The First Victory

by Andrew Stewart

  THE FIRST VICTORY

  Copyright © 2016 Andrew Stewart

  All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press) without written permission from the publishers.

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  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Names: Stewart, Andrew, 1970- author.

  Title: The first victory : the Second World War and the East Africa campaign / Andrew Stewart.

  Description: New Haven : Yale University Press, 2016.

  Identifiers: LCCN 2016031009 | ISBN 9780300208559 (cloth : alk. paper)

  Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1939-1945—Campaigns—Africa, East.

  Classification: LCC D766.84 .S74 2016 | DDC 940.54/233—dc23

  LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016031009

  A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  CONTENTS

  List of Maps and Illustrations

  Acknowledgements

  I Introduction: A Forgotten Campaign

  1Strategic Miscalculation

  2Hoping for the Best

  3War Comes to East Africa

  4Imperial Defeat: The Surrender of British Somaliland

  5Preparing for the Counter-offensive

  6The Advance from Kenya

  7Second Front: Striking from the Sudan

  8Triumph in the Mountains: The Battle of Keren

  9A Third Front: The Patriots

  10Winning the War, Worrying about the Peace

  Conclusion: The British Empire’s First Victory

  Notes

  Bibliography

  Index

  MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

  Maps

  1Italian invasion of British Somaliland.

  2Defence of the Tug Argan Gap.

  3Advance of British and Commonwealth forces from Kenya into Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.

  4Advance of British and Commonwealth forces from the Sudan into Eritrea.

  5Battle of Keren (the opening phase).

  6Battle of Keren (the final phase).

  7Advance of Patriot forces.

  Illustration credits

  4 © The National Archives (INF3/415). 9 The War Weekly, April 1941. All other illustrations are courtesy of Ministry of Defence © Crown Copyright (2016). Reproduced under the terms of the Open Government Licence http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/.

  1 On the left, General Archibald Wavell, the British commander of forces in the Middle East, meets with the South African leader Jan Smuts during his March 1940 visit to Cape Town.

  2 The governor of Kenya, Sir Henry Moore, takes the salute as South African troops begin to arrive in the colony. Standing to his right is Major-General Douglas Dickinson, the senior British military officer in the region, and on his left is the South African commander Brigadier Dan Pienaar.

  3 Wavell meets with Major-General William Platt, his commander in the Sudan, to discuss strategy.

  4 A propaganda picture showing Acting Captain Eric Wilson manning his machine gun at Tug Argan during the heroic defence.

  5 The British fort at Moyale, a good example of the defences available to the British and Commonwealth forces.

  6 Following Dickinson’s dismissal, Major-General Alan Cunningham was appointed as his replacement to lead the advance from Kenya.

  7 Troops of the Gold Coast Brigade marching through Kismayu on 14 February following the capture of this key strategic port.

  8 During the advance made by the Patriots, the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, receives advice from Colonel Daniel Sandford (to his right) and Lieutenant- Colonel Orde Wingate (to his left).

  9 A contemporary popular magazine rendition of the recapture of Berbera in March 1941 as part of Operation ‘Appearance’.

  10 The Union Jack flies over Government House in Berbera following the success of Operation ‘Appearance’.

  11 Pack mules and Bren carriers in a forward area in front of Keren.

  12 Indian troops resting at a signal point in a fort overlooking Mount Sanchil.

  13 Indian troops marching into Asmara on 1 April 1941.

  14 Troops from the Transvaal Scottish march through Addis Ababa.

  15 The emperor is driven into Addis Ababa with Cunningham accompanying him in his official car.

  16 Italian troops marching down from Fort Toselli after the surrender of the garrison at Amba Alagi.

  17 The viceroy of Italian East Africa, the Duke of Aosta (second from left), leaves his mountain fortress following his surrender. Behind him, in the centre of the picture, is Major-General Mosley Mayne.

  18 The Patriots on the march – entering Debra Tor in July 1941.

  19 The enemy positions as seen from inside the fort at the Wolchefit Pass.

  20 The Union Jack flies over the ancient Portuguese castle at Gondar at the end of the final battle of the British and Commonwealth campaign in East Africa.

  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

  I WOULD LIKE TO thank the staff of the following archives and libraries for the assistance they provided whilst I was undertaking research for this project: Bodleian Library, Oxford; Borthwick Institute for Archives, University of York; British Library, London; Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge; Imperial War Museum, London; Kenya National Archives and Documentation Service, Nairobi; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London; National Archives of Australia, Canberra; National Army Museum, London; South African National Records and Archives Service, Pretoria; Sudan Archive, University of Durham; The National Archives, London; The Royal Fusiliers Archives, London; and, finally, both the King’s College London Library and the Joint Services Command and Staff College Library. I am also extremely grateful to the holder of Field Marshal Lord Archibald Wavell’s papers who was most generous in allowing access to the relevant documents. Where appropriate, I must thank the trustees or similar of those archives above that have kindly granted access and permission the use of selected brief quotations. The material examined has proven to be of considerable benefit. All reasonable efforts have been made to acknowledge copyright but if there are any omissions these will be corrected at the first opportunity.

  The book’s completion has been greatly assisted by the many individuals who have been willing to offer advice or information and I would like to extend my sincere thanks to them all. I am particularly grateful to friends within the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, who have provided their support, most notably Dr Jonathan Hill. Professor Ashley Jackson also generously discussed many of the themes referenced within the text. I am grateful also to my colleagues at the Royal College of Defence Studies who offered huge encouragement and helped me create the time needed to complete the writing. In this regard, I must thank especially the Commandant, Sir Tom Phillips KCMG, and my Senior Directing Staff counterpart James Kidner MVO, without whom it would not have been possible to produce this book. My former students at the Joint Services Command and Staff College who helped shape my initial thinking about the campaign and the Members at the Royal College of Defence Studies who have withstood the writing process must also all be thanked for their patience and good wishes. This book has been written, for the most part, i
n Oxford and London but sections were also drafted while I was travelling and working in France, Spain, Italy, Canada and the United States.

  Andrea Jackson and Luke Vivian-Neal completed research for me in The National Archives. Gustav Betz conducted an initial review of the holdings in the South African archives and Vera Plint carried out copying work in Pretoria. In Nairobi, Humphrey Mathenge copied many relevant files relating to the local political and military wartime situation. Once again, David Steeds has read and commented upon sections of the draft manuscript and I remain indebted to him for the advice and guidance he has offered over nearly twenty-five years which has helped make me a better scholar and writer than would otherwise have been the case. I also welcome the comments made by the anonymous reviewers of the initial book proposal and the first draft version of the manuscript which proved both insightful and of considerable assistance in terms of refining some of the arguments put forward in the text.

  The encouragement and support provided by Heather McCallum and Rachael Lonsdale at Yale University Press throughout the production of this book has been most welcome. I would also like to thank Beth Humphries for copy-editing the text, Martin Brown for drawing up the maps, Samantha Cross for producing the plate section, and Ian Craine for providing the index.

  I am extremely fortunate in the support that has been provided by my parents throughout my studies and subsequent academic career. My wife Joanne continues to make enormous sacrifices in terms of the time we are able to spend together and I consider myself particularly fortunate that she remains both understanding and supportive of my work. It is to her that I dedicate this book.

  The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the Royal College of Defence Studies, the UK Ministry of Defence or any other government agency. Any errors of fact are the responsibility of the author and, if notified, I will make every reasonable effort to correct them.

  Oxford, June 2016

  INTRODUCTION

  A Forgotten Campaign

  ON 27 NOVEMBER 1941, the mountain fortress of Gondar, the last remaining stronghold of Italy’s once apparently great empire in eastern Africa, surrendered following a final attack by British and Commonwealth troops. This assault lasted less than a day but it marked the culmination of a military campaign that had begun nearly eighteen months before and which had witnessed some remarkable acts of leadership, physical endurance and individual bravery. The headlines the following morning in the major British newspapers instead focused on the fighting then going on farther north in the Western Desert, where Operation ‘Crusader’ was attempting to break the long-running siege of the port of Tobruk. It took two days before the story was published and, whilst it featured on page four of The Times, the tabloid Daily Express and Daily Mirror gave it only small columns on their back pages.1 The final success won by British and Commonwealth forces in this long and often exhausting campaign received the briefest of mentions. There was, however, an interesting commentary offered by one of the newspaper editors who told his readers:

  Gondar has gone. Or shall we say Gondar has come? The last outpost of Musso’s tottering, or rather tottered and tattered, Empire is occupied by us after two Italian mutinies and one final surrender. That means the end of a six-year Italian attempt to pick a quarrel with us in colonial territories where we tried to deal with gentlemen but found they were jackals. The jackal’s [Mussolini’s] backyard has now been dug and turned over by the British Army.2

  Whilst the first part of the statement was correct – this indeed marked the fall of the Italian East African Empire – the rest was far from the case, particularly in terms of the pre-war Anglo-Italian relationship which had not always been the subject of such animosity.3 This fairly crude wartime propaganda also, surprisingly, entirely overlooked the prominent role that had been played by British and Commonwealth forces in winning the battle; indeed it had been a campaign that depended on contributions of manpower and equipment offered up from around the British Empire. Nonetheless, it was at least a reference to a campaign that had, for all intents and purposes, been forgotten for some months. Following the liberation of the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in April 1941, attention had swiftly turned to the defeats that followed in North Africa, Greece and Crete, not to mention the drama that rapidly developed on the Russian steppe as the newest members of the alliance fighting the Axis powers seemed poised for a catastrophic collapse. In this context an assault on a remote mountain fortress was no longer much of a priority for the newspapers in Fleet Street or the people who read them.

  Whilst it was one of the Second World War’s most overlooked campaigns at the time and has largely remained so ever since, the fighting that began in early July 1940 in eastern Africa should have featured much more prominently in the crowded literature of the conflict. On one side was an Italian army which included nearly 300,000 European and African troops; on the other, a British-led force just one-quarter its size and made up predominantly of men from across Britain’s imperial territories, supported by small French and Belgian contingents. After an initial series of Italian advances, the much smaller of the two forces began a well-organised response the following January; it reached its conclusion just eleven months later in the mountains at Gondar. To get there the victorious coalition carried out one of the entire war’s most successful mechanised pursuits, launched assaults on what looked to be impenetrable mountain strongholds and even carried out an audacious amphibious landing. Brilliant logistical planning was required to overcome an often inhospitable and unforgiving terrain which encompassed a huge area extending from the flat, featureless and almost waterless bush of the Northern Frontier District, where Kenya bordered Italian Somaliland, to the rolling bush and hill country of Ethiopia.4 Added to this were the extremes of weather, from tremendous dry heat through to the humidity of the coastal areas and the cold of the mountains, as well as the threat of the arrival of monsoon rains, all of which meant it was not an area of operations suited to a lengthy military adventure. It was a campaign fought on several fronts and to the north, in the Sudan, whilst the weather was also extreme and the terrain, at times, bordering on impassable, the distances were much shorter and the attacking troops much better equipped.

  Despite its tone, the Daily Express was not wrong to highlight the abject nature of the Italian defeat, as 50,000 prisoners were captured and 360,000 square miles occupied all at a cost of 500 casualties amongst the British and Commonwealth forces and just 150 men killed. During the course of the fighting there were numerous military curiosities for the British Army and its imperial counterparts, including the last significant cavalry charge made by an opponent, the final sounding of a bugle call to direct the movement of a large body of troops, the first significant mutiny of British infantry troops during the war, and the earliest awards of the Victoria Cross during the Africa campaign. There was also the first loss of territory suffered by the British Empire, with the surrender of British Somaliland, but the campaign also saw the first liberation of occupied land when the small protectorate on the Horn of Africa was later recovered. All of this has been almost entirely overlooked despite, in many respects, providing a perfect episode of the Second World War to study, with its incredible military engagements and fascinating personalities and human stories which bring alive the nature and character of war.

  There are references to the East Africa campaign in the subsequent official histories and longer sections in the individual unit accounts, but the existing bibliography is not a large one. Although an extended narrative was produced by a British Army officer, involving years of preparatory work after the Second World War had ended, no resulting dedicated history was ever written. The work that had been done was heavily edited and later included in the first volume of the more general account detailing the war fought in North Africa and the Mediterranean.5 An official Italian history was published in 1952 – with a second ed
ition in 1971 – despite there reportedly having been very few official documents left at war’s end to provide a factual basis for the writing.6 A report written in 1970 by the ‘Enemy Document Section’ of the Cabinet Office in London noted that most high-level documents were believed to have been buried somewhere in Ethiopia and never found.7 In 1951, some civil administration and police documents had even been observed being sold in the markets of Addis Ababa to be used as cigarette paper. Those that were discovered were transferred to Khartoum, from where they also subsequently disappeared.

  In addition to this official work, a small number of military officers and members of the press who were present have produced campaign studies or their recollections of what took place. These accounts effectively convey the often unplanned nature of the fighting and the vastness of the battlespace, but they tend to provide largely narrative descriptions of the fighting they witnessed, with little or no analysis of how this fitted into the wider war.8 These include, most notably, the recollections of G.L. Steer and Ted Crosskill, both intelligence officers who wrote about the campaign, and the correspondents Kenneth Gandar Dower, also an explorer and aviator, and Carel Birkby, a South African who was embedded with his nation’s troops.9

  There have been very few noteworthy writers who have been prepared to recognise that this campaign actually had a major impact not just on events in Africa but on the entire war’s eventual outcome.10 More recent accounts include limited references at best, and even these are susceptible to error. One distinguished military historian has written about it as having been an ‘oddity’ and nothing more than ‘a footnote to the nineteenth-century scramble for Africa’.11 Suggesting that there was not really a great deal of activity has been fairly standard; another account was a little more generous but still pointed to the advance from Kenya as having been a ‘military promenade with distance, terrain and climate the chief enemies’ and not worthy of detailed study.12 The more recent assessments, aside from being very brief, continue to offer barely any acknowledgement of a ‘meaningless’ campaign.13 Those writers who do show an interest tend to focus on how, despite overwhelming odds, the overextended British forces – often ignoring the fact that it had been a British and Commonwealth effort – muddled through to what had actually been a foregone successful ending.14 There has even been a trend to claim that the decision to fight in East Africa proved detrimental as it distracted Britain from the war being fought elsewhere, specifically in North Africa, where the opportunity was lost to destroy Italian military forces in Libya.