Genius in the Shadows

by William Lanouette

  CHAPTER 27

  Meeting Khrushchev

  1960

  In the summer of 1960, at the time Leo Szilard was predicting in The Voice of the Dolphins how cooperation and peace might come about between the United States and the Soviet Union, a breakthrough in their relations was sorely needed. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had touted “peaceful coexistence” between the two superpowers during his visit to the United States in 1959, but in May 1960 he had abruptly canceled a Paris summit conference with President Eisenhower after an American U-2 high-altitude photo reconnaissance plane was shot down over Soviet territory. Khrushchev’s visit to the United Nations in the fall gave the Soviet leader a platform to denounce UN and US policies; he banged his shoe on the table for emphasis. But if Khrushchev wanted to be conciliatory on nuclear arms control, then, in retrospect, Szilard personified American willingness to cooperate better than anyone else alive.

  For his part, Szilard was known to the Russians because of the private views he shared at Pugwash meetings and his outspoken opinions, many made publicly this year at the expense of the Eisenhower administration. In May, Szilard’s letter to the editor of the New York Herald Tribune about Eisenhower’s “spy plane lie” expressed “indignation” at the US denials after the incident began. Szilard said he was “taken in by this cock-and-bull story and I resent being lied to by my own government.” Another letter that month, in the Washington Post, proposed an exchange of engineers to monitor a nuclear-weapons-test moratorium. Publicity about Szilard’s Atoms for Peace Award and the remarks he made at the ceremony further strengthened his stance as a scientist open to US Soviet dialogue. In June, Szilard had been moved by Soviet biologist Simeon E. Bresler’s visit to write to the New York Times that Russian disarmament assurances were not a hoax.1 So when Szilard wrote to Khrushchev in late June, asking that US-Soviet dialogue might be improved through Pugwash and other scientific meetings, he brought to the exchange experience, authority, and conviction. And Khrushchev probably saw Szilard as a sympathetic—and prominent—contact within the American scientific community.2

  But when Szilard received no reply to his June letter after waiting nearly two months, he wrote Khrushchev again in mid-August, this time inviting him to a visit at Memorial Hospital. As ever, Szilard preferred reaching the famous and powerful by trusted intermediaries,3 so this letter was forwarded by Marshall MacDuffie, Khrushchev’s friend from World War II, and was transmitted by Cyrus Eaton, sponsor of the Pugwash conferences. Khrushchev eventually replied to Szilard’s first letter, saying he thought a scientists’ meeting after the Moscow Pugwash conference that year was a “welcome” initiative, to which “Soviet scientists will respond. . . .”4 So Szilard wrote Khrushchev again in mid-September, thanking him for his “very heartening reply” and stating that he hoped the US government would look upon informal discussions by scientists as “a more or less continuous process. . . .” And it wasn’t necessary for Khrushchev to come to the hospital to visit, Szilard added, as “I feel very well . . . [and] can now be away from the hospital for days at a stretch.”

  Szilard first met Khrushchev at a lunch in his honor at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City on Monday, September 26, an event sponsored by Cyrus Eaton during the Soviet premier’s visit to the UN General Assembly. Szilard met Khrushchev again on Tuesday evening, October 4, at a cocktail party. Szilard left disappointed that his conversation with Khrushchev had been so brief, so when the telephone in his hospital room rang the next morning, the message was a wonderful surprise: Premier Khrushchev can see you at 11:00 A.M. for fifteen minutes.

  Excited, Szilard dressed and left Memorial Hospital immediately, hailed a taxi, and set off for the USSR mission to the United Nations. But when Szilard spotted a drugstore en route, he asked the driver to stop and wait. A few minutes later, he emerged holding a small paper bag and continued his ride. At the mission, Szilard was met by Mikhail A. Menshikov, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, and was then ushered to a salon. When Khrushchev entered, he and Szilard shook hands. Both men were cheery, rotund, and smiling as they sat down with Menshikov and a translator.5

  “Sometime,” Szilard told Khrushchev, “when time permits, I would like to have a leisurely conversation with you on the question of what the real issues are, the kind of thoughtful conversation we cannot have when we are in a hurry. Time is limited today, but before talking about a few serious matters, perhaps I can talk in a somewhat lighter vein.”

  Khrushchev agreed, and Szilard reached into his paper bag. He pulled out a Schick Injector razor and some extra blades and handed them to Khrushchev. “It’s not expensive, but it is well made,” Szilard said assuringly. “The blade must be changed after one or two weeks. If you like the razor, I will send you fresh blades from time to time. But this I can do, of course, only as long as there is no war.”

  “If there is a war,” said Khrushchev, “I will stop shaving. Most other people will stop shaving, too.”

  On more “serious” matters, Szilard said he was upset to see that while in New York, Khrushchev stressed only his disagreements with the United States. What about the few points on which you agree?

  “What points are those?” Khrushchev wondered.

  “For instance,” said Szilard, “you could say you are in agreement with Senator Kennedy on everything he is saying about Vice-President Nixon [his opponent in the presidential campaign] and add that you are in agreement with everything that Nixon is saying—about Kennedy.”

  Again trying to be “serious,” Szilard produced a Russian translation of a letter he wrote for their possible meeting, along with the Russian texts of Khrushchev’s letter to Szilard and a translated letter from William C. Foster to Szilard. Foster, then Nixon’s adviser on arms control, wrote that he favored conferences among US and Soviet scientists. Szilard said that no matter who won in November, the new president would seek constructive solutions to US-Soviet problems. Khrushchev agreed.

  Szilard then handed Khrushchev a seven-page memorandum, also in Russian. This was Szilard’s “agenda” for their hoped-for leisurely discussion. Szilard looked at Menshikov for a signal about the time remaining, and Menshikov nodded to continue as Khrushchev read the memo.

  “There is nothing in this paper to which I can object,” Khrushchev said, and urged Szilard to talk about any topic. Sensing that his time with Khrushchev would soon end, Szilard spoke rapidly. He mentioned the need for verifiable nuclear arms reductions, and the one passage underlined in Szilard’s memo caught Khrushchev’s eye:

  It should be possible for Russia and America to create conditions in which Russia could be certain that secret violations of the agreement by America would be reported by American citizens to an international control commission, and America could be certain that secret violations of the agreement occurring on Russian territory would be reported by Soviet citizens to an international control commission.

  The idea of an international arms-control authority, above national sovereignty, had appealed to Szilard since 1945. It was a leap of faith that both superpowers would have to make for serious limits on the nuclear arms race to occur. Surprisingly, Szilard later recalled, Khrushchev said that he “wholeheartedly accepted the [underlined] passage.” If there were any doubt that we mean the same thing, Khrushchev said, he could sign it. Khrushchev also said he would do it right away, but Szilard glanced at Menshikov for the time.

  “Why not just go on?” said Menshikov.

  Let’s consider the question of nuclear weapons testing, said Szilard, still talking rapidly. Some American strategists believed that their country might have to fight a war by using small atomic bombs against troops in combat, and these people press for continued nuclear weapons tests, Szilard said.

  “Russia is not thinking in terms of using small atomic bombs against troops,” Khrushchev interrupted, “because to prepare for this kind of warfare is too expensive and very complicated.” More interesting to Khrushchev would be some statement from Americans about
the future course of the arms race. Szilard urged Khrushchev to spell out disarmament proposals in a book, and Khrushchev invited Americans to produce such a book—and a draft agreement for the two nuclear superpowers. But, Szilard said, American citizens might not represent their government, while negotiators from the Soviet Union automatically reflected Kremlin policies. Nevertheless, Szilard concluded, he would try to organize material for such an “exchange of views.” Again, Szilard looked at Menshikov, who nodded and said, “Why not just go on?”

  To prevent accidental attacks, Szilard’s memo stated, “either America or Russia ought to take the initiative at this time to arrange for the installation of telephone connections that would be readily available in case of an emergency.” Khrushchev agreed this was a good idea and to underscore his point said, “It would have value, particularly if it becomes necessary to dispel quickly doubts that arise over some maneuver.” Khrushchev said that just before he embarked on the yacht Baltika for his trip to New York, he was upset by reports about an American military maneuver; so upset, in fact, that he ordered “rocket readiness” for Soviet strategic forces—just in case. “And this readiness has still not been rescinded.”

  Szilard glanced at Menshikov again, who said, “Why not just go on?”

  Two reasons can be cited for such a telephone link, Szilard continued. It could be useful in case of an emergency, and it would “dramatize the continued presence of a danger which will stay with us as long as the long-range rockets and bombs are retained.” Khrushchev said he would be willing to have such a telephone installed if the US president were also willing. Szilard said he did not see how the president could object. “I find it difficult to get away from telephones,” Khrushchev complained, “and even at the beach they mount a telephone for me. The only way to escape is to go into the water.”6

  To prepare for serious bilateral discussions, Szilard said, US and Soviet scientists should explore ways to negotiate a “first major step” to armslimitation agreements. The Pugwash conferences offer one path to better understanding. But the ultimate goal is not just arms reduction but a broader trust with “safeguards against secret evasions” of an agreement. To pursue such a tentative agreement, Szilard wanted to keep in contact. Khrushchev, he said, could always reach him through the Soviet ambassador in Washington. “Who is the Soviet ambassador in Moscow?” Szilard asked.

  “Topchiev will be able to arrange all the contacts that we might want,” said the premier, mentioning the general secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the man Szilard knew through the Pugwash meetings. Indeed, that summer, Topchiev had invited Szilard to stay on in Moscow after the upcoming Pugwash meeting in order to hold informal discussions on US-Soviet arms-control initiatives. Now Szilard’s Pugwash contacts, and his June letter to Khrushchev, seemed to be paying off.

  Again, Szilard eyed Menshikov. Again came the encouraging “Why not just go on?” Would Khrushchev like to discuss Berlin? Szilard asked. “

  Why not?” the premier answered.7

  “Perhaps one could arrive at a solution of the Berlin problem without loss of prestige either for the East or for the West by proceeding as follows,” Szilard said. “East Germany might offer to shift its capital from East Berlin to Dresden on condition that West Germany shifts its capital from Bonn to Munich. If that is done, then it would be possible to create two free cities: East Berlin and West Berlin, and there might be formed a confederation between East Berlin and West Berlin with a view of perhaps forming, at some later time, a similar confederation between East Germany and West Germany.”

  By Szilard’s account, Khrushchev “appeared to get the point” but said he could not very well ask the East Germans to shift their capital. Yet on the broader question of living with a nuclear stalemate, the Soviet leader seemed more receptive. Szilard said he had just written “a little book,” The Voice of the Dolphins, which explained the nature of the atomic stalemate and how it “may change in the course of the years to come and lead to a situation which may force disarmament on a reluctant world.” But because most statesmen are too busy to read a book, Szilard said he had an excerpt that can be read in just over an hour. “A Russian translation will be prepared for you,’ Szilard said, prompting Khrushchev to say he would be Szilard’s first reader in the Soviet Union.

  In all, Szilard and Khrushchev spoke intensely for two hours and finally ended their meeting at 1:00 P.M. with some banter. First Szilard offered to show Khrushchev how to change the blades in his Injector razor and how to open it for cleaning.

  Delighted with his gift, Khrushchev said he would like to give Szilard a present. How about a case of vodka?

  “If I could, sir, I would like to have something better,” Szilard replied.

  “What do you have in mind?” asked Khrushchev.

  “Borzhum,” said Szilard.

  Khrushchev grinned broadly. A few days earlier, during one of his long speeches at the United Nations, Khrushchev had sipped from a glass of mineral water and several times pointed to it. “Borzhomi!” he said. “Excellent Russian mineral water!” Now he told Szilard, “We have two kinds of mineral water in Russia. They are both excellent, and we shall send you samples of both.”8 Szilard and Khrushchev parted in good spirits.

  Two days later, a large case—packed with two kinds of mineral water, canned food, caviar, and three smoked fish—arrived at Szilard’s hospital room. A card conveyed Khrushchev’s compliments and wishes for a speedy recovery. Szilard thanked the premier in a reply. “I am very grateful to [the translator] that he translated so many das and so few nyets. I am very grateful to you for having given me the opportunity to have such a conversation.”9

  There was no mention of this meeting in the American press, but in Russia the next morning, Pravda, the Communist party newspaper, carried this brief account on its front page:

  RECEPTION OF AMERICAN SCIENTIST L. SZILARD

  New York, 5 October (TASS). Today in the Mission of the Soviet Union to the United Nations N. S. Khrushchev received the prominent American scientist-physicist Leo Szilard and had with him a friendly meeting in which the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the USA, M. A. Menshikov, participated.10

  Clearly, Szilard and Khrushchev had enjoyed their encounter. But what had each gained? For Khrushchev it was an opportunity to open channels with Americans favorable to arms control at a time when relations with Washington were decidedly cool. Khrushchev had also favored Topchiev and his academy colleagues, who by their influential advice might be essential in gaining arms-control agreements within the Kremlin. Finally, in Szilard, Khrushchev now had a well-known ally among the American Pugwash group, an asset no matter who won the presidential election. For his part, Szilard hoped that with Khrushchev’s support a constructive US-Soviet dialogue might flourish.

  In Khrushchev, Szilard also seemed to have found a kindred spirit; like himself an establishment outsider in his own country, a bold and intuitive strategist who was personally committed to controlling nuclear arms, a risk taker who was not self-conscious and did what seemed right and true at the time.11

  The day after meeting Khrushchev, Szilard wrote to Bohlen, then attending the General Assembly meeting in New York, and mentioned that “something came up yesterday which I feel I ought to discuss with you sometime.” He also telephoned Bohlen and promised to call again, but there is no record in Szilard’s papers that Bohlen showed any interest. Szilard wrote on October 13 to President Eisenhower, reporting the Khrushchev meeting and raising the “hot line” idea as something Khrushchev had approved. Typically, rather than writing directly, Szilard forwarded his letter through George Kistiakowsky, a science adviser to Eisenhower. This time Szilard’s appeal to the White House gained some attention. A reply on November 10 from Secretary of State Christian Herter suggested that Bohlen and arms negotiator William Hitchcock would be available to meet with Szilard.12

  Next Szilard wrote to presidential candidates Nixon and Kennedy, offering to report about the meeting with
Khrushchev to each of them personally after the election—whether to the president-elect or the “Leader of the Opposition.”13 At the same time, Szilard offered accounts of the Khrushchev meeting to Kennedy foreign policy adviser and US representative Chester Bowles, New York governor Nelson Rockefeller, and Philip J. Farley, special assistant to the secretary of state for atomic energy and outer space.

  Szilard strengthened his ties with Topchiev after Kennedy was elected president in November, when supporters of the Pugwash meetings decided to seek financial help from sponsors other than Cyrus Eaton. An heiress to the Gimbel department-store fortune agreed to give a luncheon at the Delmonico Hotel and invited C. D. Jackson, a publicist at Time-Life and President Eisenhower’s senior speechwriter and “idea” man. Jackson was fiercely anti-Communist and used the occasion to berate Topchiev. The United States had nothing more to give in arms-control bargaining, Jackson insisted.

  “In roulette we say, je donne to bet,” Jackson instructed the Russian, who seemed bemused by the analogy.14 At this, Jackson only became more insistent.

  “We have no more je donnel No more je donnel No more je donne!”

  Szilard, who attended the luncheon wearing his bathrobe over a shirt and tie, listened with chagrin at Jackson’s tirade and finally interrupted. “Let me explain what Mr. Jackson is saying,” Szilard told Topchiev. “You have got to do what we want, because we’re crazy.”15

  The fourth annual meeting of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs had been scheduled for September in Moscow, but American participants urged that the session be postponed until after the presidential election. By then Szilard felt well enough to attend and saw this trip—his first to the Soviet Union—as another chance to meet Khrushchev. He wrote Khrushchev on November 24, through Ambassador Menshikov in Washington, asking for an appointment. Ready to set the agenda for this meeting, as he had for their last, Szilard suggested that if they met, Khrushchev should first read—in the Russian translation, in Szilard’s presence—from the Voice of the Dolphins excerpt. After that, Szilard suggested, they might discuss the US-Soviet nuclear stalemate.16