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The Habsburg Empire (1790-1918)

Page 129

by C A Macartney


  67 Südland, p. 499.

  68 According to Redlich, l.c., Supilo told him that the offer was only a manoeuvre to frighten Austria into doing something for the Croats.

  69 Voting is no safe guide to opinion in South-Eastern Europe, but the figures for successive elections in Croatia show the Croat Deputies elected as divided fairly evenly between those who accepted the idea of Serb-Croat fraternity, and those who rejected it (it must not be forgotten that a quarter of the electors were Serbs, almost all of whom voted regularly for the Coalition). Besides the Party of Pure Right, the Christian Social Party which emerged in 1910 was strongly Catholic and Austro-Slav. Stjepan Radić’s first literary product, a pamphlet written in Czech in 1902, had advocated a reconstruction of the Monarchy on ethnic lines. Radić refused to join the Coalition, and in 1909 produced a programme of his own of Croat-Slovene union.

  70 See above, p. 596.

  71 The instrument was dated 14 October 1904 and was to be valid for five years.

  72 See below, p. 801 f.

  73 He had got across the Coalition leaders in his conversations with them after the ‘five minutes audience’ so badly that he himself had asked for permission to resign.

  74 See Kiszling, Franz Ferdinand, pp. 33–4, 93. The Archduke accused Goluchowski, amongst other sins, of a ‘Big Poland policy’. The truth was simply that Francis Ferdinand detested all Poles and could not be fair to one. Goluchowski’s reluctance to undertake a forward policy in the Balkans (precisely out of fear of offending Russia) probably also contributed to his fall.

  75 Prolonged controversies had gone on in the 1860s and 1870s on the respective competencies of the Chief of the Army Command (then the Archduke Albrecht), the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. When, in 1881, Beck, who before that had been head of the Emperor’s Military Chancellery, and therefore, behind the scenes, perhaps more influential than any of the three, became Chief of the General Staff, he asked Francis Joseph point-blank: ‘whose Chief of General Staff he was? The Emperor’s, the Archduke’s or the Minister’s?’ He was told that he was ‘personally, under the direct orders of the Emperor, but also assistant to the Minister’. As time went on, the Archduke faded out of the picture (he died in 1895), the Emperor became less active, and Beck in practice simply dictated his wishes to the Ministers of War and Defence, who became mere post-boxes.

  76 The conversation with Baernreither quoted here took place in the summer of 1899.

  77 Baernreither, Fragments of a Political Diary, p. 34.

  78 Ibid.

  79 Hantsch, Berchtold, p. 438, quotes a reported utterance by him indicating that he really meant Austria to expand territorially as far as Salonica. ‘Talk about the saturated condition of the Monarchy was only for the public.’

  80 Carlgren, p. 223; Hantsch, Berchtold, p. 85.

  81 Its solitary and murine, although delightful, product was the now almost disused Aspangbahn, which carries, or used to carry, travellers from Vienna to the ‘bucklige Welt’ fifty miles away.

  82 Hantsch, op. cit., pp. 585–6, quotes a letter to Berchtold from Count Forgách, a high official in the Foreign Ministry, saying specifically that it was Burian who ‘instigated and talked Aehrenthal into the … annexation’.

  83 On this, see Hantsch, op. cit., I. 106–7. The whole complex of Austro-Hungarian relations at the time is admirably treated by Carlgren.

  84 Ferdinand and Aehrenthal had met in Budapest on 23–24 September. It seems probable that Aehrenthal let Ferdinand guess his intentions but did not expect him to act until later.

  85 Italy had not, on the main point, a legal case. Goluchowski had told Tittoni on 1 April 1904 that the annexation, if and when it took place, would not entitle Italy to compensation, unless Austria annexed the Sanjak. There seems no doubt that Tittoni accepted this, although for one reason or another, Goluchowski had failed to get the acceptance into writing. Goluchowski had further warned Tittoni that Austria would not allow Italy to set foot in Albania. Aehrenthal had repeated Goluchowski’s statement to Tittoni on 4 September 1908, in Salzburg, and again Tittoni had accepted it. But this time Aehrenthal had undoubtedly lied to the Italian, whom he had promised ‘not to surprise with any kind of decision’, and Italy could justifiably resent the way in which she had been kept in the dark, only a year after again renewing the Triple Alliance.

  86 See his despatch to Schlözer, 25 June 1908, Grosse Politik, XXV, pp. 474 ff.

  87 Such conversations had taken place on previous occasions, notably during the years after 1882, which was a period during which the German General Staff still attached importance to Austrian co-operation. Even then, however, Bismarck had objected to the conclusion of a military Convention, as contrary to the spirit of his Russian policy, and when Von Schlieffen replaced Waldersee at the head of the German General Staff, he thought preparations for joint offensive operations in the East unnecessary, and the contact between the two General Staffs was ‘almost completely broken off’ after 1896. It was now renewed, on Conrad’s insistence, on 1 January 1909, although even now no firm or detailed agreements were reached, and none were in force in the summer of 1914. See the article by A. Wagner in Vorabend, pp. 73 ff.

  88 Cit. Crankshaw, op. cit., p. 330. It is true that if Aehrenthal’s own record, as given in Oe. U. Aussenpolitik, I. p. 37, is to be trusted, he omitted the devastating last sentence at the actual meeting, at which, incidentally, he appears to have been unusually dishonest, even for him: while he gave Hardinge the impression that, while he would make no promises, he would try to restrain Germany, he let the Germans believe that ‘he had defended their point of view almost passionately’. But he was in general fatuously ignorant of Britain’s importance. When visitors during the crisis warned him not to ignore Britain’s influence, ‘he asked repeatedly of them: “what can England do to us?”’ (Steed, op. cit., p. 233).

  89 This never took place.

  90 According to Redlich, Schicksalsjahre, p. 44, Aehrenthal told him (on 9 January 1910) that he had asked Friedjung to ‘collaborate’ in a Press campaign against Serbia, with the object suggested above. Friedjung had then ‘done the rest with Sektionschef Jettel’. This version, if true, saddles Friedjung with more conscious complicity and less naïveté than was generally supposed at the time.

  91 Actually, there were three cases: one by fifty-two Deputies of the Coalition against Friedjung; one by Supilo alone against Friedjung and a third by Supilo and two others against the Reichspost. Being based on the same material, they were taken together.

  92 His Southern Slav Question contains very full accounts of both trials.

  93 The date of foundation was 9–22 May 1911. For the history of the organization see Uebersberger, op. cit., pp. 279 ff., and Dedijer, op. cit., passim.

  94 Dedijer, op. cit., provides the reader rather with a glimpse of the complexity of the problems than a key to them.

  95 In May 1913, Sazonov, misunderstanding a phrase in a Bulgarian note, had jumped to the conclusion that Bulgaria was in league with Austria, and denounced all Russia’s agreements with her from 1902 onward.

  96 Several Austrian writers date the beginning of Roumanian irredentism as beginning now. In fact, as we have seen, it was nothing like so new a plant.

  97 Czernin to Berchtold, 7 December 1913, Aussenpolitik, VII. 901–2.

  98 Sazonov to Nicholas II, 29 June 1914, M. O. III, III. 339.

  99 Fischel, Panslawismus, p. 505.

  100 See the anecdote in Kleinwächter, op. cit., p. 180, of a Ruthene Deputy in the Bukovina who was accused of subverting some of these funds. He did not attempt to deny having received money from Russia, but claimed that he had devoted it all to the cause, deducting only his expenses for going to Vienna to draw it.

  101 One of these, quoted by Hofrat Barwinsky, Oe. Ungarn und das ukrainische Problem (Vienna, 1916), said that Russia was first going to liberate the Balkan States (the date was 1913), then the Ruthenes in Galicia ‘who are now groaning under the Austrian yoke’.


  102 The audience took place on 15 November 1911. Conrad handed in his resignation on 30 November and was relieved of his post on 2 December. Aerenthal’s argument was that Conrad’s agitation would drive Italy into changing sides altogether.

  103 Schönaich had offended the Archduke by his over-leniency towards the Hungarian ‘national demands’ for the Army.

  104 Service in the infantry was reduced from three years to two. It remained at three years in the cavalry and the artillery, and at four in the Navy. An additional 56,400 men were required for the first year to fill the gap.

  105 Plus 7,100 from Bosnia. For a good short account of these developments see the article by R. Kiszling, Die Entwicklung der Oe U. Wehrmacht, Berliner Monatshefte (1934), XII. pp. 735–49.

  106 It provided for the construction of four battle cruisers, three light cruisers and a number of smaller vessels.

  107 The defence budget of the Monarchy in 1911 was still only 420 million kronen. That of Germany, expressed in the same currency, was 1,786 million kronen; of Russia, 1,650; of Great Britain, 1,514; of France, 1,185; and of Italy, 528.

  108 Both halves of the Monarchy were spending large sums in these years (amounting in 1914 to twenty-four per cent of the total expenditure) on the railways. By 1913 the length of these had reached 22,981 km. in Austria and 22,369 km. in Hungary.

  109 A kmet tenant could now, if his landlord agreed, buy his holding by paying instalments to the Government, which compensated the landlord. By 1915, when the operation of the law was suspended, only 45,000 peasants out of 145,000 had taken advantage of it, and eighty-nine pe1 cent of them were in arrears with their instalments.

  110 Sieghart, p. 29.

  111 On this, see Charmatz, Oe. aüssere und innere Politik 1895–1914, p. 68, Sieghart, op. cit., pp. 61 ff.

  112 Gautsch was an old protégé of Francis Ferdinand’s, who was strongly against extending the franchise in Austria.

  113 Sieghart, op. cit., p. 83. It is important that the reform applied only to the two Parliaments; not to the Austrian Landtage or the Hungarian Counties.

  114 He had not wanted the appointment, and took the occasion to resign when the Emperor allowed the Hungarians to call their tariff autonomous.

  115 Beck had been the Archduke’s tutor. According to Sieghart (p.93), the chief qualification which the new Minister President had to possess was ‘command of the Compromise question’. But Francis Joseph was also glad to find ‘a middle-man between himself and his difficult nephew’.

  116 Interestingly, it was now the Italians who, of all peoples of the Monarchy, were getting the highest number of Deputies, relatively to their numbers (1:38,000). Then came the Germans (1:40,000), then, oddly, the Roumanians (1:46,000). The Ruthenes were, as usual, last, with 1:102,000.

  117 A clause was also added to the Bill limiting the number of life appointments which could be made by the Crown to this House.

  118 The best figures I have been able to find are in Sieghart, op. cit., p. 102, and in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which agree almost exactly; Hugelmann’s, op. cit., p. 240, add up to two short and differ in other small ways. The following is probably about right: Christian-Social-Catholic People’s Party alliance, 97 (67+30); German Agrarians, 21; German Progressives, 15; German People’s Party, 31; German Radicals, 12; Alldeutsche, 3; Czech Agrarians, 28; Young Czechs, 18; Czech People’s Party (Clericals), 17; Old Czechs, 7; Czech National Socialists, 9; Czech Realists, 2; Independent Czech, 1; Polish National Democrats, 25; Polish Conservatives, 16; Polish Populists, 17; Polish Centre, 12; Polish Independent Socialist, 1; Young Ruthenes, 25; Old Ruthenes, 4; Slovene Clericals, 18; Slovene Liberals, 5; Italian People’s Party, 10; Italian Liberals, 4; Croats, 12; Serbs, 2; Roumanians, 5; Zionists, 4; Jewish Democrat, 1; Social Democrats, 87 (50 Germans, 23 Czechs, 7 Poles, 2 Ruthenes, 5 Italians); independent, 5; seats unfilled, 2.

  119 There is no place here to go into the Zionist movement, but we may recall that the birthplace of the modern movement was Vienna and its spiritual father the Viennese (by birth, Budapest) Jew, Theodor Herzl.

  120 Charmatz, op. cit., p. 8.

  121 Thus a Ministry of Public Works was created and given to the Christian Socials, the Czechs received a linguistic concession in the postal services, etc.

  122 See above, p. 763.

  123 The story is told in detail by Sieghart, op. cit., pp. 138 ff. See also Charmatz, op. cit., pp. 82 ff. Kiszling, pp. 112 ff. Another cause of offence was his handling of the case of Wahrmund, a Liberal-thinking Professor in Innsbruck whose lectures had given offence to Catholic circles. Their complaints in turn evoked protests from the other side. Beck let Wahrmund down too lightly for the Archduke’s taste.

  124 This was first concluded between the German People’s Party and the Progressives, and later joined by the Agrarians, Radicals and the little German Workers’ Party. As before, the Social Democrats refused to join it because it was too national and the Alldeutsche because it was not national enough, and this time the Christian Socials also stood out because they thought they could do better for themselves alone.

  125 The Clerical, or rural, wing of the new party held its own well enough, but the Old Guard of the Christian Socials in Vienna was almost wiped out. They got only 7 urban seats (3 in Vienna, out of a possible 33), but 69 in the country.

  126 The main figures were: German National Association, 104 mandates; Schönerianer, 4; Christian Socials, 76; Social Democrats, 82 (49 German, 24 Czech, 9 others, chiefly Poles); Czech Agrarians, 34; Young Czechs, 19; Czech National Socials, 11; other Czech parties, 20; Polish national Democrats, 25; Polish Conservatives, 22; other Polish parties, 33; Ruthencs, 28; Croats and Slovenes, 34; Italians, 16; Roumanians, 5; miscellaneous and non-Party, 16.

  127 Hantsch, Geschichte, II. 475.

  128 It is true that several of the Landtage were reformed during these years to allow more representation to the poorer classes. This proved, however, impossible in the key case of Bohemia.

  129 The reason why Austria had to enter the World War without a Reichsrat was that the Germans had made the Bohemian Landtag unworkable by their obstruction and the Czechs had retorted that if the Landtag could not work, neither should the Reichsrat. The Landtage in several other provinces, especially where Southern Slavs and Italians clashed, were little more orderly than that of Prague. One may quote a heartfelt remark by the Landeshauptmann of Silesia: ‘God forbid that the general franchise should ever be introduced into the Landtage, for if that ever happened, it would have to be extended to the communes, and that would mean reddest anarchy and the ruin of the State’ (cit. Kiszling, op. cit., p. 116).

  130 They continued to hold the municipality of Vienna, because the new municipal elections were not yet due there.

  131 Brügel, Geschichte V. 140 ff., gives some more figures for 1913, which, however, are again incomplete. He gives the German national section of the Party as having 142,027 ‘organized members’, and the political Vereine, which were the basis of it, 108,075, 42,705 of them in Vienna. The ‘Centralists’ in Bohemia had 14,200 members, the Czech ‘Separatist Party’ 17,000. The total Trade Union membership was 428,363 (322,000 German, 70,000 Czech, 20,000 Polish, 9,000 Italian, 6,000 Slovene, 1,000 Ruthene). The membership of the Czech Separatist Trade Unions numbered 107,263. Only 16,579 members were organized in Galicia, 6,464 in the Tirol and 5,200 in the Littoral and Dalmatia.

  132 For a full description of this law see Hugelmann, op. cit., pp. 226 ff. The author of the compromise was Baron von Chlumecky, Minister of Agriculture (later, of Commerce) in the Auersperg-Lasser Government, a Deputy for nearly thirty years and a man well known to and highly respected by both nationalities.

  133 The Prince-Archbishop of Olmütz and the Bishop of Brünn.

  134 The figures were: urban communes, 20 Germans, 20 Czechs; Chambers of Commerce, 9 Germans, 9 Czechs; rural communes, 14 Germans, 30 Czechs; general Curia, 6 Germans, 14 Czechs. The Standing Committee was composed of 2 Great Landowners, 2 Germans a
nd 4 Czechs.

  135 The local Jews were counted in with the Germans, the Magyars with the Roumanians, the Armenians with the Poles and the Lipovans with the Ruthenes.

  136 Hugelmann, pp. 728 ff.

  137 Hugelmann, pp. 715 ff. According to Steed, op. cit., p. 128, Francis Joseph had exercised pressure on the Poles to make them consent to this agreement. The promise of a university was, indeed, whittled down to one of a Faculty of Law, and the outbreak of war made an excuse to postpone granting even that.

  138 Patzelt, op. cit., p. 63.

  139 Zeman, op. cit., pp. 16–17, quotes a secret memorandum sent by Kramař to a Russian friend in May 1914, outlining his plans for ‘a Slav confederation ruled from St Petersburg’, to be brought into being after a war between Russia and the Monarchy, which Kramař assumed would result in the disintegration of the Monarchy.

  140 He was Minister of Railways in 1911.

  141 The assassin, a certain Siczynski, was sentenced to life imprisonment, but escaped after three years and made his way to the USA, where he became a leader of the Ukrainian colony. I met him in London in 1931.

  142 When the Prussian Government initiated the expropriation of Polish estates in Prussian Poland, the Austrian Poles even started a boycott against imports from German Austria. And cf. Redlich, Schicksalsjahre, II. 119 (ad. 3 June 1916): ‘Since 1905 the Poles, including their Ministers, have for the most part adopted a Russophile attitude and openly described their existence in Austria as now constituting only a disagreeable “provisorium”.’

  143 Zeman, p. 4.

  144 The figure for the Bukovina is uninformative, since the Roumanian population there was Orthodox already.

  145 Thirty-two persons were sentenced to a total of 391½ years imprisonment.

  146 Zeman, op. cit., p. 12.

  147 When an Englishman visited some villages of converts, their inhabitants protested to him with tears in their eyes that they had never received a rouble. See R. K. Birkbeck, Life and Letters of W. J. Birkbeck, p. 282, cit. May, op. cit., p. 431.

 

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