Early China: A Social and Cultural History

by Li Feng

  Ideological Dilemma and the Global Context

  Certain concepts, e.g. “Virtue” (De), had a much older origin in the Western Zhou period if not earlier. As discussed in Chapter 7, for many centuries the Zhou realm had been fixed on the concept of “Heaven” (Tian), and virtue was Heaven’s superior gift to King Wen which was thereafter passed on to the succession of Zhou kings.2 Thus, the Zhou kings were literally called the “Son of Heaven” and had exclusive access to this sacred realm, a status that met no challenge even centuries after Zhou royal rule had become ineffective; no other rulers in China had claimed this ritual paramount until probably the rise of the Han Empire. When the Zhou kings died, they became attendants in the court of High God, the anthropomorphic representation of Heaven. The military conquests carried out by the Zhou kings were propagandized as “Heaven’s punishment,” and the whole range of Zhou institutions indeed rested on the single point of support – Heaven’s Mandate – for their legitimacy. However, as Robert Eno has pointed out, “it was the success of these institutions that had, in fact, anchored T’ien (Heaven).”3 In a reciprocal relationship the continuing fortune of the Zhou state depended on the religious superiority of the Zhou royal house, and in turn, firm trust in Heaven as the root of Zhou’s superiority rested on the good performance of the royal institutions. As a matter of fact, not only did the Zhou institutions perform badly, but they had come to a total collapse in 771 BC when the Zhou capitals fell to the hands of the invading “barbarians.” Thus, the impact of the dynastic downfall in that year goes far beyond the political dissolution of the Western Zhou state; in a more profound sense, it marked the beginning of the collapse of the religious–ritual system that had so far supported the operation of the early Chinese royal state.

  Therefore, new sources had to be sought in order to legitimate the power of the new political states that rose from Zhou royal ruin. In a sense, it would even seem natural that any successor to the power of the Zhou house could, as once did the Zhou themselves, exploit the lucrative political profits that the theory of Heaven’s Mandate could offer to their cause. But the very political reality that no regional state could hold onto military supremacy for more than a single century (usually it failed in only two to three generations) would have made such an argument less persuasive if not irrelevant; not to mention the continuing presence of the Zhou king, though a political figurehead, to a certain degree still religiously superior, in the small court in Luoyang until 256 BC. In this regard, the diverse philosophical traditions, Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism, and so on, represented different ways to theorize an alternative ideological ground to answer this dilemma. And indeed all philosophers who had made their names known in the period had in the background of their thinking a default ambition to recover the coherent social order once promised by the Zhou royal house as the will of Heaven; the difference was only how to achieve it. This background had given early Chinese philosophy a common position, that is, philosophy was the method to solve problems in this world, rather than the inquiry into the relationship between man and gods as was frequently the case in Greek philosophy. Even the natural philosophy developed later was not after all purely the philosophy of the natural world, but was, as it turned out in the doctrine of Zou Yan (305–240 BC), closely concerned with the human world and its history.4

  It is not difficult to find parallel intellectual developments in the global context and the concept of the “Axial Age” proposed by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers has served as an important vehicle for understanding reasons behind that parallel. In Greece, Socrates (469–399 BC) and Plato (428–347 BC) lived in the fifth to fourth centuries BC, roughly contemporary to Mozi (470–391 BC) and Mencius (372–289 BC) in China. In India, Buddha (563–483 BC) lived from the mid sixth to the early fifth century BC, being twelve years older than Confucius. In all three parts of the ancient world, the philosophers of these centuries had constructed fundamental concepts that came to define their respective civilizations, and no great civilization can survive without these fundamental ideas. Jaspers attributed the origin of the Axial Age to the common sociopolitical condition in all three regions: (1) each region was politically divided into small states and small towns; (2) a politically divided age was engaged in incessant conflicts; (3) the misery caused by wars and revolutions in one place was accompanied by simultaneous prosperity elsewhere, since destruction was neither universal nor radical; (4) the previously existing condition was held up to question.5

  For the historian, the striking similarity lies also in the very coincidence of time – in all three parts of the world, this is the period that can be regarded as “Post-Early Civilization.” In Greece, the Mycenaeans and their Bronze Age contestants for power had long gone and their stories were heard only in later epic poems of Homer; even the recent hegemony of the Athenian Empire had reached its downturn by the time of Socrates. In India, the memory of a preceding Indus civilization was probably still kept alive in the regional traditions. In China, the memory of the past was crystallized in the legends of the royal dynasties Xia, Shang, and most recently the Western Zhou. The collapse of early civilization in each regional context posed fundamental questions over which the ancients had wondered and tried hard to answer: Who are we? Why we are here and where we are going? If the early civilization is not the answer to human happiness, then what is it? In China, be more specific, what is the alternative of the Zhou way?

  Confucius and Confucianism

  The Han Dynasty historian Sima Qian (c. 145–86 BC) narrated the life of Confucius with the same length and care he accorded to the hereditary kings; this reflects the growing importance of the Confucian agenda in the mid Western Han Empire. Modern scholars, willing to challenge the historian’s account, take his narrative as merely a starting point of research to pin down some concrete bits of information about the philosopher in his own time context. One of the recent studies shows that Confucius was born close to the southern border of the state of Lu to an old warrior of the famous Zang family as his father and to a young girl of the indigenous Yan family as his mother. Since the Yan family was from a polity that was clearly known to have had its origin in the native “Eastern Barbarians” (Dongyi), this historical connection may suggest that Confucius might have been a cultural hybrid when he was young.6 The patronage of the Zang family famous for maintaining ancient rituals must have been very important in affording him an early education, but Confucius was clearly unsuccessful as a young member of the elite and remained poor through most of his life. Scholars have debated about the highest bureaucratic level he was able to reach, but Warring States sources suggest that, though probably for a short period, Confucius was evidently a figure in the Lu court influential enough to be a strong opponent to the three powerful hereditary families that had long weakened the authority of the Lu ruler. He was likely to have been behind the plan, through the action of his student Zi Lu, to guide the three families into self-destruction of their bases, and he personally sent troops to crush the rebellion of the minister of the Mengsun family.7 In 497 BC when he was fifty-four, possibly forced by the changing political circumstances, Confucius, in the company of his student group, embarked on a long journey which took him through most important states in China, reaching as far as the state of Chu in the south, not returning to his home state Lu until fourteen years later. Thereafter, it seems that Confucius devoted himself fully to learning and teaching in Lu.

  This is about as much as we can say with certainty about the life and career of Confucius. In the received tradition, Confucius was credited with the editing of the Book of Documents and Book of Poetry, commentary on the Book of Changes, and the compilation of the Spring and Autumn Annals (see Chapter 7). Although modern scholars are eager to doubt as much as possible about this tradition, there seems little ground to question that Confucius was a scholar influential to his age and to later generations. Confucius is quoted either as the author of or the authoritative voice in the new commentaries of the B
ook of Changes discovered in the Han Dynasty tomb at Mawangdui, and one of the recently discovered manuscripts cites him commenting on the Book of Poetry.8 His relation to the Spring and Autumn Annals is more plausible as he could well have copied the original materials out of the official chronicle of Lu.9 The true importance of Confucius in Chinese history is that, besides his role as a philosopher, he was probably the most learned scholar of his time on these ancient works which he had doubtless taught in his classroom in his self-declared role as a mere “transmitter” of ancient institutions. Viewed from this perspective, we may even be allowed to speculate on a likely “Confucian curriculum” in the terminology of modern academia as the core of education which Confucius provided his students with.

  As such, we find no single essay written around a particular philosophical issue where Confucius may be expected to elaborate on his ideas in some detail. However, there are a number of recurring issues in the Analects that are corroborated by quotations of Confucius across other texts, providing us with at least a snapshot capturing of the mind of the philosopher. The Analects in twenty chapters is a collection of sayings of Confucius presented in the form of responses to the questions posed by his students. Although the final compilation of the Analects probably took place not far from the end of the Warring States period, at least some of its entries must have had much earlier origins. Therefore, the Analects has been considered core text to Confucius and Confucianism.10 A very important issue for Confucius is the “Rectification of Names (Zhengming),” and Confucius saw this as the foundation of the state and government:

  When names are not correct, the words will not convey their meaning; when the words do not convey their meaning, affairs will not achieve success. Therefore, rites and music will not flourish and punishments would not fit the crimes. The people will not know what they should do.

  Confucius’ own explanation of “Rectifying Names” is found in Analects 12 where he answers the question posed by the ruler of Qi in the following words: “Let the ruler be ruler, subject be subject, father be father, and son be son.” This certainly is not a word game of names – rather, he was concerned more with what is referred to by the names, and with whether the reality can properly match what the names require. Thus, if a ruler does not behave like a “ruler,” and a subject like “subject,” the state will definitely fall into chaos. In other words, names are a referential system to social political orders, and only the government in which each person does exactly what is required by his name can provide guidance for the people.

  Interestingly, Confucius thought that this could be done not by imposing administrative orders but easily or willingly (in the sense of causing no harm to anyone) through the practice of “Ritual” (Li) which is rather natural to and even preferred by those who are engaged in it. The term Li by its origin in Western Zhou inscriptions referred to sacrificial offerings in ancestral worship which by the late Western Zhou had come to be associated with sets of sumptuary rules that determined the correct conduct of members of a religious–ritual community. By conducting oneself correctly according to these rules, one is ritually reconfirmed of his status and duty in that community. The Analects itself does not give a clear definition of Li, but offers a number of cases where Confucius very seriously considered certain conducts as “Violation of Li,” for instance, the use of dancers performing in eight rows in a ministerial family of Lu which was the ritual standard for state rulers. Confucius commented angrily: “If one can bear with this, what else is there one cannot bear with?”

  As for the social effect of “Ritual,” Confucius says:

  Li promotes mutual visits. Therefore, if someone paid you a visit but if you do not pay a visit back, that is violation of Li. By the same token, if you visited someone but he does not pay you a visit back, that is also violation of Li.

  For Confucius, everyday life is a performance in a wide social web where the interaction between people is not only inevitable but is desirable as the way to realize Li. Not only does an individual need to interact with others, but he must do so according to proper ritual rules which will naturally instill in him a sense of duty to fulfill his social obligations suitable to his status. Good social order comes as the result of each member of the society truthfully conducting his part as “ruler,” “subject,” “father,” and “son”. . . as appropriate to their names in a predetermined social hierarchy. Confucius stresses that one should not only perform his duty, but needs to do so with sincerity and deep passion, and this relates to another important concept of Confucius – “Benevolence” (Ren), which he describes as more important than water or fire that people cannot live without it. Confucius’ own interpretation of “Benevolence” is simply “to love people.” He talks about the “Government of Benevolence,” a proposition that the second great philosopher of the Confucian tradition, Mencius, was to elaborate on later. Confucius also suggested a method to determine whether one is benevolent or not – a Confucian “Golden Rule”: “Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself!” In this formula, one should take one’s own heart as the measurement of what is harmful and what is beneficial. Thus, Ren is not far from us.

  Like most philosophers of the “Axial Age,” Confucius perceived the world around him as essentially wrong. For him, the ideal social order existed only in the past, the Western Zhou, when the virtuous Zhou kings presided over a political system that was created under the Duke of Zhou, Confucius’ own hero, and sustained through a ritual system that was in perfect order. For him, the solution to the current problems was to go back to the Western Zhou when royal authority was strong and subjects obedient; “Ritual” was the foundation for doing so and the “Rectification of Names” was the proper method to achieve this goal.

  According to some accounts, the tradition once founded by Confucius was divided after the master’s death into eight sects, among which that of Mencius was most influential. Since Mencius traced his intellectual inheritance back to Zi Si, Confucius’ grandson, Zi Si and Mencius (372–289 BC) together represented a very important intellectual stream within the greater Confucian tradition. Mencius was born more than a century after Confucius’ death, in a city that was possibly also very close to Confucius’ birthplace. But he was apparently from a rich family and had good luck in finding rulers who would take delight in listening to his deliberations. In 320 BC, he was welcomed to the court of the state of Wei (Daliang) in eastern Henan where he stayed for some years. Then, he moved on to the state of Qi where he became a leading figure in the Jixia Academy sponsored by the Qi ruler.11 His words are heard collectively in the long text of Mencius which most scholars agree to have been composed towards the end of his life, if not actually by Mencius himself.

  Different from Confucius who was primarily concerned with the harmonious social order, Mencius, though with the same goal in mind, constructed his thesis at a more fundamental level by inquiring deeply into “human nature.” According to Mencius, everyone was born with a good nature and everyone had the potential to become a sage. Mencius makes this case by pointing to the fact that everyone has sympathy towards a child who is about to fall into a well, as every child has an inborn love for his parents. The reason that some men became bad is because they starved their good qualities and therefore exposed themselves to bad influence. Common men will inevitably lose their good nature, only the gentleman, the Shi, can preserve it. This good nature of man is crystallized in four superior qualities which he termed “Benevolence” (Ren), “Righteousness” (Yi), “Manner” (Li), and “Wisdom” (Zhi). According to Mencius, the seeds of these four good qualities are already inborn within every person, and what he needs to do is to discover and further develop them. On this point, Mencius is very different from another Confucian master who came after him, Xunzi (310–220 BC), who argued that the nature of man is essentially evil, and only the proper practice of ritual and learning can set him apart from beasts. Mencius is particularly noticeable for his promotion of the concept of “Righteousness
” as the principle of conduct in a time of no existing political–moral authority. On this point, he is uncompromisingly against political and moral utilitarianism. The concept of Li came to mean exclusively personal manners in Mencius’ philosophy and lost its meaning as the superior “Ritual” order, the foundation that upholds proper social relations in Confucius’ thought.

  The natural extension of this basic understanding of human nature into political philosophy is the issue of “Good Government” with an army that acts in accordance with the principles of “Benevolence” and “Righteousness,” a proposition which Mencius spent most of his energy to elaborate on. Living roughly 100 years after Confucius, Mencius was little bothered by the fact that the “Ritual” was violated, because such violation was just everywhere. Also unlike Confucius, Mencius had little interest in restoring the Western Zhou system because the Zhou house had long been proven hopeless, and by 323 BC, only three years before Mencius appeared in the court of Wei, rulers of all major territorial states had assumed the title “King” (Wang), thus being politically and ritually equal to the Zhou king. The issue for Mencius was to find a good ruler who was capable of conquering all others and re-establishing social order based on the concepts of “Benevolence” and “Righteousness,” and it did not matter who he was. According to Mencius, the government of such virtuous kings would be the one that puts people to the center of concern. This is Mencius’ answer to the most fundamental question of his time, the source of legitimacy of political power: