Despite Wisdom’s criticism, there was some good artillery work during the day. Rosenthal made the point that, on 2 September, ‘the limits of the infantry advance far exceeded the range of the guns’. However, in this situation, sections of batteries worked from zero hour in cooperation with battalion commanders to provide close support to the infantry. In his opinion, this worked effectively and many good targets were engaged. Special mention was made in the 2nd Division artillery report of the 13th Battery, 5th Field Artillery Brigade, two sections of which moved forward with the infantry, one working with each of the 25th and 27th battalions, and doing good work.47
Men of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade having lunch beside their camouflaged gun which was established in an open position, 2 September 1918. (AWM EO3145)
The batteries found progress difficult as the only available road was under shellfire, including gas, until 4.00 pm. The guns and wagons were dribbled forward one by one. The gunners had difficulty in siting new positions, as the high ground near Aizecourt-le-Haut was still in the hands of the Germans, who gassed and shelled these positions all night. Nor was it easy to draw supplies; the men hauled their horses backwards and forwards over long distances and many of the animals were feeling the strain and likely to become useless. All personnel, including the men in the ammunition columns, performed heavy work.
One of the surprising features of operations was that Allaines and Haut-Allaines crumbled so quickly. The infantry praised the shelling of these strongpoints by the 2nd Division guns and the newly attached brigades from the 3rd Division. Indeed, it seems they were subjected to considerable shellfire from both field and heavy artillery, leaving the German garrisons rattled, demoralised and incapable of withstanding the Australian assault. The 25th Battalion maintained that shellfire caused the greatest number of German casualties on the 7th Brigade front.48
The heavy artillery was also very busy elsewhere, firing concentrated shoots on selected targets of tactical importance, with fire lifting from near targets to more distant ones as the attack progressed. Aizecourt-le-Haut, Bussu, Darmstadt and Silesie trenches, Doingt, Cardinal Wood and the areas surrounding these places were heavily strafed, sometimes on request from the infantry, or on call from the air. Intense harassing fire was also placed on chosen spots beyond the objectives and on known and suspected German batteries, some of which were neutralised and others destroyed. At least 15 hostile batteries were attacked during the infantry advance. For most of the operation, the German guns were at the maximum range of the Allied artillery.
In an attempt to empty their gas shell dumps before retiring, and also hoping to adversely affect morale, the Germans used a considerable amount of gas against the Australians. Although this was largely blue cross, causing debilitation and exhaustion rather than casualties, some mustard gas was also used. This invidious substance blistered the skin and made the lungs bleed. The 14th Brigade suffered some 50 to 75 gas cases, mostly from nasal, respiratory and irritant types. Gas was also contained in high explosive shells used in the German bombardments and thus went unnoticed for some time during the approach marches and assembly of the infantry, causing some men to become temporarily incapacitated. Using gas in this way also achieved its more equal distribution and men suffered under the splinters of the high explosive shell.
Despite the need to adapt quickly to changing orders, the nightly bombings, the lack of sleep and the hard work, the gunners felt that they could also share the excitement of success at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. The artillery played an important role in demoralising the Germans, causing many prisoners to be taken, disorganising rations, inflicting casualties and making retreat almost impossible. The gunners shared the same dangers and made the same sacrifices as the infantry they supported. In most cases their work was acclaimed by the men and their commanders. They faced the daunting task of providing support on a battlefield where guns were often at the limit of their range and the gunners had to make difficult decisions to use the available artillery where it was most needed. Because the phases of the attack moved so rapidly, it was almost impossible to concentrate the artillery.
Artillery fire plans were generated in consultation with divisional and brigade commanders who, in this operation, often had incomplete information on the position of their troops. Communications were not sophisticated enough to stop the barrage or redirect it once it opened. There was insufficient time to survey many of the artillery positions and the availability of maps often determined whether the infantry and the artillery — and indeed the airmen — were working from maps of the same scale, an issue which seems to have particularly plagued the 14th Brigade. In addition to these problems, there were simply not enough guns available to neutralise the Germans. The commanders took the risk that they would not be able to suppress the German guns or follow up all the airmen’s calls for fire.
Consequently, as James Durrant points out, the artillery was unable to support the infantry as closely or as quickly as was required on many occasions when the men advanced without it, and was not as effective as expected in putting German machine-guns out of action.49 It was dangerous work at Mont St Quentin-Péronne, but what the artillery achieved by working in combination with the other arms was sufficient to secure the victory, although that victory was not due to the firepower of the guns.
Our airmen’s work
The effectiveness of artillery fire, particularly in counter-battery work, depended heavily on aerial observation and photography to find German batteries which were usually located behind the line and could be seen only from the air. Thus aircraft became an integral and essential part of the heavy artillery weapons system. However, such observation depended on the weather, on wireless reception and on the condition of telephone lines from those who received the airmen’s information to those who used it.50 Sound ranging could detect battery positions when visibility was poor, but the batteries could be moved frequently to cause confusion and guns were often deployed singly or in small scattered groups. The use of aircraft as a ‘weapons system’ in itself was rudimentary in 1918 and, except in rare cases, could not help the infantry to push forward.
In addition, Monash placed particular importance on aerial contact patrols to report on Australian infantry movements and positions as his units approached the Somme bend and to gather intelligence about German movements which he would use to plan the attack on Mont St Quentin-Péronne. He regarded the observation reports of the airmen as a quick and efficient way for divisional and brigade commanders to track the progress of their troops and, indeed, there were occasions during the battle when situation maps or messages dropped by aircraft at a prearranged point were useful to the infantry, artillery and their commanders.51
The Allies held undisputed aerial supremacy in 1918, the German Air Service having declined following the death of Manfred von Richthofen, ‘the Red Baron’, in April 1918 and due to a lack of equipment, fuel and ammunition which saw many German planes caught on the ground in the last months of the war. For Mont St Quentin-Péronne, the 3rd Squadron, AFC, took to the skies alongside aircraft from the Royal Air Force (RAF). This was the Australian Corps squadron, scouting for the Australian divisions, flying close observation or contact patrols and artillery spotting patrols and taking aerial photographs.
The 3rd Squadron was formed at Point Cook in Victoria in September 1916 and was the first Australian flying unit to arrive on the Western Front in September 1917, designated the 3rd Squadron in January 1918. The squadron mainly flew RE8s (Reconnaissance Experimental), a multi-purpose biplane built in Britain. It held a pilot and an observer, both commissioned officers, and was equipped with one Lewis gun and one Vickers machine-gun, both of which the pilot and the observer were trained to use, as well as 118 kilograms of bombs. The aircraft could remain airborne for almost four and a half hours and there were 18 planes in the squadron.
Mont St Quentin-Péronne was a problematic battle for the squadron. Over its crucial days the weather was not kind and visib
ility was poor. One artillery patrol plane was in the air for only ten minutes on the morning of 30 August before being forced to return due to fog. Another flew for only 30 minutes at 5.30 am on 31 August before bad weather forced it down.52 Leslie Morshead commented on the noticeable absence of aircraft on the 3rd Division’s front on the Bouchavesnes ridge.53
During the morning of 1 September, two contact patrols, flying at very low altitudes where visibility was better, were fired on by German machine-guns and rifles on the ground. On 2 September heavy rain squalls made flying very difficult, compounded by the fact that German aircraft were out in force trying to prevent the Australians observing the German rear areas and preparations for a possible retirement. One contact patrol in the morning was unable to gain any information because of hostile aerial activity.54 The squadron’s base was also a long way from the front line — at Villers Bocage north of Amiens — making communications difficult, particularly with Australian Corps headquarters at Méricourt. The squadron moved to a new, more centrally located aerodrome east of Proyart on 3 September.
While the history of the 3rd Squadron states unequivocally that it took no direct part in the capture of Mont St Quentin and Péronne, the airmen accomplished all they could under the circumstances and the squadron record sheet was far from blank.55 On 30 August, a number of key areas such as Péronne, Haut-Allaines and Doingt were under close observation, as well as the all-important Somme bridges and crossings, particularly those into Péronne itself. Airmen flying over the town believed it to be deserted, although they reported troops there on 31 August, intelligence which proved useful to the infantry.56 Contact patrols attempted to establish the positions of Australian troops on Mont St Quentin on 31 August but probably had greater success in relaying such information on 1 and 2 September. Lieutenant James Bull and Second Lieutenant William Nancarrow of the 56th Battalion considered air support vital in helping the infantry to cross the Somme bridges on 31 August.57 German movements were detected from the air and important intelligence gathered concerning bridges and crossings as the operation progressed. It was airmen who reported the blowing of the road bridge into Péronne from the south at around 7.00 pm on 31 August.58
Aircraft fired into the German lines from low altitudes, sometimes down to 50 feet. There were examples of airmen firing into trenches around Brie on 30 August and around Péronne on 31 August. That afternoon, once the weather had cleared a little, one plane fired over 100 rounds from its Lewis gun and 100 from its Vickers into Anvil Wood.59 James Marshall commented on ‘our airmen’s work’ in forcing the Germans into well-protected air raid shelters in Péronne and, indeed, at 7.00 pm on 31 August, an air patrol fired on targets in the town itself.60 On the morning of 2 September a contact patrol attacked three times around Doingt, south-east of Péronne and east of Mont St Quentin.61
In the early evening of 31 August there was a dogfight over Péronne, with an artillery patrol plane attacked by 13 German Fokker Scouts and forced to land, its observer slightly wounded, but not before another artillery patrol plane came to its assistance, the pilot firing 150 rounds from the Vickers and the observer 120 rounds from the Lewis. The Fokkers withdrew.62 Artillery spotting required the pilot to fly slowly and regularly on a level course for a long time at around 5000 feet. Both Australian pilots were flying at 3000 feet on this occasion, very dangerous work indeed. Such aerial combats were not unusual; on 2 September another artillery patrol, in the air for around two hours, engaged German planes on four separate occasions, firing on them from ranges of 200 to 300 yards and forcing them to withdraw.63
Aerial photographs were the basic intelligence tool for counter-battery work and directing harassing fire onto German communications.64 Although the weather was far from ideal, patrols were sent up for this specific purpose at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. On 29 August a series of photographs was taken and on 1 September two patrols took a number of vertical and oblique photographs in the afternoon, the former used for map-making while the latter allowed an angled view of the ground that could provide a clear impression of its main features and landmarks. On 4 and 5 September, when the weather had cleared, airmen took over 100 photographs to assist in monitoring the German withdrawal.65
The artillery fired on targets requested by the infantry, but also those ‘called’ by the airmen. A significant number of calls were made, particularly to the heavy artillery for neutralising fire on guns in action, but relatively few were followed up, probably because the artillery did not have the capacity to do this. This was the pattern over the three key days of the battle. On 2 September, for example, aircraft made over 50 zone calls for artillery to be directed on German batteries, trains and machine-gun positions, but only 13 were answered. Of those that were, only a small percentage were successful. 66
The heavy artillery gunners were in fact somewhat critical of the airmen, alleging that pilots were using different maps to the artillery, were not practised in observing certain shell bursts and could not be accurate in the adverse weather conditions and with so much ‘casual fire’ across the battlefield. There were problems with communications when the wireless failed or jammed. Some pilots were simply better than others.67 However, planes or balloons made almost all the identifications of hostile batteries, with No. 3 Balloon Section, RAF, singled out for particular mention for its work on 2 and 3 September. There is no indication during Mont St Quentin-Péronne that ammunition was dropped from the air, a practice which had become standard following its success at Hamel.
CHAPTER 9:
HARD & DANGEROUS WORK
The footbridge across the marsh
The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne would not have been fought at all without the work of the engineers, whose contribution is often underplayed or overlooked. Their role was absolutely crucial and they were instrumental to success in this operation. Shelford Bidwell referred to the engineers as the ‘natural allies of the gunners’ given their ability to literally ‘put them on the map’ with surveys of the battle area which made the plotting of targets and the calculation of firing data far easier.1 In the quick attacks of Mont St Quentin-Péronne there was little time for this. However, the establishment and maintenance of the signals communication network was also the role of the engineers and one which would make them indispensible to the infantry.
One common perception of the engineers portrays them as the men responsible for repairing the roads, checking that the water supply was fresh and had not been poisoned by the Germans as they withdrew, locating and de-activating enemy mines, restoring railways and, most important of all for the battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne, building bridges. Organised into field companies attached to each Australian infantry brigade, the engineers performed all these vital tasks, helping the guns to move forward and the infantry to achieve its objectives.
The field companies reflected the ‘national’ character of the AIF in that the men usually came from a different state of Australia to those in the infantry of a particular brigade. These men often brought to their units expertise from their professions or trades in civilian life before the war; they were engineers, surveyors, draftsmen, architects, carpenters, bricklayers, electricians and plumbers, to name a few. Many were ‘older’ on enlistment, often in their mid 20s to mid 30s. Some attended Engineer Officer Training School at Roseville in Sydney before embarking for duty overseas, while others were sappers when they enlisted, rising through the ranks in the field.
The formidable barrier presented to the advancing Australian troops by the Somme River and the Somme Canal as they approached the Péronne bend should not be underestimated. The Somme often meandered into vast expanses of swamp, reeds, ponds and channels that could not be bridged with a single span. By 29 August the Germans were on the eastern bank south of Péronne and had all approaches covered with well-concealed machine-gun nests. Mont St Quentin controlled the bridgeheads as far west as Feuillères on the east-west line of the river. The bridges on all crossings had been blown and the remnants we
re often mined. Yet, if the advance was to continue to the front of the Australian Corps, as Monash was determined it should, the Somme had to be crossed, reinforcing the importance of his tactical control of the Somme Valley up to this point. As in the advance, he could order the ‘continuous and rapid repair’ of bridges which would enable him ‘to pass troops and guns rapidly from one bank of the Somme to the other.’2
The role of the engineers and the sappers was just as dangerous, and their exploits just as ‘heroic’ as those of the infantry. That they took enormous pride in their work is attested by the beautifully drawn diagrams and sketches which they included in their war diaries. Many men received awards for their work from 28 August to 5 September, recognition of the significance of their tasks and the coolness and determination with which they worked.
On 29 August, as the 7th Brigade reached the Somme bend, it was the task of the 7th Field Company to get the infantry across the river for the attack on Doingt, one element of Monash’s original plan. The reconnaissance of possible crossings and establishing the condition of the remaining bridges was a significant part of its job, and saw the engineers often move some distance ahead of the infantry front line. The 7th Field Company engineers were anxious to inspect a bridge still standing to the north of Eterpigny, but this proved difficult because of the strength of the German artillery and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant John Mott set out to inspect the bridge, despite intense fire from both enemy and his own artillery, and was eventually wounded, collecting numerous shell fragments in his knee, while the shell bursts completely smashed the handle of his revolver. He was ferried back to the western bank on a tree trunk and taken out by stretcher-bearers. Mott, already a recipient of the DCM in 1917, received the MC for his work during August 1918.
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