The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century
Page 20
“China’s Strength Will Always Support You”
In East Africa, China is following in the footsteps of European powers, which competed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for territory in what is sometimes called the “scramble for Africa.” It was really the partition of Africa, and infrastructure was a favored tool for carving up territory. The Europeans arrived on Africa’s coasts and established ports as toeholds. Then they pushed inland, building railways and laying telegraph wires, redrawing Africa’s political map as they went. In 1870, only a tenth of Africa was under European control. But by the 1890s, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, and Britain were all pursuing railway projects in Africa as part of their colonial enterprises.12 By 1914, only a tenth of Africa was not under Europe’s notional control.
France was the first to plant its flag at modern-day Djibouti, and its interest was initially modest. Looking to establish a coaling station for ships heading to Madagascar and Indochina, French officials negotiated treaties with the Afars and Issas (a Somali subclan), Djibouti’s two main ethnic groups. But France’s interest grew as Europe’s competition for control intensified, and as the continent was being carved up, these measures seemed too temporary. In 1894, France declared the area French Somaliland, an answer to British Somaliland, which occupied a competing slice of coastline to the east.
More than a century later, in 2017, China established a base for antipiracy, peacekeeping, and relief operations. Over a million Chinese citizens live in Africa, according to Chinese state media, although the real number could be higher.13 China has also sent troops to South Sudan for UN peacekeeping operations. Counterintuitively, the presence of foreign militaries in Djibouti was a major selling point for Beijing. After all, how could they criticize China for joining them? But proximity has also created challenges, as Chinese troops learn how to operate in a foreign country.
China’s highest-grossing film, Wolf Warrior 2, is a window, or perhaps a fun-house mirror, into nationalist views of Africa and foreign competition. Playing up stereotypes, the plot focuses on a rescue mission in a war-torn and disease-ridden African country. The film’s hero, a retired elite Chinese soldier named Leng Feng, kicks and shoots his way through hundreds of enemies, Rambo style. Leng is also a man of the people. At one point, standing outside a Chinese embassy, he disarms an African militia simply by reminding them, “China and Africa are friends.”
The film builds toward a fight between its hero, Leng, and its villain, Big Daddy, an American mercenary played by Frank Grillo. “People like you will always be inferior to people like me. Get used to it,” Big Daddy tells Leng with a knife at his throat. But Leng gains the upper hand at the last moment, kills Big Daddy, and gets the last word. “That’s fucking history,” Leng says. Before the credits roll, the film delivers a message: “To citizens of China: When you find yourself in danger in a foreign country, never give up hope. China’s strength will always support you.”
Wolf Warrior 2 is not playing out on Djibouti’s streets, but Chinese forces have been aggressive. U.S. officials have accused China of attempting to gain access to Camp Lemonnier, using drones to interfere with U.S. aircraft, and using military-grade lasers from their base to distract U.S. pilots, two of whom sustained eye injuries.14 The Soviet Union was accused of similar tactics during the Cold War.15 Officially, China’s base housed 250 troops in 2018, but its footprint, including extensive underground facilities, could easily accommodate greater numbers.16
Local fishermen have learned to keep their distance. “Last month, a drone flew above our boat, and its speakers said in Somali, ‘Go away, Go away, Go away,’ ” one told me. A Chinese patrol boat had recently apprehended his friend and held him until the Djiboutian Coast Guard arrived. The Coast Guard did not bother to question the Chinese. “Our country takes their money, and [the Chinese] do whatever they want,” the fisherman said, his arms extended outward with palms up, hanging helplessly in the air. If the base signals China’s increased assertiveness under Xi, the behavior of its troops suggests inexperience and insecurity.
“It Scared the Death Out of Us”
Chinese officials may believe they have an insurance policy. Djibouti’s debt to China was 70 percent of its GDP in late 2019, and its borrowing has inspired warnings that it could become the “next Hambantota,” a reference to the Sri Lankan port discussed in Chapter 8.17 In Djibouti, the port that worries U.S. officials the most is the Doraleh Container Terminal, a star performer that has already ignited an international legal battle.
During my visit, the terminal was humming with activity, oblivious to the fact that its fate was being debated in courtrooms in London and Hong Kong. In 2006, the Dubai-based DP World, the same group that helps manage the Khorgos Gateway facility discussed in Chapter 3, signed a twenty-five-year concession agreement to develop the container terminal. During that period, the deal also gave DP World exclusive rights to all container-handling facilities in Djibouti. The arrangement worked well initially, establishing one of the most efficient ports in Africa.18
The dispute is captured on a two-mile stretch of Djibouti’s coastline. Sitting between China’s military base and the Doraleh Container Terminal is another port, the Doraleh Multipurpose Port. In 2012, Djibouti struck a deal with China Merchants, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, to develop a multipurpose port and free-trade zone.19 A red pipeline runs from an oil terminal on shore to a dock, and large cranes hang over a second dock. From the water, the facility nearly blends together with China’s base.
DP World objected to this deal, which undercut its exclusivity arrangement. In February 2018, following a protracted dispute, Djibouti unilaterally terminated its contract with DP World. A storm of accusations and litigation ensued, putting Djibouti on the defensive. In April 2019, a London tribunal ordered Djibouti to pay DP World over $500 million for breaching the contract. DP World is also seeking relief from a court in Hong Kong, where China Merchants is listed.20
By demonstrating the container terminal’s value, DP World may have become a victim of its own success. If the Djiboutian government intended to make that success its own, its actions have been self-defeating, alarming current and potential foreign investors. “It scared the death out of us,” one foreign investor with business operations in Djibouti told me.21
Djibouti’s competitive edge as a point of stability will not last forever, and it aspires to become more than the Horn of Africa’s gun rack. Its leaders believe they have a window, perhaps a decade or two, during which Djibouti could turn its current edge over its waterfront neighbors into a longer-lasting advantage. Ethiopia’s rise is the opportunity, while the stabilization of neighboring ports will present new challengers. Like so many other port cities, Djibouti is trying to become the next Hong Kong, Singapore, or Dubai. Lacking natural resources, it has turned to other countries for investment and, increasingly, toward China’s checkbook.
The nightmare scenario for U.S. officials is that China ends up controlling the Doraleh Container Terminal. John Bolton, then U.S. national security advisor, played up the stakes in a December 2018 speech unveiling the Trump administration’s new policy toward Africa: “Should this occur, the balance of power in the Horn of Africa—astride major arteries of maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia—would shift in favor of China. And, our U.S. military personnel at Camp Lemonnier, could face even further challenges in their efforts to protect the American people.”22 Bolton’s warning—that if the port falls into Chinese hands, so will the region—makes even the domino theory seem modest.
To be sure, the port is valuable, much more so than Sri Lanka’s Hambantota. About 90 percent of Ethiopia’s trade passes through Djibouti.23 As a result, its operations impact not only U.S. personnel in Djibouti but also the U.S. embassy in Ethiopia and the U.S. mission to the African Union, both based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital. But the United States has other options for shifting its supply chains, including ports at Berbera,
Somaliland.24 If Eritrea continues to normalize its foreign relations, its ports at Assab and Massawa may become more viable options in the future as well. Making these adjustments will not be cheap or convenient, but the entire Horn of Africa does not hang in the balance.
Fixating on Djibouti’s ports might miss the bigger prize. The Djiboutian government has invested heavily in positioning Djibouti as an emerging communications hub and would be hard-pressed to part with control of Djibouti Telecom, its state-owned telecommunications company. The company runs Djibouti’s cellular and internet networks as well as two underseas cable landing stations, where eleven international and regional fiber-optic cables converge and more are planned in the future.25 If China has a wish list of strategic assets, telecommunications should be near the top.
The United States is not alone in worrying about China’s intentions. Even despite Ethiopia’s growing loans from China, Ethiopian officials are not eager to allow any foreign power to control the container terminal. Ethiopia has even more leverage than the United States or China. It could threaten to divert trade to Somaliland or Eritrea, and it also has deep ties with the Djiboutian leadership. Djiboutian officials claim that the container terminal is so profitable that they would not hand it over to anyone. Of course, debt can make people, and countries, part with prized possessions. But if the United States wants to keep the port out of Chinese hands, it has international partners with common interests.
But Bolton’s remarks, delivered at a conservative think tank in Washington, DC, whistled past his international audience. “We want something more to show for Americans’ hard-earned taxpayer dollars,” he explained. “Under our new Africa strategy, we will target U.S. funding toward key countries and particular strategic objectives. All U.S. aid on the continent will advance U.S. interests, and help African nations move toward self-reliance.” Bizarrely, Bolton sounded like he was promoting the very approach to aid that U.S. officials have criticized China for pursuing, one that puts the donor’s strategic interests ahead of the recipient’s economic interests. Bolton attacked the recipients of U.S. aid: “From now on, the United States will not tolerate this longstanding pattern of aid without effect, assistance without accountability, and relief without reform.”26 What he offered, however, was a soliloquy without solutions. “America First” does not resonate well in Africa, especially when China is singing a sweeter tune.
“One by One, I Will Teach You”
China is already overshadowing France’s historic ties in Djibouti. In 1917, France completed Djibouti’s first railway, which tied Djibouti’s fate with Ethiopia, and cemented the location of their capitals, Djibouti City and Addis Ababa. The first passenger trains took sixty hours to travel across the route’s thirty-two stations, and freight services took twice as long.27 The railway was disrupted by Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia from 1935 to 1941, during which Italian engineers built a road from Addis Ababa to Assab, a port city on modern-day Eritrea’s coast. Its tracks were damaged during World War II, and the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 choked activity through the ports.28
Having survived all of that, the railway eventually succumbed to something dull but deadly: routine maintenance. In the 1970s, after Djibouti became independent and Ethiopia’s government was replaced by a military coup, both sides neglected repairs, and the railway began falling apart. The full original line has not functioned since 2004. In Djibouti, the French railway station has been reclaimed by locals, who have moved in and set up ramshackle dwellings. Decrepit trains, emblazoned with silver “Alstom” badges of France’s largest railway manufacturer, sit rusting in the old railway yard.
France also views China’s growing foothold with suspicion. “I wouldn’t want a new generation of international investments to encroach on our historical partners’ sovereignty or weaken their economies,” France’s President Emmanuel Macron said during a visit to Djibouti in March 2019.29 As recently as the mid-1980s, spending by French military personnel and nationals made up a quarter of Djibouti’s GDP.30 Three decades later, France’s foreign direct-investment in Djibouti does not even register in most estimates, and Macron did not announce any new commitments.31 French influence can still be seen on street signs and on restaurant menus, but like the old train station, it no longer glimmers.
Three flags flew above Djibouti’s new train station when it opened in 2018. The project is a joint venture between Djibouti and Ethiopia, the countries it connects, but China’s colors were front and center as well. China provided $3.3 billion in loans, built the railway, and will operate it until 2023.32 The new railway was built to do essentially what the old line did. It carries passengers and freight and mostly runs parallel to the old line. The passenger line is single tracked, so it goes in one direction on odd-numbered days of the month and runs the other way on even-numbered days.
Riding the new train was like watching a chameleon change color. Empty of passengers, it began as a Chinese train with brown walls, red seats, and a dull gray floor. When it was time to board, elderly women wearing brightly colored dresses, shawls, and head wraps jolted into action. Passengers rushed their designated wagon, carrying suitcases and large plastic bags. A Chinese train official, dressed in a black three-piece suit, red tie, and black conductor’s hat, stood at the door to the train, trying to turn the wave into a river. When people began pushing, he extended his arm outward, blocking the entrance. “One by one, I will teach you,” he repeated in English. “One by one, I will teach you.” Boarding a train in China, of course, is rarely orderly.
Inside, Chinese staff asked everyone to place their bags on the overhead racks. An hour into the ride, passengers were reaching for their plastic bags and pulling out large bundles of khat, a plant that provides a strong buzz. Tables between seats facing each other became mini production lines, as people broke the stems off their branches and assembled smaller bundles of green leaves. With each snap, branches were discarded onto the ground. Tables turned green, and the floor turned brown. A hum filled the train as people chewed leaves, talked, and worked on their bundles.
Shortly after opening, the new railway literally ran into trouble. Local herders were filing claims after the train hit their goats, camels, and other livestock. In one incident, fifteen camels were plowed down. The railway company offered payments to the aggrieved herder, but it paid too generously, offering terms that were twice the market price. This incentivized more animal casualties, which was unfortunate but not unexpected.33 A century earlier, France confronted the same challenge. It doled out payments until discovering that herders were grazing their oldest and sickest livestock near the tracks.34
“Nations Must Advance or They Must Fall”
The French railway helped to cement Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, by forging communications links. The railway’s technicians installed Ethiopia’s first telephone line, between Addis Ababa and Harar, a trading hub to the north, in 1897. A decade later, its first international telegraph line was built from Dire Dawa to Djibouti. More telephone lines began to radiate outward from Addis Ababa into the Ethiopian countryside. By 1930, over 170 towns were part of a telephone network that stretched 4,350 miles.35 Like the Chinese fiber-optic cables that would follow in the twenty-first century, these new connections strengthened the Ethiopian government, which benefited from foreign funding and centralized access to information.
Ethiopia has been more successful than its neighbors in courting great powers while protecting its independence. During the partition of Africa, Ethiopia was the only country to avoid European colonization. Its rugged terrain, containing many of Africa’s tallest mountains, frustrated European attempts to push inward from the coast. Ethiopia’s diplomacy and military were even more decisive. After securing arms shipments from Russia, Ethiopia routed Italy’s invading forces at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. The victory blew a hole in narratives about the inevitability of European rule in Africa.36 Shortly after, Ethiopia’s ruler, King Menelik II, signed treaties with France and Britain
, further securing Ethiopia’s independence.
Ethiopia’s Achilles’ heel is access to the sea, which it lost during the partition of Africa and regained when it formed a federation with Eritrea in 1952. But that access was lost again in 1993, when Eritrea became independent, and Ethiopia’s trade has suffered as a result. The labor costs of making a T-shirt in Ethiopia are one-third the costs of China, but after logistics expenses are added, they sell for the same price. With a surplus of inexpensive labor and energy, Ethiopia could become an export powerhouse in the coming decades.37
King Menelik II also looked beyond Europe for inspiration and assistance. “He has heard of Japan, and in his own way is trying to emulate that striking example,” reported Robert Skinner, who led the first U.S. mission to Ethiopia in 1903. “The new railroad, the new highways, the bridges, the telephones—all these things he probably cares very little for in themselves, but he realizes that nations must advance or they must fall.” Skinner believed the United States was outside the great-power fray. “America was the first country to establish diplomatic relations for the avowed purpose of protecting and extending commerce, and without a political issue of any character to discuss,” he wrote. For the European powers, by contrast, “the matter of frontiers, balance of power, and kindred questions, are so far in the foreground that the ultimate commercial ambition is entirely overshadowed.”38
But little U.S. assistance flowed to Ethiopia until the United States was competing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Italian forces had built roughly seven thousand kilometers of roads, which Ethiopia struggled to maintain. Galvanized by President Truman’s Point IV program, the United States trained Ethiopian engineers, geographers, and other technical experts and guaranteed loans for rebuilding its roads.39 In return for U.S. economic and political support, Ethiopia allowed the United States to continue using Kagnew Station, a listening post that the U.S. Army had established in Asmara during World War II.40