The Philadelphia Campaign

by Thomas J McGuire

  The fear of being plundered caused some local families to flee the area or hide their valuables, especially silver, which, other than livestock, was often the most valuable disposable item possessed by Chester County families. But most inhabitants stayed at their homes, as Captain Montrésor noted when the army finally moved from Goshen on September 18: “Between 3 and 4 this morning (the Equinoxial Gale still continuing at N. East, with small rain) the Army marched from the boot 3 miles to the White Horse, where we joined Lord Cornwallis's column,” which came down the South Valley Hill after several hours of delay caused by the artillery taking the wrong road and having to turn around. At the White Horse, the columns “halted an hour, and the whole army moved on towards Philadelphia, until we arrived at Randel Malins, being 21/2 miles further. There we struck off (the roads forking) the road to the Swedes Ford to Treduffrin.”

  The army once again divided, and “Lord Cornwallis's column continuing the Philadelphia Main Road from the Forks at Randel Malins (which was Washington's Headquarters the night before last) which road runs nearly parallel with the Swedes Ford Road,” but eventually ascends to the top of the South Valley Hill. Cornwallis's men marched on the Lancaster Road past the Admiral Warren and General Paoli Taverns. “We found the Inhabitants in general at their Homes.”87

  Howe was with von Knyphausen's column on the Swedes Ford Road, which continued east in the Great Valley to Tredyffrin Township. “The roads were extremely bad,” von Münchhausen noted, “partly because of the heavy rains and partly because Washington, with the large part of his army, artillery, and all his baggage, had passed this way last night, thus reaching his destination before Lord Cornwallis arrived at White Horse, all owing to the fatal mistake of our artillery.”88

  The Great Valley, or “Duffryn Mawr,” as many of the Welsh locals called it, was the main part of the Welsh Tract. Most of the inhabitants were first- or second-generation Americans, but many of the older people still spoke Welsh. There were also a few English, a congregation of Scots-Irish Presbyterians, some German and Swiss “Mennonists and Omish,” and a sprinkling of Africans in the region.

  While many of the Welsh were Quaker, many others were Anglican or Baptist. The army passed a road to St. Peter-in-the-Great Valley, an Anglican church with a Welsh congregation but a Scottish minister. Rev. William Currie was a Loyalist, but his three sons joined the Continental Army. Currie was also pastor of St. David's Church in nearby Radnor, where Anthony Wayne was a parishioner. A few miles east of St. Peter's was the Great Valley Baptist Church, whose firebrand pastor was Rev. David Jones, the chaplain of Wayne's 1st Pennsylvania Brigade.

  The British and Hessian forces marched past David Howell's Tavern, formerly the Sign of George III, where Maj. Gen. Charles Grey took up his quarters. Howe established general headquarters in Tredyffrin, Welsh for “the Valley Town,” at the home of Samuel Jones, a little over a mile away and a few hundred yards west of the Great Valley Baptist Church.

  “They call this region Great Valley because there are chains of high hills covered with woods on both sides of the valley,” von Münchhausen noted. “The Valley Creek, part of which flows through our camp, has the best water I have tasted here in America.”89 Mills and small manufactories of various types used the numerous streams that were found throughout the valley.

  Three miles downstream from the British camp, the rapidly flowing, sweet water of Valley Creek was utilized by an ironworks called the Valley Forge, where an American military magazine, or supply depot, was located. The forge was owned by a partnership of David Potts of the Potts family, noted Pennsylvania ironmasters, and Col. William Dewees of the Pennsylvania Militia. Whether military items were actually fabricated there is uncertain, but the state government began storing large quantities of iron goods there—axes, shovels, tomahawks, camp kettles—in the spring of 1777.

  West of Valley Forge, a number of ironworks, such as Warwick Furnace and Hopewell Furnace, were casting cannons and ammunition for Congress in 1777, and the Continental Powder Mill was established on French Creek six miles from Valley Forge, together with the “Public Gun Manufactory” and “Public Gunlock Factory” under the supervision of scientist and clockmaker David Rittenhouse. The Valley Forge storehouses were convenient locations for finished goods, along with flour ground at the local mills, one of which was situated near where Valley Creek empties into the Schuylkill River a few hundred yards below the forge. The gristmill and a sawmill were owned by David Potts's brother Isaac, who also owned a small, elegant country house nearby.

  With the British Army so close, Colonel Dewees wanted the supplies moved away quickly from his home and business. He compiled an inventory of hundreds of kettles, axes, shovels, and several thousand barrels of flour, all of which had to be moved across the Schuylkill River. None of his workers were available; they had been called up for militia duty. So Capt. “Light-Horse Harry” Lee and a handful of dragoons went to Valley Forge on the afternoon of September 18, along with Washington's aide, Lt. Col. Alexander Hamilton, to move or destroy the supplies. Two rafts and eight men were now available to move 4,000 barrels of flour, each barrel containing about 200 pounds, not to mention the tons of iron goods, which all needed to be hauled 400 yards to the river landing.

  That evening, a British force of several hundred men, composed of two mounted squadrons of the 16th Light Dragoons and 200 dismounted dragoons led by Lt. Col. Harcourt, along with three companies of light infantry, marched four miles north to seize the magazine at Valley Forge. At the crest of the hill called Mount Joy, overlooking the forge area, Lee had posted two vedettes, or mounted sentries. “The fire of the vedettes announced the enemy's appearance,” Lee wrote. Hamilton was near one of the flatboats, and “of the small party four with the lieutenant colonel jumped into the boat, the van of the enemy's horse in full view, pressing down the hill in pursuit of the two vedettes. Captain Lee, with the remaining two, took the decision to regain the bridge” over Valley Creek and rely on “the speed and soundness of his horse.” Lee escaped, as did Hamilton. Gunfire erupted; one man in the boat was killed, another wounded. Hamilton's horse was shot and killed in the boat, and the commander of the British light infantry, Maj. Peter Craig, also had his horse shot.90 The forge and storehouses were captured intact, along with one flatboat, and “the Battle of Valley Forge” was a British victory.

  When Hamilton reached the other side of the river, he scribbled a message to John Hancock in Philadelphia: “If Congress have not yet left Philadelphia, they ought to do it immediately without fail, for the enemy have the means of throwing a party this night into the city.” A few hours later, at 9 P.M., Hamilton again wrote to Hancock: “The enemy are on the road to Sweedes ford, the main body about four miles from it.” He told the president about the skirmish and the fact that the British had exactly two rafts at their disposal. “These two boats will convey 50 men across at a time so that in a few hours they may throw over a large party, perhaps sufficient to overmatch the militia who may be between them and the city.”91

  Hancock had received earlier intelligence from Joseph Burns, who had been sent by Anthony Wayne to reconnoiter the British positions. Burns was unable to get back to Wayne, so he went down to the city to report that Howe was within seven or eight miles of Swedes Ford. More alarming, though, was the fact that “some of the Pennsylvania light Horse on their return to Town had made Prisoners of two British Soldiers within eighteen miles of this City on the Lancaster Road.”92 These soldiers were from Cornwallis's column, camped on top of the South Valley Hill, and the head of the column was near the eighteenth milestone, less than two miles from the Spread Eagle Tavern. Two troopers of the 1st Troop of Philadelphia Light Horse, one of whom was John Donnaldson, “were sent out by General Armstrong to obtain intelligence of the Enemy—about 8 [sic; 2] miles from the Spread Eagle on the Lancaster road they observed a piquet of the British, & with the assistance of two young men of the neighbourhood brought off two soldiers in the face of the piquet—reported to
General Armstrong that night at Vanduren's [Vanderin's] mill,” located at the mouth of Wissahickon Creek just above the Falls of Schuylkill.93 The information was quickly sent to town.

  Philadelphia was a city already on edge, especially as news trickled in that Washington's army was now mired somewhere in the hills of northern Chester County with no ammunition. “I cannot help acquainting you, my dear General, that the distance of the army from the city” to a place “so remote has given great alarm, and very much discourages the militia,” a frustrated Joseph Reed wrote to Washington at 9 P.M. from the Falls of Schuylkill. “I do not doubt you have sufficient reasons for a measure which seems so mysterious, but if you could consistently with your plans disclose them, it would have a happy effect on the minds of the people.” He also told Washington that he would return the next morning to Swedes Ford, where they had “the works in great forwardness.”94 These were the only land works built to defend the city east of the Schuylkill.

  But events and communications were moving at different paces, locked in a fateful waltz. Hamilton's news of the British advance to Valley Forge reached Philadelphia, twenty-two miles away, in three or four hours. “The morning of the 19th September…when about one oClock (& I was not in bed, nor had my Cloaths off for three Nights before) I Rec'd an Express from the General's aid De Camp recommending the immediate Removal of Congress, as the Enemy had it in their power to throw a party that Night into the City,” Hancock told his wife, Dorothy. “I instantly gave the alarm, Rous'd the Members, collected my Waggons, Horses, Carriage &c and after having fix'd my Packages, Papers &c in the Waggons and Sent them off, about 3 oClock in the morning I Set off myself for Bristol.”95

  Now a panic began in the city, starting with the government leaders. “The Scene was equally droll & melancholy,” Congressman Henry Laurens wrote. “Thousands of all Sorts in all appearances past by in such haste that very few could be prevailed on to answer to the Simple question what News?” According to Laurens, he was one of only a few patriots who kept a level head, given the information received. “I however would not fly, I stayed Breakfast & did not proceed till 8 oClock or past nor would I have gone then but returned once more into the City if I had not been under an engagement to take charge of the Marquis delafayette who lay wounded by a ball through his Leg at Bristol.” But he admitted, “My bravery however was the effect of assurance for could I have believed the current report, I should have fled as fast as any Man, no Man can possibly have a greater reluctance to an intimacy with Sir William Howe than my Self.”96

  Two days later, having fled to Bristol and Trenton with most of the rest of Congress, John Adams wrote in disgust, “It was a false alarm which occasioned our Flight from Philadelphia. Not a Soldier of Howes has crossed the Schuylkill. Washington has again crossed it, which I think is a very injudicious Maneuvre.” Figuring out what Washington was attempting to do, he commented, “If he had sent one Brigade of his regular troops to have heald the Militia it would have been enough. With such a Disposition, he might have cutt to Pieces, Hows Army, in attempting to cross at any of the Fords.” Adams was also worried about Gates, “who seems to be acting the same timorous, defensive Part, which has involved us in so many disasters.”

  Adams had reached the end of his rope with the generals, Washington included. “Oh, Heaven!” he cried in frustration, “grant Us one great Soul! One leading Mind would extricate the best Cause, from that Ruin which seems to await it, for the Want of it.” Calming down somewhat, he continued: “We have as good a Cause, as ever was fought for. We have great Resources. The People are well tempered.” He confided in his diary, “One active masterly Capacity would bring order out of this Confusion and save this Country.”97

  As Congress fled the city, some Continental forces were on the move in Chester County. Washington's main force arrived at Warwick late on the seventeenth and early on the eighteenth, utterly exhausted; general headquarters was established at Reading Furnace, two miles farther on. From here, Washington began to formulate yet another plan to stop the British advance on Philadelphia.

  With the Schuylkill still running high, Howe would be staying west of the river for a few more days. Washington decided to send Anthony Wayne's two Pennsylvania brigades, along with four light cannon from Randall's Independent Artillery and some dragoons from the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons, a total force of about 2,200 personnel, on a mission to get behind Howe's army. “Genl. Maxwell and Potter are order'd to do the same,” Washington told Wayne, “being at Potts’ Forge,” the Valley Forge. “I could wish you and those Genl. Would act in conjunction, to make your advances more formidable.” He added, “I shall follow as speedily as possible with jaded men,” instructing Wayne, “Give me the earliest Information of every thing Interesting & of your moves that I may know how to govern mine by them.” Wayne was told to harass the rear of the British line of march, and if possible, “the cutting of the Enemy's Baggage would be a great matter.” He ended the orders with a warning: “Take care of Ambuscades.”98

  Washington had also ordered General Smallwood, who was still struggling to move his Maryland Militia up from the southern part of the county, to rejoin the main army rather than harass the rear of the Crown Forces. Smallwood was joined on the eighteenth by Col. Mordecai Gist, with 700 men from the Eastern Shore, along with three iron cannons. By September 19, this force of 2,100 Maryland troops was at James McClellan's Tavern in Sadsbury Township, about fifteen miles west of Downingtown.

  Wayne's troops left Yellow Springs during the night of the eighteenth, and by dawn, the Pennsylvania Division was at the Paoli Tavern, ten miles east of Downingtown and only four miles behind the British camp at Tredyffrin. Wayne was a cattleman and tanner, as well as a farmer and surveyor. His home and 500-acre plantation, Waynesborough, which also contained a tannery, was less than a mile from the tavern, and he knew the area intimately—the roads, hills, and bypaths, some of which he had surveyed.

  Following his instructions to keep the commander in chief informed, Wayne wrote two letters to Washington from the Paoli Tavern that morning, informing him that the British Army was lying still; “indeed their Supineness Answers every purpose of giving you time to get up.” He told Washington that if they attempted to move, he would attack them. “There never was, nor never will be a finer Opportunity of giving the Enemy a fatal Blow than the Present,” he instructed the commander in chief, “for Gods sake push on as fast as Possible.”99

  “I expect Genl. Maxwell on their left flank every Moment,” the second letter stated, “and as I lay on their Right, we only want you in their Rear—to Complete Mr Hows buisness.” Wayne reassured his commander, “I believe he knows nothing of my Situation—as I have taken every precaution to Prevent any intelligence getting to him.” But in closing, he remarked, “I have not heard from you since last Night,” an ominous indication that somewhere there was a breakdown in communication.100

  Being an active leader in the community for much of his life, Wayne also knew that Chester County had many neutrals and Loyalists, some of whom, like Jacob James, were serving as guides for the British Army. James would have been well known to Wayne, for Wayne's old regiment, the 4th Pennsylvania Battalion, had been mustered at the Turk's Head Tavern in 1776 before it marched to New York. There were others, too, whom Wayne also knew personally: Nathaniel Vernon, the sheriff of Chester County, was serving Howe as a guide, together with his son Nathaniel Jr.; and another son, Job, was a captain in the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment. Additionally, Joseph Galloway was known all over Pennsylvania, and William Allen Jr., who had served in Canada as lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Pennsylvania Battalion the previous year alongside Wayne, was also with Howe. “Consider that Galloway, the Allens, &c are conducting the enemy thro the most torified tracts,” Congressman James Lovell wrote in late September, “assisted by Sheriffs of counties who know all the paths accurately.”101

  As it turns out, some Continental dragoons deserted, and others were captured on September 19
. “Many deserters come in daily, 160 horses are brought in today by the Queens dragoons,” Parker noted.102 Howe was alerted that Wayne was moving behind him before he arrived at his actual camp location. And shortly after his second letter was sent, Wayne suddenly moved his force away from the Paoli Tavern and marched almost two miles to a wooded hillside above the Warren Tavern. Why did he make this sudden move?

  About noon on September 19, word arrived at the Tredyffrin general headquarters that the dragoons and light infantry at Valley Forge were under attack. Immediately, Howe sent Lord Cornwallis with both grenadier battalions and the 1st Light Infantry Battalion on the double to reinforce Valley Forge, four miles away to the north. All three of these units were encamped on top of the South Valley Hill along the Lancaster Road.

  The drums of the 1st and 2nd Grenadier Battalions and the 1st Light Infantry beat “To Arms,” and any scouts that Wayne had out would have heard the signal or spotted all the activity. As those units were camped along the Lancaster Road only four miles from the Paoli Tavern rather than down in the valley, it might have appeared to Wayne that he had been spotted. Pulling back to the heights above the Warren Tavern was a prudent move, and when Cornwallis's force headed in the other direction, Wayne may still have believed that he was undetected.