A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy

by Wing-Tsit Chan

  The universe from the past to the present and from the present rushing into the infinite future is truly an undifferentiated great current, in perpetual transition at every instant, discarding the old and going toward the new, jumping [like fish] in a lively manner without cease, rich, and inexhaustible. We must realize that although this undifferentiated great current changes and is daily renewed, yet for every change there must be the cause for its occurrence. No matter how novel a development may be, it cannot occur without cause and suddenly evolve an extremely strange phenomenon. For example, the seed of a pea cannot produce hemp, for it is not the generating cause of hemp. Spirit and matter are the two aspects of the universal operation of original substance, which is ch’ien (Heaven), the Originator.10 We should not regard spirit as part of matter. If we say that in the beginning of the universe there was only layers of physical obstruction and originally no manifestation of any spiritual phenomena and therefore conclude that spirit does not originally exist, then, if this theory is to be maintained, we must first of all affirm that matter originally involves the character and nature of spirit. Otherwise there will be no cause from which organic matter and the function and manifestations of the mind can emerge. But I don’t see how this theory can be maintained. We must also realize that matter is not fixed concrete stuff. As the Book of Changes has already said, as there is concrete stuff, there is function.11 It further affirms spirit as brilliant, strongly active, moving forward, pure, and developing things. It is merged with matter as one but also controls and directs it. Is this theory erroneously formulated on the basis of fancy and imagination? (ibid., 64b-65a)

  Question: I have already learned the ultimate principle of the great Book of Changes, namely, substance is at the same time function and function is at the same time substance. But I still have some doubt. Are the ten thousand things in the universe the same as the great functioning or are they its products?

  Answer: According to principle, the ten thousand things and the great functioning cannot be separated. Why is this the case? Because the ten thousand things are not separated from the universal operation of the great functioning and each independently possesses a concrete character of its own. From this we should say that the ten thousand things and the great functioning are basically one. Once this principle is ascertained, there should be no further doubt. If you say that the ten thousand things in the universe are produced by the great functioning, then I should ask you what you mean by the word “production.” If it means the same as a mother producing a son, then it will be greatly mistaken. Fundamentally the word “production” means manifestation. According to this meaning, as the great functioning universally operates in a lively and dynamic manner, it manifests all kinds of traces and phenomena. These are called the ten thousand things. The ancients meant this when they said that the ten thousand things are traces of transformation. Spoken this way, the ten thousand things are traces and forms of the universal operation of great functioning. Put differently, the concrete self-nature of the ten thousand things consists in the great functioning which operates unceasingly and in a very lively and dynamic manner. Can they and the great functioning be said to be two?

  Question: If the ten thousand things and the great functioning are one, then the ten thousand things will lose their own selves. Why is this the case? The reason is that if the ten thousand things are merely traces of transformations, how can they possess evidently independent selves? Lao Tzu sighed over [the fact that Heaven and Earth regard all things as] sacrificial straw dogs,12 and Chuang Tzu theorized [that the Creator, after people die, turns them into] the liver of a rat or the arm of an insect.13 They both wanted to merge all things with great transformation so they will lose their own selves.

  Answer: How extremely deluded you are! In the universal operation of great functioning, there are forms clearly before us. Take, for example, lightning. With each flash some red light is manifested. The red lights are traces and forms. Do you think the lightning at this time is outside the red lights? Or take, for example, water in the ocean manifesting itself as lively and active waves. The many waves are also traces and forms. Do you think that the water is outside the waves? Or take, for example, a torrent bursting violently, with thousands and thousands of white drops lashing up and down. These white drops are also traces and forms. Do you think that they are outside the torrent? Please think it over. The ten thousand things manifest themselves and seem to be individual objects, but really their self-nature consists in the great functioning universally operating without cease, (ibid., 72b-73a)

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  CHINESE PHILOSOPHY IN COMMUNIST CHINA

  Philosophy in Communist China can be summed up in one word, “Maoism.”

  Mao Tse-tung (1893—) has not claimed to be a philosopher, and he has not been labeled as such. But his ideas have determined the directions in which philosophy has been developing in New China since its establishment in 1949. Of his many works, two are of extreme importance in this connection, namely, On Practice (1937) and On New Democracy (1940).1 In the former, the nature of philosophy for New China is defined and in the latter the future of Chinese traditional philosophy is virtually decided.

  The thesis of On Practice, which is the most philosophical of Mao’s works, is simple and definite. In his own words:

  “To discover truth through practice, and through practice to verify and develop truth. To start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge, and then, starting from rational knowledge, actively direct revolutionary practice so as to remold the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, more practice, more knowledge; the cyclical repetition of this pattern to infinity, and with each cycle, the elevation of the content of practice and knowledge to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.”2

  The fact that Mao concluded his essay with the theory of the unity of knowledge and action is most interesting, for it is one of the most prominent theories in the history of Chinese philosophy.3 However, the source of Mao’s inspiration is Engels, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and not the Confucianists. In his essay he repeatedly refers to Communist writings but not to Chinese culture. In his On New Democracy, however, he made his attitude toward Chinese culture abundantly clear:

  “New-democratic culture is scientific. . . but it can never form a united front with any reactionary idealism. . . . A splendid ancient culture was created during the long period of China’s feudal society. To clarify the process of development of this ancient culture, to throw away its feudal dross, and to absorb its democratic essence is a necessary condition for the development of our new national culture and for the increase of our national self-confidence; but we should never absorb anything and everything uncritically. We must separate all the rotten things of the ancient feudal ruling class from the fine ancient popular culture that is more or less democratic and revolutionary in character. As China’s present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and China’s new culture has also developed out of her old culture, we must respect our own history and should not cut ourselves adrift from it. However, this respect for history means only giving history a definite place among the sciences, respecting its dialectical development, but not eulogizing the ancient while disparaging the modern, or praising any noxious feudal element.”4

  From the foregoing, it is clear that philosophy in New China must be practical, scientific, democratic, and popular. There have been radical changes in New China on many fronts, but so far as philosophy is concerned, its direction has been definite and straight. At first philosophers confessed their mistakes. This was followed by their study of Marxism. Then they corrected their wrong views. Subsequently there were more attacks on revisionism and rightism. With the establishment of communes in 1958, both philosophy and philosophers have been put to work among the masses. T
hroughout all these various movements, the theme of philosophy has remained the same, namely, philosophy for practical use for the masses.

  Since knowledge must come from practice, all abstract concepts, idealistic theories, and subjectivism of any kind are considered feudalistic and are to be totally rejected. Philosophy acquires its true meaning only in the discovery and solution of practical problems. Therefore the chief lesson of philosophy is the concrete development of society. Philosophy and production must be united, not only because philosophy can thus fulfill its function but also because objective analysis can best be carried out in production.

  Furthermore, this practical application of philosophy must be done among and indeed through the masses, for philosophy must be popular as well as scientific. This is the logic behind sending philosophers to work in the communes. To be democratic, philosophers must work and study with the masses. In fact, the masses are their best teachers, for theirs is really the philosophy of the people. Therefore, just as thought and practice must be identical, so intellectuals and workers must be united.

  In this situation, there can be no distinction between theory and practice. There are in Communist China courses and research on philosophy, departments of philosophy, philosophical journals, philosophical conferences, and many publications on philosophy. But these are regarded as only aids to the practical function of philosophy. The effort is not being devoted to the development of new theories of technical philosophy or the production of individual philosophical works but to the transformation of existing philosophy according to the Marxist pattern. It is significant that in a book which is virtually the official Communist history of Chinese philosophy in English, the section on contemporary philosophy, 1919 to 1959, is entirely devoted to the Communist political and social revolution with almost not a single word on technical philosophy.5 We have noted that Hsiung Shih-li (1883-1968) published his Yüan-ju (An Inquiry on Confucianism) in 1956, a presentation of his Neo-Confucian philosophy without quoting any Communist writer or using any Communist terminology.6 But Hsiung’s is essentially a new statement of an old theme and he is entirely outside the main stream.

  Like the distinction between theory and practice, that between the philosophical expert and the layman must also disappear, for philosophy is to be identified with the masses. To be sure, there are many teachers of philosophy and many writers on it. Among them Fung Yu-lan (1895—) is still the most outstanding. Evidently he is not yet completely converted to Marxian philosophy, and therefore he has been the chief target of attack. The constant demand is that he must forsake the capitalist camp and serve the masses.

  Under such circumstances what is the future of Chinese philosophy? In point of fact, research on Chinese philosophy is going on. Studies and commentaries on Chinese philosophical classics are being published. It can be said, however, that its fate is the same as that of philosophy in general, namely, that it must be reconstructed according to the Marxist pattern.

  Nothing can show this tendency better than the conference on Chinese philosophy held on January 21–26, 1957 in which the nature of the history of Chinese philosophy and the question of the continuation of the Chinese philosophical heritage were vigorously debated on among more than one hundred participants. Materials presented at the conference have been published in a volume with subsequent statements. The following selections are made from this volume.

  It may be said that since the conference took place shortly before the “Let one hundred schools contend” campaign in which relative freedom of thought was allowed, and since that campaign was short lived, the results of the conference may not be indicative of things to come. Fung Yu-lan, who upheld Chinese philosophy, was continuously criticized. More than a year later, he had to criticize himself as a member of the capitalistic class, an idealist, and one who used the metaphysical method.7 Nevertheless, it is not Chinese philosophy as such that has been attacked. Rather, it is its idealism and abstract ideas. Fung’s self-criticism serves to show that Marxian philosophy will dominate Communist China, but that Chinese philosophy will continue, although it will be reconstructed and directed to practical problems for the benefit of the masses. Confucius, Chu Hsi (1130-1200), Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), and the rest may be branded as feudalists, but who can deny that they were primarily interested in the solution of practical problems for all?

  SELECTIONS8

  1. The Nature of the History of Chinese Philosophy

  Fung Yu-lan:

  There are many struggles in social and political thought, which are in reality struggles between materialism and idealism. For example, in the history of Chinese philosophy, the question whether human nature is good or evil has continuously aroused extensive controversy from the pre-Ch’in (221–206 b.c.) period to modern times. In the pre-Ch’in period, Mencius held that nature is good, believing that inborn nature is good because there is originally a moral principle endowed by “Heaven.” This is of course the view of idealism. Hsün Tzu (fl. 298–238 b.c.), on the other hand, held that human nature is evil, believing “Heaven” to be merely “Nature” in which there is no moral principle and that man’s moral qualities are acquired through education. Such an idea directly negating Mencius’ idealism should be regarded as materialistic.

  Later, the Neo-Confucianism of Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) distinguished the Principle of Nature and human desire and emphasized that the former should control the latter. What was called the Principle of Nature is really feudalistic moral principles objectified and made absolute. Philosophers who opposed the Neo-Confucianism of Sung and Ming like Ch’en Liang (1143-1194), Wang Fu-chih (Wang Ch’uan-shan, 1619-1692) and Tai Chen (Tai Tung-yüan, 1723-1777), regarded the Principle of Nature as the correct development of human desires, denied that the Principle of Nature had any right to control human desires, and placed man’s desires and feelings in the position of first importance. This is a direct negation of the idealism of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism. This type of thought should also be regarded as materialistic. . . .

  In the past several years in our effort to settle the problem of the struggle between materialism and idealism in the history of Chinese philosophy, we have only emphasized their conflicts and have paid no attention to their mutual influence and mutual penetration. Of course this side of the story is a relative one, but to ignore it is an error of onesidedness.

  Let us take an example. In the beginning Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism was fundamentally materialistic. In the philosophies of both Chou Tun-i (Chou Lien-hsi, 1017-1073) and Chang Tsai (Chang Heng-ch’ü, 1020-1077), material force was considered as primary. Later Ch’eng I (Ch’eng I-ch’uan, 1033-1107) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200) reverted to idealism. But Wang Fu-chih set aside the idealism of Ch’eng and Chu, directly continued the materialism of Chang Tsai, and thus established his great materialistic system of thought. This line of development is quite clear, and this is what we have said in instructing our students.

  But this is only one side of the story. On the other side, while Wang continued Chang, he did not simply do so or revert to him without change. Similarly, while he set aside Ch’eng and Ch’u, he did not simply do so. What he did was to develop his own philosophy out of that of Ch’eng and Ch’u, then set them aside, and at the same time continued Chang Tsai. In the dialectical development of history and human knowledge, to go through something is not a simple matter. It involves absorbing its rational elements and throwing away its dregs. It involves an advance. . . .

  In our recent work on the history of philosophy, we have generally employed the metaphysical and materialistic methods and have oversimplified and vulgarized the struggle between materialism and idealism in the history of philosophy, so that the history of philosophy, which is originally rich and active, has become poor and static. Actually the history of philosophy is what Lenin has described as a great development. . . . (pp. 14-23)

  Chang Tai-nien:

  What is the fundamental direction in the study of the history of Chinese philosophy s
ince emancipation? Its essential expressions are three: First, the recognition that the problems of thinking and existence are basic in Chinese philosophy. Although the terminology employed in Chinese philosophy is different from that of the West, since these problems are also basic in Chinese philosophy [as in the West], the history of Chinese philosophy is also the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism [as in the West] and its area of struggle is also similar to that of the West. Second, the recognition that social consciousness is determined by social existence and that in philosophical studies the method of class analysis must be used. That is to recognize that the struggle between materialism and idealism is a reflection of class struggle. Third, learning from the enlightened experience of Russian philosophers and their method of studying the history of philosophy. . . . (p. 84)

  2. The Chinese Philosophical Heritage

  Fung Yu-lan:

  To understand totally certain philosophical premises in the history of Chinese philosophy, we must pay attention to their two meanings, one abstract and the other concrete. In the past I have paid attention almost entirely to the abstract meaning of some of these premises. This, of course, is wrong. Only in the last several years have we paid attention to their concrete meaning. Without saying, it is correct to pay attention to their concrete meaning, but it would be wrong to pay attention to it alone. In trying to understand these premises in the history of philosophy we should of course place their concrete meaning in the position of first importance, for they have a direct relation to the concrete social conditions in which the authors of these premises lived. But their abstract meaning should also be taken into consideration. To neglect it would be to miss the total picture. . . .