Looking Down the Corridors

by Kevin Wright

  Situating the Appreciation

  In the 1970s the BMP-1 AIFV progressively replaced the 1950s-era PT-76 light amphibious tanks in divisional reconnaissance battalions. At Bernau the new BMP-1s occupied the vehicle storage bays that had previously housed the PT-76s. These were now parked on the hardstandings outside, with their turret and other hatches open to the elements, clearly awaiting disposal instructions. One US organisation proposed that the reconnaissance battalion organisation should now be amended to include a new BMP-1 company in addition to the existing PT-76 equipped company. There was much discussion between the British and US PIs and the Americans finally accepted that the British view was correct, but only after the US Congress had approved the M3 Bradley armoured reconnaissance vehicle procurement programme.

  Maskirovska Strikes

  In 1976–77 indicators pointed to the imminent issue of T-72 MBTs into GSFG, with the hot candidate for the first recipient being 6 GMRD of 20 GA at Bernau, on the eastern side of the BCZ. It was then equipped with T-55s. A sighting of all the units’ T-55s with exercise markings – a white cross that ran from front to rear and side to side – painted on them caused no concerns. The unit was obviously going out on exercise. Barracks activity then went quiet for far longer than normal, which raised curiosity. Surprise, surprise, three weeks later a BRIXMIS Chipmunk sortie photographed the first ‘T-72’ in the vacant barracks. In fact it was actually a T-64 but at that time its existence was unknown. Over the next few weeks, ‘T-72’ numbers increased, confirming the unit’s re-equipment. The question now was, ‘Where had the T-55s gone?’

  About 150km south-west of Bernau, at Bad Langensalza, under the Southern Corridor, there was a heavy tank regiment equipped with obsolescent T-10 and T-10M heavy tanks. Four weeks after the T-55s had left Bernau, a large number of exercise-marked tanks appeared at Bad Langensalza. Some of the experienced PIs reported exercise-marked T-10s but this bubble was burst by a newly qualified PI who identified them as T-55s. Two valuable lessons learned: first, a neat demonstration of Soviet preparedness to practise Maskirovska in peacetime; and second, experienced PIs falling for the old trick of seeing what they expected to see, and not what was actually there.

  Command and Control

  In the 1970s and 1980s the intelligence community expended a lot of effort trying to determine Soviet command and control at all levels, including the vehicles used, the equipment operated and the relationships between them all. Identifying armoured command vehicles was relatively easy, but identifying other vehicles with a command function relied on them being seen with their armoured brethren. Help in cracking this conundrum came from an unexpected source – the Soviets themselves!

  In the early 1980s the Soviets adopted a three-tone camouflage paint scheme, similar to the one used by the US forces at the time, that was reported to be IR suppressant unlike the usual overall dark green scheme. The new paints were either in short supply, or slow in coming down the supply chain. Someone at HQ GSFG decided that the first vehicles and equipment to receive the new paint scheme would be those at a high risk of interdiction in wartime. So the Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Information (C4I) and Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) associated vehicles and equipment got a smart new paint job and the PIs got confirmation, and in some cases a surprise, of the Soviet C4I and RISTA assets at divisional and higher command levels. Regiments were slower to adopt the new scheme but the same principle applied throughout.

  Whilst serendipity played its part in the command and control study, the PIs put in a lot of conventional interpretation work needed to determine inter-vehicle relationships. One BRIXMIS Chipmunk sortie photographed a divisional headquarters in the field. The photographs clearly showed every cable run on the ground and using this the analysts ascertained the field layout of a divisional headquarters and the various vehicle associations.

  It Pays to Look at Everything

  In the mid to late 1980s US imagery was examined selectively based in intelligence requirements (IRs) although some of the more experienced PIs continued to look at all frames for anything unusual. Des Pemberton takes up the tale:

  I was going through a US sortie that was returning to West Germany through the South Corridor. I had nearly got to the end when Eisenach training area (a relatively minor one) appeared in quite small scale imagery. I scanned the imagery for any activity and found 10 BMP-1 AIFVs on a range. The BMP-1 normally carried an AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) mounted over the main armament. To fire the Saqger both it and the main armament had to be pointed at the target. These BMP-1 guns were all pointing in different directions and on each turret there was what appeared to be a tube pointing down range at the target area so it looked as though they were fitted with a new ATGM system.

  Subsequent analysis found that the ATGM was the AT-5 Spandrel and this was the first US/UK sighting of the system. A review of imagery embarassingly revealed that the modified BMP-1s had been in the DDR for some time!

  Technical Intelligence – ‘We wouldn’t do it like that’

  ‘We wouldn’t do it like that’ comes under the heading of famous last words of intelligence officers. A new vehicle was seen on vertical photography whose length/width ratio pointed to it being tracked. The lack of visible weaponry, unusual ancillary attachments, location, and association with a Soviet engineer bridging unit suggested a role connected with river crossing. Later photography showed the machine with a raised snorkel and engaged in a river crossing, confirming the initial assessment. In due course, thanks to BRIXMIS ground and air pictures of the ‘beast’, the PIs made a detailed assessment of the equipment and its capabilities. The most interesting aspect of the story was the refusal of London’s technical scientific intelligence community to accept that the Soviets could produce such a piece of equipment – despite irrefutable evidence. Their reason was ‘we have looked at such a concept ourselves and discarded it as un-feasible’. Famous last words – indeed.

  The Hunting of the Snark – the SA-9 Gaskin

  Every two years, or so, the Letzlinger Heide hosted equipment displays. The late 1972 display featured divisional-level equipment, one of which was a BRDM-2 armoured car with an ‘H’-shaped frame on top of it. Shortly before this a BRIXMIS ground tour photographed a peculiar antenna over a barracks fence in Perleberg, which housed elements of a motor rifle regiment (MRR). Some poor-quality US Corridor photography of Köthen airfield, taken earlier in the year, showed a possible BRDM-2 with a peculiar structure on its roof. JARIC (UK) assessed this as some type of meteorological apparatus.

  In Germany, the PIs believed that the Perleberg ‘antenna’, the Letzlinger BRDM-2 and the Köthen vehicle were probably the same equipment. Two PIs, who were keen scale modellers, built models of the Perleberg ‘antenna’ using matchsticks and cardboard. They agreed that the structures at Perleberg and Letzlinger were identical. Using anglepoise lamps as a light source, the models eventually cast an identical shadow to the equipment at Köthen, demonstrating that the three vehicles were the same – ipso facto, our case rested. They concluded that the system was a new low-level SAM system and this was the first time it had been seen. None of the other Western intelligence agencies had any previous knowledge of it either, so it had quietly slipped into service, undetected by satellite coverage. The system was given the NATO designation of SA-9 Gaskin (see image 57).

  A Tale of Two Freds

  The late 1970s saw GSFG undergoing a major re-equipment programme, especially of artillery systems. A degree of ‘new equipment fatigue’ set in and the appearance of a BMP-1 with a small radar antenna on the rear of the turret (later to be identified as the PRP-3 artillery observation post) prompted the inevitable question – ‘What do we call it?’ The jaded response was ‘Fred’ and so it became known as Fred. A few days later an MT-LB with a larger radar antenna at the rear of the turret (later identified as SNAR-10 gun locating radar) was seen and the two vehicles became known in the British P
I community as Small Fred and Big Fred (see image 58) respectively. The NATO nomenclature committee disapproved of this departure from normal practice and attempted to bring order by allocating the names Small Wedge and Big Wedge. Their efforts were in vain as US IPIRs instead of using the new official nomenclature continued to report them as Small Fred and Big Fred. The committee gave up the uneven fight and officially sanctioned Big Fred and Small Fred, and Freds they remain to this day.

  T-64 Main Battle Tank (MBT)

  When the T-64 MBTs arrived in GSFG they sparked off a whole raft of intelligence requirements. Soviet paranoia about the compromise of its technical features led to them issuing strict instructions on preventing photography of it. This included placing tarpaulins over it when undertaking maintenance in the open (e.g. gun barrel or power pack changes). On the whole these measures were successful and any photography normally showed the vehicle closed up. But they were sometimes caught napping, as illustrated in image 60. One priority question was determining the main armament’s calibre. Despite many photographs taken by AMLM ground tours and light aircraft sorties, the answer eluded the intelligence community until a light aircraft sortie photographed a T-64 being re-ammunitioned. Alongside the tank were the open ammunition boxes. The photographs revealed markings stating that the contents were 125mm – question answered.

  The Zerbst Phantom

  A Soviet fighter regiment equipped with MiG-21 Fishbed aircraft was based at Zerbst airfield in the Southern Corridor. An RAF Corridor mission in the early 1970s imaged an F-4 Phantom parked outside one of the hangars. The aircraft had a slightly different nose profile to a normal F-4 and carried no national markings. Much speculation followed as to how and why it had got there. The assessment was that it was a former USAF aircraft that had been shot down in Vietnam and that the Soviets had made it sufficiently airworthy to take round to brief their own fighter pilots on its strengths and weaknesses. After about a fortnight it departed Germany, never to be seen again. Some sources think that the ‘Zerbst Phantom’ was a mock-up cobbled together by modifying an existing Soviet airframe. The idea has largely been discounted as there was other intelligence indicating that it was the genuine article.

  Secure Communications Upgrades

  A buried communications array some 5 miles outside the BCZ was photographed by a Chipmunk during its construction in the mid 1970s. The array was thought to use a secure sub-surface propagated Very Low Frequency (VLF) wave system and it belonged to HQ GSFG at Zossen-Wünsdorf for use by senior commanders to communicate with Moscow.

  Sometimes we got it wrong

  We all make mistakes and the PI community was no exception. Two of the more memorable ‘wild goose chases’ are recounted below.

  BTR-60PB or BRDM-2

  The NVA’s Beelitz storage depot had over 150 BRDM-2 armoured cars in open storage. One day an Allied agency reported them as BTR-60PB. In their defence the two vehicles are of similar appearance and easy to mis-identify on poor imagery, especially if there were no other vehicles to compare them with. It took ages to convince the agency of their mistake and after one particularly bruising session, one British PI cynically said: ‘It requires the simultaneous publication of an act of war, an Act of the British Parliament, an Act of the US Congress and an amendment to a Royal Artillery Drill Book before they will be convinced that a mistake has been made.’

  The Saga of the Krampnitz Drill Square

  Krampnitz at the southern end of the Dallgow-Döberitz training area housed elements of a TD until the 1980s when an MRD moved in. One of the great mysteries that had exercised minds for at least three decades was: what was held under the Krampnitz parade square? The square was on the same level as the rest of the barracks, but underneath was a large semi-underground storage area with vehicle size entrances capable of giving access to it. Vapour was often seen coming out of the entrances, which generated many theories as to what was there. The first idea was that it held a reserve tank regiment, which caused alarms because it could mean that all GSFG divisions had such a regiment, thus increasing GSFG’s overall tank holdings by about 2,000 tanks! The appearance of chemical defence-associated vehicles caused the next alarm – was it now a divisional chemical weapon store, despite there being no other indications of such storage? After much examination of photography from the Corridor and AMLMs, the answer came one sunny morning when washing lines of uniforms were seen being hung out to dry. The under square accommodation housed nothing more offensive than the divisional laundry, which used similar vehicles to the Divisional Chemical Defence Battalion, such as autoclave trucks and a hot and cold washing system, to delouse and decontaminate uniforms before issuing them to new users.

  Inter-Allied Co-operation

  At the heart of photographic exploitation was the co-operation between the Western Allies. British and French co-operation was mainly confined to the exchange of BCZ flight and ground tour photography and reports under the Tri-Mission agreement. The British and US intelligence relationships went far deeper and stemmed from the close collaboration forged during the Second World War at the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS), Bletchley Park and ACIU at Medmenham. During the Cold War this co-operation extended from senior management down to units and even individual PIs. There was regular joint liaison and many joint projects to maximise the use of resources.

  From the outset the British and the Americans exchanged photography from the mapping update programme of the early post-war years. This soon extended to exchanging Corridor missions photography and there was a regular courier run from Rheindahlen to the 497 RTS/RTG to facilitate this. From the late 1960s there were regular exchanges of individual PIs with their opposite numbers. The British sent Army and RAF personnel on short-term attachments to 497 RTS/RTG at Wiesbaden and ODCSI at Heidelberg and the USA sent Army, Air Force and in one case a US Marine, to work with 6 Int Coy and PID. These attachments were in addition to those connected with joint projects.

  PI Workshops

  In the early 1970s Major Lionel Lacey-Johnson, whose previous tour had been as an exchange officer in the USA became OC 6 Int Coy. He believed that regular meetings between the PI units to discuss matters of mutual interest informally would be beneficial to both communities. He initiated quarterly PI workshops that were hosted by the British at Rheindahlen and the Americans at Heidelberg or Wiesbaden in rotation. The workshops achieved much, including avoiding duplication of PI effort and joint programmes where one country would take lead role. Sharing was the name of the game. One definite mutual interest was served on the food front. The Americans would buy various barbecue items from the PX for the British in exchange for Weetabix breakfast cereal that was not available in the American PX facilities. On balance the British probably got the better deal.

  Joint Programmes

  Until 1962 APIU (BAOR) made amendments to 1: 25,000 maps of the Corridor areas and the immediate environs. Hand-drawn amendments included new construction, alterations to existing facilities and new infrastructure. These amended sheets were regularly sent to 497 RTS/RTG, which incorporated them onto existing map sheets. These were then issued under a very limited distribution to relevant intelligence organisations. The programme was discontinued as satellite imagery became available to the cartographers, although 6 Int Coy continued to maintain the 1: 25000 maps for their own purposes.

  When 6 Int Coy reporting emphasis changed from predominantly I&W to unit analysis they started to generate area prints that divided barracks into unit areas. At this stage the USA still used area graphics depicting the whole barracks area. They rapidly saw that the British method would improve their IPIRs’ quality and provide deeper analysis of intelligence. The USA proposed a joint programme producing area prints to an agreed standard and a common system of defining areas and sub-areas. This meant that both British and US PI and intelligence units reported in a common way, reducing possibilities for errors. Agreeing common area prints slowed production down slightly but this was more than offset by the effic
iencies gained.

  The Box-Body Guide

  This joint project, led by the US Army’s ODCSI at Heidelberg, involved analysing box-bodied vehicles (van trucks in the USA) to enable collectors to associate a particular box with a unit or function. The containers were encoded with a five-digit number that denoted the roof shape, the number of windows on the vehicle’s offside and their positions, the number of hatches on the offside and various other characteristics. The last two digits denoted the individual number of a box-body in a series. The vehicle chassis was not included in the encoding because boxes could be moved from one chassis to another.

  The offside (left-hand side) was used to define the box-body numbers because it was the view most often seen by the AMLM ground tours who supplied the bulk of the photography used in the analysis. Other views – right-hand side, front, rear and overhead – came from the AMLM ground tours, the BCZ light aircraft flights and occasionally from the Corridor missions if the photographic quality was good enough.