Delusional Politics

by Hardeep Singh Puri

  CHAPTER 5

  Global Governance

  ‘Turning and turning in the widening gyre

  The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

  Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

  Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world . . .’

  —Second Coming by W.B. Yeats, written in 1919 in the aftermath of World War 1

  Delusional Decision-making at the Multilateral Level

  Should it ever become possible to conduct a credible global poll on the existential questions of life and death, war and peace, the verdict would be overwhelmingly clear. No matter what the ideological preferences of the earth’s seven billion or so human inhabitants, they would, cutting across nations with different political systems, opt for peaceful coexistence. They would express a preference for economic growth and development, bread and butter, over weapons, strife and war. And yet nation states, propelled by their narrow sectarian interests, continue to pursue misconceived policies. They are leading the planet’s seven billion people into a deepening existential crisis.

  The Global Governance Crises

  The governance framework of individual nations is predicated on their sovereign rights over a specific territory. In these specific territories, referred to as sovereign nations, governments are established, monarchs are anointed, dictators and military heads appoint themselves, to control and coordinate social relations and, when required, enforce decisions.

  However, the world doesn’t have a single government, monarch or dictator, to oversee its governance, and perhaps it does not need one.

  The institution which comes closest to overseeing global governance is the United Nations (UN) which views it as ‘the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-border relations between states, cultures, citizens, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and the market. It embraces the totality of institutions, policies, rules, practices, norms, procedures and initiatives by which states and their citizens (indeed, humanity as a whole) try to bring more predictability, stability and order to their responses to transnational challenges—such as climate change and environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism—which go beyond the capacity of a single state to solve.’ 1

  To summarize the UN view, one can say that global governance is required for (i) transborder relations between varying sections of society, interacting with one another on a range of public policy issues; (ii) creating a world order which is peaceful and stable, and one where aforementioned interactions lead to prosperity of mankind; and (iii) to address challenges at the supranational level, i.e. to tackle those issues which one nation or actor cannot solve on its own. 2

  To say then that 2017 was a year of turmoil for global governance would be an understatement. From governance of nuclear security to climate change, from the oceans to the Internet, 2017 witnessed delusional politics all around.

  In this book I have addressed four areas of global governance: nuclear security, climate change, terrorism and international trade. Given the complexities of the latter three, and my deep personal engagement in the subjects, I have dedicated entire chapters to them. In this chapter, I will be addressing the first two: nuclear security and climate change.

  Nuclear Security and Climate Change: The Trump Years

  The Trump presidency’s three defining acts vis-à-vis nuclear security and climate action are his handling of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA), more commonly referred to as the Iran deal, his negotiations with North Korea and the Paris Accord. And unlike the consequences of his delusional politics at home, his actions in these three spheres have had far-reaching international repercussions.

  The Art of Making a Deal: Iran

  The Iran deal—agreed to by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, besides Germany, the European Union and Iran—was a significant achievement of the international community to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. After extensive negotiations, which were led by the United States under President Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, all actors agreed the deal was the best possible outcome at the time, given the instability the Middle East had witnessed post the interventions in Iraq, Libya and Yemen.

  In an act of the highest form of delusional thinking, on 8 May 2018, President Trump withdrew from the Iran deal, stating, ‘This was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made.’ Adding, ‘It didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.’ 3

  Ostensibly, the President’s decision to withdraw was based on the reasoning that the deal was compromised to begin with. From the outset, the deal did not guarantee a safer future as it had left enough room for Iran to go nuclear in the future. At its core, however, this line of thinking had little to do with the contours of the deal itself. President Trump, throughout his presidential campaign, portrayed Hillary Clinton as part of an ‘establishment elite’ that was more concerned with international objectives, rather than American national interest. His disregard for multilateralism and its outcomes had little to do with multilateralism or its outcomes. Rather, it was a campaign strategy to galvanize his support base against the elitist Hillary Clinton and President Obama. When viewed from this perspective, the withdrawal from the Iran deal was a corrective measure he took in the interest of the average American—a delusion he himself believed and fed his support base. He was correcting, he believed, a wrong committed by the ‘establishment’ and saving America from yet another international misadventure, similar to the interventions in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Moreover, the withdrawal was meant to pander to the strong Israeli lobby in the United States, which was steadfastly against the Iran deal but got little attention from President Obama.

  The delusional act of bringing domestic partisanship and one-upmanship to international negotiations, that too to an issue as grave as nuclear security, has had serious consequences.

  The United States stands isolated as the countries of the European Union have openly distanced themselves from the President and his decision. Worse still for the United States, its withdrawal has left a vacuum and European leaders have already reached out to Russia in a bid to save the Iran deal. The following statements by the French leader Macron and the Russian President Vladimir Putin, post a meeting in May 2018, are instructive:

  I was personally assured that Iran is fulfilling all its obligations, so the question arises what grounds there were to exit this agreement . . . We welcome the efforts of Iran and Europe to preserve this deal, while understanding that it will be hard—Vladimir Putin 4

  This process that was already launched to reduce tensions on the peninsula, and the process with the goal of denuclearisation, this process should continue—Emmanuel Macron 5

  Perhaps what is even more worrying than the domestic political considerations to withdraw from the deal is Trump’s conviction that he alone can make a better deal. Only two days after the withdrawal, at a campaign rally, he stated, ‘I hope to be able to make a deal with them, a good deal, a fair deal—a good deal for them, better for them.’ 6

  It remains unclear what the contours of this ‘better deal’ will be and how it will be achieved. For now, the deal remains in the realm of delusional decision-making, stemming from delusional thinking.

  Rocket Men: North Korea

  The following tweet from the personal account of the forty-fifth President of the United States is just one example of the flailing governance of nuclear security in the world:

  North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the ‘Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted and food-starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works! 7

  For a better part of the Trump presidency, the US President and the North Korean leader were locked in a bitter war of words, trading personal insults, dropping the ‘n’ word in these duels more of
ten than anyone would have imagined. 8

  As with most policies under Trump, it was unclear whether this form of ‘diplomacy’ was part of a larger, long-term, US strategy, or just off-the-cuff remarks by the President.

  The conflicting statements by the former secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, complicated the matters further during the time the two leaders partook in these exchanges. Take for instance Tillerson’s statement which he made at an event at the Atlantic Council, a think tank in Washington, on 13 December 2017: ‘We’re ready to have the first meeting without precondition. Let’s just meet. And we can talk about the weather if you want. We can talk about whether it’s going to be a square table or a round table if that’s what you’re excited about. But can we at least sit down and see each other face to face.’ 9 It took the White House, and Tillerson’s own state department, less than forty-eight hours to contradict these views. The state department’s spokesperson claimed, ‘The secretary was not creating any new policy. Our policy remains exactly the same as it was, the very same policy that we have talked about in this room for months and months now. First and foremost, diplomacy is our top priority’. 10 After these statements were made, the White House spokesperson cautioned against Tillerson’s words, claiming ‘The president’s views on North Korea have not changed. North Korea is acting in an unsafe way, not only toward Japan, China and South Korea, but the entire world. North Korea’s actions are not good for anyone and certainly not good for North Korea.’ 11

  One might be tempted to suggest that this was the US administration’s way of playing good cop, bad cop, where the POTUS projected a more aggressive stance while his secretary of state offered the North Korean dictator an olive branch. However, this view didn’t stand on strong footing, given the press reports that suggested that the secretary of state and the President had serious differences on the subject. 12

  And like most officials in the Trump administration who differed with the President, Rex Tillerson was relieved of his job as the secretary of state. Mike Pompeo, the then director of CIA, replaced Tillerson, and his deputy at the intelligence agency, Gina Haspel, came to head the institution. In addition to these changes, the President brought into the fold John Bolton as his national security advisor, replacing Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster.

  Each of these individuals had a common reputation that preceded them—Pompeo was a former member of the Tea Party, and known to have a hawkish worldview. He famously defended the CIA against the senate report that claimed that torture tactics were deployed during the Bush presidency. 13 Gina Haspel, who replaced Pompeo as the head of the CIA, was herself accused of torturing suspects and destroying evidence. 14 Neither of them, however, comes close to the hawkishness of John Bolton, who till day remains one of the few individuals who defends the American invasion of Iraq, 15 and the intervention in Libya. 16

  Having assembled a team of some of America’s most hawkish and least internationalist individuals, President Trump performed a 180-degree turn. On 12 June 2018, he met with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Un, for a historic summit in Singapore—precisely what his previous secretary of state had advocated all along.

  This came as a relief to the international community. Unlike the bitter exchanges online, the in-person meeting at the summit saw the two leaders shake hands and interact in a manner which was warm and cordial. At the press conference following the signing of the joint document, Trump stated, ‘I want to thank Chairman Kim for taking the first bold step toward a bright new future for his people . . . My meeting with Chairman Kim was honest, direct, and productive. We got to know each other well in a very confined period of time.’ 17

  The delusional aspect of the summit, however, emerges when one studies the following—the popular reaction to the outcome, the outcome itself, and the approach adopted by President Trump to the summit’s outcome.

  Much of the left-leaning liberal commentariat has framed its personal dislike for Trump on the global governance architecture he is trying to build. He has been questioned and criticized for meeting a brutal dictator and giving the regime legitimacy. It is important here to separate the wheat from the chaff—democratically elected leaders are under no compulsion to conduct diplomacy with only leaders who have been elected through a democracy. As Trump has noted following the summit, he has to deal with whoever his counterpart is and however such an individual may have attained the leadership position in his/her sovereign territory. 18 The legitimacy argument too doesn’t hold true, particularly in the case of Kim Jong-Un. There is little to suggest the North Korean leader doesn’t already enjoy popular support in his home country. 19 There is even less to suggest he seeks/needs legitimacy from the US-led alliance system, which has over the past few decades lost its own credibility thanks to numerous ill-conceived interventions overseas. 20 Too many in the liberal space have deluded themselves to this line of thought. Nations no longer seek an American stamp of approval—the days of hegemonic powers have ended, and the world has witnessed and accepted what looks like a multipolar international order.

  Once we clear the cobwebs around legitimacy, it becomes clear that from a North Korean point of view, the summit was a meeting between two heads of state to address long-standing bilateral issues. The outcome document made no mention of South Korea, Japan and China, making it clear that the purpose of the meeting between Kim Jong-Un and Trump was not to address the North–South issue, but to deliberate upon the future of the US–DPRK 21 relationship.

  This is not to suggest that the ‘deal’ struck by Trump is even close to being ideal—the outcome document is steeped in delusional decision-making itself.

  Given the context of the meeting between the two leaders, the outcome document emanating from such a summit cannot be subjected to ‘bullet-point diplomacy’ as it has come to be realized. While there is certainly virtue in Trump and Kim having better personal relationships than they have had over the past two years, the ambiguous nature of the outcome document has left enough room for each side to interpret the agreement for their own consideration—the phrase ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ has an entirely different meaning for the US and North Korea. 22

  Moreover, this ambiguity has set the precedent for future negotiations. Both Iran and North Korea will see the other as a benchmark. For Iran, a much watered-down (and vague) agreement with the United States sends the signal that to get Trump back on the table, it too needs to expand its nuclear capability, and in return, get a better deal than the one it signed with Obama. For North Korea, if Trump can renege on the Obama-era Iran deal, which was much more comprehensive than the bullet points they have agreed to, there is little value in taking the initiative forward, and in fact, their best play is to continue to retain a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching the United States. When viewed from this prism, the discontinuation of military exercises with South Korea is a win-win solution for Kim Jong-Un. He has demonstrated that he can build intercontinental ballistic missiles, buy time from the US (due to the vagueness of the bullet points) on the future course of action, and have South Korea and Japan on the back foot.

  In what can only be described as cognitive dissonance on part of Trump, the withdrawal from the Iran deal and the removal of American military presence from the Korean peninsula has reshaped the world order as was imagined post World War II. The alliances that were forged in the aftermath of the war to uphold the liberal world order no longer hold. ‘America first’ is now the new normal.

  The third layer of delusion witnessed at the end of the summit was Trump’s belief that he could personally find a solution to North Korea’s nuclear programme, just like in the case of Iran. There is a growing sense that for Trump summit level meetings are not a means to an end, but an end in themselves. Having been an officer in the Indian Foreign Service for nearly forty years, I understand the frustrations shared by many over bureaucratic functioning. But even the harshest critics would agree that to finalize a complex nuclear deal between a reality star-turned
President and an erratic and brutal North Korean dictator requires careful consideration and deft handling. Trump, over the course of his presidency, has undermined his state department and the larger national security apparatus. The mass-scale downsizing of these institutions conducted under his watch has meant that there exists little to no resources, both in terms of number of personnel and personnel with the requisite expertise. When the time comes to get down to the nuts and bolts of a larger ‘de-nuke’ framework, questions over the capacity of United States to see it through are likely to emerge. There is every chance that the President could bring in a seasoned negotiator like Bob Einhorn, who is currently at the Brookings Institutions. That, however, will not be sufficient as the state department has been significantly weakened. There is also no guarantee that the professionals who are brought in would risk damage to their reputations as they are likely to meet the fate of many of their predecessors who were left humiliated by the President. This is a rather unlikely situation for a nation that has for long prided itself for its state capacity, and for a President whose USP is to get things done.

  The entire discourse around weaponization of nuclear material under the Trump administration is therefore steeped in delusional politics. There is very little narrative to suggest that there is a vision of how the world can be made a safer place. The United Nations has meanwhile been a bystander, its legitimacy in conducting global governance reaching an all-time low.