opinions, both for and against the official narrative, who considered the published statistical data, who observed the conduct of the Trusted News cartel and experienced the impact of hybrid warfare, easily saw through the pseudopandemic deception.

  The pseudopandemic was a global crime of such scope and ambition that the core conspirators and their informed influencers must have known they could not control every aspect of it. They appeared to anticipate the dissent which emerged among those who noticed the lack of evidence for their claims. As they progressed in solidarity, while rejecting stigma, the war against the infodemic was their primary concern. As long as most people felt compelled to obey those who didn't could be marginalised and blamed.

  For those who did not believe the pseudopandemic story an obvious question stood out: Why now?

  In many respects it seemed ill conceived. The scientific and medical evidence was extremely weak, the use of the non-diagnostic test as a claimed basis for case numbers was an obvious ruse, the hospital and mortality data was clearly manipulated and the policies designed to maximise risk for the most vulnerable were transparent. Surely better planning could have delivered a more convincing pseudopandemic?

  Only a thorough independent investigation will reveal the answers, but we can speculate. Perhaps SARS-CoV-2 was too good an opportunity to miss, maybe the core conspirators were sufficiently confident in their hybrid warfare capability to be unconcerned about the lack of evidence. However, at this stage, it seems the most likely explanation is that they had no choice.

  Exploiting debt monetisation as the source of authority could only last for so long. Inevitably the monetary system the parasite class used to enrich themselves and their favoured GPPP stakeholder partners would cause the collapse of the international monetary and financial system (IMFS). With its demise, the source of their authority would be lost. A Great Reset would be required to transition the global population into a new IMFS designed to maintain it.

  In 2018 the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) evaluated a number of economic recoveries that followed historical recessions and depressions [1]. They noted that the recovery following the 2008 banking system collapse was the weakest in modern economic history.

  In contrast to eastern economies, in particular China and notably excluding Japan [2], western aligned, democratic economies had stagnated since 2008. Prior to the financial crisis, historical productivity growth in the UK had been 2%, in the ten years that followed it was 0.3%. In 2018 real incomes were 3% lower than they were ten years earlier.

  The bank bail outs cost the people dearly. While they faced a decade of austerity and lost services, the GPPP accelerated debt monetisation. In terms of GDP the UK State franchise borrowed 50% more than it had ever done before, adding £1 trillion to the national debt by 2018.

  The UK's sick economy wasn't unique. The same disastrous economic performance was affecting all western aligned democracies. The IFS summed up what they called an astonishing decade:

  "The UK economy has broken record after record, and not generally in a good way: record low earnings growth, record low interest rates, record low productivity growth, record public borrowing followed by record cuts in public spending."

  However the IFS also noted that the bottom and middle percentiles had seen incomes rise while the top percentile had seen a decline:

  "On the upside employment levels are remarkably high and, in spite of how it may feel, the gap between rich and poor has actually narrowed somewhat"

  Given how much the money supply had expanded during that decade, the IFS findings didn't seem to evidence the expected growth in inequality. However the IFS reported that the income of the top 20% had reduced by 2% overall. They didn't report that the income of the top 1%, only dipped temporarily.

  By 2017 they had returned to holding 8.5% of the nation's wealth, just as they had on the eve of the financial crisis [3]. Relative inequality reduced among the 99% because the financial crash affected the middle class. The gap between the 99% and the 1% increased.

  The 2008 financial crisis was a banking crisis [4] caused by debt monetisation. US commercial banks were creating deposits, in the form of mortgages and unsecured loans, without making any genuine attempt to assess the risk.

  These sub-prime mortgages were attractive to the banks and mortgage lenders because it enabled them to charge more interest to people with poor credit ratings. They subsequently extended far more credit than borrowers could ever repay.

  The banks were gambling on long term, exceptionally low interest rates. They offered sub-prime borrowers short term mortgage deals betting that continued low interest rates would enable them to re-mortgage, a few years later, at a better rate. While the interest rate stayed low, suppressed by the Fed, the mortgage holders could just about cover the repayments. If they increased millions would be at risk of default.

  Between 2000 to 2006 the debt monetisation feeding frenzy was out of control and lenders were fuelling an enormous credit and housing bubble secured against very high risk assets. Many of the mortgages were packaged together as a financial assets called a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS). These securities were worth the cumulative value of the mortgage agreements contained within them. They were then traded on the financial markets with global investors eager to monetise more debt.

  The money go round started spinning faster. As foreign investors grabbed the MBS they fuelled further speculation in the US housing market, artificially inflating house prices and encouraging more profligate lending. They also saw an opportunity to monetise more debt by using the MBS as assets underpinning financial derivatives.

  As previously discussed, the derivatives market enables debt monetisation that far exceeds the financial capacity of the global productive economy. This can only happen because the money used is fairy dust. This is not money the planet could ever earn. It is extreme debt monetisation.

  The MBS were parcelled in with other securities to form derivatives like Collateralised Debt Obligations [5] (CDO's). Investors, particularly the investment banks, hedge funds and pension funds, looked to protect their CDO and MBS risks by purchasing more derivatives, in the credit derivatives market, called Credit Default Swaps [6] (CDS).

  The CDS is a form of insurance in which the buyer agrees to pay the seller a coupon until the CDS matures. In return the CDS seller guarantees to pay an agreed sum if an asset default (credit event) occurs. CDS sellers were then spreading these risks (liabilities) further, monetising CDS debt by trading them as derivatives.

  The rapid expansion of the money supply inevitably led to inflation. As the demand for assets grew and housing prices soared the Fed attempted to stave off the inevitable disaster by using the only practical restraint they could apply to slow the commercial bank's debt monetisation: they increased the base rate.

  They tried to do this in a series of small incremental steps. However, the ba
se rate grew from 2.25% in 2004 to 5.25% in 2006. The parasite class and the GPPP are not superhuman. They make plenty of mistakes and this was possibly one of them. While eventual collapse of the debt based monetary system was inevitable, events in 2007 to 2008 hastened its end.

  Many sub-prime borrowers couldn't refinance their mortgages and began to default. The housing market in the US crashed. This caused a rapid contagion which some say threatened to destroy the global financial system.

  This wasn't a potential catastrophe, the disaster happened. From 2008 the IMFS was irrevocably broken. The parasite class never let a crisis go to waste.

  While they prepared for their Great Reset they took exploitation of the monetary system to new levels. No longer so concerned about maintaining it in the long term, they raced ahead with debt monetisation, wringing as much profit and resultant authority as possible out of its death throws.

  As the 2007/2008 crisis unfolded, global investors were massively exposed to MBS losses which were potentially worthless. CDO's, incorporating MBS' and other debt monetisation products, were equally junk and the CDS buyers started demanding payment from over exposed sellers.

  Not all sub-prime borrowers would default, but due to the complex structure of the securities no one knew to what extent the securities were devalued. In particular, the CDS trading meant that no one could work out where the liability lay or who was most exposed.

  At the central banks the interbank lending process started to break down. Banks wouldn't lend to each other because they were uncertain which of them were at risk and what exposure potential borrowers (other banks) faced. Giant US investment banks like Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers were unable to access the finance they needed and collapsed. The largest insurance firms, such as American International Group (AIG), faced huge losses in the derivatives markets.

  Whole nations started to fail financially. As credit from foreign capital dried up Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus were unable to finance their deficits through debt monetisation in the bond markets. The debt monetisation model had failed on a global scale. However a few, special GPPP stakeholders were too big to fail.

  It was evident during the 2007/8 financial crisis that the bankruptcy of some banks and other investors, such as RBS in the UK and Lehman Brothers and AIG in the US, really could cause a systemic collapse. The whole system was based upon fairy dust and couldn't withstand any genuine free market pressures.

  The undeniable solution to this problem would have been to restructure the IMFS to work for the real economy and not the mythical economy built upon financial system fraud [7]. The real economy is where the people physically engage in economic activity. They gather resources, manufacture goods, sell services and trade with each other to make a living. Money, in this economy, the one we all live in, is simply the medium of exchange.

  The advent of cryptocurrencies and crowdfunding has made it possible for us to operate our physical, "real" economy, on a global scale, without any need for central banks. However, this would erode the authority of the parasite class and their GPPP stakeholder partners. So it is no surprise that the response to the financial collapse, caused by degenerate debt monetisation, was to monetise more debt.

  Through financial vehicles like the Bank of England's (BoE's) Special Liquidity Scheme [8] and the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) enormous bank bail outs [9] central banks started taking the commercial and investment banks toxic assets onto their balance sheets. Next they opened their money spigots to stimulate the economy.

  So called Quantitative Easing (QE) involved the central banks monetising debt on, what was then, an unimaginable scale. The BoE are totally transparent about the QE process [10]:

  "Quantitative easing is a tool that central banks, like us, can use to inject money directly into the economy.. Quantitative easing involves us creating digital money.. to buy things like government debt in the form of bonds.. By creating this ‘new’ money, we aim to boost spending and investment in the economy."

  While this fairy dust costs the parasite class nothing it costs the rest of us practically everything. This is a debt that we and our children must work our whole lives to repay but never will. We are condemned by it.

  The money supply is the stock of money circulating in the economy at any moment. It increases with debt monetisation and contract when accounts are settled.

  The M1 supply measures money with the greatest liquidity. Cash, commercial bank deposit accounts and cheques can readily be exchanged with immediate value. Their liquidity is high. However the M2 money supply adds savings deposit accounts, short term bond funds (money market funds) and longer term saving accounts in commercial banks. Their liquidity is lower but M2 gives a fuller picture of the money supply.

  Another aspect of how money functions in the economy is its velocity [11]. This relates to the pace at which money is exchanged in the real economy. The faster the velocity the more economic activity there is. Velocity is calculated by dividing GDP by the money supply. Higher GDP and inflation generally correlates to greater velocity and economic slow downs in the business cycle correspond to reduced velocity.

  As we have discussed, the US dollar is the global reserve currency and it impacts global trade more than any other. In 2006 the M2 money supply in the US stood at approximately $7.5 trillion. By the beginning of 2020 it had reached approximately $15.3 trillion [12]. An average increase in the money supply of a little over $550 billion per year.

  In 2007 the M2 velocity in the US stood at just above 2.0 [13]. By the start of 2020 it had reduced to 1.4. Initially, this seems difficult to understand. The Central Banks had taken on the banks toxic assets and had engaged is huge QE stimulus and yet velocity had declined. Increased GDP could account for this but GDP had stagnated throughout the period. It appeared that the vast bulk of the debt monetisation had not produced any economic activity in the productive economy. It had failed to produce a recovery.

  This is because nearly all of the debt monetisation had been siphoned off into the financial markets for the benefit of the GPPP stakeholders who caused the crash. The austerity cuts in public services, depleted incomes and vanishing job security, endured by the public, paid for their expanding wealth.

  There was little price inflation because there was no additional economic activity. The fed were artificially suppressing interest rates to allow the money go round to accelerate but only for the select few.

  This period evidenced a sustained Cantillion Effect. For the vast majority of the population there was no apparent stimulus. The early recipients of new money were reinvesting it in more debt monetisation. There was next to no trickle down as the chosen winning stakeholders used their new capital to create more capital. This is why real wages fell.

  Again, the BoE could not have been clearer about their intentions:

  "We introduced quantitative easing.. Large-scale purchases of government bonds lower the interest rates or ‘yields’ on those bonds.. QE can stimulate the economy by boosting a wide range of financial asset prices.. Suppose we buy £1 million of government bonds from a pension fund. In place of the bonds, the pension fund now has £1 million in money. Rather than hold on to this money, it might invest it in financial assets, such as shares, that give it a higher return. And when demand for financial assets is high, with more people wanting to buy them, the value of these assets increases. This makes businesses and households holding shares wealthier."

  They were inflating the stock market but were pumping even more fairy dust into the capital (financial) market. The only real restraint on debt monetisation is the capacity of the borrower to take on debt. With a reduction in real wages and a tightening of high street lending, most of us were less likely to obtain credit. Between 2010 and the start of 2020 UK household debt, as a percentage of GDP [14], dropped from a 2010 high of approximately 96% to a 2020 low of 84%.

  As the BoE acknowledged, QE transferred wealth to those investing in financial assets, as they were willing to continue to monet
ise debt. It also reignited exactly the same housing price bubble [15], seen prior to the 2008 global crash, as wealthy investors also looked towards property.

  No attempt was made to correct the errors that led to the 2007/8 financial crisis. Instead the parasite class had stepped up debt monetisation to create even more wealth for their loyal GPPP stakeholder partners. The State franchise debt they were creating for the world's population had spiralled further out of control. It was as if they had no intention of even attempting to mend the broken IMFS.

  All of this was as nothing compared to what has happened during the pseudopandemic. The US M2 money supply leaped from $15.3 trillion to 19.4 trillion in one year. Nearly a ten fold annual increase an the already high monetary expansion rate following the 2008 crash. At the time of writing it stands at more than $20 trillion.

  US GDP tanked, dropping by nearly 34% before making an apparent remarkable recovery, increasing by an alleged 70% in a two-month period. Supposedly, US GDP then plummeted again over the next few months. The huge increase in debt monetisation corresponded to a US net GDP increase of merely 3.5%. M2 velocity collapsed from 1.4 to 1.06.

  In 2008 US State franchise debt was approximately $9 trillion. By 2020 it had climbed to approximately $23 trillion. Adding around $1.16 trillion on average per year. By the end of 2021 it had soared to $27 trillion and now it has eclipsed $28 trillion.

  This debt creation smash and grab has been repeated in practically every developed economy. State franchises the world over have presided over the theft which began in 2009/10 and devolved into criminal mania [16] during the pseudopandemic.

  Central banks and their political mouthpieces maintained the deception of a functioning economy by claiming record high employment rates and low price inflation. At the same time they were grinding essential services into the ground, neglecting infrastructure or selling off the public's physical assets to private investors. Creating more global debt as investors "borrowed" to finance the physical asset purchases.