Beaten Down By Blood

by Michele Bomford

  For the 5th Brigade operation on 30 and 31 August, special arrangements were made for telephone, visual and runner communications. Edward Martin considered that these generally worked well. On 30 August a line was run across the river to his battalions ‘by means of an old punt in the face of heavy sniping’ and proved to be of great value.20 Usually, two pairs of lines were run to battalions, perhaps an extravagant use of cable, but essential for maintaining both a speaking and a message line and preventing congestion so that messages could be conveyed more quickly. However, Martin, whose headquarters were on the southern bank of the Somme, was cut off from his infantry in the field on the morning of 31 August, and Charles Rosenthal wrote that there was great difficulty in maintaining lines forward to battalions across the river, although visual signalling was used effectively.21 The wireless station at brigade headquarters sent and received messages from division and flank brigades at times when the line communications failed.

  James Robertson was not so sanguine about his communications.22 On 31 August telephone lines between brigade and battalions were broken until 4.00 pm; shellfire was intense in the forward areas and the lines could not be maintained. He experienced the greatest difficulty with his lines across the river at Ommiécourt and ordered his signallers to lay an alternative route at Buscourt, where they were not broken as frequently. Three alternative routes were laid between the brigade forward report centre east of Cléry and battalion headquarters in Lost Ravine because lines were repeatedly broken by heavy German shelling and machine-gun fire. Even then the lines were continually cut. Some of the lines were very long, with many joints where they had been cut by shellfire, and reception was often weak. On one occasion it was necessary to lay a completely new line because the existing one had been so badly broken. Visual signalling, however, was adequate and runners were used in relays between battalion and brigade headquarters, three of whom were wounded during the operation. The use of wireless again proved useful but, on 1 September, the 23rd Battalion was virtually on its own as soon as it went over the top, as all the wires were cut and the wireless smashed.23 In all, over 16 miles of telephone lines were laid and ‘the Signal Section worked indefatigably throughout the operation under most difficult conditions’.24

  For the 7th Brigade on 2 September, the maintenance of telephone lines proved difficult and they were frequently interrupted by heavy shelling, particularly in the vicinity of Mont St Quentin. A troop of the 13th Light Horse Regiment was available, but could not be used tactically, so its members worked as mounted orderlies, enabling messages to reach brigade headquarters in remarkably short time in the period prior to the establishment of telephone connections to battalions. Evan Wisdom praised both its work and that of the signallers, whose signalling arrangements were well planned and implemented under difficult and trying circumstances. He was amazed that communications were maintained as well as they were.25

  In the 5th Division, a Wilson wireless set was established at the divisional forward station near Herbecourt on 1 September, from which contact was maintained with corps, divisional headquarters, flank divisions, the divisional artillery and infantry brigades. Trench sets were established at 14th and 15th Brigade headquarters, although this proved very difficult in the case of the exposed 15th where the aerial was cut several times and one of the poles damaged by shellfire.26 All units, including battalion headquarters, were also connected by a network of telephone lines which, according to Hobbs, were well maintained throughout the operation, although not without difficulty on the part of the linesmen as the lines were constantly subject to hostile shelling. Forward of brigades, cyclists, runners and visual signalling were used.27

  On 31 August the 14th Brigade experienced difficulties with its communications and could not be contacted for most of the day. At 8.00 am — when Monash issued his exploitation orders — both the 14th and 15th brigades were out of touch, perhaps explaining why James Stewart did not receive the order until 9.30 am. Wireless was used for the communication of orders to the 14th at 10.00 am. On 2 September Norman Marshall, the commander of the 54th Battalion, received his instructions from Stewart at 2.12 am for the attack that morning, but there was some confusion — and perhaps misinterpretation —when he relayed them by telephone to his senior company commander in Péronne at 3.30 am. Marshall had been unable to raise him earlier as ‘your sigs are apparently asleep’ or else the line was down, in which case he should ‘act at once and advise this H.Q.’28 Stewart himself did not receive the vital messages detailing the change of plan for the attack that day until 8.15 am, with a further message at 8.40 am, long after the attack had gone in.29 These crucial incidents illustrate the vital importance of the communications network and the difficulties that followed when it did not work effectively. Such complications made the task of the 14th Brigade even more problematic.

  Pompey Elliott, whose 15th Brigade headquarters was well forward and in an area which was constantly shelled, suffered acutely from communications problems, particularly in trying to keep telephone lines open to division. On 1 September, both his linear communications to division and his lateral communications with flanking brigades fluctuated throughout the day. At 9.10 pm the line from the divisional forward station was disconnected and the wireless was down. An ‘urgent operation priority’ message could not be transmitted until 9.45 pm when the wireless was working again.30 Pompey’s difficulties in notifying his battalion commanders of the plans for operations on 2 September may have been due to these disruptions in communications. His battle procedure could have been severely hampered when a wireless message he despatched from Herbecourt at 3.20 am warning his battalion commanders to be ready for action and to meet him in conference when he returned did not reach them until after the brigadier was back. Remarkably, once Pompey briefed them at 4.15 am they were still able to attack on time at 6.00 am.

  Likewise, Monash may have experienced problems maintaining contact with the 5th Division on the afternoon of 2 September. At one point a crossed line meant that he was unable to use the speaking circuit, and Morse code, while working, was weak. Later, the line between the Australian Corps and the 5th Division was disconnected. At 5.00 pm it was still out and conversations and urgent telegraph business were being conducted via the 2nd Division at Cappy. Later again, the lines were earthing, creating noise in the signals, and this trouble continued on 3 September when the situation worsened, with both lines to corps earthing badly, making transmission by Morse code impossible and speaking very difficult.31

  On the afternoon of 2 September, the 5th Division Signal Company established a forward station in Péronne. Telephone exchange work was far heavier than normal with numerous telephone conversations. Its headquarters office dealt with 503 telegrams — some unusually lengthy — 16 ‘urgent operation priority’ and 17 ‘priority’ messages. On 5 September, 18 ‘urgent operation priority’ and 41 ‘priority’ messages were handled and 5000 yards of cable were used to provide communications for the battalions of the 14th Brigade.32

  For the 3rd Division on the Bouchavesnes ridge, maintaining effective communications was particularly problematic. By 9.00 am on 30 August the telephone line between the 34th Battalion and the 9th Brigade had already been cut several times. Signallers ran lines from divisional headquarters at Suzanne to Curlu and then forward to the 9th and 10th brigades on 31 August. They spent 17 hours on construction and laid 13 miles of cable, sometimes under shellfire. The Continuous Wave wireless sets used by the divisional artillery and artillery brigades were indispensible when the lines were down, and the 9th Brigade signals worked very closely with the artillery. However, disruptions could still occur. Leslie Morshead recorded that communications broke down during the 33rd Battalion’s attack on 31 August and he had difficulty relaying messages both to brigade and the artillery; by contrast, the 40th Battalion maintained excellent signals communication and liaison with its artillery.33 On 1 and 2 September, the lines to the 11th Brigade were frequently cut — run over by transport
.

  Throughout the operation, the lines worked under great pressure because of the number of messages to be conveyed, causing congestion on the circuits as some of these were lengthy. At 6.00 am on 1 September the line to the 58th Division was down and the Australians were critical of British attempts to maintain communications. On 2 and 3 September all lines to the 74th Division failed and all messages were passed through the 11th Brigade office and report centre. A signals officer from the 74th called to thank the 11th’s signallers.34

  Conditions across the Mont St Quentin-Péronne battlefield often precluded the smooth working of the communications system. Signallers were asked to establish networks for wireless, telephone and lamps across very difficult ground, including the Somme River itself, in a short space of time using extraordinary lengths of cable and working under shell and machine-gun fire. When the lines were cut, it was difficult for the commanders from Monash down to monitor the progress of the battle and retain control. It was at these times in particular that the company commanders and NCOs took matters into their own hands and used their firepower, tactics and skill to achieve a successful outcome.

  5th Division Signallers near Péronne. (AWM AO1909)

  CHAPTER 10:

  THE FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

  A stiff fight

  The objective is everything – the means do not count.

  John Monash,

  October 19151

  Australian soldiers now fully recognise that their many successes are due in part to the plans and dispositions and the organising ability of their commanders and staffs … As long as the men have confidence in themselves, and confidence in their leaders, there is nothing that they cannot achieve.

  John Monash,

  2 September 19182

  Monash was a lucky general. Never was he going to need that luck as much as at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. He stressed the opportunistic nature of warfare in the final months, that there was no ‘great general plan’ and that operations were governed by ‘the force of circumstances’. Above all else, the Australians had to seize the initiative and push the offensive to the limit in order to retain the upper hand against the Germans.3

  One of the outstanding features of the plan to capture Mont St Quentin and Péronne was its flexibility. Monash displayed ‘tactical ingenuity’ in switching the attack from the abortive ‘bounce’ of the Somme River south of Péronne to the sweeping movement which made Cléry, on the northern bank, the pivot of the whole attack. He and his divisional commanders moved brigades around the battlefield as the situation demanded — as if they were pieces on a chessboard — his unwavering intention to checkmate his German opponents and take the prize. Monash was not just the master of the set-piece battle, but also of the unpredictable. However, this was a dangerous game with the potential for disaster, and some of the elements which eliminate or reduce risk in battle were not present at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. Monash was not exaggerating when he stated that this was ‘the most difficult and intricate operation we had ever experienced’.4

  More cautious commanders, such as Hobbs, felt that the operation should have been delayed until the men had been rested and more effective artillery support could be brought to bear.5 Evan Wisdom, however, felt that the plan to attack Mont St Quentin and turn the line of the Somme from the north-west was the correct one, as ‘the key to the whole position was struck at and captured’ whereas crossing the river from south of Péronne could take days or weeks.6 A bold plan was required because the positions were so strong; to delay the attack even for a few days might have made them impossible to take.

  Monash always sent his troops into battle believing they would be successful; he could almost guarantee success in 1918 through the power of the all-arms weapons system he put in place for the set-piece battles. There could be no such guarantees for the quick attack, yet the Australian Corps commander did not consider that the Australians would lose, despite what must have been some anxious moments at various points of the operation. Monash sought the best results with what was available in a belief that what he had was good.

  Part of his optimism going into Mont St Quentin-Péronne may have stemmed from intelligence reports which indicated that the Germans were disorganised and their staffs had lost control. Evidence of a precipitate withdrawal could be found not just in the huge quantities of equipment they destroyed as they retreated, but in what was left behind. Norman Nicolson described gun repair workshops fitted out with precision tools and instruments, and rifles and ammunition, and Herbert Bailey noted that dugouts were well furnished with stoves, beds, other furniture and accessories.7 The German soldiers, some as young as 19, were demoralised and their units severely depleted. The Australians would only be facing rearguards. Prisoners did not believe that Péronne would offer much resistance as they had only intended to hold the line of the Somme for a short time prior to further withdrawal. Monash may have believed that, with the fall of Bapaume to the New Zealanders on 29 August, resistance in front of Péronne would crumble.8

  Certainly the advance to the Somme bend by the 2nd and 5th divisions had been a comparatively easy one — ‘more or less a walk over’ according to Herbert Bailey — the Australians capturing all the vital ground and driving the Germans across the river.9 Norman Nicolson did not consider it a rout, however, as the Germans were withdrawing with most of their guns and the rearguards were fighting well.10 His view was supported by Hector Brewer, a 23-year-old groom from Petersham in Sydney and a signaller with the 60th Battalion, who wrote on 29 August that ‘this retreat is a very masterly and systematic one’.11

  The Germans also used a number of ruses to try to unnerve their pursuers. These included two types of delayed-action mines: a yellow type which exploded after eight days and a blue type which ignited after a longer period, both placed in attractively furnished dugouts, single houses left standing where others had been destroyed and souvenirs such as helmets and badges left in conspicuous places. Ammunition dumps were particularly dangerous and to be avoided at all costs. Norman Nicolson recorded that one night his men made comfortable beds of pine shavings, but had to search for mines and clock bombs after hearing a suspicious noise. In the end they slept well, totally exhausted. The Germans did not tidy their dugouts or clean up their mess before they left and the Australians often arrived to find their enemy’s former quarters in a filthy condition.12

  Until 30 August Rawlinson also believed the Germans to be in a bad way, with only rearguards comprising machine-guns and sections of field artillery in front of the Fourth Army. His diary entry for that day, however, suggests that he was aware that resistance had hardened and the Australians would have ‘a stiff fight’.13 German heavy artillery activity against forward areas and particularly the Somme crossings had increased south of the Somme on 29 August and intelligence revealed that the 2nd Guard Division had been brought into the line.14 The Australians would meet these troops in the very difficult fighting on the Bouchavesnes ridge on 30 August, itself an indication that this operation would be no walkover. It seems likely that Monash underestimated the level of resistance his men would face, for the German High Command had instructed its divisions to hold the line of the Somme at all costs — as their ‘winter line’— and called for volunteers to defend the positions.

  They could have gone on forever

  No-one was expecting the 17th and 20th battalions to reach their objectives as quickly as they did on the morning of 31 August. While Monash, and indeed Rawlinson, were delighted, the rapid advance exposed some of the problems which would unfold as the battle progressed. Rosenthal may have been caught napping. Monash had instructed his commanders to rest those men not involved in action as much as possible on 30 August and the 6th Brigade was enjoying a well-earned break south of Mereaucourt Wood. At 8.45 am James Robertson ordered his battalion commanders to move their units to the most northerly point of their present positions with a view to crossing the river and supporting the 5th Brigade. Thus, the brigade was poise
d ready on the southern bank of the river some 2500 yards from the Buscourt crossing which Robertson had the foresight to task the engineers with establishing on 30 August and which would considerably shorten his approach march the following day. The 6th Brigade was fully briefed on its task.

  Rosenthal did not instruct the brigade to cross the river until 8.00 am on 31 August when it would take up a position in Gottlieb and Florina trenches in readiness to exploit that day the success of the 5th Brigade. On 26 July, at a Fourth Army conference, General Foch had advised that an attack in depth would see all troops, including reserve formations, moving forward at zero hour, because leading troops moved more quickly than their reserves.15 It is difficult to understand why Rosenthal did not order the 6th to cross the river and move into the bridgehead at zero hour, 5.00 am on 31 August, in anticipation of the 5th Brigade’s success and in support of its numerically weak comrades. For his part, Monash may have expected the 6th to do so.

  Would it have made a difference to the battle? A number of factors should be considered in answering this question. Any crossing of the Somme was going to take time. From the southern bank, the 6th Brigade could not possibly deploy for action before the afternoon of 31 August — if all went well. The 23rd Battalion, in the lead, moved at 10.00 am, was across the river at 11.30 am and coming round the bend east of Cléry at 12.30 pm, a steady rate of progress. The rest of the brigade followed behind it at half-hourly intervals. But this was already too late because the element of surprise had been lost and the Germans were reinforcing the front and preparing to counter-attack the 5th Brigade in strength.

  The 23rd, determining the rate of the 6th Brigade’s advance, found Halle and Park Wood free of Germans, but was fired on from the Prague/Florina trench system and unable to fulfil its instructions to clear up Anvil Wood or advance towards St Radegonde. Instead, it was forced back to Florina Trench. As it came to a standstill, the rest of the 6th Brigade, as well as the 14th and 7th brigades which were also crossing the river, began to bank up behind it, creating that ‘troop jam’ which provided wonderful targets for the alert German artillery. One of the problems in attacking from Cléry was that there was little room to move; Monash, if indeed he was aware of this, was relying on units dissipating quickly and maintaining the momentum of the battle.