The World Crisis

by Winston S. Churchill

  ‘For the diplomats the situation was clear. It was otherwise for the Chief of the General Staff, who on the one hand must keep before him the rapid and decisive war against Serbia, but on the other must be prepared suddenly to divert everything towards a war with Russia. This was a dilemma involving in itself the gravest responsibility and a most unfavourable situation from the point of view of operations….’20

  These reasons may be true or partly true; but they are not convincing. Conrad had misjudged what Russia would do and ignored the true proportions of the military problem. Already on July 25 the effects of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia were apparent in every capital. By the 26th the German government was conscious of a stern spirit in the Powers of the Triple Entente. The Russian agitation was intense; the French had shown an icy calm; England had declared in the most public manner that her First and Second Fleets would remain concentrated. A situation of terrific intensity had been created. The idea that Austria would be suffered to invade and crush Serbia while all the other Powers remained spectators was fantastic. Yet under the prepossessions of a fortnight before, when Germany was believed to be wishing for vigour against Serbia, and in spite of the new vast peril of the situation, Plan B was put into operation and carried out in a purblind integrity.

  It is vain for Conrad to shield himself behind ‘diplomacy.’ Nothing could supersede the military situation for which he was responsible. The life-and-death fortunes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire depended upon the Russian action. If Russia invaded Austria, every man would be needed. Until a battle had been fought between Russia and Austria no entanglement of Austro-Hungarian forces in Serbia could be tolerated. If on the other hand Russia, confronted with the armed might of Germany, lowered her sword, the chastisement of Serbia would be easy and sure. A very few days would settle the question one way or the other. Conrad had only to reply to those who pressed him to strike down Serbia: ‘We shall know very soon whether it is to be Plan B or Plan R, and I insist upon that delay, even if we lose our advantage against Serbia.’ But impatient to strike the detested enemy, he underrated the chances of Russian action, and though the briefest pause would have given him certainty, launched the Imperial armies on an erroneous premise.

  On July 31 the general mobilization of Russia was in full progress. On the same afternoon the Kaiser telegraphed to the Emperor as follows:

  ‘The preliminary mobilization of my entire army and of my navy which I have ordered to-day will be followed in the shortest possible time by definite mobilization. I count the 2nd August as the first day of mobilization and am prepared, in fulfilment of my duties as an ally, to begin war against Russia immediately. In this momentous struggle it is of the greatest importance that Austria should direct her main forces against Russia and should not divide her forces by an offensive against Serbia. This is the more important as a large part of my army will be tied by France. In the battle of giants into which we are entering shoulder to shoulder, Serbia plays quite a subsidiary part, which calls only for such defensive measures as are absolutely necessary. A successful issue of the war, and with it the existence of our monarchies, is only to be hoped for if both of us move with our full strength against our new and mighty opponents. I beg of you further to do all you can by meeting her wishes to induce Italy to take part. All else must be subordinated to the entry of a united Triple Alliance into the war.—WILHELM.’21

  So here is the whole web of illusion torn to pieces and Conrad and the Austrian leaders are face to face with a hideous reality of an immediate Russian invasion which their Ally is urging them to meet with their fullest strength. On paper, Plan B was automatically superseded by Plan R. It was now necessary to send the Second Army to the north. However, it was already in its trains for the opposite direction. A spring had been released and the highly complicated process was in active progress. To arrest the movement of the Second Army in mid-transit would throw the whole organization into confusion. No course was open but to allow its eight divisions to complete their journey to the Serbian frontier, detrain at their appointed sidings, proceed to their assembly points, and then in their proper order of arms and units re-enter their trains and be carried to Galicia. This return journey could not begin effectively till August 18. There was the consolation that the mere arrival of this army on the Serbian frontier would draw off a proportion of the Serbian forces and thus aid the Fifth and Sixth Austrian Armies. Conrad was thus forced to pretend a necessity where none existed, and to make a virtue of it, if possible. He says:

  ‘The First, Third and Fourth Armies were on the way occupying all assembly transport routes towards Galicia, while the Second Army was arriving, to start with, on the Save and Danube and would not follow the above-named armies until after the lines of approach to Galicia had become free.

  ‘If these orders, imposed by necessity, had the advantage that until the Second Army was withdrawn from the Save and Danube the enemy would find himself threatened there and would be compelled to hold forces to oppose them, yet there was also the danger that the forces of the Second Army might become involved in hostilities against Serbia. The great river barrier, of course, diminished this danger.’22

  He felt the need of offering some explanation to his military colleague upon the strange peregrinations to which his Second Army was condemned. He wrote to Moltke on August 1:1

  ‘YOUR EXCELLENCY,—

  ‘At this fateful moment I am impelled to place myself in direct relations with you in order to make certain of that full unity which I have always kept as my objective. We hoped to wage this as a localized war without further complications. The endeavour of all the Powers to localize the war strengthened us in this belief. It is natural that we should assemble for this [localized] war sufficient forces to hold out a prospect of success by weight of numbers. When Russia by mobilizing her southern military districts showed herself hostile to the Monarchy, we turned to Germany with the request that she would declare that this step taken against us would also be unacceptable to Germany. At the same time, mobilization of the remainder of the army was ordered, for their assembly in Galicia was envisaged. At this stage we were obliged—as, indeed, Germany also urgently wished—to declare openly that our hostile measures were only directed against Serbia and that further mobilization was merely a measure of protection against the threat from Russia.

  ‘It was hoped that these measures, in conjunction with the energetic diplomatic pressure of the other Powers, more especially Germany, would restrain Russia from hostile action against the Monarchy, and would also afford to the latter the possibility of carrying through her action against Serbia.

  ‘Such being the case, we could, and must, hold fast to the idea of the offensive against Serbia, the more so since we had to bear in mind that Russia might merely intend to restrain us from action against Serbia by a threat, without proceeding to war against us. While, however, the Powers—and, above all, Germany—were only intervening diplomatically, Russia did not discontinue her mobilization, but made it general. Meanwhile, our movements destined against the South began to take place. From the diplomatic activities of that time it was, in our opinion, apparent that Germany, if we were attacked by Russia, would, indeed, fulfil her duties as an ally, but that she would rather avoid a Great War. Thus, we were obliged to hold to our intention to proceed with our action against Serbia, and to entrust our protection against Russia—against whom we could not by ourselves initiate an offensive war—to our troops which were to assemble in Galicia and to the German threat to Russia and the influence of the remaining Powers.

  ‘It was not until July 31 that there came suddenly the decided declaration of Germany that she herself was now willing to carry through the Great War against France and Russia. This produced an entirely new situation. It was immediately reckoned here that we must put in the preponderating mass of our forces in the North, and I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance that, in spite of the great complications caused by our transport of troops to the South which ha
s already been completed, this will be carried through.’23

  ‘Qui s’excuse, s’accuse! Qui s’explique, se complique!’

  The full force of ‘Plan B’ had been put into operation against Serbia concurrently with the Austrian mobilization on July 25. The Dual Monarchy declared war upon Serbia on the 28th and three Austrian armies moved towards the Serbian frontier. The position of the Serbians seemed forlorn. Northern Serbia is lapped and bounded on three sides by the Danube and its tributary, the Save, into which the Drina flows. Belgrade, the capital, stood actually upon the Danube at the frontier and was undefendable. Three army corps comprising eight divisions of the Austrian Second Army began to deploy along the northern frontier while the Fifth and Sixth Austrian Armies, each comprising two corps, about eleven divisions, advanced to invade Serbia from the West. The Serbian Commander-in-Chief, the Voivode Putnik, could not tell whether the main hostile advance would be made from the North or the West. He did not know, as we know, that the Austrian Second Army detraining to the northward was from August 2 under orders to scramble back into its trains and hurry to the Russian front in Galicia. All he saw was the marshalling and deployment of powerful forces upon both frontiers. Indeed, he believed that the main invasion would come upon him from the North. The Serbian army consisted of 11½ infantry divisions and one cavalry division, in all 180,000 rifles, 8,500 sabres and 500 guns. To the southward in the mountainous and broken country behind the upper Drina, the Montenegrins gathered, 40,000 strong. The Serbian forces were divided into three so-called Armies, each of which, however, was little stronger than an Austrian Army Corps. Leaving detachments to observe the frontier and delay the invasion, General Putnik assembled his three armies in the centre of Northern Serbia, facing North with their left upon the town of Valjevo and with covering troops along the rivers. These prudent dispositions, although facing north in error, enabled the front to be easily and swiftly changed to meet the real attack from the West.

  The deployment of the Austrian armies around the Serbian frontiers marshalled some 19 divisions against the Serbian 11½, and these by their geographical position seemed able to advance now from one side, now from the other, to turn the flank or rear of any position occupied by their weaker antagonists. In addition, behind all, low down on the eastern border, Bulgaria waited, armed and silent, with memories of recent unutterable injuries to avenge. But the Serbians, seasoned, war-hardened men, inspired by the fiercest patriotism, the result of generations of torment and struggle, awaited undaunted whatever Fate might bestow.

  The command of the two armies destined to invade Serbia was confided to General Potiorek, whom we have already met as Governor of Bosnia on the fatal day of Sarajevo. Potiorek had a strong position with the Court. He had served under Baron Bolfras for some years. He was intimate with the Emperor. His favour had survived unharmed the many indignant comments which the faulty and neglectful police arrangements of June 28 had excited. His nerves were however seriously affected by the tragedy. Throughout his campaigns against Serbia he kept himself closely within his guarded headquarters. Thence he directed the operations and used his influence with the Emperor to procure the largest number of troops for the longest possible time—regardless of the general situation. In particular he clamoured unceasingly for the use of the Second Army; and Conrad was soon engaged in a serious dispute with him about it.

  Potiorek knew that the Second Austrian Army was strictly forbidden to cross the Save-Danube line and must begin its departure for Galicia on the 18th. Nevertheless he ordered his Fifth and Sixth Armies to invade Serbia upon two widely separated and divergent lines. The Fifth Army advancing on August 12 was to reach Valjevo on the 17th; The Sixth Army to the southward, starting between August 14–18, would move on Uzhitse. Meanwhile the Second Army would demonstrate especially against Mitrovitsa and Shabatz and threaten to cross the Save from the North. It followed from this plan that the Austrian Fifth Army would have to fight practically the whole of the Serbian forces single-handed; for the Second Army was soon departing, and the Sixth Army was out of contact to the southward, preoccupied with maintaining the loyalty of Bosnia, and wandering off to engage the Montenegrins, and 1½ Serbian divisions coming from Uzhitse. The relative strength of the combatants was thus transformed. The 6 Austrian divisions of the VIIIth and XIIIth Corps might expect to meet the bulk of the Serbian army, actually 10 divisions, somewhere between the Drina and the Kolubara, or behind the latter river itself. Potiorek hoped, of course, that the threat of the Second Army from the North and the Bulgarian danger in the East would lead the Serbians to disperse their forces. General Putnik, in what may well have seemed to him a desperate situation, found safety by running risks. He kept his three armies together in his central position, determined to hurl their whole strength at whichever of the foes who encircled his country first exposed themselves to battle.

  On August 12 the Austrian Fifth Army began its advance, and crossed the Drina between Zvornik and Liuboviya, meeting determined resistance from the Serb covering troops as they fell back slowly. The IVth Corps from the Second Austrian Army entered Shabatz almost unopposed. The direction of the invasion being now defined, Putnik swung his Third and Second armies to face west behind the Dobrava and Jadar rivers, while his First Army followed them up. By August 15, the right of the Austrian advance had reached the neighbourhood of Krupanj and Zavlaka on the Jadar, while its left approached the Dobrava which flows into the Save below Shabatz. Their centre was still an hour from the township of Tekerish at nightfall. A heavy storm in the evening brought all movements to an end. Meanwhile Putnik, marching swiftly forward from the Kolubara, placed his Second and Third armies ready for battle from the Save below Shabatz to Krupanj. He held his First Army in reserve to guard against the attacks which he must fear from the Second Austrian Army across the Save between Shabatz and Obrenovatz.

  On August 16 what has been called the Battle of the Jadar began. Fierce fighting ensued on a front of about thirty miles. The Serbian left, threatened on both flanks by the advance of Potiorek’s XIIIth Corps, retired beyond Krupanj. But in the north among maize-fields and thick, intersected blind country, the Austrian advance from Shabatz was repulsed with heavy loss. Even worse were Austrian fortunes on the front of the VIIIth Corps in the centre. The 21st (Schützen) Division, composed mostly of Czechs, met with grave disaster and were driven in rout from the key position of the whole battle. Treachery and cowardice were imputed to these unwilling soldiers, who, after a prolonged disorderly flight, reassembled beyond the Drina only 3,000 strong. Night fell with the Austrian centre broken and driven back upon the Drina, and with the Austrian left repulsed with heavy losses, and also compromised by the disaster in the centre.

  That same night Conrad, with the titular commander-in-chief, the Archduke Frederick, left Vienna for Przemysl, his headquarters against Russia. Here, on August 17, he learned Potiorek’s unpleasant news. It raised a poignant issue. The Second Army, already so long delayed, was due to leave the Serbian front on the 18th. There was not an hour to lose. But its departure at this moment might well entail the complete defeat of the Fifth Army and the failure of the whole plan against Serbia. On the other hand, its intervention promised an almost certain victory, which would or might bring in Bulgaria and Turkey. Already, during the night of the 16th, Conrad had consented to allow the Second Army to demonstrate in force along the Save to conceal the fact of its impending departure and to pin down the enemy. Now Potiorek demanded its full support; and a few minutes later the Second Army itself reported the retreat of the Northern Wing of the Fifth Army, and that its own IVth Corps was advancing towards Shabatz to their assistance. Meanwhile beyond the frontiers of Galicia, the Russian masses must be gathering in enormous strength and the battle of the nations drew near. Tossed on the horns of his self-created dilemma, Conrad allowed the Second Army to throw the IV Corps in towards Shabatz, if this was judged necessary, in order to achieve success. But that evening came a further wire from Potiorek. His demands had in
creased with his distresses. ‘The intervention of the Second Army in driblets might,’ he declared, ‘lead to a reverse; they should cross the Save in force not only at Shabatz but lower down. Until they had to depart to Galicia surely they could not remain passive onlookers.’ The Second Army themselves wired: ‘Are we to leave IV Corps behind, or to move as arranged?’ Conrad thereupon ordered the departure in principle of the Second Army, but agreed that the IVth Corps might remain until the Shabatz situation was resolved.

  The fighting continued on the 18th and 19th. The Austrian IVth Corps drove back the Serbian right and the Serbians fell back behind the Dobrava. But the Serbian Second Army, reinforced by a division from its First Army, threw back the remainder of the Austrian VIIIth Corps on Lyeshnitsa, while their Third Army held its own in the south. The whole of the Austrian Fifth Army was now in a grievous position. A week’s hard fighting in hot weather and difficult country against a hardy enemy and with poor artillery support had exhausted its strength. Supplies, both of ammunition and food, were running low. Its centre and left were hard-pressed and retiring. Its left flank was about to be exposed by the withdrawal of the Second Army. In these circumstances its commander (Frank) ordered the general retirement of the Army beyond the Drina river. Potiorek’s report on the evening of the 19th ended ‘Fifth Army in retreat… one division of VIIIth Corps has been dispersed and the other has suffered very heavily. The XIIIth Corps is intact. The IVth Corps at Shabatz is engaged with equal numbers of the enemy. Result not yet known. The help asked for,’ he added ungraciously, ‘came two days too late.’ Conrad and the Austrian Headquarters now took a hard decision. They determined to cut the loss in Serbia and at all costs to prevent the Second Army becoming involved there. Potiorek challenged this ruling. ‘If the Second and Sixth Armies cannot forthwith take the offensive, as a set off to the defeat of the Fifth, my task of keeping the Serbs off the soil of the Monarchy will be very difficult,’ and further that he was ‘holding the three divisions in readiness.’