A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy

by Wing-Tsit Chan

  In psychology, act and content are usually distinguished as two different aspects. . . . We must realize that act is involved in content and content is produced by act. The two cannot be separated, for they are but the two aspects of the same thing. . . . Modern science supports my view, namely, that content is produced by act. For this reason I feel that what Kant saw more than a hundred years ago is not inferior to what contemporary scholars see. The idea of threefold synthesis presented in his Critique of Pure Reason really cannot be shaken. Unfortunately he almost did not explain sensation at all. What I am doing is to amend his deficiency with the relatively reliable theories of modern psychology.

  Comment. One wonders if Chang’s persistent refusal to accept any absolute bifurcation is not an influence of Chinese traditional thought, for the doctrines that “substance and function come from the same source”3 and that knowledge and action form a unity have been major Chinese traditions. Chang is a profound student of both Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism.

  On the basis of the ideas set forth above, we must first of all admit that “mind” or “consciousness” is merely an act of continuous and progressively advanced synthesis. Progress from psychological activities on the low level (such as sensing a shadow or form) to those on the high level (such as thought and judgment), form all but continuous stages in this synthesis. Synthesis can advance continuously to the degree of changing its nature. In other words, synthesis can advance from one level to another and thus move up so that the content of each level becomes different. I call the result of this synthesis “the constructs.” Even that which synthesizes is a product of synthesis.

  We must realize that sensation is still only a synthesis, although it is on the lowest level, or a synthesis that tends to be biological. As to the ordinary person’s idea that whiteness, hotness, or fragrance is a simple thing, that is wrong. Kant called this thoroughgoing synthesis a Verbindung, but I rather call it collectively “physical integration.” Within it there are four levels, to each of which I have given a name. With respect to sensation I call it “fusion or sensory fusion.” With respect to perception, I call it “configuration.” With respect to conception, I call it “unification.” And with respect to categories, I call it “regulation.” (Chih-shih yü wen-hua, pp. 7-9)

  Now we have to explain unification, or the nature of concepts. We must realize that sensation is necessarily related to perception and perception to conception. In their aspect of advancing upward, they are continuous. But in their special characteristics, perception involves meaning which sensation does not possess, and concepts can enter into another person’s mind, which perception cannot do. . . .

  According to Kant, no knowledge can be separated from concepts. This means that when we discriminate a thing or an event, we simply have to use concepts. Without concepts there will be no knowledge. What is called knowledge is simply the use of concepts we already have and concepts newly formed. Therefore it is quite natural that perception changes to concepts. But when we analyze them, we cannot help saying that conception is more advanced than perception, that is all. For a concept can detach itself from the immediate perception and goes from one’s own mind into another person’s mind.

  Now our question is this: How is a concept produced? In other words, how is it formed? Of course concept is formed by “unification to become one. . . We learn in psychology that perception always leaves an image . . . . When the image becomes weaker and weaker, it naturally changes to be a sign. A sign means a vague and general outline. When the sign is transferred, it becomes a symbol. By transferring is meant that a sign for A becomes the sign for B. This is the mobility of signs. I believe that this is the origin of the concepts of things, because as soon as the sign appears, the concept is formed. What we ordinarily call a concept is really a sign. We talk about the origin of concepts purely from the point of view of psychological process. In reality a concept is the same as a sign, and a sign is the same as a concept. In short, a concept is not like what the new realists call the subsistent which subsists in things but exists in them as an independent entity. [On the contrary] a concept is formed when a concreta changes from a sign into a symbol and can be applied to another concreta so that it becomes an abstraction. . . .

  The concreta from which the concept emerges is not limited to the object of perception. The most important concreta is the meaning of the perception, and relation is one of the meanings. All of these can be abstracted to be concepts. For example, when I see two things, I perceive that they coexist. This coexistence can become a concept. Or I perceive that A is larger than B. This comparative largeness can also become a concept. . . .

  The reason why a concept can become a norm for other concepts is that when a concept arises, it immediately becomes a world or group of concepts, in which all concepts are related. In other words, in a group of concepts, the concept with the strongest normalizing power can cause other concepts to follow it and change their color (or become tainted by its color). Although this normalizing function only operates among the concepts themselves, it does definitely have a negative condition, and that is that the concept cannot conflict with perception or oppose it. If in perception there appears a phenomenon conflicting with it, the concept will immediately collapse. Then another concept must emerge to explain the phenomenon, so that the new phenomenon and other existing concepts will not conflict. This is why experimental knowledge can correct and revise concepts.

  If it is necessary to give examples to show that concepts can be advanced to categories, we have some excellent ones. Take, for example, purpose. This concept arose from the fact that primitive people felt that they had the will to do something. Gradually this feeling is broadened until it is believed that all changes are due to a will. Take, for example, a man killed by lightning. Primitive people thought it was God’s will that he died. The man’s death is a fact. It remains the same but its interpretations are different. Explained in scientific terms, it is electric shock, and in terms of superstition, it is God’s punishment. These two interpretations are completely compatible with the culture of their times. If in our day of scientific culture we still believe that it is God’s punishment, we will be considered wrong. But in the whole of ancient culture, only the theory of God’s punishment was compatible. Therefore it could not have been discovered by the people of the time that it was not the truth . . . . (ibid., pp. 19-26)

  Western religious concepts like God and Supreme Being and philosophical concepts like substance, ultimate stuff, the highest idea, oneness, and the absolute all serve to reflect society as a whole, so that when people believe in them they will feel more and more united with it and will be willing to sacrifice for it. For when society needs a centripetal force stronger than the centrifugal force, some theory or idea must arise to hold the people together so that they feel in their own minds that it is the truth and only then will they be willing to practice it and seek its realization. We must realize that any concept has a suggestive power. French scholars have called it the idea force. The term itself (that is, the concept) has a suggestive power to urge us to move toward a united society. On the other hand, philosophical concepts like freedom, personality, and dialectics all reflect social conflicts. When people believe in them, a psychology of conflict naturally arises in society. . . .

  Since government is a “force,” it is in itself a necessary evil. But the degree of its evil cannot be higher than the degree of goodness which society needs. Otherwise society will completely disintegrate. This is a natural check and balance. Therefore no matter in what evil society, when moralists promote social unity they always have an appeal to people, can exert their influence, and can prove their usefulness. What we have been talking about does not concern society as such but to show how social conditions are reflected in ideas so readers may realize that while ideas seem on the surface to be independent and represent laws of logic or the structure of the universe that we talk about, actually they are secretly controlled by social needs, that is
all. . . . (ibid., pp. 80-82)

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  THE NEW RATIONALISTIC CONFUCIANISM: FUNG YU-LAN

  There is no doubt that Fung Yu-lan (1895—) has been the most outstanding philosopher in China in the last thirty years.1 He was already on the way to sure prominence when he published his two-volume History of Chinese Philosophy2 in 1930, 1934. With the publication of his Hsin li-hsüeh (The New Rational Philosophy) in 1939, his position as the leading Chinese philosopher was firmly established. It is the most original Chinese philosophical work in this century. It has been the most discussed. Aside from Hsiung Shih-li’s Hsin wei-shih lun (New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only) it is also the only work in twentieth-century China presenting a person’s comprehensive philosophical system. Significantly, Fung’s system is a reconstruction of rationalistic Neo-Confucianism while Hsiung’s is a reconstruction of idealistic Neo-Confucianism.

  The term li-hsüeh, literally “school of principle,” is the usual name for the Neo-Confucianism of Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) times. Fung explicitly said that his system is derived from, though does not follow, Neo-Confucianism.3 It is based on four main metaphysical concepts, namely, principle (li), material force (ch’i), the substance of Tao, and the Great Whole.4 Collectively, they are deduced from the statement that “Something exists.” They are all formal concepts and logical implications, empty and without content.5 Specifically, each of them is deduced from a proposition or a set of propositions developed chiefly in the rationalistic Neo-Confucianism of Ch’eng I (Ch’eng I-ch’uan, 1033-1107) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200) but also in Taoism.

  The first concept, that of principle, is derived from the Ch’eng-Chu proposition that “As there are things, there must be their specific principles.”6 In order to be, a thing must follow the principle by which it is what it is.

  Principle is self-existent, absolute, eternal, a universal as understood in Kung-sun Lung (b. 380 b.c.?)7 and in Western philosophy. It is neither in nor above the world, for in itself it does not enter into any temporal or spatial relationship. A thing needs to follow principle but principle does not have to be actualized in a thing. It belongs to the realm of reality but not actuality.8 Hence there are more principles than are actualized in the world. The sum total of principles is the Great Ultimate.9

  The second concept, that of material force, is derived, as in the Ch’eng-Chu School, from the proposition that “If there is principle, there must be material force.” This means that if a thing is to exist, there must be the material force by which it can exist.10 This material, comparable to matter in Western philosophy, is the material force in Neo-Confucianism. Being the material of actualization, it has the characteristic of existence but itself does not exist either in principle or in the actual world. Like principle, it is only a formal logical concept.11

  The third concept, that of the substance of Tao, is derived from the Neo-Confucian proposition of “The Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate.”12 This means that the universe is a “universal operation” or a “great functioning” through the processes of “daily renewal”13 and incessant change.14

  The fourth concept is that of the Great Whole, Tao, or Heaven,15 in which, according to Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, one is all and all is one.16 This is a formal concept, because it is merely the general name for all and not an assertion about the actual world.17 It is the Absolute in Western philosophy, just as the concepts of principle, material force, and the substance of Tao may be compared to the concepts of being, non-being, and becoming, respectively.18

  The Great Whole is the goal of life which is to be fulfilled through the investigation of things, the fulfillment of one’s nature, and serving Heaven. When this is done, one will reach the highest sphere of life, that of “forming one body with all things,” which is the sphere of “great jen (humanity).”

  Such is a bare outline of the Hsin li-hsüeh. Following it Fung wrote five books to complete his system in its various phases. The Hsin shih-lun (China’s Road to Freedom, 1939) deals with social, political and cultural reconstruction and is an economic interpretation of Chinese civilization and history. The Hsin shih-hsün (A New Treatise on the Way of Life, 1940) presents his mainly Confucian but to some extent also Taoistic ethics. The Hsin yüan-jen (A New Treatise on the Nature of Man, 1943) offers a theory of four different spheres of living. The scheme involves an advance from the innocent sphere where one does not know what he is doing, to the utilitarian sphere where one lives primarily for self-benefit, to the moral sphere of serving society, and finally to the transcendental sphere when one becomes a “citizen of Heaven” and serves Heaven.19 The Hsin yüan-tao (The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, 1944) interprets the historical development of Chinese philosophy. In the Hsin chih-yen (A New Treatise on the Methodology of Metaphysics, 1946), Fung develops his own methodology. These works supplement but do not alter the fundamental position of his philosophy.

  Fung frankly calls his own system a “new tradition,” which to him not only represents a revival of Chinese philosophy but is also the symbol of a revival of the Chinese nation.20 Thus his is not only a new system, but also one that continues and reconstructs the orthodox tradition from Confucius through the Sung Neo-Confucianists to himself. Quite aside from this confident sense of destiny, his system is new in the sense that he incorporates into the traditional rationalistic Neo-Confucianism the Western elements of realism and logic as well as the Taoist element of negativism and transcendentalism.21

  Fung’s greatest innovation is of course his conversion of Neo-Confucian ideas into logical concepts. In so doing he has transformed Neo-Confucianism fundamentally. Neo-Confucianism, which is essentially a philosophy of immanence, is now replaced by one of transcendence. In Neo-Confucianism, problems of the mind and the nature are basic, and metaphysical speculation about the universe is intended primarily to help understand them. Fung considers the mind and the nature to belong to the world of actuality, and does not seem to take them as seriously as logical concepts. In emphasizing universals, he found more of them in Chinese philosophy than there really are. To interpret Kung-sun Lung’s chih (mark?) as a universal is no more than a conjecture. As to principle, if it only belongs to the realm of reality and does not imply actuality, is the actual world then an accident or even a mistake? How can reality be real without existence? How can principle be the moral nature of things and yet in our nature transcends the actual world? If principle is not immanent in things, it is difficult to conceive any direct relation between universal operation and principle. In rejecting the Neo-Confucian philosophy of immanence, he also undermines its practical and this-worldly character. This is in direct opposition to the persistent tendency of Chinese philosophy and raises the serious question whether Fung’s claim of a new tradition is justified.

  These questions call for answers. The more vital question, however, is whether Fung still holds this new rational philosophy. In 1950 he repudiated it, saying that it is but a twilight of old Chinese philosophy, just as Neo-Thomism is a twilight of Western philosophy. He regretted his neglect of the concrete and the particular, and compared Marxism-Leninism to modern medicine and traditional Chinese philosophy to medieval medicine.22 Later in the year he specifically renounced the main thesis of his five books mentioned above. To him becoming a citizen of Heaven was no longer the highest sphere of living but escapism. As to the Hsin li-shüeh itself, he said that it over-stressed the universal and was too strongly influenced by Taoism and Buddhism, thus reflecting the crumbling feudal society.23

  It is difficult to appraise utterances of this sort. Fung’s attraction to Marxism is by no means an unlikely possibility. After all, as early as 1939, he wrote his Hsin shih-lun from the point of view of materialistic interpretation of history. Later he said that the Taoist idea of returning to the root or reversion and the whole concept of daily renewal are dialectic. In 1952, however, he maintained that the difference between the new philosophy and the old philosophy in China is t
hat the former is close to the people. The old philosophy should be criticized, he added, but what is correct in it should be adopted.24 In 1957, he argued that Confucius was not a materialist but an idealist who brought facts into harmony with abstract concepts, as when he said, “Let the ruler [fact] be a ruler [concept].25 To defend both idealism and abstract concepts when these were under strong attack seems to indicate that much of traditional Chinese philosophy in general and his own philosophy in particular is still with him. More will be said about him in chapter forty-four. We are here concerned solely with his new rationalism for which the following selections have been made from his Hsin li-hsüeh, Changsha, 1939.

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