Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword

by Andrew Bamford

  The retreat to Vigo represented an exceptional circumstance, however, and commanders who resorted as a matter of course to the drumhead courts-martial used by Craufurd on that occasion were wont to find themselves incurring the displeasure of higher authority. A good example of this can be found in the case of the detachment of the 2/95th serving at Cadiz, which makes it abundantly clear that, for all the enlightened training of John Moore, Coote Manningham, and William Stewart, leadership in the rifles was not always benevolent or paternal. Having inspected the detachment during the summer of 1810, Brigadier General Daniel Hoghton noted,

  This detachment . . . has been commanded for the period under review by Major [George] Wilkins. . . . The proceedings of the Courts Martial are regular, with the exception of a drum head Court Martial held under circumstances which by no means called for such an extraordinary measure. I regret also to observe that within a period of four months 22 Courts Martial have been held in this Detachment, by which 4,700 lashes have been sentenced and 2,500 inflicted. I feel it the more necessary to enforce this remark, as I am persuaded that in some instances the necessity of corporal punishment might have been obviated by a proper discrimination in the Commanding Officer.76

  Although Wilkins’s brutality seemingly failed to dent the efficiency of the men under his command, it cannot have been conducive to retaining their respect or state of morale, particularly in a regiment with a larger-than-average proportion of genuine volunteers.

  To place the case in context, in the same period Hugh Gough of the 2/87th, also at Cadiz, ordered some 12,250 lashes, of which only 2,720 were actually inflicted—this in a unit with more than three times the manpower.77 Taking the rank-and-file strengths at the time of the respective inspections, this gives an average of twenty-five lashes per man ordered in Wilkins’s detachment, as opposed to nineteen lashes per man in the 2/87th, but in sentences actually carried out this translates as thirteen lashes per man in the rifles but only four per man in the 2/87th. Thankfully, Hoghton’s report seems to have been acted upon, since a penciled note in the report’s margin records that “Maj. Wilkins has since returned to England.” Wilkins’s departure may well have been encouraged by his superiors, but it did not end his career, and he subsequently served with the battalion in Spain and Flanders, including another spell in command.78

  Just as authority condemned the overuse of punishment, so too was credit bestowed on those officers who were able to run an efficient unit without recourse to the lash. An earlier report on the 2/87th, when the battalion was in garrison on Guernsey prior to embarking for the peninsula, not only bestows general praise upon Gough’s predecessor as commander, Lt. Colonel Charles William Doyle, but goes on to specifically opine that “[P]erhaps the best criterion of this officer’s conduct is that in a battalion of more than 1,000 men in a quarter where spirits are abundant and cheap there has been only one punishment since the last inspection and no punishment in the antecedent six months.”79 Evidently, the same humanitarian approach had been continued by Gough, whose attention to the comfort and well-being of his men was noted in Hoghton’s 1810 report.80

  Several senior officers—Henry Clinton in particular, as a divisional commander in the peninsula—used their position to limit the use of corporal punishment in their commands, and in March 1812 York himself caused a circular to be issued making it clear that he disapproved of excessive corporal punishments and drawing a direct comparison between a good commander and a lack of need for the lash. Issued above the signature of Sir Harry Calvert, who as adjutant general had the ultimate responsibility for military discipline, the letter was sent to all officers commanding regiments and read as follows:

  Sir,

  The Commander-in-Chief judges it expedient to transmit to you, with the enclosed documents, a few observations on the salutary effects with which it is reasonable to hope that an occasional recurrence to the powers with which you are hereby vested will be attended, amongst which the most obvious advantage is that of limiting the operation of regimental courts-martial strictly to the purposes for which they are designed by the Legislature, viz., for enquiring into such disputes and criminal matters as may come before them, and for inflicting corporal or other punishments for small offences, and, in order to prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding on this important point, it is His Royal Highness’s command, that on no pretence whatever shall the award of a regimental court-martial hereafter exceed 300 lashes.

  The Commander-in-Chief has commanded me to take this opportunity of stating, that there is no point on which His Royal Highness is more decided in his opinion, than that when officers are earnest and zealous in the discharge of their duty, and competent to their respective stations, a frequent recurrence to punishment will not be necessary.

  The Commander-in-Chief is confident the officers of the army are universally actuated by a spirit of justice, and impressed with those sentiments of kindness and regard towards their men which they have on so many occasions proved themselves to deserve; but His Royal Highness has reason to apprehend, that in many instances sufficient attention has not been paid to the prevention of crime. The timely interference of the officer, his personal intercourse and acquaintance with his men, (which are sure to be repaid by the soldiers’ confidence and attachment) and, above all, his personal example, are the only efficacious means of preventing military offences; and the Commander-in-Chief has no hesitation in declaring, that the maintenance of strict discipline, without severity of punishment, and the support and encouragement of an ardent military spirit in a corps, without licentiousness, are the criterions by which His Royal Highness will be very much guided in forming his opinion of the talents, abilities, and merit of the officers to whom the command of the different regiments and corps of the army are confided.81

  Whilst some of the above is perhaps a little optimistic, and needs in part to be seen in the context of the contemporary political campaigns against flogging, it does make clear the prevailing trend in thinking at the highest levels, particularly so far as the link between effective leadership and the need for corporal punishment is concerned.82 Of more practical import was the restriction of the number of lashes that could be awarded by a Regimental Court Martial, although, as we shall see, the spirit of this restriction remained open to legalistic challenge.

  In practical terms, heavy punishment alone was not necessarily enough to ruin the efficiency and effectiveness of a unit, particularly if the penalty was seen as being fair. Inglis’s tenure in command of the 1/57th saw the revival of the old regimental nickname of “Steelbacks,” a title originally dating back to the eighteenth century when a previous commander had adopted a similar approach to discipline.83 Whether this title was bestowed in grudging admiration or adopted out of perverse pride, it implies something of a manly immunity to the ordeal of physical punishment, and a general toughness amongst those to whom it referred. Conversely, arbitrary punishments served to destroy the element of trust that was essential for effective command, and all the more so if such measures were adopted by an officer already lacking respect through other deficiencies. One such officer was Richard Archdall of the 1/40th, who gained the dubious distinction of being the only commander to be formally relieved whilst on active service as a result of having awarded illegal punishments. Yet, even in this extreme example, the circumstances were by no means straightforward.

  Having served with it for the bulk of the Peninsular War, Archdall assumed command of the 1/40th as a major in April 1812, replacing Lt. Colonel Charles Harcourt who had been wounded at Badajoz, and was himself brevetted lt. colonel in August the same year having distinguished himself at Salamanca in the interim.84 Whilst the evidence shows Archdall as particularly harsh toward the men under his command, this in itself did not necessarily make him a bad commanding officer, and would alone have been insufficient to bring about his removal. But Archdall’s harshness was arbitrary and was accompanied by a bending of the rules to enable punishments to be inflicted in excess
of the three-hundred-lash limit instituted by York. What was more, so far as unit efficiency was concerned, Archdall did not restrict his ill treatment to the rank and file but also took a bullying approach in his dealings with his officers. In that his court-martial was due to charges preferred by some of the latter, this attitude may well have represented his undoing since when he was tried in February 1813 only half of the charges related directly to his abuse of the punishment system. The full catalogue of charges stood thus:

  1st. For violent and oppressive conduct unbecoming an Officer and contrary to the rules of the service.

  2d. For having, on the march from Villa de Ciervo [sic] to Cedovem [sic], and at the latter village, inflicted corporal punishment on several non-commissioned Officers and private men of the 40th Regiment, without any trial, sufficient Officers being present to have formed a Court Martial.

  3d. For acting contrary to the spirit, and avoiding the intentions of the late act of Parliament, limiting the sentences of Regimental Courts Martial to 300 lashes, by inflicting, at one time, the sentences of two distinct Regimental Courts Martial, held for different offences.

  4th. For using intemperate and improper language to Officers of the regiment, the same being in breach of good discipline, and unbecoming the character of an Officer and a Gentleman.

  5th. For divulging the contents of a confidential letter, addressed by Captain Heyland, to the late Major Colquhoun, and falsely asserting that he had opened the same in the presence of Captain Phillips and Lieutenant J. Cook, being conduct unworthy the character of an Officer and a Gentleman.

  6th. For having released soldiers of the regiment, sentenced by Courts Martial to receive corporal punishment, and having permitted those soldiers to do duty in the presence of the enemy, and at other times, the punishment still impending, and afterwards put in execution, the same being highly prejudicial to good discipline, and contrary to the orders of the army.85

  Archdall was convicted in full on the second, fourth, and sixth charges, whilst the court found with relation to the first that although he was guilty of “violent conduct” this was neither “oppressive” nor “unbecoming.” Since the actions that had brought about this charge were also deemed not to be “contrary to the rules of the service,” it may be inferred that they did not relate to the illegal punishments covered by charges two, three, and six.86

  Whilst the fifth charge, although indicative of the poor relations between Archdall and his officers, was thrown out as being patently frivolous, the third caused the court some difficulty, and exposed a clear, if legalistic, distinction between York’s hopes of reducing corporal punishment and the actual letter of military law: “In regard to the third charge, the Court is of opinion the prisoner is Not Guilty, as no such Act of Parliament exists in the knowledge of the members of this Court, but is of opinion, that the prisoner is Guilty of acting contrary to the spirit of the circular confidential letter from His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, to Officers commanding Regiments, bearing date, Horse Guards, 25th March, 1812.” In other words, Archdall was guilty so far as the spirit of the charge was concerned, but could not be convicted by the law as the court understood it. Nevertheless, the convictions on the remaining charges, and the partial guilty verdict on charges one and three, were enough to ensure that Archdall was “sentenced to be dismissed from His Majesty’s Service.”87

  This judgment, one might assume, should have been the end of it, but it was clear that Archdall had in fact managed to win considerable sympathy and support for his case, with the president of the court-martial, Major General Andrew Hay, composing a plea for clemency.

  I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I am requested by the members of the Court Martial, of which I am President, to recommend to your Excellency’s favourable consideration the prisoner, Lieutenant Colonel Archdall, as after having performed the painful part of its duty, in consequence of his having transgressed against the Articles of War, yet it most humbly begs leave to submit, that there is a conviction on their minds, that he has been actuated by what appeared to him a most zealous discharge of his duty.

  The Court also begs leave to submit to your Excellency’s consideration, the testimonials of Lieutenant General Cole, and Major General Anson, as to the prisoner’s character, as an Officer and a Gentleman, as also that of Staff-surgeon Boatflower to the same effect, and that of Assistant-surgeon Cartan, which latter evidence has also borne testimony to his humane attention towards the sick of the 40th Regiment.

  The Court cannot close their proceedings, without feeling it their duty to remark upon, and to express their regret that the fourth charge should have been brought forward by the prosecutor, for their investigation, as it appears from the evidence of Lieutenants Butler and Lunn, that Lieutenant Colonel Archdall had made an explanation to their satisfaction; the Court cannot but remark also upon the frivolous part relative to Lieutenant Richardson’s great coat, as adduced in evidence in that charge.88

  Like Quentin of the 10th Hussars, Archdall may have benefited from an element of sympathy engendered by the fact that his juniors had spoken out against him. The timing of the events in question should also be borne in mind, since the march during which the offenses forming the second charge occurred had been in January 1813, in the aftermath of Wellington’s infamous Burgos retreat circular.89 Indeed, Archdall in his defense specifically cited Wellington’s orders concerning the need to rapidly punish offenders on occasions when even a drumhead court-martial was not possible. He was, however, able to establish that such exonerating circumstances had been in force on only one of the instances for which he was tried.90 Whatever his views on the necessity of appropriate recourse to the lash, Wellington most certainly did not advocate bending the rules to make illegal punishments, but one can readily believe that his words were fresh both in Archdall’s mind when his battalion marched out of Villar de Ciervo, and doubtless too in the minds of the officers forming the court that tried him the following month. Archdall certainly appears to modern eyes as a deeply flawed character, but it is evident that at least some of his contemporaries judged him less harshly.

  The terms in which Hay couched his appeal suggest that, to the officers of the court, Archdall had done the wrong thing but for the right reason. Whilst the regulations clearly required that Archdall be dismissed, nowhere in the court’s findings is there an out-and-out statement that he was unfit to command a battalion. However, the clemency plea, although successful, only ensured that Archdall was permitted to sell his majority and retire; the 1/40th, having suffered less than a year under his command, would subsequently go on and serve with effectiveness and distinction at Toulouse and Waterloo. Archdall, meanwhile, having escaped the complete disgrace inherent in being dismissed from the service, uniquely elected to begin his military career again from scratch, and purchased a cornet’s commission in the 3rd Dragoons. He subsequently served in India with the 11th Light Dragoons and 17th Foot before finally going on half pay as a lieutenant of the 17th in 1822, dying seven years later.91

  Assuming the man in question was removed before he could thoroughly destroy the morale and internal cohesion of his command, a single bad commanding officer need not necessarily result in a unit becoming militarily ineffective. However, some units were unfortunate enough to be commanded by a string of such officers, under which circumstances the results could be rather more serious. A prime case of this kind comes from the unfortunate career of the 2nd Foot during the period, wherein the regiment’s single battalion suffered under a succession of poor commanders. The problem seems to have begun with the first of these officers, Lt. Colonel William Iremonger, who took command of the 2nd in March 1808 having been promoted from the 88th.92 When the 2nd, then stationed on Guernsey, was inspected shortly afterward, Lt. General Doyle found a weak and inexperienced unit whose interior arrangements were described only as “tolerable.”93 This in itself was no great indictment of Iremonger, who had only recently taken command, but it soon became c
lear that he was not of a character suited to turning the situation around, and future events would demonstrate that his leadership style was both harsh on the men and unpopular with his fellow officers. At this stage, Iremonger was the regiment’s junior lt. colonel, and when the 2nd went on active service in 1808 it was the senior man, the Hon. James Ramsay, who commanded. However, Ramsay left after Vimeiro, and during the Corunna campaign, with Iremonger in command, the battalion largely fell apart, losing 205 rank and file or 31 percent of its starting strength. These losses were far higher than the army average, and, since the unit was never heavily engaged, can only be attributed to straggling, and in turn therefore to poor internal management.94

  Scarcely had the battalion begun to recover when it was redeployed as part of the Walcheren expedition. Fevers took a heavy toll, and, with no second battalion, this meant that replacement manpower had to be found from outside the regiment, either by transfers from the Militia or by direct recruiting. Men were found, but the sources from which they came meant that when the battalion was inspected in autumn 1810, as it prepared for a return to the peninsula, 355 of its 793 men had one year’s service or less.95 Furthermore, the problem was not so much obtaining recruits as keeping them; in addition to finding fault with the battalion’s drill and internal economy, an exasperated Lt. General John Sherbrooke, newly returned from commanding the First Division under Wellington, wrote, “Twenty Two Recruits have joined out of which Two only remain with the Reg. the desertions in the period having exceeded the number enlisted.”96 Sherbrooke also noted that the adjutant had already complained to Horse Guards concerning Iremonger’s conduct, but since the latter’s actions had been within regulations there was no way in which he could have been removed. There are continued hints that the 2nd was a flogging regiment, although back in 1808 Doyle too could note only that “there seems much of the old system remaining in this Regt.” and that punishments were “rather frequent”; there was nothing being done illegally.97 Even so, the evidence from 1810 of men voting with their feet is a damning indictment of how low morale in the battalion had fallen.