Sickness, Suffering, and the Sword

by Andrew Bamford

  Whilst the 95th shared similarities with the Foot Guards at a company level, the existence of semipermanent Guards Brigades mirrors the formation of standing two-battalion brigades of KGL infantry, which also facilitated operational flexibility. Although this system began to break down as the war went on—with the two line brigades in the peninsula being combined after the 1809 campaign, and the five KGL battalions remaining by 1814 eventually forming a single large brigade—the close ties created as a result were clearly demonstrated by the ease with which it was possible to draft effective manpower from the 7th Line Battalion into the 1st, 2nd, and 5th, after all four units had been reduced by wastage by 1811. Indeed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the KGL brigade was treated as akin to a multi-battalion regiment of the type fielded by most continental armies. This situation is emphasized by the arrangements for the manpower transfer: “Major General Low will accordingly give orders that this transfer be made, taking care to transfer to each battalion such a number of effective men as will nearly equalise the strength of each, [and] direct that the soldiers transferred may be placed in battalions and companies with their countrymen and comrades.”36 The first point serves to emphasize the ease with which the greater number of battalions into which the men could be drafted simplified the process—a regular British battalion in a similar condition could, at best, give up its effectives to one other unit, assuming that another battalion of the same regiment was at hand. The second also emphasizes the existence of a common identity across the KGL battalions that could not exist within a similar British brigade, in which there would likely have been no previous connection, nor common experience and origin, to link the battalions prior to their brigading.

  For the Foot Guards, Rifles, and KGL, being something apart from the norm allowed for more creative approaches to the management of manpower, but the extension of such practices to the regular infantry of the line was far rarer for the bulk of the period. Nevertheless, there are a few earlier examples that provide an element of precedent for what would follow. Thus, when the 2/23rd was preparing for service as part of the Walcheren expedition, only months after its return from Corunna, the available fit rank and file—403 of them—were concentrated into five companies for active service, and the remaining five left at home with only 172 rank and file between them, of whom 62 were sick.37 A similar expedient was resorted to in the case of the 2/8th, which was originally intended to embark as a full-strength battalion of 544 men. This figure was then revised down to 400, in an unspecified number of companies, but this target too could not be met, and eventually only the flank companies were slated to join the expedition with an anticipated strength of 200 men. Exactly how many deployed in the event is unclear, since the detachment is not included in the monthly returns for the campaign.38 It is unclear why such a weak unit was not made into part of the Corps of Embodied Detachments, unless the hope was still being entertained that the remaining companies would in time be made fit to join the flankers. The regiment’s manpower shortage was down to its first battalion having just been brought up to strength for service in America by drafts from the second, leaving the junior unit with insufficient manpower to take the field in its own right.39

  This practice of deploying only parts of battalions continued after Walcheren. In much the same way that Corunna had sapped the strength of the 2/23rd, so had Walcheren sapped that of the 85th, and this influenced its state of readiness when being prepared for deployment to the peninsula a year later. Although the battalion was apparently healthy again by late 1810, its training had suffered whilst its manpower had been on the sick list and so too had its recruiting.40 Again, effective manpower was concentrated into five active companies, totaling 414 rank and file, leaving only 82 fit rank and file at home, with a further 27 sick.41 In a sense, what was being done here was a division at battalion level that would normally have been applied on a regimental scale. The five active companies were in effect the “first battalion” whilst the five inactive ones took the role of the “second battalion.” It may be inferred that the intention was to send out the remaining companies once they were back up to strength, but in practice the situation never arose. The detachments of the 2/8th and 2/23rd were soon returned to Britain once the Walcheren campaign became bogged down, whilst the 85th lasted less than a year in the peninsula before its numerical weakness and poor internal economy saw it ordered home. On the other hand, the 1/71st, having initially gone out to the peninsula with only six companies in September 1810, for much the same reasons as the 85th, did regain its missing companies as fit men became available; as we have already seen, the reunited battalion rendered good service for the remainder of the war.42 By this time, though, a flood of manpower was again becoming available for active duty as the Walcheren men returned to fitness, and throughout 1811 and into 1812 the manpower shortfall diminished and the forces in the peninsula were steadily built up.

  1813: Pushing the System to Its Limits

  As units returned from Walcheren began to regain fitness from late 1810 onward, finding additional reinforcements to go overseas became less of a problem, at least for the time being. Furthermore, thanks to the policies of unit rotation outlined in the previous chapter, more effective use could be made of troops already overseas thus extending the amount of service that could be obtained from them. However, with manpower demands steadily increasing, the redeployment of recovered Walcheren survivors was not, in itself, sufficient to maintain an indefinite supply of new units, particularly once 1812 saw the opening of a second front in America. Similarly, unit rotation could only do so much; once all the effective units were assigned to active theaters, further transfers could achieve nothing. These factors led to an inevitable reduction in both the quality and strength of reinforcements being sent to the main theater of war, as shown in table 4. The tailing off in both size and number of units toward the end of the period is clear, particularly after the peak of 1811 and 1812 once the ex-Walcheren units had joined. Reinforcements were in similarly short supply for North America, and the forces there were initially built up largely through moving units from elsewhere.43

  Table 4. Battalions Deployed to the Peninsula, 1810–1813

  Source: Compiled from data, TNA, WO17/2465, 2467–2474, using total strengths upon arrival in Portugal. These figures do not account for units redeployed to the peninsula from elsewhere or to sub-battalion deployments such as the trickle of rifle companies.

  Although the strategic priority remained the peninsula, both Horse Guards and the Cabinet now had other areas to consider—not only North America, but the Mediterranean and northern Europe as well. Unfortunately, it was at this point that Wellington’s tendency to emphasize his own needs above all others began to become apparent. Previously, his frustration with the regimental system had been confined to barbed asides in General Orders; now, he began to oppose it more vigorously. In Wellington’s view, it was far better to retain seasoned veteran troops in the peninsula; they were hardened to campaign service, could be relied on in action, and were less likely to fall ill. On the other hand, the end of the 1812 campaign saw many of the units containing these veterans so reduced in numbers as to be verging on ineffective. Wellington hoped to work around this problem by reducing the number of subunits, working weak cavalry regiments with only two squadrons, and cutting weak infantry battalions down to four-company detachments that could be paired to form the equivalent of a full-strength unit. Wellington’s proposals for the cavalry were rejected out of hand, with four worn-down regiments going home but six new ones, later joined by a seventh, replacing them.44 In a sense, this was a fight that Wellington could afford to lose; the new troops of the Household and Hussar Brigades gave him trouble, but were ultimately integrated into the field army without undue problems. The issue of the infantry was, to Wellington, rather more important, but here he did at least have precedent on his side because for two battalions he had already been using a version of the proposed organization for over eighteen months
. Thus, he knew that what he was proposing would work, and he knew too that he had been able to implement it without anyone in London finding fault.

  The initial concept of what would become the creation of provisional battalions stemmed from a typical piece of Wellington pragmatism in the aftermath of the Battle of Albuera. So badly had the Second Division suffered that the seven battalions of what had been Colborne’s and Hoghton’s Brigades were all far too weak to continue as independent units. In the immediate aftermath of the battle, all effective troops from these two brigades were formed into a single battalion, commanded, as every account feels required to remind us, by an émigré French captain with the unfortunate name of Cimetière.45 The only exceptions were the two battalions of the 48th Foot, which were combined into a single unit, although in due course the 1/3rd and 1/57th were rebuilt by drafts from their second battalions in England and resumed a separate identity. This left three battalions—the 29th, 2/31st, and 2/66th—still being worked as a single unit but now on a rather more formal basis, with the 2/31st providing four companies and the other battalions three each.46 Ultimately, the shrunken state of the 29th resulted in its being ordered home, but the expedient of working the other two half-battalions together was maintained, formally designated as the Provisional Battalion. The combined unit came under the lt. colonel commanding the 2/31st: first Guy l’Estrange and then Alexander Leith. Field and staff officers from both battalions remained in the field, with Lt. Colonel Charles Nicol of the 2/66th still with the battalion in early 1813, although his function was restricted to maintaining order and discipline in his own proper command.47

  Even before the Provisional Battalion had been organized, Wellington was speculating on the possibilities of extending the concepts it entailed. When Liverpool wrote to him in the spring of 1811 discussing plans for offensive operations, Wellington made it clear that he would need to build up his forces if such operations were to be viable, and that this would mean retaining units in the peninsula that might otherwise have gone home. In order to do this, Wellington proposed that he “form into six companies the 2d battalions of the 24th, 31st, 38th, 42nd, 58th, and 66th, and to send home to recruit, or to form the recruits, the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the four companies drafted.”48 The proposal does not make it clear whether the resulting cut-down battalions would have been paired or not; possibly they would have formed combined units for tactical purposes, whilst retaining a distinct organizational identity. At this stage, Wellington still accepted that he would be unable to entirely escape the strictures of the system, and that he would likely lose some weak units. Nevertheless, he went on to try and obtain Liverpool’s blessing for an expansion of his proposals, sugaring the pill with a suggestion that his schemes would also lead to financial economies: “According to this plan we should reduce in some degree our expense in this country. We should keep here Officers inured to the climate and accustomed to the service; at the same time that we should send to England Officers and non-commissioned officers to raise and train recruits. Indeed, it would be desirable if I were authorised from time to time to incorporate the ten companies of a regiment into eight or six companies, according to their numbers, and to send home to recruit, or to train recruits, the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the drafted companies.”49 Whilst blessing was not forthcoming—unsurprisingly, since it was in the gift of the commander in chief, not the secretary of state—it is clear that the concept behind the later extension of the provisional battalion concept had been developed for some time in advance of its implementation. In the short term, Wellington got his reinforcements for the campaign of 1812 and could thus shelve the scheme retaining only the original, still unnumbered, Provisional Battalion to test the validity of the concept.

  Although the pairing of the 2/31st and 2/66th seems only to have been envisaged as a temporary expedient until the two units could be brought back to strength, drafts were not forthcoming and the paired organization was maintained. Nevertheless, the combined battalions formed an extremely effective unit. Colonel John Byng, in whose brigade they were placed, reported in spring 1812, “I have now to remark, that a proper understanding and good spirit pervades both Corps, they agree well together, [which] reflects much credit on their commanding officers . . . I consider it a very satisfactory battalion to have under my command, and think it in general good order and fit for any service.”50 The ease with which the two battalions were able to merge may well have had much to do with their having served alongside each other for eighteen months prior to their amalgamation, and was also evidenced by the good relations between their officers, with Lt. George l’Estrange of the 2/31st’s “friend and chum and invariable shooting companion” being Lt. Stepney St. George of the 2/66th.51

  Thus, in the aftermath of the Burgos retreat, Wellington had both a solid precedent to prove the effectiveness of the provisional battalion organization, and several other units that he believed would benefit from it. Some of these battalions had been noted as early as 1811 for potential reduction, and were now so reduced by wastage on campaign to be nearly as weak as the 2/31st and 2/66th had been after Albuera. Other second battalions that had been noted as weak in 1811 had since been absorbed into the first battalion of their respective regiments, but six units remained where there was neither a sister battalion to which the fit men could be drafted nor any chance of reinforcements from home. Accordingly, as of December 6, 1812, Wellington ordered these battalions to implement a similar organization to that of the 2/31st and 2/66th.52 Incorporating the ideas that Wellington had proposed to Liverpool in 1811, Wellington’s scheme incorporated steps to aid the rapid reconstruction of the component battalions and expedite their return to the field as complete units. Thus, the six battalions were required to draft their effectives into four companies of equal strength, sending the unfit men home with the officer and NCO cadres of the six remaining companies. The intention was that these companies would recruit up to strength and then return, allowing the battalions to resume their original independent identities. Meanwhile, the four companies remaining in the field were paired to form three new provisional battalions, numbered 2nd through 4th with the original unnumbered unit becoming the 1st. Rather than keep the headquarters of both component battalions in the field, the commanding officer and staff were transferred complete from one regiment and that of the other sent home: as an additional advantage, this enabled Wellington to retain whichever battalion commander he thought more useful. The only downside of the new system over the 1811 prototype was that, because the weak battalions were taken from across the army, the prior relationship that had aided the amalgamation of the 2/31st and 2/66th did not always exist. In fact, it was paralleled only for the 2/30th and 2/44th, which did not last long together as a provisional battalion but which did continue to maintain good relations with each other thereafter.53

  The units involved were the 2nd and 2/53rd, forming the 2nd Provisional Battalion with the staff of the latter; the 2/24th and 2/58th, forming the 3rd Provisional Battalion with the staff of the former; and the 2/30th and 2/44th forming the 4th Provisional Battalion with the staff of the former.54 Inasmuch as the monthly return for December 1812 caught the 2/58th in the process of dividing itself, we can see the mechanics of the new arrangement in action, with the returns showing 23 rank and file going home, along with 5 staff and 9 company officers, 18 sergeants, and all 16 musicians; 354 rank and file remained in the peninsula along with 9 officers and 20 sergeants. Only 2 men recorded as sick were in the detachment set to leave, but there were 147 with the four companies staying.55 Although retaining so many sick seems contrary to the intention of keeping only fit men, this proportion was in line with most other battalions in the aftermath of the Burgos retreat, representing men who could reasonably be expected to recover in time for the next campaign.

  Wellington might have thrown the rulebook of the regimental system out of the window by organizing the provisional battalions, but he was careful to maintain the
individual identities of the units involved with companies within the new battalions each containing men from only one regiment, under their own officers. Interestingly, the record of courts-martial for the 2nd Provisional Battalion, which shows the company and battalion of origin of all those brought to trial, demonstrates that here the ordered eight-company structure was dispensed with in favor of a standard ten-company organization including flank companies. Coming from the senior unit, men from the 2nd formed the grenadiers and right-wing battalion companies, whilst the light company and left-wing battalion companies came from the other component battalion, the 2/53rd.56 Unit seniority was also maintained at a higher level, since the seniority of the provisional battalions within their respective brigades—important so far as the combat deployment of the battalions was concerned—was taken from the identity of the senior element of the provisional battalion. Thus, the 2nd Provisional Battalion was the right-hand, or senior, unit in Anson’s Brigade of the Fourth Division since it contained elements of the 2nd Regiment of Foot, irrespective of the fact that it also contained men from the 2/53rd, which would otherwise have been the brigade’s most junior unit.57 Wellington always took care, when mentioning the provisional battalions, to stress the identities of the component units by name, in preference to that of the single combined unit. Whilst this no doubt aided the continued fostering of regimental esprit de corps, there may also have been an element of discretion involved, with Wellington not wishing to draw attention to a scheme that he knew was unpopular at Horse Guards. He also wrote in this fashion to Bathurst after the Vitoria campaign, emphasizing the quality of the units composing the 2nd and 3rd Provisional Battalions, justifying the correctness of his decision to retain these men in the peninsula by telling the secretary of state “it is impossible for any troops to behave better.”58