Looking Down the Corridors

by Kevin Wright

  The Corridors and BCZ were only open to aircraft of the four wartime powers. Other nations’ aircraft wishing to use the Corridors and BCZ had to obtain prior permission from the BASC. East and West German registered aircraft were prohibited from using them at any time. Initially only military flights were permitted to use the Corridors and BCZ, but this was later extended to include civilian airliners and scheduled services by airlines from all four of the wartime Allies. These operated to and from the city to cater for the needs of residents, business and governments.

  Berlin Under Stress

  As relations between the wartime Allies deteriorated elsewhere in the world, much attention continued to be focused on Germany and Berlin. Both were simultaneously a cause of poor relations and indicators of the widening competition between the two blocs. The partition of Germany gathered pace and developments in Soviet and Western Zones began to parallel each other. In the SOZ, socialist economic reforms had taken place particularly in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The Social Democrats in the SOZ had been efficiently emasculated and forced to join with the Socialist Unity Party (SED), effectively eliminating any opposition to the Communists.

  In early 1948, talks started in London between the Western Allies on the future of Germany, involving representatives from the Länder Assembly. It progressed to the creation of an Assembly, a Basic Law and ultimately the declaration of the Federal Republic (FRG) in September 1949, to be based in Bonn. Mirroring political developments in the West, the constitution of the Deutsches Demokratik Republik (DDR) with its civilian government in Berlin was declared in October 1949. Predictably, each side refused to recognise the other’s arrangements for German governance.

  The Soviet blockade of West Berlin from 24 June 1948 until June 1949 was the first major crisis over the city and an early Cold War confrontation. It indicated Stalin’s growing impatience with the continued presence of Western forces in the city. As relationships between East and West had spiralled downwards, a long-term settlement of the German question was becoming increasingly unlikely.

  Berlin lay some 100 miles inside the SOZ and although the Western Allies had surface access by road, rail and water, these were never formally agreed as the Air Corridors were. By unilaterally closing the surface routes, the Soviets’ apparent objectives were to drive the Western Allies from Berlin and starve the civilian populace into accepting Soviet rule. The crisis could have easily escalated into a general European war. The decision to supply the city solely by air was a courageous one, in what is still frequently referred to as ‘the greatest humanitarian airlift in history’. The Allies (predominantly the USA and Britain) flew close to 278,000 flights carrying in more than 2.3 million tons of supplies into the city, costing the lives of seventy-one military personnel.6 Although the blockade was lifted in June 1949, the airlift continued until September to accumulate reserves in the city in case of a repeat. Among the huge number of supply aircraft heading to Berlin during the airlift there were occasional British and US reconnaissance flights, trying to discover Soviet military dispositions and intentions.

  During the blockade the Soviets threatened to increase their own air exercises, which would impinge on the Corridors. Indeed they did so in September 1948 but punctiliously filed their activities with BASC.7 Anti-aircraft firing practice and mock air engagements continued into October and caused some problems, particularly for traffic in the Northern Corridor. Western objections were met by Soviet counter accusations of infringements and threats to cancel the Corridor agreements. Similarly, in the final stages of the airlift in May 1949, more Soviet air exercises and ground firing threatened to interrupt the Corridors again.8 Whilst Soviet harassment of airlift traffic was not uncommon, they never took systematic action to deliberately bring down aircraft involved in it. Perhaps somewhat ironically it was Soviet insistence on the formalisation of the Air Corridors into the city in 1945 that ultimately assured its survival in 1948–49.

  By the end of the 1940s US–Soviet relations had become very fractious. Away from Germany, there had been tensions between the two over the Soviets refusal to withdraw troops from Iran and threats to Turkey over access through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Communist parties and movements were being electorally successful in Western Europe and the rest of the world. Throughout Eastern Europe the Americans, British and French could only watch the installation, in rapid order, of Communist governments in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, all under Soviet domination. In Asia the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists and the ascent of the Communists, the partition of Korea and Communist insurgencies across much of the territory recently occupied by the Japanese were just some of the early disputes.

  The Second Berlin Crisis

  In the years following the airlift, reconstruction and managing practicalities were the priority in Berlin. Berlin became a particular focus for friction between East and West again between 1958 and 1962 in what was later known as the ‘second Berlin crisis’. Tensions centred on a whole series of issues: Berlin’s status as a Western ‘outpost’ in the East, the haemorrhaging of East German citizens to the West via the city, U-2 deep-penetration flights over the USSR, the creation of the FRG, NATO plans to allow German aircraft to carry nuclear weapons and restrictions on official travel that led to the ‘face off’ at ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ in October 1961. It was only the near disaster of the Cuba crisis in October 1962 that finally took the focus away from Berlin. The city was an obvious place for the Russians to apply pressure on the Western Allies because of its vulnerability. Afterwards, in an August 1963 speech, Khrushchev described the problem Berlin posed for the West in typical manner: ‘Berlin is the testicle of the West. When I want the West to scream, I squeeze on Berlin.’ It may be a rather earthy analysis but it captured its vulnerability succinctly.

  In November 1958 an increasingly confident Nikita Khrushchev had quickly generated tension by demanding that the West stop using West Berlin as ‘a springboard for intensive espionage, sabotage and other subversive activities’.9 Although not imposing a blockade, he threatened that if the West did not withdraw its forces from the city, within six months, the USSR would conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German government. The Soviets also expressed preparedness to hand over control of the Air Corridors to the GDR. Whilst this was unacceptable to the West, simply not to have engaged with Khrushchev would have left the problem unresolved and possibly risked further escalation. Significant pressure on Khrushchev to reach a settlement over Berlin was being exerted by the East German leader Walter Ulbricht. Having no direct control over the city, Ulbricht was struggling to stem the haemorrhaging flow of East Germans going to the West through Berlin, and demanded the Soviets put a halt to it. In the United States President Eisenhower stated American intentions to stand firm on Berlin and in December, despite further Soviet demands, the three Western Allies firmly rejected Khrushchev’s demands for them to leave Berlin.

  British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited the USSR for two weeks in late February 1959 when Khrushchev indicated his willingness to let the deadline slip if the West agreed to a summit to discuss the matter. From the great comfort of fifty-plus years later, it is apparent that Khrushchev’s ultimatum was a negotiating tactic to try to restart the stalled ‘German question’ discussions. Nevertheless this was an excellent example of Khrushchev’s ‘testicle squeezing’ upon the West and it had the desired effect. Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed to a preliminary Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva in May 1959 with a full summit scheduled for May 1960 in Paris. That conference was ultimately scuppered by the shooting down of Powers’ U-2 high over the heart of the USSR on May Day 1960.

  What Faced NATO?

  On 9 July 1945, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces Germany (GSOFG) was formed from elements of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, becoming an Army of Occupation. These occupation forces were subsequently maintained at close to wartime levels, soon considerably outnumbering the combin
ed Western forces facing them. In 1949 they were renamed the ‘Group of Soviet Forces in Germany’ (GSFG), which remained in being until 1 June 1989 when they became the Western Group of Forces (WGF) as the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe began to unravel. This formation stayed in Germany until 1994 when the total withdrawal of Russian forces was completed. These forces were huge, supplemented until 1990 by the GDR’s own military services.

  At the height of the Cold War, GSFG could muster 21 Tank and Motor Rifle (armoured infantry) Divisions grouped into 5 armies and a single front that each possessed its own subordinate units. In total they consisted of nearly 500,000 personnel with some 6,100 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), 8,000 armoured vehicles, 4,300 artillery pieces which included 600 multiple rocket launchers and 200 surface-to-surface missile systems, 1,200 air defence systems (including surface-to-air missile systems), 310 attack helicopters and 350 transport and utility helicopters. The 24 (later 16) Tactical Air Army provided fixed-wing air support to GSFG. Helicopter units were usually subordinated to the relevant Army-level formation, except for one regiment that was a front-level asset. The Tactical Air Army possessed around 610 fighter aircraft, 320 fighter-bombers, 50 attack and 120 transport helicopters.

  The huge Soviet presence was supplemented by the GDR’s forces, consisting of the East German Army – the National Volksarmee (NVA). The NVA had six Tank and Motor Rifle Divisions grouped into two Military Districts (MD) and the Ministry of National Defence (MND), each of which had directly subordinate units of its own. There were also five reserve Motor Rifle Divisions. These forces consisted of 180,000 personnel and operated around 2,700 MBTs, 5,400 armoured vehicles, 1,700 artillery pieces (including 200 multi-barrel-rocket-launchers (MBRL)) and 700 air defence systems, including SAM systems. There were also some 40 attack and 110 transport helicopters. The East German Air Force consisted of two Air Divisions and could muster around 450 fighter aircraft, 90 fighter-bombers, 50 attack and 120 transport helicopters. The East German Navy was composed of three flotillas based on the Baltic coast. It was predominantly a coastal force but did have a considerable amphibious warfare capability plus three squadrons of helicopters.

  The four Border Guard (Grenz Truppen) commands were in essence another Military District but without heavy armour and self-propelled artillery. The Border Guard had around 47,000 personnel and besides small arms they also operated some obsolescent armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.

  The Soviets and East Germans occupied nearly 900 installations at some 400 locations in the GDR. These included over 55 airfields and 150 major training areas and ranges. About 40 per cent of these locations lay either directly beneath or adjacent to (up to 20 miles outside) the Corridors and BCZ. There were also other locations that could be seen from the air along the Baltic Coast of the GDR and near the German–Czechoslovakian border. The installations in the GDR that could be viewed from the Corridors, BCZ and their immediate environs are listed in the appendix. Beyond any doubt this was an intelligence ‘target rich environment’ and for the next forty years both sides conducted an intelligence battle across the IGB using all means at their disposal.

  Intelligence Resources

  Both sides possessed a formidable array of assets in Germany to acquire the intelligence sought by national governments, military staffs and Germany-based commands. The Western Allies’ assets included HUMINT: the division of Germany presented many opportunities for HUMINT exploitation. West Germans could travel to visit families in the GDR, although reciprocal trips were not possible. Such movements of people provided one source of information. Civilian employees of the Allied forces were required to report any visits to the GDR and on their return were usually debriefed by military or civil security authorities. There was also a constant flow of refugees from the East as well as defectors and controlled sources (spies).

  A key and very successful resource was the unique presence of the Allied Military Liaison Missions (AMLMs) created after Allied occupation of Germany by the wartime Allies.

  Allied Military Liaison Missions

  Because the GDR was diplomatically unrecognised, there were no Western military attachés based there. Their nearest equivalents were the three Allied Military Liaison Missions (AMLMs), which were far more valuable. Established in 1946 and 1947 under individual agreements between the respective Western Commanders-in-Chief and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, they were accredited with a quasi-diplomatic status. The British Mission’s full title was the British Commanders’-in-Chief Mission to the Soviet forces in Germany, mercifully shortened to ‘BRIXMIS’ or ‘The Mission’. The British, Americans and French had Mission Houses in Potsdam, also the home of the Soviet military headquarters until it moved to Zossen-Wünsdorf. The houses were where all Mission touring activity started and generally finished. Although the Mission houses were ‘sovereign’ territory, like an embassy, the locally employed East German staff reported the comings and goings at the houses. Mission members’ activities, both official and personal, were closely monitored and reported, and communications were believed to have been monitored and intercepted and were accordingly regarded as insecure. The AMLMs’ close proximity to Berlin meant that they also maintained HQs co-located with their own national headquarters in West Berlin, which gave them much more security, freedom and flexibility.

  Reciprocal Soviet Military Liaison Missions were located in each of the three Western Zones. The Soviet presence in the British Zone was known as ‘the Soviet Commander-in-Chief’s Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief British Army of the Rhine’, shortened to ‘SOXMIS’. During its existence SOXMIS was located in Bad Salzuflen, Lübbecke and Bünde in special compounds but these were never sufficiently close to the GDR for them to have a separate HQ like the Allies in Berlin, so they were always rather more isolated in their operations.

  BRIXMIS’s primary official purpose was, according to the agreements, to maintain liason between the staff of the two Commanders-in-Chief and their military governments in the Zones to prevent incidents or events escalating to higher levels. Although emphasis quickly shifted onto intelligence collection the liaison function remained a core task throughout the Mission’s existence. Because of this liaison function, and some of the personal relationships created, serious incidents, including the detention of Mission staff, could often be resolved without involving respective Commanders-in-Chief, diplomats or politicians.

  BRIXMIS’s intelligence collection included military and civil targets. To carry out these intelligence-gathering tasks BRIXMIS personnel were always unarmed, in working, not combat, uniform, and ‘toured’ throughout the GDR in specially marked military cars. They compiled visual, written and photographic reports on the activities they observed. Up to thirty-one British military personnel, referred to as being ‘on pass’, could be accredited to the GSFG Headquarters as being with BRIXMIS at any one time. They had relative freedom of movement within the GDR and their vehicles were regarded as being ‘sovereign’ territory and, in theory at least, inviolable. However, access was far from unfettered. The Missions were forbidden from penetrating designated ‘Permanent Restricted Areas’ (PRA), which theoretically placed the area out of bounds. Unsurprisingly, PRAs protected the high-value intelligence targets, including many of the Soviet and East German garrisons, airfields, major logistics facilities and training areas. PRAs were detailed on published maps. There were also designated Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) that were time limited, usually created to cover major military exercises or troop movements, often linking PRAs together. Unofficial ‘Mission Restricted’ signs, planted in the German countryside, were generally ignored by the Missions because they had no agreed official status and frequently became treasured souvenirs for Mission members. All these restrictions nevertheless inhibited Mission activities. However, the Soviets managed the imposition of PRAs and TRAs carefully because overuse ran the risk of provoking tit-for-tat restrictions on the Soviet Missions in the FRG.

  The Missions deployed into the GDR ever
y day, including Christmas Day, to observe activities, equipment and personnel. They recorded details, took photographs and sometimes returned with items of equipment and even, on a few occasions, pieces of ordnance. They had to be experts in military equipment recognition, learn Russian or German to a required standard and develop good photographic and later video skills. The aim was to get as close as possible to the opposition by stealth or using bluster and trickery to obtain the information they sought. For many Mission personnel this posting was often regarded retrospectively as a highlight in their military careers. Some experienced difficulty in returning to ‘regular’ soldiering afterwards. It was certainly a high-stress posting for many. In the early 1980s, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when East–West relations were particularly sour, Mission work became particularly dangerous. During this time there were two fatalities. Adjutant Chef Mariotti of the MMFL was killed in a deliberately engineered traffic accident in 1984, and in 1985 Major Nicholson of United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) was shot and killed by a Soviet guard close to a military installation at Ludwigslust. Throughout the Missions’ existence there were many incidents of Soviet and East German forces causing physical injury to Mission members by administering beatings if they compromised an observation point, or during the detention of a ‘Tour’.

  The Mission’s exploits were truly remarkable and are too numerous to describe in detail, though mention of a few of their intelligence ‘scoops’ gives an idea of what they achieved.