72 Ward, op. cit., p. 4. It was arguably in the British interest to lift this American gloom, to pre-empt a possible renunciation of the treaty!
73 It was on the west bank that most of the famous ‘Hunters of Kentucky’ were actually posted, not in the main battle. When finally attacked by Thornton’s 450 men later in the morning, over a thousand of the Kentuckians ran away after receiving a volley at 150 yards. They inflicted but 33 casualties on the British, and abandoned their colours and nine cannon. See Brooks, op. cit., p. 242, and Carter, op. cit., p. 237.
74 Burgoyne, R. H., Historical Records of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders (London, Bentley, 1883) pp. 29–34, 36–45.
75 Carter, op. cit., pp. 247, 253.
76 Among the ranges variously quoted for the opening of fire are 150 yards (Reilly p. 299); 200 yards (James vol. II, p. 545), and 250 yards (Casey, p. 84).
77 Carter, op. cit., p. 254; cf Reid and Eaton, op. cit., p. 339, say all the Americans opened fire at once, and at quite short range because of the mist.
78 Casey, op. cit., pp. 73, 84; Surtees, op. cit., p. 376; and James vol. II, op. cit., p. 381. On p. 75 Casey states that the Kentucky troops involved in these actions were firing buckshot, not using rifles. See Ward, op. cit., pp. 16–26, for another interesting corrective to the ‘frontier rifleman’ myth at New Orleans.
79 Surtees, op. cit., pp. 373–4.
80 Surtees, op. cit., pp. 375–6.
81 Burgoyne, op. cit., p. 33.
82 Surtees, op. cit., pp. 389–90.
Chapter 3
1 E.g. Porch, D., ‘The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive 1900–14’, in Bond, B., and Roy, I., War and Society – A Yearbook of Military History (London, 1975), p. 117; Travers, T.H., The Killing Ground (Allen & Unwin, London 1987); or Ellis, J., Eye-deep in Hell. The Western Front 1914–18 (London, 1976), Chapter 6, ‘Strategy and Tactics’.
2 The earliest use of the term ‘firefight’ which I have come across was in February 1853 in the Military Review II, p. 1. Quoted in Strachan, H., ‘Wellington’s Legacy: The British Army in the Age of Reform’ (unpublished thesis, Cambridge University, 1978).
3 Waterloo Letters, op. cit., pp. 365–6.
4 Kincaid, J., Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, in the Peninsula, France and the Netherlands from 1809 to 1815, ed. Fortescue, J. (London, 1929), p. 255.
5 Clausewitz, C. von, On War, translated by Graham, J. J. (new edition 3 vols., London, 1940), vol. 3, pp. 263–4.
6 Hofschroer, P., Prussian Light Infantry, 1792–1815 (Osprey, London 1984), pp. 10–27, and his Prussian Line Infantry, 1792–1815 (Osprey, London 1984), pp. 10–16. For the French Grandes Bandes, see J. Arnold, op. cit.
7 Lauerma, M., L’Artillerie de Campagne Francaise Pendant les Guerres de la Révolution (Helsinki, 1956). For a British example of a battlefield made empty by two contending artilleries, we need look no further than the two opening rounds at New Orleans, on 28 December 1814 and 1 January 1815.
8 Duc d’Orléans’ cyclostyled letter to the Minister of War, 1840, on the Chasseurs, p. 12. In AHG MR 1947.
9 Fuller, J. F. C, Sir John Moore’s System of Training (London, 1924). Sir John Moore’s personal role in training the Light Division has recently been called into question: see Gates, op. cit., p. 112.
10 Paret, P., Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807–1815 (Princeton, 1966).
11 Blackmore, British Military Firearms 1650–1850 (London, 1961), pp. 85–7.
12 Barré MSS on percussion muskets, December 1830, in AHG MR 2141, Projects, 1830–33 (A) – Machines. For a similar American experience with the Hall rifle, from 1811 onwards, see Davis, C. L., Arming the Union (National University, New York 1973), pp. 107–14.
13 Morand, C. A. L. A., De l’Armée Selon la Charte (Paris, 1829), p. 235.
14 Orléans on Chasseurs, op. cit., p. 16; Col. Marnier, cyclostyled article ‘Améliorations Proposées dans l’Armement et l’Education des Troupes’, May 1837, pp. 19–20, in AHG MR 2140; also Ardant du Picq MSS ‘De l’emploi de la Carabine et des Chasseurs’ n.d., p. 1, in AHG MR 1990.
15 Hamilton, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 144.
16 Le Louterel, ‘Essai de Conferences sur l’emploi des Manoeuvres d’Infanterie devant l’Ennemi’ (Paris, 1848), p. 11.
17 Bapst, C. G., Le Marechal Canrobert (6 vols., Paris, 1898–1913), vol. 1, p. 362. For all these debates see my Military Thought in the French Army, 1815–51 (Manchester University Press, 1989).
18 Engels, F., Engels as a Military Critic (eds. Chaloner and Henderson, London, 1959), p. 79 ff.
19 MSS 27th April 1844, in AHG Xs 141.
20 MSS 10th September 1833, ‘Quelques Observations sur la Formation de l’Infanterie sur Deux ou Trois Rangs’, in AHG MR 2012.
21 Delorme du Quesney, A., Du Tir des Armes à Feu (Paris, 1845), p. 176.
22 Bugeaud, T. R., Apercus sur Quelques Details de la Guerre (First published in 1832. 24th edn. Paris, 1873).
23 Ibid., p. 145.
24 See my article ‘The Strategic Challenge to the French Engineers, 1815–51’, in Fort (the Journal of the Fortress Study Group), no. 5, Spring 1978, p. 31.
25 See p. 132 of my thesis (op. cit.) and Spivak, M., ‘Le Colonel Armoros, un Promoteur de l’Education Physique dans l’Armée Francaise’, in Revue Historique de L’Armée, 1970.
26 Thoumas, C. A., Les Transformations de l’Armée Francaise (2 vols., Paris, 1887), vol. II, p. 452.
27 Luvaas, J., The Military Legacy of the Civil War – The European Inheritance (Chicago, 1959), pp. 150 et seq.
28 Lecomte, F., Relation Historique et Critique de la Campagne d’Italie en 1859 (Paris, 1860), p. 126.
29 Ibid. For the Italian campaign see also Wylly, H.C., 1859, Magenta and Solferino (Swan Sonnenschein, London 1907).
30 Ardant du Picq, op. cit., p. 102.
31 Ibid., p. 128.
32 Ibid., p. 147.
33 Ibid., p. 116.
34 For France, 1867–84, see Thoumas, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 456–64; and Holmes, E. R., ‘The Road to Sedan, the French Army 1866–70’ (Royal Historical Society, London 1984). For Britain, 1902–9, see Travers, T. H. E., The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870–1915’ in Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 13, no. 3, July 1978, p. 531.
35 Bonnal, H., Sadowa, a Study, trans. Atkinson, C. F. (2nd. Imp., London, 1913), p. 237.
36 Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, Letters on Infantry, trans. Walford, N. L. (London, 1889), pp. 135–6. See also Wilhelm Duke of Württemberg, The System of Attack of the Prussian Infantry in the Campaign of 1870–71 (Trans. C. W. Robinson, Aldershot 1871).
37 Herbert, W. V., The Defence of Plevna 1877 (London, 1895), p. 281.
38 Forbes, Macgahan et al., The War Correspondence of the ‘Daily News’, 1877 (3rd edn., London, 1878), p. 365.
39 Herbert, op. cit., p. 198.
40 Hamilton, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 203–6.
41 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 309.
42 Rommel, E., Infantry Attacks, trans. Kiddé, G. E. (US Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Virginia, 1956), p. 7.
43 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
44 Ibid., p. 16.
45 From War and Policy (New York, 1900), p. 159, quoted in a different sense in Ellis, J., The Social History of the Machine Gun (London, 1975), p. 53.
46 Hamilton, op. cit., vol. I, p. 114.
47 Bloch, I. S., Modern Weapons and Modern War, ed. Stead, W. T. (London, 1899).
48 Tactical lessons drawn from the Boer War by the British have been extensively analysed in recent years in Bidwell, S. and Graham, D., Firepower (Allen & Unwin, London, 1982); Travers, T., The Killing Ground (Allen & Unwin, London, 1987); and Badsey, S. D., Fire and the Sword (unpublished doctoral thesis, Cambridge, 1981, due to be published by Manchester University Press).
49 Actually it was won by Maxim guns, with the revealing final ‘score’ of around 400 British casualties to 30,000 Dervishes. Ironically, this was to be about the same propo
rtion of casualties, albeit on a smaller scale, as was suffered between the Germans and the British on the First Day of the Somme.
50 Esposito, V. J., ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars (2 vols., Praeger, New York 1959), vol. I, 1689–1900.
51 Dupuy, T. N., The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (first published 1980; Jane’s edn., London 1982) p. 191. The latest scholarly re-working of this time-honoured theme is Hagerman, E., The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare (Indiana University, 1988); but see also Mahon J. K., Civil War Assault Tactics in Military Affairs, vol. 25, summer 1965, pp. 57–68; and McWhiney, G., and Jamieson, P. D., Attack and Die (University of Alabama, 1982).
52 My book Rally Once Again (Crowood, 1987, published in USA by Yale University as Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 1989) devotes some 230 pages to explaining this quite simple point. Unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes, it is the reference for the present section.
53 Wynne, W. R. C., Memoir (privately printed by the family, Southampton c. 1880; to be re-published by Fieldbooks, Camberley 1990, edited by Howard Whitehouse), p. 136.
54 See especially Rally Once Again, op. cit., pp. 88–9, 145–50. For a parallel that would be ludicrous if it were not true, the reader is referred to the gunfight at the OK Corral, 1881, where the engagement range was apparently between six and eight feet.
55 Hardee, W. J., Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of Troops (2 vols, first published 1855; reprinted Greenwood, Westport, Conn. 1971).
56 Rally Once Again, op. cit., pp. 150–4.
57 Johnson, R. U. and Buel, C. C., eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (4 vols., Century, New York 1884 and many later reprints), vol. II, p. 510.
58 Ibid., pp. 29–72 and Appendix I. One would certainly not wish to suggest, however, that they were anything but fully committed to charges which were unavoidable.
59 Ibid., pp. 39–40, 50–51, 133–5.
60 Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918: The Live and Let Live System (Macmillan, London 1980).
61 Rally Once Again, op. cit., pp. 154–8.
62 A New System of Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, adapted to American Topography and Improved Firearms (Appleton, New York, 1867).
63 Weigley, R. F., in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., pp. 413–18; and Rally Once Again, op. cit., pp. 123–35. H. W. Halleck’s book was Elements of Military Art and Science (Appleton, New York 1846, reprinted by Greenwood, Westport, Conn. 1971).
64 Hagerman, op. cit., has the most thorough analysis of the rise of fortifications.
65 E.g. Dupuy, p. 171. For my analysis of similar claims, see Rally Once Again, op. cit., pp. 165–78.
66 Against rifled artillery not even the best infantry weapons could outrange the guns. In the field, however, rifled cannon fired relatively small and technically less effective rounds than the 12-pounder smoothbores. Gunners normally wanted to deploy two smoothbores to every one rifle.
67 Rally Once Again, op. cit., pp. 179–88, and see Badsey, op. cit., pp. 15, 21–7.
68 Moulin à café fire is in Württemberg, op. cit., pp. 8–10. Badsey, op. cit., pp. 15, 30, describes problems encountered with the needle gun’s gas seal, requiring fire from the hip to avoid back blast. Note that J. A. English agrees that the important mid-century change came with the needle gun, not the rifle musket – On Infantry (first published Praeger, New York 1981; new edn 1984), p. 1.
69 E.g. Howard, M. E., The Franco Prussian War (first published 1960, Fontana edn., London 1967), p. 36.
70 Ibid., pp. 215–6.
71 Ascoli, D., A Day of Battle (Harrap, London 1987) pp. 168–72; Captain Loir, Cavalerie (Paris, Chapelot 1912) pp. 308–317; and elsewhere in Loir for other effective uses of cavalry in 1870. Howard, however, scoffs: op. cit., p. 157.
72 Morris, D., The Washing of the Spears (first published 1965, Sphere edn., London 1968), pp. 300, 371–6; see also the diagram in Whitehouse, H., Battle in Africa (Fieldbooks, Camberley 1987) p. 35.
73 Barrow, E. G., Infantry Fire Tactics (Hong Kong, 1895, reprinted by Wargame Library, Hemel Hempstead, Herts, 1985), pp. 4 ff. There was a story that at Omdurman troops armed with the Martini-Henry held the enemy attack at 300 yards; those with the Lee Metford at 500.
74 De Grandmaison, L., Dressage de l’Infanterie en Vue du Combat Offensif (Berger-Levrault, Paris 1906) p. 6; de Maud’huy, L., Infanterie (Lavauzelle, Paris 1911) p. 103.
75 Balck, W., Tactics (new edn., Posen 1908; trans. W. Kreuger, Fort Leavenworth 1911; reprinted Greenwood Press, Westport Conn., 1977), vol. I, pp. 137, 150–3, 162.
76 The title is taken from graffiti chalked on trains taking troops to the front in August 1914, ‘Train de Plaisir pour Berlin’ – see e.g. Blond, G., La Marne (new edn., Livre du Poche, Paris 1962), p. 7.
77 Much of the technical background is in Porch, D., The March to the Marne, The French Army 1871–1914 (Cambridge University, 1981). The weapons are listed in Hicks, J. E., French Military Weapons, 1717–1939 (Flayderman, New Milford, Conn. 1964).
78 A useful general military history is Contamine, H., La Revanche, 1871–1914 (Berger-Levrault, Paris 1957); see also Hanotaux, G., L’Enigme de Charleroi (Edition Française Illustrée, Paris 1917). The quotation comes from a telling prediction in Captain ‘Danrit’, La Guerre de Demain (6 vols., Flammarion, Paris 1891), Part I, La Guerre en Rase Campagne, vol. I, p. 320.
79 The justice of the French view of the BEF leaps out from between the lines of the British official history, Military Operations, France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan, London 1923) vol. I; and Terraine, J., Mons, the Retreat to Victory (Batsford, 1960). Essential reading in this context is General Lanrezac’s Le Plan de Campagne Français et le Premier Mois de la Guerre (Payot, Paris 1920).
80 The ideological background may be found in three fascinating and complementary books – Sternhell, Z., La Droite Révolutionnaire, 1885–1914 (Seuil, Paris 1978); Girardet, R., L’Idée Coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (La Table Ronde, Paris 1972); and Digeon, C, La Crise Allemande de la Pensée Française, 1870–1914 (PUF, Paris 1959).
81 Actually an inspection of the ground today shows that this ‘battlefield’ is a shell trap, badly chosen for the material aspects of defence, whatever may have been its spiritual advantages. The battle is described in La Guerre de Demain, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 332 ff, of which the pseudonymous author was in fact Lt. Col. E. Driant, an early Fascist agitator celebrated since 1916 as a significant Verdun martyr.
82 Dragomirov, P., Les Etapes de Jeanne d’Arc in Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 March 1898, pp. 153–76. Péguy, C., Oeuvres Complètes (Nouvelle Revue, Paris 1933). Péguy was killed in action in 1914.
A modern view of Joan is Warner, M., Joan of Arc (Penguin, London 1983).
83 The evolution of French planning is in Contamine, op. cit., p. 59 ff; Gambier, F., and Suire, M., Histoire de la Première Guerre Mondiale (2 vols., Fayard, Paris 1968), vol. I, pp. 157–75; and the French official history, Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre (Ministère de la Guerre, Paris 1922), book I, vol. I, pp. 1–36.
84 Balck, W., Tactics, op. cit., vol. I, p. 119n, shows that in French tests red (and presumably also dark blue) came towards the middle of the spectrum of inconspicuous colours in the field. Greens and browns were better, but light blue was worse.
85 Military politics are in Porch, op. cit., and de la Gorce, P.-M., The French Army (trans. K. Douglas, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1963), pp. 17–92. The 1905 recruitment law reduced the term of service to two years. This was increased to three in 1913 but by then, of course, it was a little late …
86 Danrit, op. cit., vol. I, p. 378; cf. he strongly recommends the bayonet counter-charge in vol. II, p. 31.
87 The story is traced in Contamine, op. cit., passim; Carrias, La Pensée Militaire Française (PUF, Paris 1960) pp. 268–301; and Possony, S. T., and Mantoux, E., Du Picq and Foch: The French School in Earle, E. M., ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University, 1943)
Chapter 9, pp. 206–32.
88 Règlement de Manoeuvre d’Infanterie du 20 Avril 1914 (Chapelot, Paris 1914).
89 Ibid., p. 14. Compare Holmes, op. cit., for a similar confusion of tactics in 1868–70.
90 Règlement de Manoeuvre, op. cit., p. 69.
91 Telling passages are in ibid., pp. 23, 77, 115–23, 140–1.
92 Psychologie des Foules (PUF, Paris 1947 edn). The impact of this book is extensively discussed in Nye, R. A., The Origins of Crowd Psychology (SAGE, London 1975), Chapter 6, pp. 123–53, Gustave Le Bon and Crowd Theory in French Military Thought Prior to the First World War.
93 Infanterie, op. cit., pp. 14–29. Fatigue and nervous exhaustion are treated at greater length on pp. 47–87. Compare the equally perceptive analysis of combat shock and leadership in General Percin’s Le Combat (2nd edn., Alcan, Paris 1914), Chapter 4, pp. 34–84.
94 De Maud’huy, op. cit., p. 33.
95 Ibid., pp. 30–46, 97–100.
96 De Grandmaison, published by Berger-Levrault, Paris.
97 Ibid., pp. 2–3, 20–2, 42–7.
98 Deux conférences faites aux officiers de l’état-major de l’armée: La notion de sûreté, et l’engagement des grandes unités (Berger-Levrault, Paris 1911).
99 Ibid., pp. vi, 1–4.
100 Ibid., p. 40.
101 This problem continued to plague French exercises even after de Grandmaison’s work had been published; see e.g. General Palat’s Les Manoeuvres de Languedoc en 1913 in Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 October 1913, pp. 799–817; and Percin, op. cit., pp. 152–3.
102 Gambiez, F., and Suire, M., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 108 ff, accept that ‘de Grandmaison himself was in practice far less crazy than his explosive phrases might suggest’.
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