While there may have been batteries of four brigades of heavy artillery in action on the 2nd Division front on the morning of 31 August, their fire was directed on selected targets as arranged with the infantry and continued for 60 minutes, with two lifts. Targets at Feuillaucourt, Mont St Quentin, Anvil Wood, St Radegonde, Allaines and Haut-Allaines, the brickworks and sugar factory near St Denis and areas near Bussu were all engaged. The heavies undertook some counter-battery work and, although this task was not allocated to any particular brigade, the 9th Royal Garrison Artillery appears to have performed most of the work in this area. Overall, action was restricted because the plan was not of the usual coordinated nature and not all the batteries in action were firing all their guns. Indeed, the counter-battery report from 3.00 pm on 30 August to 3.00 pm on 31 August records that counter-battery work consisted only of heavy harassing fire — often hit and miss — directed on known and suspected battery areas. This was not a sophisticated counter-battery program and the German artillery was far from suppressed.29
This was not the amount of artillery support that the infantry had come to expect in a 1918 battle. On 31 August, the 5th Brigade advanced with no more than 120 field guns and 90 heavies in support, fewer than 1000 men to take and hold what became a 4000-yard front. On 4 July, the 6500 troops who attacked at Hamel on a front of around 6000 yards were supported by 326 field guns and 302 heavy artillery pieces as well as tanks. On 23 August, the 3000 attacking troops advanced on a 4000-yard front under the protection of some tanks, 360 field guns and four brigades of heavy artillery, with another six — including some 6-inch guns — involved specifically in counter-battery work. The positions captured were nowhere near as formidable as Mont St Quentin. The artillery support should have been far greater — not less — to compensate for the shortage of manpower on 31 August if Monash did not expect that the German defences would be ‘beaten down by blood’. Such comparisons illustrate just how hard the gunners had to work in this battle and the risks Monash was prepared to take in launching the quick attack. The elements that remove risk — present in set-piece battles such as Hamel and Chuignes — were not in play at Mont St Quentin-Péronne.
How effective was the timed program on the morning of 31 August? Corporal Alfred Edwards and Private Daniel Petersen wrote that there was no barrage — this was understandable considering how thinly it was spread.30 Certainly the Germans believed that the Australians attacked without artillery preparation and were not fazed as much by shelling as they were by the surprise and noise of the attack which came just as they were relieving in place. Charles Rosenthal considered the barrage ‘adequate’.31 The 5th Brigade was able to follow it across the dangerous open ground of the amphitheatre and onto its objectives, suffering few casualties. In this sense, then, the available artillery firepower had achieved its purpose and the gunners could be proud of their contribution.
Some of the most effective shooting during the day was by field artillery batteries working closely with the infantry following the lifting of the barrage. The 12th Battery of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade, under Major William St Clair, was one of only two batteries across the river on 31 August and continued its work with the 20th Battalion, doing some ‘magnificent shooting’. The 20th also commended a British brigade of field artillery whose observation officers went out on horseback, selected their positions, and rapidly brought their guns into action.32
Throughout the day, the field and heavy artillery of both the 2nd and 5th Divisions was frantically busy, firing on known enemy locations such as Anvil Wood, the aerodrome and Mont St Quentin Wood, the trenches to the rear of the 5th Brigade positions, strongpoints around Doingt, Bussu, Allaines and Haut-Allaines and many more positions requested by the infantry in the afternoon. The 5th Field Artillery Brigade 18-pounders fired 7000 rounds and the 4.5-inch howitzers 1200 rounds from noon on 30 August until noon on 31 August in support of the 5th Brigade.33 In addition, the heavy artillery put down harassing fire on German communication lines, shooting at opportunity targets and responding to some calls from the air. A destructive shoot by 6-inch howitzers on a hostile battery near Agram Alley secured two direct hits.
However, these impromptu shoots could not suppress the strongpoints sufficiently for the depleted infantry battalions to mop them up — the 23rd Battalion, for example, had no success against Anvil Wood or St Radegonde. From around 11.30 am the 17th and 20th battalions were targeted by a German bombardment that was heavy and accurate. Counter-battery fire had failed to silence the German guns or make them difficult to man once the enemy had gathered his wits. At around 3.00 pm the 2nd Division artillery fired on Germans moving towards Feuillaucourt, but the fire proved insufficient to halt the counter-attacks against the 20th Battalion, nor could the 5th Division artillery firing into the Germans assembling near Bussu prevent counterattacks on the right flank. The artillery support was insufficient to enable the numerically depleted 5th Brigade to hold the positions won in the morning and any exploitation was impossible.
This was an unenviable situation for the artillery. In the confusion of battle and with frequent disruptions to communications, there was some uncertainty over the positions of the 5th Brigade troops during the afternoon and early evening. Consequently, Rosenthal would not allow the artillery to fire on Mont St Quentin village, believing his own men to be there. While this was a possibility, the decision was heavily criticised by Pompey Elliott, who believed that the 5th Brigade was nowhere in the vicinity.34 There were several other occasions when Rosenthal prevented the artillery from firing for the same reason. The artillery was hampered in providing close support to the troops trying to hold their objectives because of the danger of hitting them and there may have been occasions when this actually happened.35 With an attack by the 6th Brigade expected in the afternoon, most of the batteries of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade and the 16th Royal Horse Artillery were on the move to support the attack, so little effective firing was conducted, further thinning the artillery support for the 5th Brigade.
The lack of clarity regarding the 5th Brigade positions — particularly in the Uber Alles/Gott Mit Uns trench system — was one reason the barrage laid down for the attack of the 6th and 14th brigades on 1 September was far from satisfactory. The artillery start line was also too far east. This meant that the barrage fell behind the Germans, leaving them free to fire on and attack the advancing infantry. The attacking battalions — the 23rd, 24th, 53rd and 54th — all declared that they had little or no artillery support going into the attack, the 24th attesting that ‘we waited a minute for the guns to open fire, but in vain.’36 Indeed there were wide stretches of open country that the infantry would need to cross and where they were not afforded supportive or protective artillery fire.
Diagram showing artillery program for 1 September.
On the 5th Division front, the timings of the barrage made it particularly difficult for the 14th Brigade. In the fire plan, its troops had just 15 minutes to walk 1000 yards from the jumping-off line in Florina Trench to the barrage, falling from St Radegonde Wood along a trench to Anvil Wood. Fire lifted from the north-western corner of Anvil Wood at the same time as it lifted from its southern extremity, so the infantry had to fight through 400 yards of strongly defended territory. Likewise, only 15 minutes was allocated to cover the ground from Anvil Wood to the northern edge of Péronne. The barrage lifted too early for the troops — who met unexpected opposition — and they lost it.. James Stewart stated in his Report on Operations that, by 7.30 am, ‘the artillery program was by this time almost an hour in advance of the progress of the infantry, and the enemy were not controlled at all by our artillery fire.’
None of the strongpoints of the sugar factory, St Denis, the north-eastern ramparts of Péronne or Bretagne were engaged from zero hour, allowing the Germans stationed there to fire into the ranks of the 14th Brigade as soon as it went over the top. To make matters worse, the open country was swathed in thick barbed wire entanglements which remained un
cut. This was a further indication of the weakness of the barrage as, by 1918, the 106 percussion fuse used in high explosive shells would routinely demolish wire. The 53rd Battalion, hit hardest of all, not only had to fight its way through wire, but advanced into converging fire from field and machine-guns on Mont St Quentin — unsuppressed by the 2nd Division artillery — the ramparts of Péronne and the hills surrounding St Denis. When the barrage did reach the strongpoints of St Denis, the sugar factory and Péronne, the defenders took cover only to re-emerge when it passed, their effectiveness unimpaired. Although some smoke was fired in the barrage to obscure observation from the high ground, this appears to have been largely ineffective. Thus, on the morning of 1 September, the timed programs did not adequately support the infantry of either the 2nd or the 5th divisions.
Soldiers inspecting three dead horses from a team of a British artillery limber struck by a German 5.9 inch shell near Clery, 1 September 1918. (AWM EO3155)
James Robertson arranged a hurricane bombardment of Mont St Quentin from 1.00 to 1.30 pm. Every available field and heavy gun was in action, although the heavies were firing on trench systems and approaches east of the village because of the danger of hitting their own men, while only the shells of the field guns were ‘bursting in the village’.37 This was an intense barrage; the rates of fire for the field guns had been increased to four rounds per gun and three rounds per howitzer per minute. The 6th Brigade war diary commented on the ‘fine shooting’, particularly of the 16th Royal Horse Artillery, remarking also that the barrage was a credit to the artillery, whose gunners were indefatigable and skilful.38 When the infantry again advanced from the much closer position of Elsa Trench at 1.30 pm, there was a period of desperate fighting, but it was not long before German resistance crumbled and, by 3.00 pm, the Mont had been captured. This intense and concentrated artillery shoot, the only one of its kind in the battle, undoubtedly contributed to the 6th Brigade’s success on the afternoon of 1 September.
However, on the right flank, the desperate plight of the 14th Brigade continued. An attack at around 1.00 pm, apparently without artillery support, was expensively unsuccessful. The capture of the Mont relieved the situation somewhat and, when the men advanced again at 5.00 pm, some ground was gained. The 13th Field Artillery Brigade war diary records that a creeping barrage was put down for this attack, but this seems unlikely, although there was some sort of barrage placed between 5.00 and 6.00 pm.39 At 5.45 pm an impromptu heavy artillery shoot was placed around Cardinal Wood and the trenches nearby at the request of the infantry. This artillery activity no doubt assisted their limited and short-lived success. At around 8.15 pm, Stewart ordered his troops at St Denis to withdraw, as it was impossible to bombard these positions or those in Péronne with the Australians so close, and artillery fire was the only means of dislodging the Germans from their strongpoints.
Throughout the day, Stewart experienced difficulty liaising with his artillery and was frustrated by the ‘slowness’ of its support, perhaps reflecting the lack of battery support for individual battalions. At the same time the artillery was hampered because most of its guns were at the limit of their range and by the fact that the infantry brigadier rarely knew where his troops were.
The 13th Field Artillery Brigade war diary describes how difficult it was for the batteries to move into position on 1 September as the country was a network of old trenches with little cover; positions were exposed and it was hard to find good sites that could not be observed by the Germans, who were now reinforcing the front. To make matters worse, the 13th’s guns badly needed overhauling and calibrating because they had been firing so intensely over the previous days. However, the gunners themselves appeared to have no need of overhaul as, on 20 August, the brigade purchased hairdressing sets with funds from the regimental trust account.40
On the Bouchavesnes ridge on 1 and 2 September, creeping barrages were laid, but again their effectiveness was questioned by the infantry while the gunners asserted that they had provided considerable assistance to the troops of the 11th Brigade. The artillery took advantage of ‘fleeting opportunities’, particularly against German guns and transport. The forward observation officers occupied advanced positions and field and heavy artillery conducted excellent observed shoots. There was also a program of harassing fire against roads, approaches, trenches and German areas not under observation.
At 1.00 pm on 1 September, Hill 115, on the Mont St Quentin ridge, was strafed in cooperation with the 2nd Division artillery, while on 2 September, a concentrated shoot was placed on Aizecourt-le-Haut and the trenches nearby, the latter reached by the 7th Brigade. The heavies were directed on Germans retreating along the Aizecourt– Nurlu road and other targets which were out of range for the field brigades. The batteries were constantly engaged in harassing fire to the limits of their range. When the British 74th Division was pushed back in its attack on Nurlu, the Australian batteries, meant to be standing fast as the 3rd Division had now been squeezed out of the line, opened fire in support and continued firing all day, prompting messages of thanks from the III Corps commanders.
The 8th Field Artillery Brigade stressed the importance of direct communication between field guns and heavies; this worked well during the operation. Single guns or sections of batteries were not moved forward, as this created communications issues, caused casualties and was hard on the horses. Batteries, however, were moved well forward and the guns remained within range of the Australian infantry at all times, providing as much support as possible. The artillery was able to engage opposition in front of the troops and annihilate Germans advancing from the rear areas. All communication lines were put through promptly and held well; effective use was made of lamp signalling and continuous wave wireless, useful in maintaining communications between artillery brigade, infantry brigade, division and divisional artillery.41 From 31 August to 2 September, the 3rd Division artillery performed well under the circumstances and in the difficult conditions on the Bouchavesnes ridge. Its gunners were so tired that they were falling asleep at their guns, falling off limbers and being run over.42
On 2 September on the Mont St Quentin and Péronne fronts, problems began even before the infantry went over the top. Different start times were set for the attacks of the 7th and 14th brigades, while the British rate of fire to the left of the 7th was different to that of the Australian artillery. This made it extremely difficult to coordinate the artillery, particularly in the short time between receiving orders and zero hour. James Stewart was critical of the 30-minute preliminary bombardment, arguing that it negated any element of surprise and gave the Germans plenty of time for their own counter-battery work.43 The devastating German barrage of high explosives mixed with gas caught the 56th Battalion in its assembly lines and the 15th Brigade in Péronne, where it was also hit by its own guns.
The attack of the 56th was never going to be viable as long as enemy machine-guns continued to fire from the ramparts of Péronne. They were not silenced, nor was the infantry helped by the late and ragged bombardment of Bretagne. Later in the day, and for the next two days, all attempts to silence the machine-guns in Flamicourt by artillery fire proved ineffectual. However, the Germans certainly suffered casualties in the tightly packed streets of Péronne, Hector Brewer writing that ‘enemy dead testify to the havoc wrought by our own barrage earlier in the morning’.44
Norman Nicolson provided some interesting insights into the role of his battery which supported the 14th and 15th brigades. The battery remained on the west bank near Barleux until 2 September, in the old 1916 front line where there were ‘crude crosses everywhere’ and ‘rotted bodies’. While the position was frequently shelled, the cover was good and the battery suffered few casualties. Ammunition was brought in at dusk or dawn as, during the day, the carriers were under full observation by the Germans. Nicolson maintained that field artillery fire caused heavy casualties and the guns fired continuously in support of the Australian attacks on Péronne. At one stage the Germ
ans ran from a trench and their officers tried to drive them back, ‘apparently with whips’. On 5 September Nicolson’s battery was the first to pass through Péronne, where it was photographed by the official photographer, Hubert Wilkins.45
14th Field Artillery Brigade passing through Péronne, 5 September 1918. This is possibly Norman Nicolson’s battery, photographed by Hubert Wilkins. (AWM EO3231)
Evan Wisdom, commanding the 7th Brigade, gave an articulate appraisal of the role of the artillery on the 2nd Division front on 2 September. He stated unequivocally that the barrage was unsatisfactory. He noted that the actual shooting was good, but it was too thin and its speed of advance too great to provide support to the advancing infantry, held up by devastating machine-gun fire as the Germans emerged from their dugouts once the barrage had passed. The artillery neglected to run lines forward to exploit infantry gain. Difficulties with communication between forward observation officers, batteries and battalion commanders created problems; in one case a forward observation officer, having failed to contact his battery, reported to a battalion commander two hours after the objective had been taken and was told to ‘get the Hell out of it’. On other occasions the artillery missed good targets because of poor communications. Wisdom also noted that the counter-battery work of the heavy artillery was ineffective because there was too little time for the registration of the guns and, indeed, the most that the four available brigades could do was to harass the enemy. Again, the 7th Brigade struggled through uncut wire in the trenches and on the northern and southern slopes of the Mont St Quentin ridge.46
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