Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current Developments and Future Directions
Page 7
not simply in terms of the decision to confess, deny or say nothing, but also
in the way in which the suspect denies. Truthful denials are of equally compel-
22
Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing
ling interest as false confessions. Moreover, it would obviously help the police
offi cer ’ s pursuit of the guilty to be able to distinguish between those who are
falsely denying and those who are merely being truthful. As a fi rst step in
understanding denials as a species of behaviour by suspects, we offer in this
chapter an analysis of denials obtained in earlier studies of interrogation
outcomes.
Denial s trategies
What are the most common ways in which suspects deny accusations and what
are the characteristics and motives of the suspects who utilize each of these
‘ denial strategies ’ ? A central theme in this chapter is the way in which police
offi cers react to denials and the likely implications of each denial strategy on
the perceived credibility of the suspect. By perceived credibility we refer to
the offi cer ’ s assumption that the suspect is telling the truth or lying. That is,
a denial is either accepted as the statement of an innocent person or as a lie
put forward by someone trying to evade prosecution. Of course, a suspect
may genuinely have a different perception of the content or signifi cance of
their behaviour from that of the offi cer. In many instances a denial in the
police interviewing suite is akin to the alcoholic ’ s denial of his or her lack of
control over drinking. In such an instance it can be said of the suspect
’ s
behaviour, as of the alcoholics, that ‘ Denial is not lying. It is actually a per-
ceptual incapacity – the most primitive of the psychological defences ’ (Thombs,
1999 : 69).
In the criminal case the misperception may have been at the time of the
event, as of the dangerous driver who is convinced they looked carefully
before pulling out into the path of another vehicle, or the violent offender
who misreads as provocation the perfectly reasonable observations the victim
made about his conduct. Equally, as occurs in some sexual offences, a belief
in their essential innocence may be the product of false premises about what
constitutes an offence, or even disbelief that they would be capable of perpe-
trating such harm to another. Shame and anger may certainly motivate the
drinker labelled an alcoholic to reject the help offered, and those motivations
may well motivate the suspect labelled a rapist, for example, to deny the
accusation.
Thombs goes on to describe the dangers of directly confronting the alco-
holic with the reality of their situation: ‘ The use of confrontative procedures
to break down the denial may in many situations have the unintended effect
of actually strengthening it ’ ( ibid .: 70).
The ‘ truth ’ is an elusive and negotiable interpretation of events; the diffi cul-
ties of assuming otherwise will be discussed later. For the moment we will
assume that offi cers are naturally inclined to assume that telling the truth on
the one hand, and lying on the other, are mutually distinct categories, regard-
A Typology of Denial Strategies by Suspects in Criminal Investigations 23
less of the oversimplifi cations this distinction introduces and regardless of the
fact that this assumption may well be tactically inept.
There is currently a fundamental difference in attitude between different
police jurisdictions towards the desirability and signifi cance of denials of
involvement in an offence by suspects. In view of this it is surprising that very
little is known about the ways in which suspects deny accusations. Some forces
view denials as an important factor that is crucially important evidence for
establishing guilt or innocence, depending on their plausibility in relation to
the evidence. Others seem to assume that denials are invariably best treated as
potentially supporting false alibis. Either way, it seems there would be merit
in preparing for an interview in such a way as to anticipate the types of denials
(or alibis) that both an innocent and a guilty suspect might put forward. For
example, in Australia the New South Wales Police (2005) are taught to ask
questions to elicit full denials before introducing evidence such as fi ngerprints
(there are no data to confi rm or refute the actual use of such tactics). A similar
approach is used in The Netherlands (van der Sleen, 2006 ), where the empha-
sis is on getting the suspect to give a detailed statement that would prevent a
guilty suspect from rejecting the implication of the evidence in the case, whilst
allowing innocent suspects the opportunity to explain how they have come to
be under suspicion. This approach to interviewing is very different from the
approaches seen in countries such as the USA, where the ever - popular Reid
technique holds that denials by the suspect are to be avoided (see Inbau, Reid,
Buckley & Jayne, 2001 ) in the interests of securing a presumably truthful
confession. In both approaches, however, it is apparent that an analysis of
‘ denial strategies ’ , potentially characterized according to their use by deceptive
or by honest (even if mistaken) suspects, would inform the investigation and,
we would hope, facilitate procedural justice.
One study that has explored the different verbal (and nonverbal) strategies
employed by truth - tellers and liars was conducted by Hartwig, Granhag &
Str ö mwall (2007) . In this study mock suspects, role playing either guilty or
innocent suspects, were interviewed by trainee police offi cers. The study found
that liars used a series of strategies to appear credible. These included appear-
ing to be calm and relaxed; telling the truth as much as possible; fi rmly denying
guilt; avoiding incriminating details by denying having seen key items; pre-
tending to be innocent; and being nice and pleasant. In another experimental
study by the same authors (Str ö mwall, Hartwig & Granhag, 2006 ), during
mock interrogations truth - tellers and liars differed in terms of their denial
strategy, with liars favouring a ‘ keep it simple strategy ’ .
In Hartwig et al. (2007) , and in research by Vrij (2006) , truth - tellers and
liars were also found to exhibit different nonverbal behaviours. Such results
indicate that deceptive suspects are likely to enter into interrogations with a
diverse set of strategies which may well set them apart from those who are
telling what they believe to be the truth. While the above studies featured
mock suspects, there is no reason to believe that suspects in real cases would
be any less proactive.
24
Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing
A t ypology of d enial s trategies
The following descriptions of denial strategies are derived from a diverse range
of available sources, including over 100 tape - recordings of interviews from the
UK, which were supplied to the authors by colleagues from a number of UK
police services, sometimes as part of wider research studies on police interview-
ing; interview transcripts from Aust
ralia and the United States, also supplied
to the authors by police offi cers; and court transcripts that were available in
the public domain (mainly from the UK and Australia). The one common
element in each case was that during an interview in a police station, the
suspect denied committing an offence. As this was a diverse set of data no
attempt to quantify the frequency of each strategy was attempted. Subsequent
research using representative samples of cases would be required to address
that issue accurately.
All records of interviews have been anonymized and the participants labelled
as ‘ interviewer ’ and ‘ suspect ’ (except in public domain cases). The approach
here is primarily descriptive, with an emphasis on illustrating the typical char-
acteristics of a range of denial strategies. Inevitably, we cannot say with cer-
tainty to what extent strategies are characteristic of suspects with either
deceptive or honest intent. We do not have details of the subsequent history
of the cases, who was charged, prosecuted and found guilty, as against those
whose cases were not pursued and who dropped out of the system at one or
other stage, for whatever reasons. Such research is needed, and when con-
ducted will be guided by the categorization of denial strategies outlined in this
study. We shall, however, where it seems justifi ed, comment on the plausibility
of ascribing one or another strategy to deceptive or honest intent, and comment
on the anticipated response of interviewers to employment of the strategies in
varying circumstances.
Denial strategies can fi rst be classifi ed into one of two broad typologies:
passive and active. A passive denial is one in which the suspect denies the
accusation but does not provide any exculpatory detail. An active denial does
include exculpatory detail.
Passive d enials
Simple d enial of c harge. The denial of charge, or a simple denial, is the
most elementary way in which a person can challenge evidence or refute an
allegation, as in:
Interviewer : You were then seen to put the items in your bag.
Suspect : No.
The suspect does not support the statement or offer an alternative version of
events. Instead, he simply offers a short statement (
‘ No ’ ,
‘ That ’ s wrong
’ ,
A Typology of Denial Strategies by Suspects in Criminal Investigations 25
‘ You ’ re mistaken ’ , ‘ I didn ’ t do it, all right? ’ etc.) rejecting the interviewer ’ s
assertion. The simple denial is characterized by a lack of elaboration on the
part of the suspect. No alternative explanation of the facts is offered, nor is
there any attempt to challenge the evidence in a case (e.g., a witness state-
ment). This particular strategy has been seen in several high - profi les cases, such
as the serial murderer Harold Shipman.
Interviewer : The letters in the will were all typed on your Brother typewriter.
Can you account for that?
Shipman : No.
…
Interviewer : Can I put it directly to you, doctor, that you forged; you pro-
duced the letters of this will from your typewriter in the hope
of benefi ting from Mrs Grundy ’ s estate.
Shipman :
Is that a question or a statement?
Interviewer : I put it to you that that is the case.
Shipman :
That is not the case.
Interviewer : I put it to you that you are responsible, you are the author of
the letters and you manufactured the will. You forged the
signatures.
Shipman :
And I am saying I didn ’ t do it.
Another high - profi le case to feature this defence was employed in the trial
of the child murderer Roy Whiting. Timothy Langdale QC, prosecuting,
questioned the likelihood of Whiting being the
‘ unfortunate victim of an
extraordinary accident ’ . Specifi cally, he questioned how it was possible that
hair from a victim could have dislodged from an exhibit package taken from
the victim ’ s home and then got into a bag containing a red sweatshirt belong-
ing to Whiting, where it was subsequently found.
Langdale :
The alternative is that barring that extraordinary accident it can
only mean one thing. … You were the man who kidnapped, you
were the man who killed that child and you were the man who
buried her body. That is the only other alternative, is it not?
Whiting :
It was not me.
According to Inbau et al. (2001) , the credibility of simple denials is under-
mined further when suspects use qualifi cations such as ‘ I honestly wouldn ’ t
do that ’ or ‘ I swear I didn ’ t do this ’ . It has, however, to be recognized that
evaluation of the plausibility of simple denials has to be considered in the light
of good evidence to the contrary. Without such evidence it would certainly
be rash always to interpret simple denials as evidence of dishonesty.
Regardless of evidence, many interviewers become hostile when confronted
with such denials. This may be due, in part, to surprise. The interviewer, having
26
Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing
entered the interview confi dent of the suspect ’ s guilt, encounters a denial that
goes against their expectations, and frustration may lead to annoyance. Denial
in the face of evidence is especially likely to be interpreted by the interviewer
as stubbornness, or on occasion as stupidity on the part of the suspect.
Bewilderment:
d enial of
k nowledge. Some suspects will claim that
they
‘ don ’ t know anything
’ about the offence under discussion and so
they cannot answer any questions. This particular strategy has a long history,
with the Gospel according to Mark (14: 66
– 8) featuring the following
exchange.
As Peter was in the courtyard below, one of the maids of the high priest came,
and seeing Peter warming himself, she looked at him, and said, ‘ You were also
with the Nazarene, Jesus! ’ But he denied it, saying, ‘ I neither know, nor under-
stand what you are saying. ’
On some occasions the apparently exasperated suspect may attempt to
convey a feeling of indifference or boredom with the accusation and question-
ing process. Others may state that they are keen to help: ‘ If only I could. ’ This
enthusiasm might be coupled with a thirst for information, with the suspect
eager to hear all about the crime.
For the guilty suspect this strategy no doubt represents an attempt to mimic
the reactions of an innocent person. Unfortunately, it is always going to be
diffi cult to determine whether a person is being truthful or deceptive.
Independent evidence is required, which the suspect, if innocent, may well
offer to provide. As with some of the other strategies described here, the
suspect is trying to opt out of questioning, and this may or may not be justi-
fi ed. Suspicions may rightly be entertained, however, if, as frequently happens,
suspects preclude the possibility that they could answer questions a
bout any
aspect of the incident under investigation and are unable to give a verifi able
alternative account.
This type of denial is especially likely to reduce the credibility of the suspect
when there is some evidence to implicate them. Then, the complete absence
of any knowledge of the relevant incident or event will be deemed deeply
suspicious by the interviewer.
Denial of p erception. On some occasions, particularly those in which several
suspects are thought to have acted together, say in a theft or assault, the
(guilty) suspects will try to give the impression that even though they were
present at the incident (which is probably incontestable – a key determinant
of this strategy), they were only on the periphery of events, and as for whatever
it is that the police are interested in, didn ’ t see it. Any event which might
implicate them or their accomplices will have occurred while they were ‘ looking
the other way ’ or were ‘ out of earshot ’ . As with some of the other challenges,
the suspects are unlikely to deny that the event occurred, merely that they did
A Typology of Denial Strategies by Suspects in Criminal Investigations 27
not see it. This stratagem may also be characteristic of an onlooker who wishes
to protect the perpetrator of the offence.
Either way, the clear intention here is to divert the interviewer from pressing
the suspect to explain what happened. By claiming not to have seen anything
the suspect avoids the risk of lying. Claiming to have missed the event, the
suspect is attempting to opt out of the process of questioning. Each question
put by the interviewer will be met with a uniform ‘ I don ’ t know ’ response.
A variation on this strategy is for suspects to claim that they were too drunk
(or drugged) to remember anything that occurred. As with the other form of
this type of challenge, this is often an attempt to opt out of questioning. The
suspect will probably accept any suggestions from the interviewer, including
admitting that ‘ I may have done it – if only I could remember ’ . The interviewer
needs to be wary in such cases of listing the evidence and accepting the sus-
pect ’ s simple acquiescence.
Guilty suspects who use this strategy have two possible motives. First, it
serves as a prompt for the police interviewer to reveal any evidence that impli-