Terrorism, Inc

by Colin P Clarke

27. Levitt, Hamas, p. 77.

  28. Levitt, Hamas, p. 69.

  29. Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas, p. 140.

  30. Jodi Vittori, “Idealism Is Not Enough: The Role of Resources in the Autonomy and Capability of Terrorist Groups,” PhD dissertation, University of Denver, June 2008, p. 199.

  31. Triffin J. Roule, “Post-911 Financial Freeze Dries Up Hamas Funding,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 19, 2002.

  32. Claudia Rosett, “Can We Give to Gaza Without Giving to Hamas?” Forbes, March 5, 2009.

  33. Chaim Levinson, “Shin Bet Probe Reveals Scope of Hamas Money Laundering Through Chinese Banks,” Haaretz, September 29, 2013.

  34. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 937.

  35. James J. F. Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970–2010: Is Ideological Orientation Relevant?” Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 58, No. 5, pp. 769–797.

  36. According to Matthew Levitt, a longtime Hamas operative from the West Bank and now living in Turkey is responsible for formulation of Hamas’s kidnapping strategy. Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’ Not-So-Secret Weapon,” Foreign Affairs, July 9, 2014.

  37. “Gaza Banks Close in Protest at Hamas Cash Seizure,” Reuters, reprinted online in the Jerusalem Post, March 3, 2011.

  38. John Rollins and Liana Sun-Wyler, “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), October 19, 2012, p. 10.

  39. Clare Ribando Seelke et al., “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), May 12, 2011, p. 6.

  40. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise,” Testimony presented to United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 25, 2005, p. 10.

  41. Gerard DeGroot, “The Enemy Below: Why Hamas Tunnels Scare Israel So Much,” Washington Post, Monkey Cage blog, July 25, 2014; Jodi Rudoren, “Tunnels Lead Right to the Heart of Israeli Fear,” New York Times, July 28, 2014; and Jodi Rudoren and Ben Hubbard, “Despite Gains, Hamas Sees a Fight for Its Existence and Presses Ahead,” New York Times, July 27, 2014.

  42. Daniel Byman, “Is Hamas Winning?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3, Summer 2013, p. 67.

  43. Yezid Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief, No. 41, March 2010, p. 6.

  44. Dennis Lormel, “Identifying and Disrupting Funding Streams to Thwart Terrorist Financing and Organized Criminal Activities,” IPSA International, 2009, p. 8.

  45. “Hamas Extortion Ring Uncovered in Israel,” Xinhua, September 24, 2012.

  46. “Hamas Leaders Worth Millions of Dollars from Allegedly Skimming Donations and Extortion: Is Anyone Surprised?” Inquisitr, July 18, 2014.

  47. David B. Carter, “A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups,” International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 1, January 2012, p. 138.

  48. Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas, p. 224.

  49. Ibid., p. 140.

  50. Ibid., p. 133.

  51. Hillel Frisch, “Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 12, 2009, p. 1059.

  52. Iran temporarily cut financial support to Hamas, while increasing aid to PIJ and the Popular Resistance Committees. There is also now tension between Hamas and Hezbollah, a key ally of the Assad regime.

  53. Adam Dolnik and Anjali Bhattacherjee, “Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?” Terrorism & Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 2002, p. 109; 125.

  54. Triffin J. Roule, “Post-911 Financial Freeze Dries Up Hamas Funding,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 19, 2002.

  55. Byman, “Hamas Winning?,” p. 71.

  56. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 935.

  57. Byman, “Hamas Winning?,” p. 63.

  58. Yoav Appel, “Israel: Bombers Tried to Use Cyanide,” The Associated Press, June 5, 2002.

  59. Dolnik and Bhattacherjee, “Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?,” p. 113.

  60. Dolnik and Bhattacherjee, “Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?,” p. 113.

  61. Byman, “Hamas Winning?,” p. 66.

  62. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 931.

  63. Hillel Frisch, “Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 12, 2009, p. 1057.

  64. Levitt, Hamas, pp. 55–56.

  65. Brian A. Jackson, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007, p. 25.

  66. Ioana Emy Matesan, “What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, No. 5, 2012, p. 688.

  67. Milton-Edwards, “Islamist versus Islamist,” p. 269.

  68. Levitt, Hamas, p. 49.

  69. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 930.

  70. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 58.

  71. Levitt, Hamas, p. 26.

  72. Byman, A High Price, pp. 102–103.

  73. Levitt, “Target the West?,” pp. 928–929.

  74. Byman, A High Price, p. 355.

  75. Dolnik and Bhattacherjee, “Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?,” p. 109.

  76. Throughout the Second Intifada, the four main themes emphasized by Hamas were the untrustworthiness of the Israelis, the need for revenge, maintaining Palestinian unity, and the tangible gains made by the intifada. Joas Wagemakers, “Legitimizing Pragmatism: Hamas’ Framing Efforts from Militancy to Moderation and Back?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2010, p. 360.

  77. Cragin et al., Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth, pp. 59–66. The physical technology exchanges included Ketusha rockets (both 122 m and 107 mm), AT-3 Sagger missiles, and YM-III Iranian antitank missiles.

  78. Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps,” p. 259.

  79. Cragin et al., Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth, p. 53. According to Ranstorp, Hezbollah is credited with introducing suicide bombing as a tactic into the Palestinian theater.

  80. Kim Cragin, “Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and Its Implications for U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 7, 2009, p. 583.

  81. Levitt, Hamas, p. 36.

  82. Tavishi Bhasin and Maia Carter Hallward, “Hamas as a Political Party: Democratization in the Palestinian Territories,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2013, p. 81.

  83. Daniel Baracskay, “The Evolutionary Path of Hamas: Examining the Role of Political Pragmatism in State Building and Activism,” Terrorism & Political Violence, 2014, p. 2.

  84. Dolnik and Bhattacherjee, “Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?,” p. 125.

  85. Levitt, Hamas, p. 34.

  86. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 933; p. 936.

  87. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 926.

  88. Kim Cragin, “Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and Its Implications for U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 7, 2009, p. 583.

  89. Litvak, “’Martyrdom Is Life,” p. 718.

  90. Meir Litvak, “Martyrdom Is Life: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 8, 2010, p. 716.

  91. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 934.

  92. Ioana Emy Matesan, “What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24, No. 5, 2012, p. 674.

  93. Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weimann, “The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2010, p. 224.

  94. Some of these groups include Jund Ansar Allah, Jaysh Tawheed wa Jihad, Jund Allah Popular Resistance Committee, Jaysh Arafat as-Sunnah, and Jaysh Ansar a
s-Sunnah. Milton-Edwards, “Islamist versus Islamist,” p. 261; p. 268.

  95. Byman, “Hamas Winning?,” p. 63.

  96. Byman, “Hamas Winning?,” p. 72.

  97. Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas, p. 225.

  98. Dolnik and Bhattacherjee, “Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?,” p. 113.

  99. Robert Brathwaite, “The Electoral Terrorist: Terror Groups and Democratic Participation,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2013, pp. 66–67. To put things in perspective, compared with the group’s operating budget in the early 1990s, by the mid-2000s, U.S. government estimates put the figure at approximately $50 million annually. Haim Malka, “Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2005, p. 39. Levitt provides a broader range, between $30 million and $90 million annually. Levitt, Hamas, p. 54.

  100. Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weimann, “The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2010, pp. 212–213.

  101. Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weimann, “The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2010, pp. 213–214.

  102. Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2005, p. 590. According to Mia Bloom, Palestinian acceptance of suicide bombings resulted from the continued televised killing of Palestinians by Israelis, a poor economy, disillusionment with the peace process and Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

  103. Levitt, “Target the West?,” p. 927.

  104. Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas, p. 170.

  105. Byman, A High Price, p. 194.

  106. Byman, “Hamas Winning?,” p. 64.

  107. Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas, p. 108.

  108. Ibid., pp. 164–165.

  109. Hillel Frisch, “Strategic Change in Terrorist Movements: Lessons from Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 12, 2009, p. 1056.

  110. Ibid.

  111. Author interview with Jean-Marc Oppenheim, December 2014.

  112. Haim Malka, “Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2005, p. 43.

  CHAPTER 6

  1. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban, revised edition, Philadelphia, PA: De Capo Press, 2009, p. 279.

  2. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, p. 25.

  3. Daniel P. Sullivan, “Tinder, Spark, Oxygen, and Fuel: The Mysterious Rise of the Taliban,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 2007, p. 96.

  4. For more on the differences between “old” Taliban and “neo-Taliban,” see Antonio Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. On meaningful differences between Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns, see Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 285–336.

  5. It should also be noted here that the Afghan Taliban is a separate group from the Pakistani Taliban, otherwise known as Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), which is an umbrella organization of roughly 40 smaller insurgent groups active in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s 24 districts, 7 tribal agencies, and 6 provincial regions. The Afghan Taliban considers Pakistan as a benefactor, while the Pakistani Taliban has been waging an insurgency against the Pakistani state and its security forces since 2002. For more, see Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2011, pp. 574–602 and Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, February 25, 2014. This chapter focuses on the Afghan Taliban, although it also touches briefly upon other insurgent and terrorist groups active in the Afghanistan–Pakistan (AfPak) region, including the Haqqani Network and others.

  6. Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban: Tracking the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” New America Foundation Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, April 2010, p. 1.

  7. Collins and Ali, “Financing the Taliban,” p. 5. The CIA and the DIA estimate that the Taliban receives $70 million a year from the drug trade. According to the former U.S. director of national intelligence Dennis Blair, the Taliban made $100 million from the drug trade in 2008. The DEA puts the number at around $300 million, while Gretchen Peters asserts that the number is much higher, probably $500 million.

  8. See the considerable body of literature devoted to the effect of resources on conflict. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56 (2004): pp. 563–595; Richard Snyder, “Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 8 (October 2006): pp. 943–968; Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 2004): pp. 35–67; Michael L. Ross, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2004, pp. 337–356.

  9. For a discussion of active versus passive support in terrorism and insurgency, see Christopher Paul, “As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships Between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 6, 2010, pp. 488–510.

  10. Barnett R. Rubin, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10, 2000, pp. 1789–1803.

  11. Justin Y. Reese, “Financing the Taliban,” in Michael Freeman, Financing Terrorism: Case Studies, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012, p. 104.

  12. Matthew Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand, “Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan Conflict and United Nations Peacemaking,” Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001, p. 12.

  13. Barnett Rubin, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10, 2000, p. 1791.

  14. Kristian Berg Harpviken, “The Transnationalization of the Taliban,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, p. 221.

  15. Collins and Ali, p. 9.

  16. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 86.

  17. Howell and Lind, p. 724.

  18. Aram Roston, “How the U.S. Funds the Taliban,” November 11, 2009; also see, Aram Roston, “How the U.S. Army Protects Its Trucks—By Paying the Taliban,” The Guardian, November 12, 2009, In full disclosure, a header at the top of The Guardian article notes that the article is the subject of a legal complaint from lawyers acting on behalf of NCL holdings and its principal, Hamed Wardak.

  19. Roston, “U.S. Funds the Taliban.”

  20. Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror, p. 42.

  21. Seeds, p. 183.

  22. Peters, Seeds, p. 183.

  23. Seeds, pp. 184–185.

  24. Freeman, p. 106.

  25. Jihad is literally translated as “to struggle,” hence the term strugglers used in lieu of jihadists. See BBC, “Religions: Islam,” BBC.com, 2009.

  26. A in-depth analysis on some of the Taliban’s criminal activities can be found in Farhana Schmidt, “From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords: The Evolution of the Taliban Insurgency,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2010, pp. 61–77.

  27. Anand Gopal, “The Taliban in Kandahar,” in Peter Bergen with Katherine Tiedemann, Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 41.

  28. Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul, Logar, and Wardak,” in Giustozzie, Decoding the New Taliban, p. 52.

  29. Collins and Ali, p. 7.

  30. Sami Yousafzai, “For the Taliban, A Cr
ime that Pays,” The Daily Beast, September 5, 2008.

  31. Thomas Johnson and Matthew C. Dupee, “Analyzing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): An Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2012, p. 82; see also, Asim Qadeer Rana, “Mullah Omar Wars Taliban Leaders of Action Over Abductions,” The Nation, April 3, 2013.

  32. For more, see Warlord Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, Report of the Majority Staff, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 2010.

  33. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit? Afghanistan’s Drug Economy and Politics Since the 1980s,” Conflict, Security, and Development, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 127–149.

  34. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Fighting the Nexus of Organized Crime and Violent Conflict While Enhancing Human Security,” in Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012, p. 13.

  35. Peters, Seeds of Terror, pp. 116–123.

  36. Phil Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized Crime,” in Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012, p. 45.

  37. Brahimi, “Evolving Ideology,” p. 9.

  38. Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Destroy Poppy Fields in Surprise Clampdown on Afghan Opium Growers,” The Guardian, May 20, 2012.

  39. Gretchen Peters, Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Program, 2012, p. 40.

  40. For more on the Haqqani Network, see Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

  41. Peters, p. 39

  42. Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY: Harmony Program, August 2012, p. 2.

  43. Shivan Mahendrarajah, “Conceptual Failure, the Taliban’s Parallel Hierarchies, and America’s Strategic Defeat in Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2014, p. 109.