The Young Sharpshooter at Antietam

by Percy F. Westerman

  CHAPTER V

  THE PLAN OF GENERAL LEE

  In order to understand more clearly the predicament in which the twoyoung soldiers found themselves at the close of the preceding chapter,it is necessary for us to review briefly the events which led up to thattime after the second battle of Bull Run when the Union forces againwere defeated. The failure of General Jackson to strike the troops ofGeneral Pope on their line of retreat had enabled the latter with hismen to regain the shelter of the fortifications at Washington.

  Meanwhile the Confederate commander, Lee, gave his troops rest only fora day. As has been said, he was aware that it was impossible for him atthis time either to invest or to attack the lines of Washington. Inspite of his success he was convinced that only two courses of actionwere open to him. One of these was to remain in Virginia and try todefend the capital of the Confederate States from possible attacks byhis enemies, and the other plan was to cross the Potomac and enterMaryland. There he might strike, or at least threaten to strike, some ofthe Northern cities that were not far from the border, and preventGeneral McClellan from carrying out his cherished desire to attackRichmond.

  Besides, General Lee was aware that, if he merely tried to defend thecapital of the rebellion, it would leave his enemy with full power toassume the offensive and make attacks wherever it was decided, after thespirits of his army had been restored and the ranks once more had beenfilled.

  There were many who believed that General Lee displayed great keennessof vision when he decided to enter Maryland with his army. Such an acton his part would enable the distressed farmers of the South to gathertheir crops and harvests. Especially was this true in the beautiful andfertile Valley of the Shenandoah.

  In addition to these advantages, the presence of the Confederate army inMaryland would bring many recruits, it was believed, and at the sametime would confuse the Northern army by the possibility of the troublethat might be created there. And every day of delay was of especialadvantage to the Confederates, who were working zealously to erect andcomplete the fortifications of their capital.

  Another thought that is said to have been in the mind of Lee was thatthe people of the North, if the war should be transferred to theirterritory, would thus obtain a more intimate knowledge of its horrors,and this personal experience would arouse a desire to bring the contestto a close. Indeed, it is said that General Lee was confident at thistime that he could accomplish the end of the struggle, which now hadbeen fiercely fought for nearly a year and a half.

  General Lee's first plan was to move rapidly into southern Pennsylvania,and by compelling his enemies to follow him, as he was confident theywould do, he would draw them so far away from any defenses such as Popehad recently secured in Washington after the second battle of Bull Run,that if he should then plan for a battle it would be impossible forMcClellan's troops to escape surrender as well as defeat. So confidentwere the Southern leaders now that they were filled with the thoughtthat if the desire for peace could be strengthened in the North by abattle fought on Northern soil, and at the same time if the powers ofEurope should agree to secure their cotton from the Southland, theresults at the same time would put added pressure upon the Government atWashington and terminate the bloody struggle.

  Keen as was the plan of General Lee, he was aware that his army was inno condition for an enlarged or energetic campaign. No small part of hismen, as they marched over the sandy soil, were leaving bloody marks oftheir bare feet. It had been impossible to provide many of his soldierswith shoes. The provisions, too, were not sufficient, and in the daysthat had followed the battle many had been suffering from disease. As aconsequence it is said, by those who are competent to judge, that notmore than fifty-five thousand men were in the army of the brilliantSouthern general when he crossed the Potomac River.

  Much as the men were suffering, the animals of the camp were in nobetter condition. The horses were weakened by lack of food and by thehardships of the recent days. As if these facts were not sufficient tomake the general hesitate, it is said that his supplies of ammunitionalso were deficient, and that he was as seriously troubled by this lastfact as by both of the others combined.

  But, like every successful man, General Lee decided not to think somuch of what he did not have as of what he did have. Whatever mightbefall his attempt, he was confident that he would be able to make theNorthern armies remain so long and so far from the protection of theirdefenses that he could draw out the campaign and there would be no freshattempt to take Richmond before the following spring. This opportunity,as we know, would be seized by the defenders of Richmond to strengthentheir defenses.

  At this time Lee was not expecting to receive any reinforcements, as thecampaigns in Tennessee and Kentucky demanded all the men that could bespared.

  Between the 4th and 7th of September (1862) the Confederate troops werecrossing the Potomac. On the last-named day General Jackson occupiedFrederick city and speedily was followed by another division. Then thedashing cavalry of Stuart spread out in the State in such a manner thatmost of the attempts of the Union generals to gain informationconcerning the plans of their enemies were frustrated.

  Meanwhile, as we know, the Federal soldiers were holding three fortifiedplaces in or near the Shenandoah Valley which was the chief reliance ofGeneral Lee for his supplies. About eight thousand men had beenstationed at Harper's Ferry, and there also were small garrisons atMartinsburg and at Winchester.

  As has been said, General McClellan urged General Halleck to recallthese men and attach them to the Army of the Potomac. This is exactlywhat General Lee believed would be done, because it was what he himselfwould have decided upon if he had been in his opponent's position.

  When General Halleck decided to leave these garrisons in the Valley, Leeinstantly decided that they must be taken, and he believed also thatthey could be captured easily.

  It was essential for the plans he had formed that his own communicationswith his base of supplies should not be threatened by such a largegarrison as had been placed in Harper's Ferry.

  Acting promptly, as he usually did, General Lee now decided to dividehis army and reunite the divisions west of the mountains before adecisive battle could be fought.

  With this purpose in his mind the commander of the Confederate troopsissued his orders on the 9th of September, and on the following dayGeneral Jackson, in command of three divisions, after he had crossedthe mountains, was to ford the Potomac at some place west of Harper'sFerry and then move upon the little garrison at Martinsburg.

  His companion, General McLaws, with two divisions was to take possessionof the heights which overlooked Harper's Ferry and the Potomac, whileanother division under General Walker was to cross the Potomac east ofHarper's Ferry, and secure the Loudon Heights. This last-named positionwould enable the Confederate soldiers to command Harper's Ferry from theeast bank of the Shenandoah. By this plan the little body of troops inHarper's Ferry would be surrounded and absolutely cut off from everyhope of escape because General Jackson, just as soon as he had obtainedpossession of Martinsburg, was to march swiftly toward Harper's Ferryand block every road that led westward.