Many projections of a conventional war for Germany have anticipated massive ‘collateral damage’ and the wholesale destruction of cities. This may indeed be the case at specific points of main effort, where HE shelling is especially concentrated. There would also be very widespread demolitions to block roads and defiles. Nevertheless, neither side would wish to fight large battles in towns if they could be avoided, and a speedy conclusion to operations would certainly be preferred to stand-up attritional fighting. The more discriminating and economical nature of much modern ammunition may even mean that a short war lets the landscape off relatively lightly – apart perhaps from a persisting carpet of millions of unexploded minelets.
A major unanswered question – if not the most important question of all – concerns the speed at which a battle line might be expected to move backwards or forwards. Both sides would hope to ‘bite fast and deep’, in de Grandmaison’s phrase, keeping up the momentum of their spearheads by making overwhelming concentrations at key points. However, the logic of increasingly dispersed tactics would suggest that such concentrations might today be prohibitively dangerous. The statistical norms for breakthrough ratios, which might have worked with effortless ease in the Great Patriotic War, may now lead to disasters still greater than the attempted break-outs at ‘Goodwood’ in 1944 or on the Golan in 1973. Unless deep force reductions have been negotiated and accepted before a war for Germany starts, a defender may always be able to find the squadron, the company – or the force equivalent in heli-borne reserves or scatterable mines – that he needs to contest every avenue of approach. The range and flexibility of firepower, combined with realtime surveillance by HQs, should then allow him to reinforce each of the threatened points very rapidly, as the Iraquis were able to do in their repeated Gulf War defensives. The gaps could then be plugged and the battle front stabilised into a frontal deadlock.
The logic of the dispersed battlefield, however, also implies that devastating infiltrations by small units may still be eminently possible for an attacker. Given the right type of laser designator and rear-link transmitter, it may need only one observer lurking fifty kilometres behind enemy lines to bring down instant pinpoint fire against a key HQ or ammunition dump. Two or three raiding helicopters or armoured cars may be able to slip through narrow gaps in the front, to take out the supply echelon for a brigade. A fast-moving force of a dozen or so tanks may be able to manoeuvre around an enemy’s flank to surprise and destroy an armoured battalion within a few moments. A highly fluid and ‘intermingled battle’ is thus a distinct possibility in the close country of Germany,21 and we may find ourselves looking more to the Vietnam model of forest infiltration and mobility than to the Gulf War model of locked fronts in open terrain.
This type of battle may well be enhanced if the new surveillance and firepower technology fails or can be countered, as was already often happening in Vietnam. To meet the new electronic weapons, the number and sophistication of new electronic counter-measures is today certainly prodigious, albeit often shrouded in secrecy and uncertainty. They include such things as jammers fired in shells against enemy HQs to obliterate transmissions locally, and counter-laser lasers to decoy incoming beams or blind their operators. Smart munitions may also be vulnerable to quick-reacting high-volume point defence systems, designed to shoot down bombs and missiles before they can effectively engage. Smokes, chaffs, flares, anti-radiation missiles and simple but stupendous jamming energies all have a part to play, and more than a few commentators have wondered whether command, control and target acquisition may not all break down completely under the pressures of real battle. Even without having to contend with ECMs, indeed, many electronic weapons carry built-in weaknesses simply because of their own inherent complexity. A system which uses eighteen different technologies is surely at least six times more likely to fail than one which uses just three.
A dispersed but fluid and ‘intermingled’ battle might be embarrassing for NATO’s somewhat linear concept of ‘forward defence’, and it would entrust the ultimate decision to the accidents of personal inspiration and training at relatively low levels of command. Nevertheless, it is a type of contest which the military establishments on both sides believe they can win, and which even NATO would in many ways prefer to a more predictable trenchlocked battle of attrition. Everyone agrees that the best war is one that can be ‘over by Christmas’, especially since no one has stockpiled ammunition to fight for more than a few weeks. Yet it remains as true today as it was on the Marne in 1914, or on the Gulf in 1980, that neither side can win quickly, even in the most mobile of wars, if both sides fight equally well and survive the initial phases. Conversely, a rapid decision can be reached even in the most static of trench deadlocks, provided one side has an overwhelming advantage over the other. It is therefore the duty of analysts to discover just where such an advantage may lie, and in this process a judicious understanding of the military past can be no less rewarding than a mastery of the technology and hardware.
Notes
Chapter 1
1 There are only a few alternatives to written evidence for the history of tactics. One of them is battlefield archaeology: see e.g. Scott, D. D. and Fox Jr, R. A., Archaeological Insights into the Custer Battle (University of Oklahoma, 1987), but also the many straightforward guidebooks for battlefield tourism. Another approach is oral history: for example, the systematic interviews with world war survivors that have been tape recorded by the Imperial War Museum, London; but see also the many diverse volumes of interviews and battle impressions that have been published in recent years in Britain and USA.
2 Lasswell, H., Propaganda Technique and the World War (New York, 1938), p. 90.
3 Convenient summaries of the evolving tactical debate may be found in e.g. Paret, P, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1986); or Wintringham, T., and Blashford-Snell, J. N., Weapons and Tactics (London, 1973).
4 See especially Appendix I, The Art of Tactical Snippetting in my Rally Once Again (Crowood, 1987, and – as Battle Tactics of the Civil War – Yale University, 1989), p. 193 ff.
5 Colin, J., L’Infanterie au XVIIIe. Siècle; la Tactique (Paris, 1907). See also Léonard, E. G., L’Armée et ses Problèmes au XVIIIe. Siècle (Paris, 1958).
6 Hamilton, I., A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book during the Russo-Japanese War (2 vols., London, 1905), vol. 2, p. 194.
7 Siborne, H. T., Waterloo Letters (London, 1891), p. 383.
8 See the notes to Chapter 5, below. A controversial and stimulating thesis on the nature of battle reporting is Keegan, J., The Face of Battle (London, 1976).
Chapter 2
1 Jomini, H., Précis de l’Art de la Guerre (new edn., 2 vois., Paris 1855. The first complete edition appeared in 1838.), vol. 2, p. 231; and Précis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815 (Paris, 1839), p. 205.
2 Oman, C. W., A History of the Peninsular War (7 vols., Oxford, 1902–1930), and the articles referred to below in footnote 34. Colin, J., La Tactique et la Discipline dans les Armées de la Révolution (Paris, 1902), and Les Transformations de la Guerre (Paris, 1911).
3 Quimby, R. S., The Background of Napoleonic Warfare (New York, 1957) is an even more extreme translation of Colin’s work; while Oman’s ideas have been given a late twentieth century flavour by two weaponry experts – Jac Weller in his histories of Wellington’s campaigns, and Major General B. P. Hughes in his Firepower (London, 1974).
4 Weller, J., Wellington in the Peninsula, 1808–1814 (London, 1962), p. 47.
5 Gurwood, ed., The Dispatches of the Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington (London, 1835), vol. 4, p. 95.
6 Curling, H., ed., Recollections of Rifleman Harris (London, 1929), p. 50.
7 Wyld, J., Memoir Annexed to an Atlas (London, 1841), p. 4.
8 Landmann, Colonel, Recollections of my Military Life (2 vols, London, 1854), vol. 1, pp. 212–14.
9 Fyler, Colonel, History of the 50th (or the Queen’s Own) Regiment (London, 1895), pp. 105–6.
&nbs
p; 10 Anon., Recollections of the Peninsula (5th edn., London, 1827), p. 151.
11 USJ, September 1844, p. 92.
12 USJ, June 1834, p. 183.
13 Siborne, H.T., Waterloo Letters (London, 1891), p. 383.
14 USJ, October 1829, p. 417.
15 USJ, June 1834, p. 183. The British cheer was already thought to be more effective than volley fire at the battle of Dettingen, 1743: Orr, M. J., Dettingen 1743 (London, 1972), pp. 65–6.
16 See Nafziger, G. The Thin Red Line: A Tactical Innovation or a Circumstantial Necessity? in EEL no. 62, March 1982, pp. 4 ff. Note that the restricted frontages of many British battles lead one to speculate that in practice the troops were often packed more closely than two deep.
17 USJ, February 1830, p. 207. Michael Glover’s inspection of the ground at Albuera, however, has convinced him that no such gulley existed (private communication to the author).
18 Two of these battalions were probably composite units made up of two weak battalions each, hence a total of ‘seven battalions’ is sometimes given. See also Shopfer, P. A. & Lochet, J. A., The Attack and the Formations of the Middle Guard at Waterloo in EEL no. 75, October 1983, pp. 38–9, summarising a lengthy debate. Compare also J. E. Koontz’ remarkable analysis, Note on D’Erlon’s First Attack at Waterloo in EEL no. 78, March 1984, pp. 47–55, and no. 79, April 1984, pp. 19–44.
19 Waterloo Letters, op. cit., p. 248.
20 Ibid., p. 277.
21 USJ, March 1845, p. 403.
22 USJ, April 1845, p. 471.
23 USJ, June 1841, pp. 179–180.
24 Quoted in Gover, M., Wellington’s Army in the Peninsula, 1808–1814 (Newton Abbot, 1977), p. 169.
25 USJ, June 1841, p. 181.
26 Ibid., p. 183.
27 USJ, July 1834, p. 321.
28 USJ, January 1848, p. 41.
29 A. F. Becke, quoted in Quimby, op. cit., p. 342.
30 USJ, December 1833, p. 438.
31 Ardant du Picq, C.J.J.J., translated by Greely, J. N., and Cotton, R. C., Battle Studies (New York, 1921), p. 151.
32 Fortescue, J. W., ed., Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne, 1812–13 (London, 1926), p. 8.
33 Saint-Pierre, L. de, ed., Les Cahiers du General Brun de Villeret, Pair de France, 1773–1845 (Paris, 1953), p. 146.
34 Oman, C. W., The Battle of Maida’ in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars (London, 1929. The article on Maida first appeared in 1908); and ‘Line and Column in the Peninsular War’ in Proceedings of the British Academy, London, vol. 4, 1910, later reprinted in Wellington’s Army, 1809–1814 (London, 1913). Maida and its historiographical implications are discussed in Arnold, J., Column and Line in the Napoleonic Wars. A Reappraisal in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research vol. LX, 1982, pp. 196–208.
35 Anon. (‘An artillery officer commanding a French battery at Maida’), ‘Combat de Maida, Rectification d’une Erreur de Walter Scott’ in Spectateur Militaire, Paris, No. 23.
36 Colin’s preface to La Tactique et la Discipline, op. cit. Modern research tends to confirm these findings, at least in the period before 1808.
37 Archives Historiques de la Guerre (AHG) at Vincennes; Carton C 7/6, Junot’s MSS report 31st August 1808, p. 8. and Thiébault’s MSS report 15th September 1808, p. 16. Carton C 8/147, Soult’s MSS report 18th May 1811, p. 198.
38 Précis de l’Art de la Guerre, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 231.
39 Martin, Souvenirs d’un Ex-Officier, 1812–15 (Paris, 1867), p. 160.
40 Chambray, G. de, De l’Infanterie (Montpellier, 1824), pp. 16–17.
41 Quoted in Maxwell, H., The Life of Wellington (4th edn., 2 vols., London, 1900), vol. 2, p. 320, footnote.
42 Colonel Hanger’s famous remark is quoted in e.g. Gates, D., The British Light Infantry Arm, c. 1790–1815 (Batsford, London 1987), p. 139.
43 E.g. Duhesme, C., Essai Historique sur l’Infanterie Légère (first published 1814, 3rd edn, Paris 1864), pp. 145–9, 302. Duhesme’s work is often overlooked, but was a very important inspiration for many French tactical writers in the nineteenth century.
44 Weller, J. Shooting Confederate Infantry Arms, Part One in The American Rifleman, April 1954, pp. 43–4.
45 Busk, H. The Rifle (first published in the mid-1850s. 4th edn., London, 1859, reprinted Richmond, England, 1971), p. 18. The well-known Vittoria statistic seems to have appeared first in Henegan’s 1846 memoirs vol. I, pp. 344–6, cited in e.g. Gates, op. cit., p. 140.
46 Nafziger, G., French Infantry Drill, Organization and Training in EEL 39, October 1979, p. 17. Guibert had claimed an even longer maximum, at 600 toises, or 1170 metres, in Essai Générale de Tactique in Menard, ed., Guibert, Écrits Militaires 1772–1790 (Paris 1977) p. 124. The comparable figure for the British Brown Bess was apparently 700 yards: Haythornthwaite, P., Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars (Blandford, Dorset, 1979), p. 19.
47 German target scores quoted in Lauerma p. 32, and Scharnhorst Uber die Wirkung des Feuergewehrs (Berlin 1813, new edn., Osnabruck 1973), pp. 93–7. Compare comparable British and French results discussed in Haythornthwaite, P., op. cit., pp. 19–20.
48 French infantry inspection reports for 1831–45, covering some 368 separate shoots, in AHG cartons Xb 626–726. Busk, op. cit., gives an astounding example of 11% hits being achieved with French muskets at 600 metres!
49 Holmes, R., Firing Line (Cape, London 1985) p. 168, based on Fortescue. The small number of troops in the sample, however, make this a result for ‘one tactical action’ rather than for ‘a whole battle’.
50 See my notes in EEL no. 101, July-August 1987, pp. 4–7.
51 See my comments on Bressonnet’s Études Tactiques sur la Campagne de 1806 (Chapelot, Paris 1909), in EEL no. 82, September 1984, pp. 16–22, showing how French skirmishing was already widespread as a ‘decisive’ combat technique.
52 Gates, op. cit., pp. 138–48, for the movement towards aimed fire, from the 1790s onwards.
53 In the French range tests of 1831–45 already cited, ‘light’ infantry regiments were not noticeably more accurate than line. The 6th Light in 1842 scoring a record low of 0.6% hits, as opposed to the staggering claim from 37th Line in 1844 that it had achieved 70%! Overall only 46 of the results (12.4%) showed a score higher than 20% hits; but only 30 of them (8.1%) registered 6% or fewer. Note also that in four other comparable cases the chasseurs à pied, using rifles, succeeded in scoring an average of only 16.3% of hits.
54 My Military Thought in the French Army, 1815–51 (Manchester University 1989) pp. 122–5. Cf many of the un-standardized skirmisher drill books and schemes of the revolutionary period can be found in AHG MR 2034, 2041, 2043, 1962, 2008, 2012, Xs 143. See also Duhesme, op. cit., and La Roche Aymon Des Troupes Légères (Paris, 1817).
55 Houssaye 1814, and my A Book of Sandhurst Wargames (Hutchinson, London 1982) pp. 25–30.
56 This emerges in e.g. Liddell Hart, B. H., ed., The Letters of Private Wheeler (Joseph, London 1951).
57 Weiler op. cit. Gates, op. cit., pp. 79, 144–5, suggests that in battle there could not be great accuracy with rifles at much more than 150 yards, although on pp. 96, 144, he shows that Rottenberg’s training manual envisaged target practice up to 300 yards.
58 Baker, E., Remarks on the Rifle (first published Brighton, 1805; 11th edn., London 1835, reprinted Standard publications, Huntington, West Virginia n.d., c. 1960?), p. 53. Note that his rifle was sighted to 200 yards.
59 Marshall, S. L. A., Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea (E. C. Ezell ed., Greenhill, London 1988) pp. 7–8. See also Chapter 5, below, for Vietnam.
60 Busk, op. cit., pp. 22–3; Haythornthwaite, op. cit., pp. 18–19; and Gates, op. cit., p. 142, for rates of fire.
61 For Wellington at Toulouse see Oman, Peninsular War, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 475; for the Imperial Guard at Essling see Lachouque, H., The Anatomy of Glory (trans. A. S. K. Brown, new edn., Brown University, Rhode Island 1962), p. 156.
62 At Maya an entire British battalion
was formed on a frontage of 25 yards, with steep slopes on either side, making perhaps 20 or 30 men per yard – although it would only be the first two ranks that could use their muskets effectively. Wellington at Waterloo had almost 21,000 men in his front line, which was a mile and a half long – as many as eight men per yard – while in more normal battles the effective density in the front line rarely fell lower than 5 men per yard.
63 For the musket found at Gettysburg loaded 23 times, see my Rally Once Again, op. cit., p. 86.
64 For Salamanca see Glover, Wellington’s Peninsular Victories, p. 83; for Toulouse see Oman, Peninsular War, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 476.
65 Bressonet, op. cit., p. 135.
66 Oman, Peninsular War, op. cit., vol. VII, p. 360.
67 Norris, A. H., and Bremner, R. W., The Lines of Torres Vedras (London 1980) PP. 14 ff.
68 Duffy, C. J., Borodino, Napoleon Against Russia 1812 (Sphere edn., London 1972) pp. 102, 125–9.
69 Beatson, F. C., With Wellington in the Pyrenees (Goschen, London n.d., 1914?).
70 Gleig, G. R., The Subaltern, p. 112 describes the cantonment of 100 men in a farmhouse, and on p. 151 the whole regiment in a cottage.
71 New Orleans is covered in Ward, J. W., Andrew Jackson, Symbol for an Age (Oxford University Press, New York 1962); Brooks, C. B., The Siege of New Orleans (University of Washington, Seattle 1961); Reid, J. and Eaton, J. H., The Life of Andrew Jackson (F. L. Owsley jr, ed., University of Alabama 1974); Carter, S., 3rd, Blaze of Glory (St Martins, New York 1971); Reilly, R., The British at the Gates (Cassell, London 1974); James, W., Military Occurrences Between Great Britain and America (2 vols., London, 1818), vol. II; Casey, P., Louisiana in the War of 1812 (privately printed, Baton Rouge 1963); and Surtees, W., Twenty-Five Years in the Rifle Brigade (first published 1833, Military Book Society reprint, London 1973).
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