The Philadelphia Campaign

by Thomas J McGuire

  Having advanced too far too fast, Ewald found himself unsupported, as had happened at Boundbrook the previous April. The Jägers and light bobs took cover below the fence along the Street Road embankment. “They shouted to me that the army was far behind, and I became not a little embarrassed to find myself quite alone with the advanced guard,” the intrepid captain confessed. “But now that the business had begun, I still wanted to obtain information about these people who had let me go so easily.”

  Ewald decided to swing wide to the right and, out of range, reconnoiter a large hill that lay several hundred yards to the southwest. Taking two Highlanders and a mounted Jäger named Hoffman, “a very courageous fellow,” he crossed the rolling, open fields and ascended the height. Over the crest, Ewald made a remarkable discovery. “I gazed in astonishment when I got up the hill,” the one-eyed marksman recalled, “for I found behind it—three or four hundred paces away—an entire line deployed in the best order.” It was the New Jersey and Pennsylvania troops of Stirling's Division, “several of whom waved to me with their hats but did not shoot.” The Hessian captain remarked, “I kept composed, examined them closely, rode back, and reported it at once to Lord Cornwallis by the jäger Hoffman.”

  Circling back toward the advance guard, Ewald “crossed a road that led to the right through a light wood.” This was the Street Road west of Birmingham. “I told a Scot to follow this road for a few hundred paces,” toward Jones's Ford, just under a mile away. “I rode after him,” Ewald continued and, looking northwest, “caught sight of a whole enemy column with guns marching through the valley in which Lord Cornwallis's column had been marching for some time, a quarter or half an hour [about a mile] away to the right.”98 These troops were Hazen's two battalions, now outflanked and nearly cut off by Cornwallis, pulling back from Wistar's and Buffington's Fords to rejoin the Delaware Regiment straight ahead at Jones's Ford.

  At that same moment, coming up from Brinton's Ford to the south, the rest of Sullivan's Division arrived at the Street Road. “I began my march in five minutes after I Received my orders,” Sullivan told John Hancock, “& had not marched a mile when I met Colo. Hazen with his Regiment which had been Stationed at a Ford three miles above me who Informed that the Enemy were Close upon his Heels & that I might Depend that the principal part of the British army were there.” Sullivan complimented Hazen, a tough old French and Indian War veteran, for his observations: “Altho I knew the Reports Sent to head Quarters made them but two Brigades as I knew Colo. Hazen to be an old officer & a good Judge of Numbers I gave Credence to his Report in preference to the Intelligence before Received.”

  Then Sullivan spotted Ewald and the Highlanders. “While I was Conversing with Colo. Hazen & our Troops Still upon their march, the Enemy headed us in the Road about forty Rods [220 yards] from our advance Guard.” He ordered his division off the road. “I then found it necessary to turn off to the Right to form & to get nearer to the other two Divisions which I that moment Discovered Drawn up on an Eminence both in the Rear & to the Right of the place I was then at.”99 Sullivan directed his division to move toward the front of the hill Ewald had just descended.

  “Had I the battalion with me, I would have cut off this column,” Ewald commented wistfully. Instead, “I rode back to my detachment and reported this event.”100 Lt. Col. Ludwig von Wurmb, commander of the Jäger Corps, told his superiors in Kassel that “Captain Ewald of the advance guard reported the enemy was approaching and they were forming up on a hilltop and that another column was approaching on the right.” Ewald's report was sent to Lord Cornwallis, who was back on Osborne's Hill with General Howe. As soon as His Lordship received it, “Then the order was received to form the line.”101

  “He was on horseback, appeared tall and sat very erect,” is how Joseph Townsend remembered Cornwallis, seeing him pass by earlier that afternoon. “His rich scarlet clothing loaded with gold lace, eapulettes &c occasioned him to make a brilliant and martial appearance.” Now, as Townsend and some of his friends were wandering among the troops behind Osborne's Hill, he noticed a sudden stir: “They were resuming their march and the halt that they had made was only to refresh the horses.”

  Together with James Johnson, another local Quaker, Townsend “proceeded through the crowd on the public road untill [they] reached the advanced guard, who were of the German troops.” The Hessian and Anspach Jägers were moving up the north face of Osborne's Hill toward the top, and Townsend was struck by a peculiar feature that often startled and frightened people when first seeing German soldiers: Many of them “wore their beard on their upper lips.”102 Most men in the English world of the late eighteenth century were clean-shaven, as were British troops. European armies followed different rules; the Hessians and many other German forces modeled themselves—uniforms, drill, maneuvers—after the Prussian Army. Like the Prussians, the Hessian grenadiers all wore stiff, blackened mustaches waxed into sharp points with “black-ball” paste, giving them a uniform and sinister look. Among other German soldiers, such as the Jägers, it seems to have been left to personal preference, as Townsend observed.

  Cornwallis's force now began moving into position. “At four in the afternoon our two battalions of light infantry and the Hessian jägers marched down the hill” on the Birmingham Road. “They marched first in a column, but later, when they approached the enemy, in line formation, deploying to the left,” von Münchhausen reported. Behind the light troops, “soon after this the English grenadiers did the same in the center, almost at the same time.” About 400 yards to the right of the road, “just a little later, the English Guards formed the right wing.” In support of the front line, “behind the English grenadiers were the Hessian grenadiers; behind the light infantry and the jägers was the 4th English brigade. The 3rd English brigade was in reserve on top of the hill.” Near Howe, who was observing from the top of Osborne's Hill, were the 16th Queen's Light Dragoons. “The two squadrons of dragoons, who were close to us,” von Münchhausen stated, “halted behind the left wing of the Hessian grenadiers.”103

  After descending the hill, the light troops continued up the road in a column. Halfway to the Street Road, the Jägers swung to the left and headed about 800 yards east into broken, wooded terrain. With them were “two English 3-pounders,” light cannons known as “grasshoppers,” “which were covered by the Hessian Jäger Lieutenant Balthasar Mertz with thirty grenadiers.” There were also two amusettes, large, heavy muskets capable of lobbing 1-inch balls several hundred yards. “The Jäger Corps had the honor to man the extreme left wing and consisted, after the departure of the detachments under Captain Ewald and the cavalry, which because of the difficult terrain could not follow us, to something over 300 men.”104

  The 1,300 troops in the two British light infantry battalions followed the Jägers and moved quickly into the area just east of the Birmingham Road. The fourteen companies of Maj. John Maitland's 2nd Light Infantry Battalion deployed on the right of the Jägers in some woods and open fields a few hundred yards out, while Lt. Col. Robert Abercromby's 1st Light Infantry Battalion, also fourteen companies, formed in the fenced fields along the road, their right flank resting on the road itself. On the hill behind them in support were the four regular regiments of Gen. James Agnew's 4th British Brigade, another 1,500 troops.

  The light bobs were arranged in files four men deep, with arm's-length intervals between them. From this formation, the troops could quickly move into “extended order,” from five to fifty yards apart. This permitted the great flexibility that was the hallmark of light infantry tactics and enabled the men to spread out and take cover rapidly as the situation required, for, as one light infantry officer put it, “in danger men like all animals croud together.”105

  As the light troops were moving into position on the left, the two British grenadier battalions, about 1,400 men, came down the hill on the Birmingham Road and began deploying to the right of the road, forming the center of Cornwallis's line. Lt. Col. William Medows's 1st
Battalion of sixteen companies swung to the right and headed across fields and fences a few hundred yards west of the road, while the fifteen companies in the 2nd Battalion under Col. Henry Monckton took up their initial position in a line less than 100 yards behind Medows, forming a “column of battalions,” with the Birmingham Road on their left.

  About 400 yards west of the road, Gen. Edward Mathew's brigade of Guards came over Osborne's Hill in a column 1,000 strong to take the position of honor, the right flank. The 1st Guards Battalion swung to the right and deployed, while the 2nd Battalion fell in on their left, next to Monckton and Medows. Like the light infantry on the left, the Guards were advanced about 200 yards ahead of the grenadier battalions. The Guards Light Company fanned along the front, while the Guards Grenadier Company held the most prestigious position in line, “the right of the right.” Both flank companies were commanded by Sir George Osborn.106

  The scene was spellbinding. “Being now in front of the army we walked inconsiderately,” Joseph Townsend remarked, as he and Johnson went into a field to the left, southeast of the Birmingham Road, about halfway between Osborne's Hill and the Street Road. “On turning our faces back we had a grand view of the army as they advanced over and down the south side of Osborns Hill and the lands of James Carter, scarce a vacant place left.”107 From the Birmingham Road west, Cornwallis's front was half a mile wide—and that was only half of his first line. Brigade artillery, ammunition wagons, officers and their aides on horseback—“almost the whole face of the country around appeared to be covered and alive with these objects.”

  “While we were amusing ourselves with the wonderful curiosity before us,” Townsend recalled, “to our great astonishment and surprise the firing of the musketry took place.”108 Ahead, Ewald and the advance guard were still deployed at Jones's orchard and could see the army forming up behind them. It was now approaching 4:30, nearly forty-five minutes since he had first skirmished with the 3rd Virginia. The waiting was unbearable, and with enemy skirmishers only a few yards away, Ewald took matters into his own hands. “As soon as the army had drawn near to me by three or four hundred paces, and I received no orders,” he admitted, “I attacked the village and the church on the hill.”109

  “The advance-guard…having arrived at the Street Road…[was] fired upon by a Company of Americans who were stationed in the orchard north of Samuel Jones’ dwelling house,” Townsend observed from several hundred yards away, well out of musket range. Using classic light tactics, “the attack was immediately returned by the Hessians by their slipping up the bank of the road, along side of the orchard, and using the fences as a breastwork through which they fired upon the Company who commenced the attack.”110 This maneuver allowed the Jägers move up the embankment along the Birmingham Road and outflank the Virginians, hitting them on their left.

  Overwhelmed by the sheer spectacle unfolding around him, Townsend confessed, “From the distance we were from them (though in full view untill the smoke of the firing covered them from our sight) I was under no apprehension of danger especially when there was such a tremendous force coming on and ready to engage in the action.” But he and his friends were directly in the path of the main body of Jägers and light infantry, who were still forming. Common sense finally took hold of Townsend: “Finding that my curiosity had exceeded the bounds of prudence,” he said, he made his way back toward the Birmingham Road. There, he “was met by several companies of soldiers” from the main force of light troops “who were ordered into the fields to form and prepare for the approaching engagement.” As he came to the road, “a German officer ordered the fence to be taken down.” Townsend wrote, “As I was nearest the spot I had to [be] subject to his orders, as he flourished a drawn sword over my head with others who stood nearby.”111

  As he was removing the rails, the young Quaker suddenly realized that his taking down the fence might be a violation of the Friends’ testimony against active participation in war. Fortunately for Townsend, “as the hurry was great and the rushing forward of so many men under arms, [he] found no difficulty in retiring undiscovered and was soon out of reach of those called immediately into action.”112 The “rushing forward” described by Townsend was how light troops, in squads and companies, moved into action—at a trot.

  Across the road and back toward Osborne's Hill, the regular British troops formed for battle in what was called “open order”: two ranks deep, with the files spaced at arm's length from each other, rather than shoulder to shoulder. A year earlier, as the New York Campaign was about to begin, Howe announced in the General Orders that “the Infantry of the Army without exception are ordered upon all occasions to form two Deep, with the Files at 18 inches Interval till further Orders.”113 Colonel von Donop confirmed that this was still in effect when he wrote to the prince of Prussia on September 2, 1777, less than two weeks before Brandywine: “I hope…that we—(I mean the English)—may be a bit more closely drawn together for the attack. For unless we are, I cannot yet reassure myself that infantry with its files four feet apart can capture intrenchments by escalade, or hold its ground against cavalry.”114

  The three Hessian grenadier battalions—von Minnegerode, von Lengerke, and von Linsing—1,300 blue-clad troops wearing tall, gleaming brass or tin mitre caps, all under von Donop's command, were drawn up in support behind the Guards and British grenadiers. “We occupied a height in the Brandywine Mountains, and made a short halt towards three o'clock,” stated a von Minnegerode Battalion report. “Then we moved on and after going about a mile we had to march forward with all possible dispatch, advance abreast in 2 divisions, and after we had passed through a wood and come out upon a height; the English Guards which formed the right wing…were supported by the Minnigerode Battalion in the 2nd line.”115 The von Lengerke battalion was positioned in the center of the Hessian line, with the left held by von Linsing.

  The Hessian grenadiers continued using their traditional, Prussian-based tactics and troop formations—the same methodical slowness that Cresswell had observed a few months earlier in New York—and their maddeningly slow marching step.116 “At Brandywine, when the first line formed, the Hessian Grenadiers were close in our rear, and began beating their march at the same time with us,” Lieutenant Hale of the 2nd Grenadier Battalion wrote. “From that minute we saw them no more till the action was over, and only one man of them was wounded by a random shot which came over us.” He smugly added, “They themselves make no scruple of owning our superiority over them, but palliate so mortifying a confession by saying ‘Englishmen be the Divel for going on, but Hesse men be soldier.’”117 A Hessian report confirmed Hale's observations about few Hessian casualties, but for different reasons: “The 3 battalions of Grenadiers have suffered little on this occasion, as they could not get a chance of firing on account of the enemy fleeing,” conveniently neglecting to mention that rapidly advancing British bayonets had caused the Americans to flee.118

  Regarding Hessian maneuvers, Hale told his parents, “I believe them steady, but their slowness is of the greatest disadvantage in a country almost covered with woods, and against an Enemy whose chief qualification is agility in running from fence to fence and thence keeping up an irregular but galling fire on troops who advance at the same pace as at their exercise.” In the British forces, by contrast, “Light Infantry accustomed to fight from tree to tree, or charge even in the woods; and Grenadiers who after the first fire lose no time in loading again, but rush on, trusting entirely to that most decisive of weapons the bayonet; will ever be superior to any troops the Rebels can ever bring against them.” Hale concluded by saying, “Such are the British, and such the method of fighting which has been attended with constant success.”119

  The British were about to once again demonstrate their successful method of adaptive tactics based on speed, use of the bayonet, and taking cover when necessary. Having learned much from Lexington and Concord and Breed's Hill in 1775, they modified their approach in the New York Campaign, with excellent re
sults: tactical superiority and minimal casualties, as demonstrated at the Battle of Long Island on August 27, 1776. A few weeks later, as the British prepared to land on Manhattan, the General Orders stated, “The Soldiers are reminded of their evident Superiority on the 27th of August last, by charging the Rebels with Bayonets even in the Woods, where they thought themselves invincible.” The American positions “are to be carried with little Loss by the same high spirited mode of Attack; the General therefore recommends to the Troops an intire Dependence on their Bayonets, with which they will always command that success their Bravery so well deserves.”120

  The serious discrepancies between American reports of tremendous British casualties at Brandywine and the small numbers officially reported may be partially explained by the actual tactics used by the British Army at this stage in the American war, which are largely misunderstood and repeatedly misrepresented in popular history. Lt. Loftus Cliffe of the 46th described some innovative tactics and maneuvers adopted by Capt. Matthew Johnson for his regiment's light company shortly after the Battle of Long Island:

  Johnson and his (46th) Company behaved amazingly, he goes thro his Manoevers by a Whistle, for which he has often been laughed at, they either form to right or left or squat or rise by a perticular whistle which his men are as well acquainted with as the Batallion with the word of Command, he being used to Woods fighting and having a quick Eye, had his Company down in the moment of the enemies present [i.e., the moment the enemy takes aim], & up again at the advantegious moment for their fire.121

  In other words, these British troops repeatedly dropped to the ground by whistle signal as their opponents took aim and rose again once the volley was fired to push ahead with bayonets. No one laughed at Johnson and his whistle after that.

  Of Brandywine, “my situation that Day was exactly simular to the command I had the 27th of August, upon Long Island,” General Grant told General Harvey, “the plan for attack was much the same tho’ upon a larger scale & of course more complicated.”122 It was helpful, too, having a commander in chief who was an expert in light infantry tactics.