The First Victory

by Andrew Stewart

  Wavell wrote to Chater that he was still ‘most anxious’ to hold the protectorate if it was possible and he believed the second option of trying to retain Berbera carried with it the best potential of avoiding any damaging loss of prestige.108 However, on one of his final visits to Chater, a member of his senior staff warned him that there could now be a much stronger Italian attack than had ever been anticipated.109 Chater reckoned this would amount to a force of at least twenty infantry battalions along with heavy and light artillery and tanks advancing either along the coast road via Zeilah or in the direction of the Tug Argan Gap. He therefore pressed for urgent additional support, specifically another battalion of infantry with some light artillery and anti-tank rifles, and the resources to build further defences to protect both of these possible routes. He also noted in this renewed request that if he were given additional rifles he could also raise further units of the Illaloes, the well-thought-of local irregulars who guarded the more remote camel passes and acted as scouts. In response he was told that, other than the reinforcements that had arrived during the previous months, all that could be found immediately were six 20mm anti-aircraft guns captured from an Italian ship, effective only against low-flying aircraft; gunsights and ammunition clips would also first have to be made locally before they could be used. At the same time an updated report by the Chiefs of Staff in London acknowledged that the threat had increased but, other than accepting the potential effect on prestige, it now recommended that there be ‘no extensive commitment’ to hold the protectorate.110

  The policy of ambiguity and confusion which had existed since before the war had led to British Somaliland effectively being offered up for occupation. This coincided with the temptation to finally do something: the prospect of taking advantage of the dramatically changed strategic position became too great for the Italian General Staff to ignore. They concluded that an attack against this enemy-held territory and a quick and spectacular success could strengthen the flanks of Italian East Africa and raise the morale of Italian people everywhere. In a territory larger than England and Wales, defended by just one battery of light artillery and fewer than 3,000 British and Commonwealth troops, the scene was set for the first major battle of the East Africa campaign.

  CHAPTER 4

  IMPERIAL DEFEAT

  The Surrender of British Somaliland

  AT THE START of the Second World War, British Somaliland was largely unknown to the average Briton. According to one weekly magazine, it was ‘perhaps the least valuable’ territory in the British Empire, with its ‘burning heat and so parched and barren a ground’ making it difficult for Europeans to survive.1 For an American readership not subjected to War Office censorship there was perhaps an honest conclusion that, with ‘no railway, no bank, no hotel’, it remained a ‘torrid little country’.2 A lengthy column in The Times on the day the war came to this small imperial outpost referred to it as ‘rather a Cinderella among British colonies’.3 The writer was Margery Perham, who had spent her career studying Africa. She concluded that ‘man and camel seem to look with equal contempt at the white stranger who visits their ungracious country’, which had throughout its history ‘been by no means a land of peace’. The long delay in defeating the Mad Mullah’s insurgency caused great embarrassment in Whitehall and the territory was left ‘with a very bad reputation’. Even with the ‘careful nursing’ it was given throughout the inter-war period, there remained considerable political and military uncertainty about what policy the authorities in London might pursue.4 Now it was to be the location of a short but intense burst of military activity.

  Wavell had inherited responsibility for the protectorate’s security much too late to make any real difference and could not envisage a major fight, but he was committed to making a show of defiance even though faced by a much larger opponent.5 By mid-May 1940, in addition to the reinforcements which had arrived in Berbera from the 1st Northern Rhodesia Regiment, the Camel Corps had been strengthened by a small number of European officers and NCOs from Southern Rhodesia.6 To these were added a second batch of troops who followed shortly afterwards, with two Indian Sikh battalions arriving from Aden and another of British-led Nigerians transferred from Kenya by sea. With the increased forces now under his command, and in order to make his discussions with the French authorities in Jibuti easier to conduct, it was recommended that Chater be promoted to brigadier.7 He himself had requested privately that this be done – that he ‘be given a rank in keeping with my responsibilities without delay’. His greatest anxiety was that the recently arrived African troops could not understand who he was and the authority he actually held, and London agreed to the change in rank.8

  In addition to increasing the size of the garrison, work continued on improving the fixed defences as men from the Camel Corps, supported by Indian builders and Somali labourers, strengthened what were anticipated to be the key positions.9 The main defensive effort was established at the Tug Argan Gap which dominated the road to Berbera. When Wavell had visited British Somaliland in January he concluded that, whilst this had great potential for halting any Italian advance, there were about four miles of ground to be defended and at least three strongpoints would be needed, set about a mile apart from each other.10 Another visit was made two months later by a junior officer from the Royal Artillery who viewed at first hand this strategically significant feature, which he measured at about 8,000 yards in length. On his return to Cairo he submitted a detailed appreciation highlighting how the advantages offered by the local terrain could be used to best effect.11 This also recommended that the smallest possible defending force needed was a full battalion of troops with, potentially, a second in reserve, supported by eight 25-pounder guns split into two groups. With a maximum range of 13,000 yards, these were vital, and it was recommended that ideally they should be situated at the foot of Castle Hill, one of the position’s small flat-topped hills, from where there was good visibility over the entire gap. The report noted the need for additional fixed defences to be prepared, but by this stage the lack of available men and money had slowed down work and prospects for anything being finished already looked bleak. The officer’s comment at the very end of his report was that ‘whatever the type and number of guns employed they are sure to be inadequate for the demands which will be made upon them’. The clear suggestion was that Tug Argan could not be held.

  Despite such a pessimistic conclusion, four defended localities were formed and manned by the recently arrived North Rhodesians and a machine gun company of the Camel Corps. Consisting of well-prepared defences with barbed wire and concrete posts, they were dug in on what were named Black Hill, Knobbly Hill, Mill Hill and Observation Hill, with Castle Hill being used as the headquarters. Elsewhere, Indian and Nigerian troops occupied other key positions across the territory, defending routes that offered access either to the coast road or the mountain passes. From an entirely desperate position just a few months before, when the Italian attack eventually began there were in fact a total of 4,507 British and Commonwealth troops scattered across the protectorate, and whilst 75 per cent of these were African infantrymen and Somali irregulars, this was still an eightfold increase on the available strength at the beginning of the year.12 Although this represented less than 1 per cent of the British and Commonwealth troops then available for active duty across the British Empire, in many respects it was a remarkable outcome, particularly in light of the worsening situation in Europe and the calls for manpower that were being made from elsewhere.13

  There remained, however, significant deficiencies. Other than a light battery on Knobbly Hill manned by Kenyans, and despite the recommendations that had been made, crucially there were still no significant anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns. This failure to provide adequate firepower, when it was known that the Italians had tanks and armoured cars, undermined any claims that there were plans to conduct a credible defence. Some of the shortages were made up by the homemade mortars that had been produced in the railway workshop
s of Nairobi, but when they were eventually used, lacking proper dial sites as they did, there was no way of achieving precision when firing.14 There were other key problems: lack of transport meant that the defenders lacked mobility, despite a strong mobile reserve being thought absolutely critical. The positions were widely separated but the Italians were known to have mules, which would allow them to cross the rough terrain and outflank the defenders. The differences that still existed between the senior political and military figures in Berbera about what strategy to follow only made the situation worse. Whilst preparations had been made at the Sheikh Pass to completely destroy the road and make its repair a very long operation, Glenday continued to refuse to allow explosives to be put in place for fear of unsettling public opinion.15 He had proved a grave obstacle throughout the year and it was only in July, as the situation dramatically worsened, that the governor finally adopted a new outlook, proposing that he now leave as ‘there was not much left for him to do as the military had everything more or less in their hands’.16 Chater chose to encourage him to stay while also asking Wavell’s headquarters what he should do if London’s senior political representative did depart.

  The lack of clear decision-making was, for once, not mirrored on the Italian side. Despite his previous orders from Rome, Aosta still wanted to launch attacks on Jibuti in order to secure control of the coast and prevent his opponent from using the excellent port to land additional forces. As he assumed that the troops in British Somaliland would interfere, Aosta proposed to march on Berbera at the same time.17 His plan was once again submitted to Mussolini on 18 June but it was not until early the following month that he was finally given authority to proceed. Aosta had used the intervening period to study how an invasion might be conducted, and the viceroy and his deputy, General Guglielmo Nasi, who had arrived in Italian East Africa the previous May and who was one of Italy’s most capable military officers, had produced an accurate estimate of likely enemy forces and an appreciation which outlined the campaign’s objectives. On 25 July detailed instructions were issued to his troops by Lieutenant-General Carlo De Simone, who was in command of what would be the main advancing column.18 He controlled the bulk of Italian fighting power, including the reinforced Harrar Division, with its three colonial brigades comprising eleven infantry battalions supported by plentiful artillery and even some tanks and armoured cars, and a further two Blackshirt battalions. The priority still appeared to be to keep apart the French and British forces and prevent any landings which might lead to a counter-offensive against Harrar. A subsequent British analysis also identified two main objectives, but these were to occupy British Somaliland and to destroy the defending garrison. De Simone had chosen to interpret his main task as being to pass through Hargeisa and Sheikh in order ‘to annihilate the enemy and occupy Berbera’.

  The timetable for the advance was set and East Africa’s period of relative calm was about to come to an end. There were very few aircraft available to the defending garrison, just three Blenheims and a number of antiquated Gladiators, but air reconnaissance on 3 August confirmed that about 400 Italian troops had crossed the border at Biyad. The next morning, a Sunday, additional reports identified De Simone’s column moving towards Hargeisa.19 Along with the road to Odweina further to the south, these were the only practical routes that could be taken to Berbera. Having been held up by the Camel Corps, just after 10 a.m. on 5 August the Italians attacked the protectorate’s major inland town with a mixed bombardment from mortars and light and heavy artillery supported by aircraft flying over the position. Three hours later, twelve light tanks advanced in line and, although three were disabled by anti-tank rifles, the decision was taken to withdraw the company of Rhodesians who had blocked the Italians’ progress.20 Moving in three columns but separated by a considerable distance, Nasi relied upon wireless and aircraft to communicate with De Simone he as manoeuvred into a position to attack Tug Argan from the front. The other two columns tried to mislead their opponent and potentially exploit any weakness as it appeared.21

  1 Italian invasion of British Somaliland.

  Elsewhere troops led by Lieutenant-General Sisto Bertoldi had occupied the port of Zeilah on the invasion’s first day, which removed any possibility of help for the British coming from French Somaliland. The Italian commander failed to exploit the opening presented to him and proceeded cautiously south-east along the coast, managing only to occupy the small village of Bulhar. This was possibly because the local defences had been thought to be much stronger, and thus more able to hold out longer, than was the case. However, had the defenders, operating about 150 miles from Berbera, tried to fight in such an isolated position they would have run the risk of being surrounded and destroyed, and it was sensible that they withdrew. Whilst the opportunity had not been taken to seize this potentially open road to the port, there were now scant defences blocking the advance towards Tug Argan and both sides appeared to recognise, as Wavell had anticipated, that this was the critical point in the coming battle.22

  Despite British and Commonwealth troops falling back at every point, the initial media reports showed an apparent lack of concern, the suggestion being that the invasion was merely ‘a “face-saving” tactic designed to strengthen morale in Italy’.23 Several referred to it as having been expected for some time, and that the Camel Corps, ‘an excellent and capable body of men’ with knowledge of the local terrain, was well equipped to use guerrilla tactics and act as a mobile defence that would cause casualties and delays. Great emphasis was also placed on the challenging nature of the terrain, with the Italians forced to conduct long marches over the mountainous Golis ranges, 10,000-feet-high peaks across which mechanised troops could not travel and where British aircraft could easily find targets. There was also the climate: August was the start of the dry season during which a constant burning wind and temperatures in excess of 120°F made conditions almost unbearable. Another cause for optimism were the local nomadic groups who were said to ‘both dislike and despise’ the Italians and could be counted on to fight for the Empire.24 These kinds of themes were commonly repeated throughout the campaign’s initial days, during which a narrative was developed for the largely ignorant readership in Britain and elsewhere about just how difficult it would be for the attack to succeed. However, this failed to grasp that virtually all of the factors enumerated as slowing down the Italians were also challenges for the garrison. Within only a few days of the fall of Zeilah and Hargeisa there was a subtle change in the media’s tone, with references to how much more difficult the defence was due to the collapse of France and the removal of any chance of support from Jibuti.25 Such reports even accepted that the possible loss of ‘the wretched tract’ of British Somaliland might have to be considered, and it seemed clear that the British public were being readied for worse to come.

  Enemy aircraft had initially flown over Tug Argan late on 6 August, by which point the Italians had already secured local air superiority and the RAF had practically lost the battle.26 What few aircraft there were had been put in the air immediately following the invasion but there were insufficient fighters to provide any protection, and of the only three bombers one was lost within hours.27 With no radar and little or no anti-aircraft defence, the decision had been quickly taken to withdraw from the temporary landing strips that had been built at Berbera and fall back on the small permanent base at Aden more than 200 miles from the battle area.28 Two days later, six Italian aircraft carried out a first raid on the gap, killing an askari and three Somali refugees.29 At the same time reports were received that a small column of tanks and infantry were moving from Hargeisa, and were finding the roadblocks and homemade landmines in front of the hills to be no barrier to their advance. The troops in the forward trenches were consequently withdrawn just after midday on 10 August and pulled back to the main prepared defences. Here they faced an intensive artillery bombardment followed by an advance of troops, both colonials and some of the paramilitary Blackshirts whom the defenders con
sidered to be the equivalent of second-line infantry.30 The assault continued into the night and, after a brief pause, resumed the next morning shortly after first light as every defended post along the British line was attacked. Although the wire was reached in each case, only one of them fell. Even though by this stage it was clear that the defending forces were handicapped by a lack of adequate provisions, Chater believed that ‘my present feeling is that troops will stick it out but [I] do not think we shall be out of the wood for some days yet’.31