A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
Page 46
The central doctrine of the school is that of eight consciousnesses. No other philosophy has ever analyzed the mind into so many parts. According to the school, the eight consciousnesses, that is, the five sense-consciousnesses, the sixth or sense-center consciousness (manovijñāna) which forms conceptions, the seventh or thought-center consciousness (manasvijñāna) which wills and reasons on a self-centered basis, and the eighth or storehouse consciousness (ālaya), are in perpetual change which involves a threefold transformation. The first transformation is the storehouse consciousness. It is so called because it stores the “seed” or effects of good and evil deeds which exist from time immemorial and become the energy to produce manifestation. This storehouse consciousness is in constant flux, constantly “perfumed” (influenced) by incoming perceptions and cognitions from external manifestations. At the same time, it endows perceptions and cognitions with the energy of the seeds, which in turn produce manifestations. According to the stock saying of the school:
A seed produces a manifestation;
A manifestation perfumes a seed;
The three elements (seed, manifestation, and perfuming) turn on and on;
The cause and effect occur at one and the same time.
This is the basic consciousness. All others are “stored” in it and depend on it for their own transformation. The second transformation, which constitutes the seventh or thought-center consciousness, transforms with the storehouse consciousness and, unlike the first six consciousnesses, has as its object not the external world but the ālaya itself. Its special function is intellectual deliberation, which clings to the ālaya consciousness and considers it to be the self. Its operation is deep and uninterrupted and is always accompanied by the evils of self-interest.
The third transformation consists of the five sense-consciousnesses and the sixth or sense-center consciousness. They are characterized by discrimination and differentiation out of which the external world appears. The difference between the sixth and the first five is that while each of the five has its own sphere of objects,8 the sixth takes the external world as a whole as its object. In this sense it is self-centered but not to the degree of the seventh, which is free from the external world. Because these six consciousnesses have external things as their objects, they are conditioned by them and are therefore crude, superficial, and discontinuous.
All these transformations take place at the same time and influence each other. They are all governed by cause and effect. The law of cause and effect is a cardinal one in Buddhism, but in no other school is it so closely bound with its central thesis. It must be noted, however, that this law is applied here purely in a speculative fashion, with neither historical nor scientific support.
The school further analyzes each consciousness into four functional portions, namely, the objective portion, the subjective portion, the self-witnessing portion, and the rewitnessing portion. That is to say that each idea not only involves the seeing and the seen, but the witnessing of the experience by the self, which witnessing will then be witnessed once more. It is out of this complicated process of deliberation and discrimination that the external world appears. The result is a world of differentiated dharmas (elements of existence)9 each with its own specific characters.10 It is to these dharma-characters that the school has directed its attention. Of Vasubandhu’s thirty verses, the first twenty are devoted to them. Consequently the school is also known as the Fa-hsiang or Dharma-character School.
The characters of dharmas are classified into three different kinds. Those “conceived by vast imagination,” like horns of a rabbit, are purely illusory and therefore have only false existence. Those which “depend on others for production” have purely temporary or dependent existence, for they depend on causes for their production and have no nature of their own. Only those of the “nature of perfect reality” have true existence. This perfect reality transcends all specific characters. It is simply Thusness or Suchness (Tathatā), the Ultimate Reality.11 This reality will be realized when through discipline and enlightenment the pure seeds in the storehouse consciousness are cultivated and the impure aspect of the storehouse is overcome.
This type of philosophy is completely alien to the Chinese tradition so that, like the Three-Treatise School, it was merely an Indian system transplanted on Chinese soil. However, its emphasis on dharma-characters, that is, on the mundane world, may have been due to the mundane character of Chinese thought. As indicated before, it may have been Hsüan-tsang’s own choice. Unfortunately, in spite of this mundane tendency, it did not survive the Chinese climate and rapidly declined since the ninth century. The persecution of Buddhism in 845 dealt all Buddhist schools a serious blow. Within Buddhism itself, forces were at work to bring about its decline. In the seventh century, the Consciousness-Only and the Zen (Meditation or Ch’an) Schools were the two major movements in Chinese Buddhism, one essentially a classical movement and the other romantic.12 The romantic movement, because of its affinity with Taoism, gradually soared to great heights and overshadowed the Consciousness-Only School. At the same time the Hua-yen School, which was growing in influence, relegated it to the position of “elementary doctrine” in the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) far below other Buddhist schools, because it advocated that some people, being devoid of Buddha-nature, can never achieve Buddhahood, thus clearly betraying the Mahāyāna ideal of universal salvation. Its own philosophy was too abstract for the practical Chinese mind. Its texts are the most difficult to read (and to translate!). Above all, its hair-splitting analysis was not harmonious with the Chinese spirit of synthesis. Besides, its most important texts were lost and forgotten during the Yüan period (1271-1368). With these basic works gone, both knowledge and interest evaporated. Its influence on Neo-Confucianism is negligible, if any. Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692) showed an interest in it but few other scholars did until the late nineteenth century. In the 1880’s, a number of Buddhist texts were brought back to China from Japan, including K’uei-chi’s Notes. This aroused immediate and strong interest. The leading authority on Chinese studies, Chang Ping-lin (Chang T’ai-yen, 1868-1936) wrote a commentary on the second chapter of the Chuang Tzu in terms of Consciousness-Only philosophy. China was by this time on the eve of the Intellectual Renaissance. New systems of thought were being introduced, and European idealism was becoming popular. The new scientific spirit made analysis attractive. Two Buddhist scholars, layman Ou-yang Ching-wu (1871-1943) and Abbot T’ai-hsü (1889-1947) revived the philosophy and created two strong movements in the twentieth century.13 Actually they contributed little that was new except to revive the old. It is in Hsiung Shih-li that the Consciousness-Only philosophy has been used constructively, that is, as a stimulation to his idealism which is his reconstruction of Neo-Confucian idealistic philosophy.14
The following are selections from Hsüan-tsang’s Ch’eng wei-shih lun, including all the thirty verses by Vasubandhu.
THE TREATISE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUSNESS-ONLY
1. The Nonexistence of the Self
1. Because the ideas of the self (atman) and dharmas are [constructions produced by causes and therefore]15 false,
Their characters of all kinds arise.16
These characters are [constructions] based on the transformations of consciousness,
Which are of three kinds.
2a. They are the consciousness (the eighth or storehouse consciousness) whose fruits (retribution) ripen at later times,
The consciousness (the seventh or thought-center consciousness) that deliberates, and the consciousness (the sense-center consciousness and the five sense consciousness) that discriminates spheres of objects.
The Treatise says:
Both the world and sacred doctrines declare that the self and dharmas are merely constructions based on false ideas and have no reality of their own. . . . On what basis are [the self and dharmas] produced?17 Their characters are all constructions based on the evolution and transformation of consciousness. . . .
How do we know that there is really no sphere of objects but only inner consciousness which produces what seem to be the external spheres of objects? Because neither the real self nor the real dharma is possible.
Why is the real self impossible? Theories of the self held by the various schools may be reduced to three kinds. The first holds that the substance of the self is eternal, universal, and as extensive as empty space.18 It acts anywhere and as a consequence enjoys happiness or suffers sorrow. The second holds that although the substance of the self is eternal, its extension is indeterminate, because it expands or contracts according to the size of the body.19 The third holds that the substance of the self is eternal and infinitesimal like an atom, lying deeply and moving around within the body and thus acts.20
The first theory is contrary to reason. Why? If it is held that the self is eternal, universal, and as extensive as empty space, it should not enjoy happiness or suffer sorrow along with the body. Furthermore, being eternal and universal, it should be motionless. How can it act along with the body? Again, is the self so conceived the same or different among all sentient beings? If it is the same, when one being acts, receives the fruits of action, or achieves salvation, all beings should do the same. But this would of course be a great mistake. If it is different, then the selves of all sentient beings would universally penetrate one another and their substance would be mixed, and since the field of abode of all selves is the same, the acts of one being or the fruits of action received by him should be the act or fruits of all beings. If it is said that action and fruits belong to each being separately and there would not be the mistake just described, such a contention is also contrary to reason, because action, fruits, and body are identified with all selves and it is unreasonable for them to belong to one self but not to another. When one is saved, all should be saved, for the Dharma (truth) practiced and realized would be identical with all selves.
The second theory is also contrary to reason. Why? If in substance the self always remains in the same state, it should not expand or contract along with the body. If it expands or contracts like wind in a bag or a pipe, it is not always remaining in the same state. Furthermore, if the self follows the body, it would be divisible. How can it be held that the substance of the self is one? What this school says is like child’s play.
The last theory is also contrary to reason. Why? Since the self is infinitesimal like an atom, how can it cause the whole big body [that extends throughout the world of form]21 to move? If it is said that although it is small it goes through the body like a whirling wheel of fire so that the whole body seems to move, then the self so conceived is neither one nor eternal, for what comes and goes is neither eternal nor one.
Furthermore, there are three additional theories of the self. The first holds that the self is identical with the aggregates22 (namely, matter,23 sensation, thought, disposition, and consciousness).24 The second holds that it is separated from the aggregates.25 And the third holds that it is neither identical with nor separated from the aggregates.26 The first theory is contrary to reason, for the self would be like the aggregates and is therefore neither eternal nor one. Furthermore, the internal matters (the five senses) are surely not the real self, for they are physically obstructed (or restricted) like external matters. The mind and mental qualities are not the real self either, for they are not always continuous and depend on various causes to be produced. Other conditioned things and matters are also not the real self, for like empty space they are without intelligence.
The second theory is also contrary to reason, for the self would then be like empty space, which neither acts nor receives fruits of action.
The last theory is also contrary to reason. This theory allows that the self is based on the aggregates but is neither identical with nor separated from them. The self would then be like a vase [which depends on clay] and has no reality of its own. Also, since it is impossible to say whether it is produced from causes or not produced from causes, it is also impossible to say whether it is a self or not. Therefore the real self conceived in the theory cannot be established.
Again, does the substance of the real self conceived by the various schools think or not? If it does, it would not be eternal, because it does not think all the time. If it does not, it would be like empty space, which neither acts nor receives fruits of action. Therefore on the basis of reason, the self conceived by the theory cannot be established.
Again, does this substance of the real self conceived by the various schools perform any function or not? If it does, it would be like hands and feet and would not be eternal. If it does not, it would be like [illusory] horns of a hare and not the real self. Therefore in either case, the self conceived by them cannot be established.
Again, is the substance of the real self conceived by the various schools an object of the view of the self or not? If it is not, how do advocates of the theory know that there is really a self? If it is, then there should be a view of the self that does not involve any perversion, for that would be knowledge of what really is. In that case, how is it that the perfectly true doctrines believed in by those holding the theory of the self all denounce the view of the self and praise the view of the non-self? [Advocates of the theory themselves]27 declare that the view of the non-self will lead to Nirvāṇa while clinging to the view of the self will lead to sinking in the sea of life and death (transmigration). Does an erroneous view ever lead to Nirvāṇa and a correct view, on the contrary, lead to transmigration?
Again, the various views of the self [actually] do not take the real self as an object, because it has objects [which are not itself] like the mind takes others [such as external matters]28 as objects. The object of the view of the self is certainly not the real self, because it [the view] is an object like other dharmas. Therefore the view of the self does not take the real self as an object. Only because the various aggregates are transformed and manifested by inner consciousness, all kinds of imagination and conjecture result in accordance with one’s own erroneous opinions . . . . (ch. 1, tsd, 31:1-2).
Comment. The denial of the ego is the starting point of Buddhist philosophy in general and the Consciousness-Only School in particular. The idealism of Berkeley and that of this school are very much alike. But while Berkeley’s philosophy is built on the assumption of individual minds and therefore finds itself in an “egocentric predicament,” Buddhist idealism rejects the ego to start with and is therefore able to be free from solipsism.
2. The Nonexistence of Dharmas
Although the variety of heterodoxical schools is great, their theories of existent dharmas29 are only of four kinds. The first, like the Sāṁkhyas30 and others, holds that existent dharmas and the nature of being31 and so forth32 are definitely identical in substance. Their theory is contrary to reason. Why? Because it must not be held that all dharmas are identical with the nature of being. If they are all the same as the nature of being, there would be no difference in their substance. This would contradict [the Sāṁkhya theory that]33 the three qualities [of goodness, activity, negativity of matter], the self, and so forth are different in substance. It would also contradict the fact that in the world the various dharmas are different. Furthermore, if color and so forth are identical with the nature of color and so forth, they should not be differentiated as green, yellow, and the like.
The second, like the Vaiśeshika34 and so forth, holds that existent dharmas and the nature of being and so forth are definitely different in substance. Their theory is also contrary to reason. Why? Because it must not be held that dharmas are different from the nature of being. If they are extinct and no longer exist, they cannot possess any substance. This would contradict [the Vaiśeshika theory that]35 substance and other categories are not without nature of their own. It would also contradict the fact that in the world things evidently exist. Furthermore, if color and so forth are not identical with the nature of color and so forth they, like sound, would not be objective spheres of vision.
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The third, like the Nirgrantha36 and others, holds that existent dharmas and the nature of being and so forth are both identical and different. Their theory is wrong. Why? Because they are mistaken about identity as the first theory and about difference as the second. The two characters of identity and difference are mutually exclusive and should be differentiated in substance, and it is impossible for identity and difference to share the same substance. It must not be held that all dharmas are of the same substance or that they should be simultaneously identical and different. This view is false and not true but is held to be true. It is certainly contrary to reason.
The fourth, like the Ajivikas37 and others, holds that existent dharmas are neither identical with nor different from the nature of beings and so forth. Their theory is contrary to reason. Why? Because the theory that existent dharmas are neither identical with nor different from the nature of beings is virtually the same as the theory that existent dharmas are both identical with and different from the nature of beings. Is the expression “neither identical with nor different from” an affirmation or a denial? If it is an affirmation, the double negation should not be used. If it is purely a denial, then no theory should be held. If it is both an affirmation and a denial, it is self-contradictory. And if it is neither an affirmation nor a denial, it is nonsense. Furthermore, such a doctrine contradicts the fact that the whole world knows that one thing differs from another. It also contradicts the doctrine of the schools themselves, which hold that existent dharmas such as color are definitely real. . . . (ch. 1, tsd, 31:3-4)