Rage

by Bob Woodward

  Twenty-four miles to the north, he said, is where “the prison state of North Korea sadly begins.” Forced labor, famine, malnutrition, gulags, torture, rape, murder, Kim’s cult of personal repressive leadership—“the horror of life in North Korea.”

  “America does not seek conflict or confrontation, but we will never run from it. We will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction.”

  Addressing Kim, he said, “the weight of this crisis is on your conscience.… The weapons you are acquiring are not making you safer. They are putting your regime in grave danger. Every step you take down this dark path increases the peril you face.”

  THIRTEEN

  Meanwhile, one of Andy Kim’s first actions had been to reach out to an old back-channel contact in the North Korean intelligence service he’d developed 20 years earlier. The White House sanctioned a meeting, and he arranged to meet his contact in a third country. His instructions were to find out what North Korea wanted.

  North Korea was continuing its nuclear and missile testing, and making provocative public statements attacking the U.S. But Andy Kim sensed that was for domestic consumption in the North. The contact could not give Andy Kim authoritative information about the real goals because in North Korea only one person, the leader, has any significant control.

  Andy Kim had no idea what might follow the meeting, where it might lead or in what direction. His only assessment was that North Korea also wanted to engaged. How and when were unclear.

  Some clues soon began to emerge shortly after Trump’s visit to South Korea. One of the first was Kim Jong Un’s statements following a November 29 ICBM missile test, a huge milestone for North Korea. Instead of sounding bellicose, however, Kim Jong Un gave a January 2018 speech effectively announcing he was done with military preparations and escalations. He now had his “mighty sword”—the powerful ICBM that could carry a nuclear weapon—to protect his country. His intention was to turn his focus to improving the North Korean economy.

  There were also signs of a thaw in the usually tense relationship between South and North Korea. The newly elected South Korean president, the left-leaning Moon Jae In, had signaled he wanted closer relations with his Northern counterpart, hinting even possible reunification with the North. With the Winter Olympics scheduled to begin in early February in Pyeongchang, South Korea, an open question was North Korea. Would it participate? Would it cause trouble?

  In January, Moon formally invited North Korea to talks about the Olympics, the first time in two years the two countries had talked formally, and North Korea announced it would send a delegation of athletes to participate in the games. A military hotline, disconnected for two years, also was reconnected.

  Sensing an opportunity, Trump sent Vice President Pence on a tour of Asian countries, with the real purpose being a secret meeting with the North Koreans. Pence, however, denounced North Korea’s nuclear intentions during his trip and the meeting was canceled two hours before its scheduled start time.

  * * *

  Less than a week after the end of the Olympics, however, President Moon, who was eager to deescalate tensions and engage the U.S. directly in talks, sent his national security adviser Chung Eui Yong, on March 5 to meet with the North Korean leader. Three days later, Chung visited the White House to brief key Trump cabinet members on what Kim Jong Un had promised.

  Chung also had a meeting scheduled the next day with Trump. But Trump got word that the South Koreans were at the White House meeting with McMaster and cabinet members. Why don’t I just see them now? Trump said, jumping the gun and inviting Chung to the Oval Office.

  Chung explained that Kim had made four explicit promises. He was committed to denuclearization; North Korea would refrain from any further nuclear or missile tests; routine joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States could continue. And lastly, Kim was eager to meet with Trump.

  McMaster reminded the president that Kim had been willing to have his own uncle killed, and Trump should be careful about believing his promises.

  “I’m willing to meet with Kim,” Trump said, dismissing McMaster’s caution. “Why don’t you”—and he pointed to Chung—“go announce it.”

  It was unprecedented for such an important presidential announcement to be made by a foreign official at the White House. Trump wanted Chung to go before the cameras outside the West Wing and announce the four ideas. He directed McMaster to work with Chung on the statement.

  McMaster and Pottinger sat down with Chung to make sure Trump’s comments and intention were not misrepresented. It was a negotiation that took almost an hour.

  Standing outside the West Wing with two other South Korean officials and no American ones, Chung made the announcement after dark. He faced the Sticks, so-called because of the array of microphones from TV news crews. He summarized the four ideas and Trump’s agreement to meet.

  “Along with President Trump,” Chung said in the carefully hedged agreed-upon language, “we are optimistic about continuing a diplomatic process to test the possibility of a peaceful resolution.”

  The announcement was big news. No sitting American president had ever met with a North Korean leader.

  Trump loved the American news coverage of the forthcoming meeting—“audacious,” “a breathtaking gamble,” “dramatic,” a reflection of Trump’s “improvisational style,” leaving “dazed White House aides” with “another day of swirling drama” that “upended” previous plans, “head-spinning.”

  But many from the foreign policy establishment criticized Trump for agreeing to meet without locking down some commitments from the North Korean leader. The piling on was intense. In this view Trump had instantly given the North Korean leadership the international standing and legitimacy it had long sought.

  Evan S. Medeiros, an Asia expert and adviser to former President Obama, said at the time, “We got nothing for it. And Kim will never give up his nukes. Kim played Moon and is now playing Trump.” The drumbeat continued. Dozens of articles and opinion pieces in the major media explored the downside of such a meeting, often harshly.

  Nearly two years later—after the president had held three meetings with Kim Jong Un—I asked Trump if he had given too much power to Kim by agreeing to meet.

  “You know what I did?” Trump said. “One thing. I met. Big fucking deal. It takes me two days. I met. I gave up nothing. I didn’t give up sanctions. I didn’t give him anything. Okay? Didn’t give him anything.”

  I mentioned what President George W. Bush had once said to me about Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il. “I loathe Kim Jong Il,” Bush had said, because he starved his people and kept tens of thousands in deplorable, hard-labor prison camps.

  “And you know what? That attitude got him nothing,” Trump said. “In the meantime, they built a huge nuclear force during the last two administrations.” So Trump said he agreed to meet. “What the fuck? It’s a meeting. I agreed to meet. What? You mean instead of sitting home reading your book, I met?”

  * * *

  Before Trump’s sudden announcement that he was willing to meet with Kim, Tillerson had been working the traditional State Department channel to North Korea through Sweden. Andy Kim didn’t think Tillerson was fully utilizing the talents at the State Department. He was trying with just a few people on his own staff. Many veteran diplomats felt his management at State was heavy handed and some had resigned.

  Tillerson often seemed at odds with the White House position. He’d twice before made public statements in support of talks, only to be contradicted by the White House. Trump wanted any talks to be between him and Kim.

  The most recent episode had occurred in December 2017, when Tillerson said, “We’ve said from the diplomatic side we’re ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk, and we’re ready to have the first meeting without precondition.” He added, “Let’s just meet and let’s—we can talk about the weather if you want.” A White House spokesman pushed back, saying, “The administrat
ion is united in insisting that any negotiations with North Korea must wait until the regime fundamentally improves its behavior. As the secretary of state himself has said, this must include, but is not limited to, no further nuclear or missile tests.”

  Tillerson, whose relationship with Trump seemed to be badly fraying, began to hear chatter that something else was going on that he did not know about. He approached CIA director Pompeo.

  You know, Pompeo said, we’ve got this channel. We keep it open all the time, but we’re not doing anything.

  Tillerson could tell Pompeo was not being honest with him. He was being shut out. That frustrated him. But he also thought the approach was wrong. The CIA seemed to be exactly the wrong route if they were to build some foundation to go forward with North Korea. Not only was it clandestine, but it excluded China.

  Tillerson saw China, a critically important trading partner with North Korea, as central to North Korean policy. He told President Xi in an earlier meeting, I have to know that you’re standing behind Kim with your hand around his neck. And every time he misbehaves, you just give him a gentle squeeze so he knows you’re there.

  All Xi did was smile.

  Tillerson was in Ethiopia, not at the White House, on March 8 when Trump had the South Koreans announce that he would meet with the North Korean leader. In fact, the day before the surprise announcement Tillerson had publicly revealed how far he was out of the loop, saying “We’re a long way from negotiations.”

  CIA director Pompeo had also missed the announcement. He was on his plane coming back for the meeting scheduled the next day when Trump called the audible. Pompeo huddled with his deputy, Gina Haspel, and Andy Kim.

  Haspel recounted what had happened.

  What was the president’s motive? Pompeo asked. Putting the South Koreans out there to make the announcement? Was it designed to distance Trump from the summit? That was unlikely since Trump would be out front personally with the North Korean leader. Or was it just one of Trump’s impulsive, spur-of-the-moment decisions?

  None of the three had an answer.

  Andy Kim said the South Koreans had suggested to him that the North was hung up on a statement Trump had made during the 2016 campaign: “If he came here, I’d accept him,” candidate Trump said of Kim Jong Un, “but I wouldn’t give him a state dinner like we do for China and all these other people that rip us off.” Trump had continued to rail against state dinners in general, adding that instead, “We should be eating a hamburger on a conference table.”

  North Korea had its own Lessons Learned from dealing with the United States, Andy Kim said. His North Korean counterparts had this explanation: Back in December 2000 President Clinton had intended to go to North Korea, but Republican George W. Bush had won the election instead of Clinton’s vice president, Al Gore. As president-elect, Bush didn’t want Clinton to make the trip. Clinton, now a lame duck, felt he had to honor the request and he canceled.

  So what was the lesson? The North knew negotiations took a long time. The United States had elections every four years and plans could easily be derailed and everything could blow up. The best course was to start dealing with a new American administration early so there was time. So, that is one of the reasons the North wanted to deal with Trump early, Andy Kim said.

  * * *

  A few days later Tillerson was in Kenya, halfway through his trip to visit five African nations, when he received a call from chief of staff John Kelly at about 2:00 a.m. local time.

  “Hey, you need to get back right away,” Kelly said.

  “What’s going on?” Tillerson asked.

  “The president’s going to fire you,” Kelly said. “I told him he can’t do that while you’re gone.”

  “Well, John, okay,” Tillerson said. “What’s going on?”

  “I don’t know. I don’t know what happened.” Kelly said he was in his office and one of his staffers told him that H. R. McMaster and U.N. ambassador Nikki Haley were in the Oval Office meeting with the president. “I rushed down the hall just in time to see them coming out. I walked in. All I know is the president’s just ranting and raving about you. He said, ‘It’s time for Tillerson to go. Never did like him.’ ”

  “Was there a specific issue?” Tillerson asked.

  “I don’t know,” Kelly said. “I don’t know what they said to him, but they got him all spun up.”

  “I’ll have to see what the fastest I can get back is, but obviously I’ll have to cancel a lot of head-of-state meetings and this is going to raise a lot of questions, and so we need to think about how you want me to respond to those,” Tillerson said. “Because people are going to wonder, has something bad happened back in Washington?”

  Kelly called Tillerson back about an hour later. The president had agreed not to do anything until Tillerson returned. “But I still think you ought to try to get back as soon as you can,” Kelly said.

  Tillerson truncated his trip by one day without canceling any of his head-of-state visits, and landed at Andrews Air Force base at 4:00 a.m. on March 13. He called Kelly. The secretary of state had been up for nearly 72 hours straight.

  “I’m on the ground,” Tillerson said. “I’m going to run to the house. I’m going to take a shower. I’m going to get about two hours of sleep. And I’ll be in the office between 9:00 and 10:00.”

  Shortly before 9:00 a.m., Tillerson was getting dressed when he got a call from his own chief of staff.

  “Have you seen it?” she asked.

  “No.” Tillerson did not have a Twitter account, so anytime the president tweeted something, somebody had to tell him.

  The staffer read Tillerson the president’s tweet, posted at 8:44 a.m., firing the nation’s chief diplomat.

  “Mike Pompeo, Director of the CIA, will become our new Secretary of State,” Trump wrote in the tweet. “He will do a fantastic job! Thank you to Rex Tillerson for his service! Gina Haspel will become the new Director of the CIA, and the first woman so chosen. Congratulations to all!”

  Tillerson was never told why he was fired. The president did not give him a reason. It had earlier leaked out that Tillerson had called Trump a “fucking moron” at a July 20, 2017, Tank meeting. Probably nothing could have triggered Trump’s insecurities more.

  After the news broke, Tillerson got a call from Mattis.

  “Mr. Secretary, I don’t know what to say,” Mattis said.

  “Jim, you don’t have to say anything,” Tillerson said. “But I want to say something: Thank you. I couldn’t have had a better partner.”

  They had stopped or slowed some of Trump’s intentions in Afghanistan and South Korea, but their ambitious goal of directing foreign policy had largely failed.

  * * *

  Speaking to reporters on the South Lawn of the White House that morning, Trump thanked Tillerson for his service and said he was “a good man.” But he was hardly effusive in his praise.

  “Rex and I have been talking about this for a long time,” Trump said. “We get along, actually, quite well, but we disagreed on things.”

  Around noon, Tillerson got a call from the president, who was traveling to California for a fundraiser and to inspect border wall prototypes.

  “Hey Rex, how you doing?” Trump said.

  “I’m fine, Mr. President.”

  “Well, I hope you saw all those nice things I said about you,” Trump said. “You know, you’re going to be fine. I know you never wanted to do this job. You can go back home to your ranch now, where you really wanted to go.”

  Trump invited Tillerson to come visit him in the Oval Office when he returned from California. “We’ll get a nice picture of us shaking hands.”

  “Okay,” Tillerson said, and hung up the phone. At 2:00 p.m., he gave a five-minute farewell address at the State Department in which he didn’t mention Trump by name.

  “This can be a very mean-spirited town,” he said. “But you don’t have to choose to participate in that. Each of us gets to choose the person we want
to be, and the way we want to be treated, and the way we treat others.”

  The betrayal was deep for Tillerson. In his view, the president had broken two of the three promises he had asked for before taking the job: Trump had agreed to let Tillerson pick his own senior staff, but Trump or the White House had continually meddled with or vetoed Tillerson’s picks. And the president had pledged they would never have a dispute in public, but he had been summarily fired, without discussion and by tweet. The only promise Trump had kept was not to pull Tillerson’s nomination.

  “Tillerson Ousted as Trump Silences Dissent in Cabinet,” read the headline across the front page of the next day’s New York Times.

  Trump questioned Mattis when they met for lunch not long after Tillerson’s firing.

  “Aren’t you friends with him?” Trump asked.

  “No, no, we weren’t friends,” Mattis said. “We’re best of friends. But I’ll work with whoever you put in, because you’re the president. You’re the one who was elected, not me.”

  * * *

  As a first step Trump wanted Pompeo to go to North Korea to meet Kim Jong Un on his behalf.

  Andy Kim described for Pompeo what it would be like to meet with the North Koreans. They will start with the party line that the United States created the hostility and was exclusively responsible for the bad relations. Then they’ll repeat and repeat. You’re going to be just sick of hearing the same thing. Don’t object or try to argue with them. They were told to make that statement. You are going to have to let them finish. So you’re going to stay there for a long time. They’ve been practicing this for a long time. Relax. But you’ll never enjoy it.

  On Easter weekend 2018, Pompeo flew to North Korea. He was still CIA director, not yet confirmed as secretary of state. Andy Kim and a few staff accompanied him to Pyongyang. After they arrived, they were escorted to a room in a government guesthouse. Kim Yong Chol, the vice chairman of the Central Committee and former general and former head of the North Korean intelligence service, greeted Pompeo. Kim Yong Chol was generally thought to be the number two, but with such a dominant number one, it was hard to tell for sure.