Wellington Against Massena

by David Buttery

  However, Napoleon’s hopes that usurping the Spanish throne would be an easy process were unfounded. The Spanish had been restless under Charles and had detested his adviser Godoy, but although the enforced abdication of Ferdinand angered them, their insular society was outraged by the prospect of a foreign ruler. As more French troops entered the country to secure the transition of power the people became increasingly rebellious. This culminated in a large riot in May 1808, which became known as the Dos de Mayo in Madrid, when the crowds were infuriated at the sight of the remaining royal family being taken into exile. Individual and isolated groups of French soldiers were set upon and murdered in the most brutal fashion. Marshal Murat, a general known for extravagance and courage but lacking in restraint, ordered his cavalry to charge directly into the crowds, provoking hours of rioting and running fights with the mob. When the violence ended around 150 French soldiers had been killed, but around three times as many rioters had died.7 The aftermath saw many Spaniards executed in scenes later immortalised by the Spanish artist Goya, and news of the massacre spread rapidly throughout the nation to widespread indignation. Local juntas were soon established across the country in opposition to Joseph’s rule, many of which had militia or regular military support.

  When Joseph entered Spain he had a genuine desire to institute lasting liberal reforms for Spain’s benefit. Although Napoleon was younger, he was over-awed by him and possessed far more equanimity than his domineering brother. However, from the moment he arrived he perceived how discontented the people were and his official reception in the towns on his route to the capital was very muted. In Madrid, aghast at the sullen attitude of his new subjects and the growing acts of rebellion, he immediately wrote to Napoleon requesting further troops and huge financial support if he was to have any chance of ruling effectively.

  Napoleon was dismayed by events in Spain, having hoped for a relatively peaceful annexation. Yet he still underestimated Spanish patriotism and was openly scornful of the martial qualities of Spain’s armies and unafraid of the consequences of military action. As The Times later remarked with hindsight: ‘The treaty of Tilsit, in which the destiny of the world seemed to be decided in his favour, was hardly concluded when he turned his eyes towards the West, and resolved on the ruin of Portugal and Spain…’8 After the abdication, the Spanish nobility had divided into factions and was largely spread out across the country. Therefore Napoleon judged that mounting ‘police actions’ with flying columns against centres of resistance could conclude the war relatively swiftly. Although these expeditions met with some limited success, the Spanish generally refused to commit to battle and withdrew before them. Within a short time French troops were tied down in the siege of Saragoza and French columns were forced to pursue the Spanish far further south than expected, beyond the easy reach of supply and reinforcement. Though the Spanish forces were largely disunited and poorly led, Napoleon was reluctant to commit large numbers of troops and the French were therefore dangerously overstretched.

  General Dupont had been entrusted with the pacification of Andalusia and soon encountered far more resistance than anticipated. After the capture and sacking of the city of Cordoba, Dupont found the local peasantry raised against him and a large army approaching under General Reding. Although he possessed around 23,000 men with the promise of reinforcement, Dupont committed the worst of military sins by lingering indecisively on the plain of Andujar instead of making a strategic withdrawal. Hearing that the road to Madrid had been blocked, he sent General Vedel with 10,000 men to ensure that his line of retreat was clear. Dividing his force proved unwise, because a combined Spanish army under generals Reding and Castanos subsequently attacked him at Bailén. Repeated attempts to break out proved futile and the return of Vedel failed to extricate the French from the trap. On 21 July 1808 Dupont surrendered with at least 18,000 men.9

  The defeat at Bailen was a disaster for the French campaign and had grave repercussions. King Joseph, already depressed by the enormity of his task, panicked at news of the reverse and fled the capital. The Spanish, who already dismissed him as a drunkard and a womaniser, viewed his overreaction as cowardice. Napoleon was furious at the debacle, making a scapegoat of Dupont, who after all had been allotted insufficient troops to subdue Andalusia, most of whom were conscripts and had been heavily outnumbered. Yet his brother’s flight from the capital was even worse politically and, though he had stopped at the line of the River Ebro, it was almost as bad as having fled the country. The Spaniards were heartened by the scale of their victory and the Austrian war party made political headway on the strength of it. Even the Pope, previously cowed by Napoleon, felt confident enough to issue a public condemnation of French expansionism.

  Meanwhile, General Junot was encountering severe problems in Portugal. Realising that the French conquest was far from secure, the British sent an expeditionary force under General Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington, which landed at Mondego Bay in early August. Whilst Junot reacted quickly to repel the invasion, he underestimated the strength and resolve of British infantry and committed his forces piecemeal in poorly co-ordinated attacks. The French suffered three defeats within the month at Obidos, Roilça and Vimiero. At Vimiero the French sustained 2,000 casualties and lost thirteen guns, the capture of which was usually seen as representing the scale of a defeat, and Junot negotiated an armistice. The subsequent Convention of Cintra was poorly received in Britain as it gave extremely generous terms to the French. Not only were Junot and his army permitted to leave Iberia with all the plunder acquired in Portugal, but the Royal Navy was obliged to convey them back to France. Generals Dalrymple and Burrard, who had assumed command, were held accountable and re-called to answer for their actions along with Wellesley. A court of inquiry exonerated Wellesley and blamed his superiors, but nevertheless a notable victory had been won. The British Army had proved itself in three battles and the French had relinquished Portugal. The British political position was strengthened with the Regent in exile and, temporarily at least, they had regained their foothold in Europe.

  With events in the Peninsula spiralling out of control, Napoleon was forced to admit that he had underestimated the strength of Iberian patriotism and that greater commitment would be necessary to accomplish his aims. Years of success had made the French army feared throughout Europe, but defeats on this scale would soon destroy their reputation and encourage resistance. He decided to intervene in person to restore French prestige. However, in central Europe Austria was making warlike preparations, eager to avenge former defeats and encouraged by the French preoccupation with the Peninsula. Knowing that he would have to weaken his forces in Germany to assemble enough men, Napoleon tried to ensure that Russia would support him in the event of Austria declaring war.

  At a meeting with the Tsar at Erfurt, Napoleon requested Russian military aid against Austria. However, Alexander proved strangely intractable compared to his previous enthusiasm at Tilsit. He was under pressure from the Russian nobility to renege on his trade agreements against Britain and was wary of Napoleon’s increasingly despotic actions. The Continental System showed little sign of weakening Britain, whilst its effects on the Russian economy were proving ruinous. For example, the Royal Navy bought large amounts of timber from Russia and the loss of such contracts was keenly felt, while the British had other sources they could rely on.

  Well aware of French reluctance to fight on two fronts, Alexander won concessions from Napoleon, including an acceptance of Russian expansion into Wallachia and Moldavia and a pledge not to intervene in the Tsar’s designs on Turkey. In return, Alexander promised to denounce any aggression on Austria’s part, but the wording of the treaty was ambivalent regarding direct Russian intervention. This disappointment was a warning for Napoleon that his influence was diminishing and he might have been well advised to pull his troops back beyond the Ebro at this stage and postpone his Iberian conquests.

  Napoleon, however, rarely abandoned a venture once he had
embarked upon it. After all, his refusal to be discouraged had served him well in the past. As the most renowned soldier in Europe, the power of his reputation was a weapon in itself and he gave speeches proclaiming his intention to settle the Iberian struggle in person. The Bonapartist newspapers published contemptuous articles on the British Army in Portugal and speculated on how swiftly it would be ousted when the Emperor arrived. Bonaparte derided the British military and referred to them as ‘leopards’ in mockery of the thin British lions on their heraldic arms, remarking: ‘The hideous leopard contaminates by its very presence the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. Let us carry our victorious eagles to the Pillars of Hercules.’10 He promised that the Spanish rebellion would soon be crushed and the British driven into the sea.

  The Spanish were now in a state of uneasy alliance with Great Britain, who had been their traditional enemy for centuries. The British presence in Portugal was being gradually consolidated, but it would take time for the army under Sir John Moore to march to Spain’s assistance. In any case, the Spanish junta in Madrid hoped to resolve the war without foreign aid. They planned to envelop the French by attacking over the Ebro on their flanks, hoping to cut off their line of retreat to the Pyrenees. However, marshals Ney, Moncey and Bessiéres swiftly mounted attacks against Castano’s forces in the Spanish centre and right, averting the Spanish offensive before it had even started.

  When Napoleon arrived in the Peninsula French forces had been strengthened to around 190,000 men. He rapidly determined that his enemies were still set on their plan of encirclement, despite their recent reverse, and that this could be turned to his advantage. He decided to allow the Spaniards to attack his flanks and, as they moved forward, the French would attack their centre, pushing it back, thereby leaving the Spanish flank attacks exposed to a manoeuvres sur les derriéres, whereby he would swing about on their rear and defeat them in detail. Once a clear victory was won Bonaparte would march on the capital.

  Although the Spaniards were vulnerable to this strategy, Napoleon’s plan relied on simultaneous movement and was marred by a premature attack mounted by Marshal Lefebvre on General Blake’s forces. However, when the offensive began on 7 November the Spanish were outmanoeuvred and their forces scattered. Blake managed to save 10,000 men, roughly half his force, denying Napoleon a total victory, but the path to Madrid was open. The French ‘Army of Spain’ soon encountered great difficulties in finding supplies and troops resorted to looting on an alarming scale, forcing Napoleon to impose harsh measures to restore order.

  Although their regular forces were in retreat, the peasantry began to ambush and murder isolated groups of French soldiers with increasing frequency. The pillaging of the country alienated the Spaniards, whose pride was already affronted by the invasion and many fled to the countryside to mount organised resistance. These groups came to be known as ‘guerrillas’, from the Spanish ‘little war’, and their raids became increasingly effective. Small garrisons, left in the wake of the advance, were attacked and couriers were forced to travel with large escorts. Napoleon soon became aware of this hazard when guerrillas began to intercept his dispatches. In later life, General Mattieu Dumas recalled his time in Spain as a young officer: ‘I will always remember how I was afflicted with great anxieties. Each day saw the murder of several Frenchmen, and I travelled over this assassins’ countryside as warily as if it were a volcano.’11

  As Joseph rode back towards Madrid, Napoleon warned him of widespread banditry in the countryside, advising him to travel with a heavy escort. Though some were inspired by patriotic motives, Napoleon was correct in thinking that many guerrillas were nothing more than brigands. Often descending on Spanish villages with no warning, they would extort money, carry off provisions and press gang young men into ‘enlisting’ with them. Their attitude was aptly summed up by the Spanish jest: ’Viva Fernando y vamos robando!’ (Long live King Ferdinand and let us go robbing!’) The land was devoid of supplies and full of roving bands of armed peasants, who threatened communications and harassed his troops. Having previously dismissed his generals’ complaints, Napoleon began to appreciate the difficulties of war in Spain compared to the rest of Europe.

  As the French approached the capital, the Spanish junta made preparations to flee to Cadiz, but a last-ditch defence was mounted just north of Madrid. General San Juan occupied a strong defensive position with around 12,000 men at the Pass of Samosierra and General Heredia took his troops to defend the defiles of Guadarramas to block the invaders’ approach. Attacking San Juan, Napoleon encountered unexpected resistance and took some losses, but eventually dislodged the defenders, entering Madrid on 4 December. Joseph was restored to his throne but was received with indifference by his subjects. His rule, at least for the present, was entirely dependent on a large French military presence.

  Napoleon, alerted to the presence of a British army under Moore marching towards him, determined to isolate and destroy this force. Moore was an experienced and capable general, having served in the Helder and Egypt campaigns in 1798 and 1800–1801. He was known for his great ability in training troops and his passion for military reform, but was a stern disciplinarian who expected a lot from his men. Having mounted an effective cavalry screen in front of his advancing army, he soon witnessed the defeat of his allies and the overwhelming superiority of the enemy and reluctantly decided to withdraw.

  The British retreat was conducted in appalling weather conditions at the start of the Spanish winter. Napoleon was determined to catch the British force and defeat it, but the French pursuit was hampered by snowstorms and the lack of shelter and supply along the march. The Times, quoting from Le Moniteur, remarked on the pitiful scene left in the army’s wake: ‘The Emperor arrived at Astorga on the 1st of January. The road… to Astorga is covered with dead horses belonging to the English, with travelling carriages, artillery caissons and warlike stores.’12 Yet Moore’s skilful evasion won the Emperor’s grudging respect, and he realised that, since the British appeared to be intent on embarking as soon as they reached the coast, he would fail to inflict a decisive defeat. Alarming rumours had reached him that Austria was about to begin hostilities and he took his leave of the Army of Spain, leaving Marshal Soult in command to continue the pursuit.13

  Napoleon’s departure, with the Peninsula only half conquered, is cause for speculation. Whilst the Austrian threat was very real, some British contemporaries, including Wellesley, surmised that he was afraid to face British troops in open battle for the first time. Leaving aside patriotic bias, this was almost certainly untrue considering the calibre of Napoleon’s previous enemies. After all, he had defeated the British at the siege of Toulon and had been eager to cross the Channel to invade their homeland. A more likely explanation is that, at least for this stage of the war, the Peninsula could no longer provide the decisive battle that the Emperor persistently sought. Most of his campaigns were dominated by this objective, though it would become progressively more elusive for him. The emphatic victories of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland had all led to peace treaties shortly afterwards, providing a clear and unequivocal victory. In this case, with the Spanish throne usurped by his brother and Portuguese royalty having fled abroad, the defeat of forces under divided juntas or the Regency for an absentee monarch would yield limited military glory. Napoleon hoped that the following campaigns would be largely mopping up operations, best left to eager subordinates whose minor victories would not rival his achievements.

  The British suffered terribly on the retreat towards Corunna in northern Spain. Hundreds died from the elements, with the camp followers and sick often being left in the snow to freeze or at the mercy of the pursuing French cavalry. The troops were discontent at being ordered to retreat without a fight and vented their frustrations on the locals, looting without restraint and occasionally committing acts of wanton destruction.14 Moore’s general order to the troops to desist from such indiscipline was sometimes ignored, with the officers sympathetic to their soldiers’ pl
ight. Rifleman Harris of the 95th Regiment recalled the men’s feelings on the winter retreat:

  ‘…we now began to see more clearly the horrors of our situation, and the men to murmur at not being permitted to turn and stand at bay – cursing the French, and swearing they would rather die ten thousand deaths, with their rifles in their hands in opposition, than endure the present toil.’15

  Rearguard skirmishes with the French vanguard failed to overawe the men, who yearned for the chance to prove their mettle in open battle once again. When the tattered force reached the port of La Corunna on 12 January, they discovered the ships that they expected had not arrived. Though a fleet arrived two days later to evacuate his army, Moore realised that he would have to turn and face the enemy in order to protect his withdrawal. Even so, with the docks crowded with cartloads of supplies, the priority was to save the artillery and many stores were fired and horses slaughtered to deny them to the enemy.16