Delusional Politics

by Hardeep Singh Puri

  The American right sought a change in the status quo, but a Clinton victory would dupe them into another four years of growing uncertainty and into further retreat into their polar end of the political spectrum. This all goes to say that Clinton’s loss can be explained in many colourful ways—ways that have merited and received its own dedicated book—but the failure of the Democratic Party must be given due credit. Its popularity has slowly been waning. Its mirage of hope can no longer be upheld; the people need action, not abstract promises.

  The party’s reliance on irregular voters—voters who do not vote unless ‘actively inspired’ and who ‘can be easily discouraged from going to the polls’ 40—ultimately cost them the presidency and the last branch of government they held. Some devotees of the Democratic Party chose to express their discontent by staying at home on election day. Others tried their luck with a third-party candidate. But many decided to take a chance on a candidate who campaigned on deliverables, no matter how egregious the proposals were. The system needed a shake-up, and they were offered a candidate who epitomized a sledgehammer, ready to demolish the system and drain the swamp.

  An Alternative Populist: Feeling the Bern

  Early on in the election cycle, I had held high hopes for Democrat-pledged-Independent Bernie Sanders. The existential angst that was susceptible to Trump’s pseudo-populist rhetoric could have been swayed by Sanders’ populist campaign, had he been confirmed as the Democratic nominee. Though the outcome of Clinton vs Trump was murky and too close a call to predict, polls and pundits alike placed a Sanders vs Trump face-off at a Democratic victory. 41 Despite an abysmal turnout for primary elections and a Clinton nomination, Sanders was able to invigorate his supporters in much the same way Trump was able to activate his.

  ‘Populist’ is used to describe both of these candidates’ campaigns but barring their catalytic potential and a certain degree of us vs them-ism, they bear no resemblance. Political analyst John B. Judis’s The Populist Explosion offers a distinction between right- and left-wing populism. These two different strains of populism are key to understanding how uniquely the two men impacted political culture in the United States.

  Candidate Trump followed the textbook formula for right-wing populism, ‘champion[ing] the people against an elite they accuse of coddling a third group.’ 42 In his case, the third group tend to be immigrants and minorities—the takers—and the people the American right—the makers. His campaign targeted Capitol Hill for sympathizing with the undeserving and for robbing honest Americans. He poised himself as the right’s defender against the political establishment and pledged his service to hard-working men and women.

  Sanders adhered to the left-wing populist approach, ‘champion[ing] the people against an elite or an establishment’. 43 He sought to redistribute wealth from the affluent to the working people, to shift power from the concentrated few to the hands of the many, to provide a basic standard of living found in all other developed countries but absent from the United States. He proffered an antidote to inequality through socialist-rooted policies.

  He remained faithful to his anti-elitism throughout his campaign, raising funds through appeals for small-dollar sums, the average donation having been $27; he didn’t have the sums, but he had the masses, with over four million unique donors. 44 His gestures on the campaign trail confirmed his socialist persona. People used words like authentic to describe him—an adjective only otherwise used during the election to describe Trump by his loyalists. 45

  Characteristically, presidential candidates tended to stray far from the extreme ends of political rhetoric, aiming instead for the centre, where traditional votes remained a safe bet. 46 Both Trump and Sanders broke political taboos, venturing into polarized territory. Sanders refused to dance with ‘fleeting’ social issues and instead plunged headlong into the great plagues of American life, at the seldom-taken gamble of losing votes over politically sensitive topics. He stood at the podium animated with vigour, denouncing the so-called ‘economics of exclusion’ and fearlessly pointing fingers at elites who held considerable sway over the outcome of elections. 47 He didn’t try to win votes through pleasantries or gimmicks. He wanted his voters to know, concretely and transparently, the strides he would take once in the White House. He was as he spoke.

  Trump did not abide by the customs of political correctness and used explicit language where he saw fault. The list of his deviations from norms is quite impressive in its extensiveness—colourfully ranging from mocking a reporter with a disability 48 to calling Mexicans rapists. 49 But Trump’s now-staunch supporters did not see in him racism, ignorance and bigotry, as the liberals did. They saw a future president who would not hesitate to communicate to his people using language unburdened and untainted by political censorship. Regardless of the sensitivity of the topic, Trump’s candour would prevail. He would talk to his people as one of their own.

  In this sense, the two candidates forged a personal relationship with the American voters. Sanders was impassioned by the fight for the ever-absent equality, both economical and social, and seemingly held no other motives for the presidency. Trump was the relatable ‘normal guy,’ who lashed out when prodded, and whose character, however flawed and delusional, remained unscathed to his support-base.

  Sanders’ defeat to Clinton in the 2016 primary elections deprived us the opportunity to witness the populist crossroads where the ‘hardworking’ Americans would have stood. I will not discuss the reasons for Sanders’ defeat to Clinton, of which there are many. Nor will I ponder how a Sanders presidency would have differed from the turbulent reign of Trump. I discuss the Trump and Sanders campaigns only to highlight what is all-too-often missing from all sectors of politics—in campaigns, presidencies, legislation, policies, and countless others. The United States, in short, was not ready for a democratic socialist.

  In the United States and indeed elsewhere, discourse surrounding politics often falls into the trap of drowning in numbers, debates surrounding the broken political system, gerrymandering, or other such factors that overlook what lies at the heart of democracy: the individual voter. Qualitative analytics or policy analysis is inarguably important. But numbers don’t reflect emotions; they can’t express existential angst. Trump and Sanders connected to individual voters, and the connection slowly chipped away at the sense of political detachment that gives form to angst.

  In the end, both Sanders and Trump were successful in leaving their imprint on American politics. But, as I predicted, the nature of Trump’s pseudo-populism has proven most antagonistic towards the shifting sands of the world order. Though he himself may not be an isolationist, his polarized leadership has misdirected the American right’s existential angst towards isolationism. The inequalities suffered in the United States will only be heightened, and the angst is destined to return.

  Where to Now?

  Because Trump is such an unusual President, the usual, run-of-the-mill templates for assessing the performance of past Presidents like the first hundred days or six months in office would not provide a satisfactory and comprehensive explanation. Clearly, if judged in the usual traditional manner, he would be characterized as an unhinged, delusional character completely out of sync with reality. Not surprisingly, less than hundred days into office, there were already whispers of a possible impeachment. 50

  In making an assessment of both the current state of play and the future, i.e., the remaining two years, a few caveats are necessary. He is an unusual President. He comes with no administrative and governance experience. He had not been a particularly successful businessman either. He beat an impressive list of sixteen Republican candidates, many of them highly qualified and with outstanding credentials for the top job. To Trump’s credit, he read the national mood and the pulse of the people. What he said resonated with the segment of the population that preferred him over his Republican rival and his democratic opponent. Why this happened has been explained in the previous section. This section looks at th
e possible scenarios of how the Trump Presidency could possibly play out.

  Having said that, we should bear in mind that Trump has a Twitter following of over fifty-two million and has not lost much of his support base of approximately forty-six per cent of the population. 51 He won by the narrowest of margins on account of the peculiar architecture and arithmetic of the Electoral College. Two years into the Presidency, he has not been able to deliver on many of his major promises: healthcare, the Mexican border wall, the immigration ban (‘the Muslim ban’, currently under consideration by the Supreme Court) and so on. He has also taken some very unpopular decisions such as overturning an Obama-era policy that allowed transgender persons to serve openly in the US armed forces, citing budgetary reasons that were later found to be inaccurate 52 (the policy was subsequently overturned by the US Supreme Court, only to be brought back under the guise of mental and physical health standards). 53 He has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change—his predecessor’s signature international achievement—leaving the US as the only country rejecting the pact. 54 He formally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, breaking with seven decades of US foreign policy and stripping any prospects of a US-led mediation. 55 He has announced that the US will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, breaking away from Western allies and possibly inciting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. 56 His attempts to earn a Nobel Peace Prize for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula have fallen embarrassingly short. He initially made negotiations with North Korea virtually impossible by threatening to ‘totally destroy’ the country of twenty-five million and by insulting Kim Jong-Un personally, calling him ‘Little Rocket Man’ and a ‘sick puppy.’ He then proceeded to meet with the North Korean leader at a summit in Singapore, where both of them agreed to ‘denuke’ the Korean Peninsular. A detailed analysis of the summit and its outcomes is provided in the chapter ‘Global Governance’, but it is safe to say that Trump’s walking out of a comprehensive Iran deal and signing a vague and ambiguous agreement with North Korea raises more questions than it answers on his ability to restore stability in East and West Asia.

  There are many examples, and surely many more to come. The question is what lies in store for Trump’s future.

  There are five possibilities: (i) He might succeed despite what is widely perceived as rank incompetence; (ii) He could continue for the remainder of his presidential term as a ‘lame duck’; (iii) Given his propensity for gaffes and other costly mistakes, the GOP might replace him; (iv) or as a variant of (iii) above, he might walk out on his own; or (v) He could be impeached.

  I spent a fair amount of time in New York, and the most entertaining reality show on TV was the process that led to the election of the forty-fifth POTUS. I have since been a keen observer of the ongoing theatre of the absurd. Clearly, Trump is not the only guilty party. The western liberal democratic order has refused to come to terms with his victory. Within the United States, the deep state and the fourth estate in particular are guilty of gross violations.

  Two years on, it seems to me now that the prospects for an impeachment—given past precedent and with the Democrats gaining a small majority in the House of Representatives—appear remote, even if costly mistakes continue to be made. A party in power has little to gain by impeaching its own sitting President. Given the ‘friendly’ Supreme Court, the prospects for impeachment appear even more unlikely. 57 Any suggestion that the chances of impeachment have increased because of the mid-term elections and success for the Democratic Party 58 should be treated with a degree of circumspection. Impeachment is not possible without a certain level of Republican support, which we should not expect any time soon.

  Trump has demonstrated his deep concern over the Russia problem, most notably by firing former FBI Director James Comey. It is almost clear that Trump will face criminal indictment for actions taken prior to his election and, at the very least, charges of obstruction of justice on account of administrative actions as President in relation to the Russia investigations. Five figures with ties to the Trump campaign—his first National Security Adviser Michael Flynn; presidential campaign adviser George Papadopoulos; former lawyer Alex van der Zwaan; former campaign aide Richard Gates; and Richard Pinedo—have pleaded guilty and have agreed to cooperate with the ongoing investigations, while seventeen Trump affiliates have been indicted. 59 More indictments and cooperation deals are likely to follow. Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen, who was involved in several of Trump’s questionable business dealings (most notably a payment to adult film actress Stormy Daniels), is under investigation for campaign finance violations. 60 Unless Special Counsel Robert Mueller is fired—and even then, possibly despite the firing—the Russia problem seems to be the most likely form of the Trump presidency’s decline.

  Looking at Trump’s cabinet appointments, it is clear that those in his administration are striving for the ‘lame duck’ option. In an article titled ‘The Adults in the Room’ in the New York Review of Books, 61 James Mann profiles three notable Trump appointees: Defence Secretary James Mattis, former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly. With their military backgrounds, these men have been considered the icons of stability within a chaotic, incomprehensible administration, and Trump’s best bet for a modicum of success during his tenure. However, in the short time since this article was published, H.R. McMaster has already resigned, and while John Kelly has insisted he will remain chief of staff till 2020, 62 given the precedent set by Trump, this might not be the case.

  An article in the Guardian quotes Frank Luntz, a Republican consultant and pollster, as saying, ‘With Donald Trump, every news cycle is a lifetime. Never assume he’s dead, because he always rises from the ashes of some political or personal error. And never assume he’s safe, because the next political explosion is no more than days away.’ 63

  Conclusion

  Roberto Savio, founder of Inter Press Service and now its professor emeritus, in a column 64 argues that many of President Trump’s policies, like declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel or withdrawing from the UN Global Compact on Migration, have little to do with American interests. Rather, these decisions are taken as they resonate with a certain section of the population, namely evangelicals, blue-collar workers, and much of rural America, who were left behind in the globalization process. Throughout the campaign trail, President Trump courted this vote bank, and ultimately, it was instrumental in getting him elected to the highest public office in the country. 65

  Given that voter turnout in America is only 55.7 per cent 66 (notwithstanding various measures taken to restrict access to voting), President Trump can ride a thirty-two per cent approval rating, 67 the lowest in the history for an American President, as eighty-two per cent of his voters, would still cast the ballot in his name. 68 Public opinion, and the larger American interest, therefore, matters little to the forty-fifth President of the United States.

  At the centre of delusional politics is always the delusional politician. The damage that the delusional politician does will be assessed against the resilience of institutions. In the case of the United States, fortunately, the institutions are strong and will assert themselves hopefully to emerge stronger. Will other countries be able to step in to fill the void created by a US retreat, either perceived or real? There aren’t too many around with the capacity to do so. And even those that have that potential, appear both distracted and unwilling to step up. A certain re-ordering and reset will, however, inevitably follow.

  Post Scriptum: The Trump Administration

  Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House

  On 3 January 2018, the New York Magazine published excerpts from the book Fire and Fury by Michael Wolff. 69

  The excerpts published by New York Magazine begins with Kellyanne Conway, the campaign manager for President Trump’s bid for the White House, entering the campaign office in a ‘buoyant mood’, for she was going to have her cake and eat it too. Candidate Trum
p was going to lose, the blame would be borne by the Republican leadership, and she would in all likelihood land a financially lucrative deal with one of the popular news networks she so prominently featured on.

  The excerpt, as much of the book, is predicated on this larger theory—candidate Trump was never expected to ‘win’ the election. His bid for Presidential office was to make him one of the most famous men on earth, which in turn would add value to his business empire, and everyone associated with him would get his/her own slice of the pie. ‘Losing’ the election itself was the end game.

  Before going deeper into the book, a few words about the author and the tone of the book need to be mentioned.

  Described in 2004 as the ‘It-boy of New York Media’, 70 Wolff rose to prominence as a writer by profiling the lives of the rich and powerful. His most prominent works in fact were focused on those who occupied the high-table in his own profession—the news media.

  His reportage has been dubbed unconventional, and that ‘. . . he absorbs the atmosphere and gossip swirling around him at cocktail parties, on the street, and especially during those long lunches.’ 71 A profile of Wolff by the New Republic describes his writing as ‘. . . the scenes in his columns aren’t recreated so much as created—springing from Wolff’s imagination rather than from actual knowledge of events.’ 72

  Given this background, it should come as no surprise that the tonality the book adopts is more akin to a gossip column or even a screenplay for a Netflix special, than a book of either investigative journalism or of academic standing. It is at best a highly dramatized version of the first 100 days of the Trump Presidency, and at worst, a rather long gossip column on the workings of the White House under the forty-fifth POTUS.

  Coming back to the contents of the book, the author claims that given that no one on the campaign team, including Donald J. Trump, expected him to win the election, each member(s) proceeded with their respective post-election plans—as mentioned, Conway had laid the foundation to become an expert on TV news; Trump proclaimed he could be the most famous man in the world with the most powerful brand in the world; Ivanka Trump and husband Jared Kushner would be propelled to celebrity status in the international policy community; Reince Priebus would regain control of the Republican Party; and Steve Bannon of Breitbart would come to head the Tea Party.